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Abstract. The Iranian nuclear crisis is a proxy arena for competing visions about the 
functioning of international relations. Yet, no comprehensive analyses have been conducted 
so far that use the Iranian nuclear case as an illustration to conceptualise the interaction 
EHWZHHQµKHJHPRQLFVWUXFWXUHV¶DQGWKRVHDFWRUVUHVLVWLQJWKHPThis doctoral dissertation is a 
first step to fill this gap in the literature. It analyses the foreign policies of China, Russia and 
Turkey towards the Iranian nuclear programme and thereby answers the research question to 
what extent their policies are indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony. Based on 
55 semi-structured elite interviews with experts and decision-makers closely involved with 
the Iranian nuclear file, this research draws on neo-Gramscian scholarship to analyse 
resistance to hegemony across its ideational, material and institutional framework conditions.
 7KHFDVHVWXGLHVH[DPLQHGVKRZKRZµFRPSOLDQFH¶RQWKe part of China, Russia and 
Turkey with approaches to the Iranian nuclear conflict has been selective, and how US policy 
preferences in the Iran dossier have been resisted on other occasions. To understand such 
YDULDWLRQLQµQRUPFRPSOLDQFH¶ WKLVGLVVHUWDtion introduces a two-level model to understand 
foreign policy discrepancies between a discursive and a behavioural level. Chinese, Russian, 
and Turkish reluctance to use sanctions as tools in international diplomacy on a discursive 
level did not prevent the eventual adoption of international sanctions against Iran and 
Chinese, Russian, and Turkish compliance therewith on a behavioural level. While 
multilateral Iran sanctions are seen as complying with the rules of the UN system, additional 
unilateral sanctions are contested on normative grounds and perceived as illegitimate and as 
an extraterritorialisation of domestic legislation.     
 Besides an ideational resistance to unilateral sanctions, the economic impact of these 
µVHFRQGDU\ VDQFWLRQV¶ RQ WKLUG FRXQtry entities constitutes an additional material reason for 
Chinese, Russian, and Turkish criticism. Their eventual compliance with sanctions lists, 
however, indicates a level of receptiveness to the economic leverage of US-dominated 
international financial mechanisms. In this context, the Iran nuclear case serves as an 
illustration to shed light on the contemporaneous interaction of the forces of consent and 
coercion in international politics. This research thus makes a critical contribution to key 
questions of International Relations at the interstice of security governance, proliferation 
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Note on Transliteration and Translation 
 
For all transliterations from the Chinese to the Latin alphabet, the standard Pinyin system 
(without diacritic markers) has been used for all proper names and translations (e.g. Xi 
Jinping, Zhuhai Zhenrong, taoguang yanghui).  
Special characters of the modern Turkish alphabet have been used for all Turkish proper 
names, authors, and terms (e.g. Orta do÷u, (UGR÷DQ$OWXQÕúÕN.  
)RUWUDQVOLWHUDWLRQIURP5XVVLDQWKH%ULWLVKVWDQGDUGYHUVLRQKDVEHHQXVHGWKXVɸEHFRPHV
µ\X¶ɹEHFRPHVµ\D¶ɴLVDSRVWURSKLVHGHWF3URSHUQDPHVKDYHEHHQDQJOLFLVHG6HUJHL
Andrei, and Alexander instead of Aleksander) ± H[FHSWZKHQLQDQRWKHUDXWKRU¶VFLWDWLRQ
7UDQVODWLRQVIURP5XVVLDQDUHWKHDXWKRU¶VH[FHSWZKHUHLQGLFDWHGRWKHUZLVH 
While there is no unified system for the transliteration of Farsi, the romanisation of Farsi 
names and titles has largely followed the Library of Congress system (e.g. Ahmadinejad, 

















List of Acronyms 
 
ABC ± Atomic, Biological, Chemical (weapons) 
AEOI - Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran  
AKP - $GDOHWYH.DONÕQPD3DUWLVL (Justice and Development Party) 
BBC ± British Broadcasting Corporation 
BRICS ± acronym referring to Brazil, Russia, India, China, South Africa 
CCP ± Chinese Communist Party 
CENESS - Center for Energy and Security Studies  
CFAU - China Foreign Affairs University  
CFSP ± Common Foreign and Security Policy (of the European Union) 
CICIR - China Institute of Contemporary International Relations  
CIIS - China Institute of International Studies 
CIISS - China Institute for International Strategic Studies  
CIS ± Commonwealth of Independent States  
CISADA - Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, Accountability, and Divestment Act  
CITIC - China International Trust and Investment Corporation 
CNOOC - China National Offshore Oil Corporation 
CNPC - China National Petroleum Corporation  
CTBT ± Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty 
CRS ± Congressional Research Service 
GCC - Gulf Cooperation Council  
JCPOA ± Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action 
E3 ± WKHµ(XURSHDQ7KUHHµ*HUPDQ\)UDQFH8QLWHG.LQJGRP 
E3+3 ± WKHµ(¶SOXV China, Russia, United States 
ECFR ± European Council on Foreign Relations 
EEAS ± European External Action Service 
EU ± European Union  
HEU - Highly Enriched Uranium  
IAEA ± International Atomic Energy Agency 
ILSA - Iran-Libya Sanctions Act 
IMEMO ± institut mirovoj ekonomiki i meshdunarodnikh otnoshenii rossijskoi akademii nauk 
(institute of World Economy and International Relations, Russian Academy of Sciences) 
IR ± International Relations 
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IRISL - Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines 
ISA - Iran Sanctions Act 
IRGC - Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps  
JPOA ± Joint Plan of Action (of 23 November 2013) 
LEU ± Low Enriched Uranium 
LNG ± Liquefied Natural Gas 
MD ± Missile Defense 
MFA ± Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
MoU ± Memorandum of Understanding 
Minatom ± Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (until 2004) 
0ø7- 0LOOLøVWLKEDUDW7HVNLODWL7XUNLVKLQWHOOLJHQFH$JHQF\ 
MTCR ± Missile Technology Control Regime 
NAM - Non-Aligned Movement  
NATO ± North Atlantic Treaty Organisation 
NDAA - National Defense Authorization Act  
NNW ± Non-nuclear Weapon State 
NPT ± Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty 
NSG - Nuclear Suppliers Group 
NWFZ ± Nuclear weapons-free zone  
NWS ± Nuclear Weapon State 
OFAC - Office of Foreign Asset Control  
OPEC ± Organisation of Petroleum-Exporting Countries  
OSCE ± Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe 
P5+1 ± the five permanent UN Security Council members plus Germany 
PJAK ± Partiya Jiyana Azad a Kurdistanê (Party of Free Life of Kurdistan) 
PKK - Partiya Karkerên Kurdistanê .XUGLVWDQ:RUNHU¶V3DUW\ 
PLA - 3HRSOH¶V/LEHUDWLRQ$UP\ 
PMD ± Possible Military Dimension 
Rosatom ± Russian Ministry of Atomic Energy (since 2004) 
SIIS - Shanghai Institute for International Studies  
SIPRI ± Stockholm Peace Research Institute 
START ± Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty 
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TAP ± Trans-Adriatic Pipeline 
TRR - Tehran Research Reactor 
UK ± United Kingdom 
UN ± United Nations 
UNSC ± United Nations Security Council  
UNSCR ± United Nations Security Council Resolution 
US ± United States 
USSR ± Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WTO ± World Trade Organisation 





















- Turkish diplomat in conversation with the author, Washington, 14 February 2014.  
 
In 2002, an Iranian exile opposition group revealed the existence of nuclear facilities in Iran 
that were undeclared to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), and therefore in 
EUHDFK RI ,UDQ¶V REOLJDWLRQV XQGHU WKH QXFOHDU QRQ-proliferation treaty (NPT) to which Iran 
had acceded in 1968(XURSHDQVWDWHVVWDUWHGWRQHJRWLDWHLQWKHIRUPDWRIWKHµ(¶*HUPDQ\
France, the United Kingdom) with Iran to de-escalate what was soon turning into a delicate 
political conflict ± to no avail. The file was taken to the United Nations Security Council 
(UNSC) in 2006, where the negotiation format was enlarged to the E3+3, or P5+1 (the five 
permanent UNSC member states plus Germany). When Iran was found in non-compliance of 
first UN resolutions and exhibiting insufficient transparency with the IAEA, international 
sanctions were imposed soon after, paralleled by unilateral sanctions imposed by the US and 
the EU. Years of missed opportunities, misunderstandings, stonewalling, and tactical 
deceptions on all sides followed.  
At the time of writing, the six world powers are negotiating with Iran over a 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHµ-RLQW3ODQRI$FWLRQ¶WRUHSODFHWKHILUVW-3R$WKDWZDVVHDOHGLQ1RYHPEHU
2013 in Geneva. After a political framework agreement has been reached on 2 April 2015 
after marathon negotiations in Lausanne, Switzerland, delegations are gathering to hammer 
RXWWKHWHFKQLFDOGHWDLOVRIZKDWZLOOEH,UDQ¶VILQDOQXFOHDUVWDWXV,QH[FKDQJHIRUJXDUDQWHHV
IRU WKH SHDFHIXO QDWXUH RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH monitored by the IAEA, sanctions 
imposed on Iran over the nuclear conflict will be gradually lifted. This prospect is dependent 
on a number of open question marks. Differences in opinions persist as to the time frame for 
the lifting of sanctions, the sequencing of their lifting, the concrete nature of the inspection 
UHJLPHDQGDµSRVVLEOHPLOLWDU\GLPHQVLRQ¶30'RISDVW,UDQLDQQXFOHDUDFWLYLWLHVThe joint 
statement of Iranian foreign minister Mohammad Zarif and EU High Representative Federica 
Mogherini, issued after 2 April 2015, remained vague in all central points on durations and 
concrete procedures (EEAS 2015) ,Q DGGLWLRQ GLIIHUHQW µIDFWVKHHWV¶ RQ WKH IUDPHZRUN
agreement circulate that all differ in significant aspects. Domestic pressure forces constraints 
onto the negotiation teams because especially the US and Iranian administrations will have to 
µVHOO¶WKHRXWFRPHRIWKHQXFOHDUWDONVDWKRPH      
 The stakes could not be higher. ,UDQ¶V LQWHUQDWLRQDO VWDQGLQJ FRXOG EH DIIHFWHG LQ D
process where international trade, political and security relations with Iran will no longer have 
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to take place under the dangling Damocles sword of the nuclear conflict. While US President 
2EDPD¶V DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ KROGV WKDW D UHVROXWLRQ RI WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU FULVLV FRXOG KDYH
µWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDO¶ SRZHU 86 GRPHVWLF and international critics find a shrill rhetoric to 
castigate what they regard as treason, deception or naivety.  
The final contours of a nuclear agreement with Iran will have far-reaching 
implications for the future of the NPT, global security governance and the regional security 
architecture. The solution of the Iran nuclear crisis will co-determine the future working 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ µWKH :HVW¶ DQG ,UDQ %XW RQ DQ HTXDOO\ IXQGDPHQWDO DQGXQGHUVWXGLHG
dimension, the more than decade-old Iranian nuclear conflict served as a battle ground 
EHWZHHQµWKHPRGHUQLVHG¶DQGWKHµPRGHUQLVLQJ¶ZRUOGDQGEHWZHHQKHJHPRQLFSRZHUVDQG
norm-shapers in the making.  
It is that crucial nexus to which this dissertation will direct its attention. This research 
project analyses Chinese, Russian, and Turkish foreign policies towards the Iranian nuclear 
programme. While Chinese, Russian, and Turkish Iran policies, respectively, as well as their 
foreign policies towards the controversial nuclear programme of Iran have been analysed 
before, no comparative analysis thereof at book length has been produced yet. All three states 
have been involved substantially at different phases during the Iranian nuclear conflict. Their 
LQYROYHPHQW DQG µVWDNHV¶ LQ WKLV FRQIOLFWZLOO EH HODERUDWHGXSRQ LQ WKH IROORZLQJFKDSWHUV
What is driving this research project is the underlying question how and where their foreign 
policies interact with another actor whose involvement, for a number of reasons, is critical for 
any resolution of the nuclear stand-off with Iran ± namely the United States. Not least because 
of traumatised US-Iranian relations and the centrality of the US in Iranian foreign policy 
discourse, Washington holds coQVLGHUDEOHVZD\RYHU,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUIXWXUHDQGWKHVWURQJ86-
Iranian bilateral negotiation track under their respective foreign ministers John Kerry and 
Javad Zarif testifies to this. But also on a structural level, the omnipresence of US financial 
power in international governance and the extent to which this particular leverage shapes 
SROLF\IRUPXODWLRQRIRWKHUDFWRUVFUHDWHVZKDWLQWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQZLOOEHFDOOHGµKHJHPRQLF
VWUXFWXUHV¶ 7KHVH VWUXFWXUHV KDYH PHW FULWLFLVP DQG RXWULJKW UHMHFWLRQ E\ D range of actors, 
including Iran. An agreement with Iran thus also entails the potential for transatlantic 
disagreements over sanctions enforcement and the lifting of sanctions. Frictions between US 
and European administrations over the applicability of unilateral sanctions are already starting 
to emerge on the political horizon. And between Iran and its negotiating counterparts, but also 
within the P5+1, the different views over the implementation of a comprehensive agreement 
will ensure that the Iranian nuclear case will continue to be high on the world political agenda 
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long beyond 2015. While Iran has demanded the lifting of all sanctions upfront, others 
advocate a gradual lifting of nuclear-related economic sanctions in exchange for Iranian 
compliance with the terms of the agreement. And Russia and China have voiced concerns 
over the prospect that sanctions could automatically be reimposed if Iran was found in non-
compliance, as such provisions in an international agreement would circumvent their veto 
power in the UN Security Council. Russia especially has indicated a strong desire to deepen 
trade relations with Iran in aspects that are currently still under international sanctions (like 
weapons trade) and is unlikely to easily agree to the re-imposition of sanctions. The 
momentum of P5+1 consensus might gradually be eroded after a nuclear agreement will have 
been reached. The US ambassador to the UN, Samantha Power, has therefore publicly 
SOHGJHGIRUDµVQDSEDFN¶DXWRPDWLVPIRUVanctions in case of Iranian violation of its terms of 
agreement, regardless of Russian and Chinese objections (Reuters 2015b). These dividing 
lines indicate that the implementation of a nuclear agreement will be fraught with intricate 
legal, institutional, and profoundly normative disagreements.    
 Technical questions about nuclear physics have been held hostage to political 
QDUUDWLYHV RQ GLIIHUHQW VLGHV &KLQD¶V DQG 5XVVLD¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ WKH 3 IRUPDW ZDV
crucial in dispelling the impression that the Iranian nuclear conflict in essence was a stand-off 
EHWZHHQ ,UDQ DQG µWKH :HVW¶ <HW ZLWKLQ WKH 3 DQG EHWZHHQ WKH 3 DQG H[WHUQDO
mediators (such as Turkey), diverging views emerged as to the best approach and policies to 
resolve the nuclear crisis. Especially the debate over the imposition of sanctions became a 
thorny issue that stood emblematic for larger questions of legitimacy in international 
governance, hegemonic politics and conceptions of World Order. Against this background, 
the dissertation will be guided by the main research question to what extent Chinese, Russian, 
and Turkish foreign policies towards the Iranian nuclear programme were indicative of a 
security culture that resists hegemony. The Iranian nuclear case, in a sense, serves as a 
laboratory to examine fundamental questions about international relations that will continue to 
reverberate long after the Iranian nuclear file will be closed.  
The structure of this dissertation is as follows. A first chapter will outline and justify 
the conceptual and theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation. It will be shown how 
neo-Gramscian scholarship in conjunction with a constructivist theoretical framework 
HPEHGGHG LQ WKH VFKRODUO\ OLWHUDWXUH RQ µQRUP G\QDPLFV¶ ZLOO EH D IUXLWIXO DQJOH WR WKH
research project. The theoretical foundation for this study will lead to the conceptualisation of 
the guiding research question and break it down into analysable components. It will make 
VHQVH RI DQG HOXFLGDWH WHUPV VXFK DV µVHFXULW\ FXOWXUH¶ µUHVLVWDQFH¶ DQG µKHJHPRQ\¶ DQG
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situate the theoretical approach taken in the scholarly literature. A second chapter presents the 
methodology used to carry out the research and therefore directly follows from the discussion 
of the conceptual framework identified in the preceding chapter. It will outline which research 
techniques have been used for the case study analysis that follows. Chinese, Russian, and 
Turkish Iran policies will be presented as three in-depth case studies to illustrate the degree of 
resistance to hegemony. Qualitative interviewing with experts and decision-makers closely 
involved in nuclear diplomacy with Iran has been complemented with process-tracing and 
qualitative data analysis of a range of primary and secondary material. In addition to 
justifying why and how these research methods have been used the way they were, this 
chapter also articulates positionality of the researcher and reflects on epistemological 
constraints in social science research as they apply to the research subject at hand here. A 
third chapter gives a literature review of the state of the art in the empirical research on 
foreign policy towards Iran and shows the main dividing lines in the literature. It thereby aims 
to give a comprehensive account of not only the state of research on Chinese, Russian, and 
Turkish Iran policies, but of the wider scholarly literature that informs this dissertation, 
ranging from interdisciplinary studies in Inter-regionalism, Conflict and Security Studies, to 
$UHD6WXGLHVDQGUHVHDUFKRQµHPHUJLQJSRZHUV¶This dissertation has used a wide range of 
literature, bridging disciplinary divides and drawing on international and Chinese, Russian, 
Turkish, as well as Iranian experts in the issue areas analysed in the chapters that follow. 
 Chapters Four, Five and Six then present the empirical case studies of this dissertation. 
Chapter Four DQDO\VHV7XUNLVKIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH, and shows 
how Turkish Iran policies are torn between resistance to US approaches because of ideational 
and material disagreements and accommodation with US positions because of institutional 
IUDPHZRUNFRQGLWLRQV7XUNH\¶V1$72PHPEHUVKLSDQGDVKDUHGQHLJKERXUKRRGZLWK,UDQin 
particular will be portrayed as influential factors that have led many analysts to situate Turkey 
betwHHQGLIIHUHQWJHRVWUDWHJLFDQGSROLWLFDOµFDPSV¶,WZLOOEHVKRZQKRZWKLVDIIHFWV7XUNLVK
foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme both on a discursive and a behavioural 
level. Chapter Five analyses Russian Iran policies and thereby introduces the second in-depth 
case study of this dissertation. Following a similar structure to the previous chapter, it will 
process-WUDFH 5XVVLD¶V SRVLWLRQLQJ LQ Whe Iranian nuclear negotiations, especially when the 
case was referred to the UN Security Council in 2006, and outline the different ideational, 
PDWHULDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO IDFWRUV LPSDFWLQJ 5XVVLD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV WKH ,UDQLDQ
nuclear programme on a discursive and a behavioural level. It will be shown how each of 
these factors contributes to Russian overall Iran policies as an expression of a balancing act 
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between resistance to hegemony and hegemonic accommodation. Likewise, Chapter Six 
applies the conceptual framework worked out in the preceding chapters to an analysis of 
Chinese foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme. It will be shown how 
ideational, material and institutional framework conditions let China walk a tightrope between 
WKH LPDJHU\ RI D µSHDFHIXO GHYHORSPHQW¶ DQG &KLQHVH LQWHUHVWV WKDW SDUWLDOO\ FRQIOLFW ZLWK
µKHJHPRQLF VWUXFWXUHV¶ RYHU WKH DSSURSULDWH DSSURDFK WR VROYLQJ WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU FULVLV
Chapter Seven comparatively analyses the research findings of these three in-depth case 
studies and answers the research question to what extent Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran 
policies are indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony. A final chapter concludes 
the dissertation by summarising the main research findings and outlining possible further 
























This chapter presents the theoretical framework of this study for a comparative investigation 
into Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies. An analysis of different conceptions of 
approaching the Iranian nuclear crisis not only reveals different understandings of the nuclear 
non-proliferation regime, it also unravels diverging views on how international politics 
function at large. It is in this sense that the present dissertation will answer the research 
question how Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear 
programme are indicative of a security culture resisting hegemony. Disentangling the nexus 
between foreign policies, the discursive projections thereof and security cultures that 
represent normative disagreements about international security governance, this research 
draws on a range of theoretical contributions that will be addressed in this chapter.  
2. Security Discourse on Iran: The Power to Construct International 
Relations 
 
This study analyses the rationale of China, Russia and Turkey in following policies that do 
not converge with norm- and security perceptions of Western administrations in their 
negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme. If we are to understand how actors use and 
refer to norms and how security perspectives differ, we need to account for a range of factors 
in foreign policy interest formation. 7KHIDXOWOLQHEHWZHHQµPDWHULDO¶DQGµLGHDWLRQDO¶IDFWRUV
in foreign policy is a long-standing one, and much older than the discipline of International 
Relations (IR) itself.1 Without revisiting the underlying millennia-old philosophical debates 
surrouding µLGHDV¶DQGµLQWHUHVWV¶WKHIROORZLQJSDUDJUDSKVDLPWRFRQGHQVHDQGSUHVHQWWKH
scholarship onto which this dissertation builds.        
 ,Q3HWHU-.DW]HQVWHLQ¶VHGVHPLQDOERRNµThe Culture of National Security. Norms 
and Identity in World Politics¶.DW]HQVWHLQ:HQGWDQG-HSSHUVRQ aim to develop a 
framework for analyzing national security alternative to the ³mainstream security studies´2 by 
IRFXVLQJ ³RQ WKHZD\V LQZKLFKQRUPV LQVWLWXWLRQV DQGRWKHU FXOWXUDO IHDWXUHVRIGRPHVWLF 
                                                          
1
 Ĩ ?,Ăůů ? ? ? ? ? )ŽŶ ‘/ĚĞĂƐĂŶĚƚŚĞ^ŽĐŝĂů^ĐŝĞŶĐĞƐ ‘ ? 
2
 Cf. different attempts to conceptualisĞ ‘ƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĞƐĐŽƉĞŽĨƐĞĐƵƌŝƚǇstudies: Walt (1991); Kolodziej 
 (1992); Buzan (1983); Buzan, Waever, Ole & Wilde (1998); Buzan & Waever (2003); Dalby (1992); Shaw (1993); 
Waever et al. (1993); Klare & Thomas (1994); Sperling & Kirchner (1995); Williams (ed., 2008) 
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DQG LQWHUQDWLRQDO HQYLURQPHQWV DIIHFW VWDWH VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWV DQG SROLFLHV´  DQG WKHUHE\
propagate an essentially social constructivist argument: namely that ideas and identities of 
actors are being socially constructed by their social environment.3 Different from rationalist 
accounts which emphasise material security environments and state-inherent actor properties 
and treat ideational factors as epiphenomenal to material capabilities and predispositions,4 
VRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLYLVWVGHSDUWIURPDUHODWLYHVRFLDORQWRORJ\DQGYLHZDQDFWRU¶VSURSHUWLHVDV
³VRFLDOO\ FRQWLQJHQW´ ibid.: 34), i.e. as being constructed and reconfirmed through social 
interaction. International politics becomes a relational process. This is a first theoretical 
premise that will carry throughout this dissertation. Katzenstein, Wendt and Jepperson outline 
three possible effects of the environment on actors: First, it can affect the behavior of actors; 
VHFRQGLWFDQDIIHFWWKHµFRQWLQJHQWSURSHUWLHV¶RIDFWRUVDQGWKLUGLWFDQDIIHFWWKHH[LVWHQFH
RI DFWRUV DOO WRJHWKHU  7KLV ILWV LQ ZLWK WKHLU RYHUDOO ³WKHRUHWLFDO SHUVSHFWLYH RI
VRFLRORJLFDOLQVWLWXWLRQDOLVPZLWKLWVIRFXVRQWKHFKDUDFWHURIWKHVWDWH¶VHQYLURQPHQWDQGRQ
the cRQWHVWHG QDWXUH RI SROLWLFDO LGHQWLWLHV´ DV .DW]HQVWHLQ IRUPXODWHV  What their 
IRUPXODWLRQRIUHODWLRQDOSROLWLFVIDLOVWRWDNHLQWRDFFRXQWKRZHYHULVWKHµIHHGEDFN¶HIIHFW
that these very actors have on the environment, i.e. how actors and their environment are 
locked in a mutually impacting way. Their approach, in other words, focuses on identity 
construction with a heavy emphasis on actor-centricity. Other authors have subsequently 
expanded the spectrum by shedding light on structures and their impact on the power of 
norms. Alexander Wendt made an important contribution in filling this gap with his seminal 
µSocial theory of international politics¶ . In it, he examined agency and structure as 
EHLQJ³PXWXDOO\FRQVWLWXWLYHDQGco-GHWHUPLQHG´84). He then brings this observation to its 
ORJLFDOFRQFOXVLRQ³structure exists, has effects, and evolves only because of agents and their 
practices$OOVWUXFWXUHPLFURDQGPDFUR LV LQVWDQWLDWHGRQO\LQSURFHVV´HPSKDVLV LQ
the original). The analysis of the foreign policies of the three case countries presented in this 
research project will draw on these tenets of co-determination between agent and structure 
that have defined and shaped much of social constructivist scholarship. As will be shown, 
such an angle helps shed light on security perceptions, role expectations, and public relations 
and identity politics ± issues which are crucial in foreign policy analysis of a controversial 
topic such as the Iranian nuclear programme. Yet, it is only a first step towards accounting for 
                                                          
3
 Cf. further influential constructivist works: Onuf (1989, 1998); Kowert (1998); Kubálková, Onuf & Kowert 
(1998); Wendt (1987, 1999); cf. also Adib-DŽŐŚĂĚĚĂŵ ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? ? ? ? ? )ĨŽƌĂŶĞǆĐĞůůĞŶƚĂŶĂůǇƐŝƐŽĨƚŚĞŝŶƚĞƌƉůĂǇ
of norms, identities and ideologies in the construction of international politics of the Persian Gulf and West 
Asia, revealing the  “ŝŵƉĂĐƚŽĨĞǆĐůƵƐŝŽŶĂƌǇŝĚĞŶƚŝƚǇƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐŽŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ? ? ? ) ?Cf. also Adler (1997); Lapid 
(1989); Lapid & Kratochwil (1996); Kratochwil (2001); Ruggie (1998). 
4
 cf. also immutability thesis: Linklater (2008: 282). 
19 
 
structural forces that introduce systemic asymmetries between actors. Seeking to answer the 
research question whether Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies are indicative of a 
security culture resisting hegemonic structures furthermore requires the theoretical input of 
schools of thought addressing hierarchical orders, and the construction of hegemony. The 
sections that follow will discuss how structures of hegemony are essentially socially 
(co)constructed, and which conceptual frameworks help us to understand them.   
 If structure can affect agency, they also must have the power to condition 
differentiations among actors. Structures of power condition hierarchies of agents. It is this 
premise that captures the logic of the concept RI µVecuritisDWLRQ¶ as developed by the 
µ&RSHQKDJHQ 6FKRRO¶ (Buzan, Waever & Wilde 1998; Buzan & Waever 2003). Borrowing 
from constructivist theorising on the social construction of identities, this concept helps to 
analyse what issues or actors are being framed DVD VHFXULW\ WKUHDW µVHFXULWLVHG¶ ³>«@ WKH
exact definition and criteria of securitisation is constituted by the inter-subjective 
establishment of an existential threat with a saliency sufficient to have substantial political 
HIIHFWV´ %X]DQ :DHYHU DQG GH :LOGH   HPSKDVLV LQ WKH RULJLQDO IRUPXODWH DQG
refer to the process of securitisDWLRQ DV D µVSHHFK DFW¶ WKHUHZLWK H[SOLFLWO\ ERUURZLQJ IURP
sociolinguistics (ibid.: 26).5 In this reasoning, being in DSRVLWLRQWRµVHFXULWLVH¶DQLVVXHRUDQ
DFWRUPHDQVKDYLQJWKHDXWKRULW\WRGHILQHZKDWFRXQWVDVµH[FHSWLRQDO¶PHDVXUHVWRdeal with 
the perceived threat. The securitisDWLRQ RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU GRVVLHU DV ZLOO EH VHHQ RIIHUV
illuminating examples. Here, the rendition of enmity is order-constituting. µ2UGHU-
FRQVWLWXWLQJ¶ UHIHUV WR WKH HIIHFW RI reconfirmation of the securitisLQJ DJHQW¶V SRVLWLRQ RI
authority through the act of securitising. 7KHSRZHUWRODEHORWKHUDFWRUVµURJXHV¶UHFRQILUPV
prevalent power structures (cf. also Homolar 2011; Hoyt 2000; Senn 2009). If such a 
discursive practice of enemy/threat construction is to have an effect DQ ³DXWKRULWDWLYH
GHFODUDWLRQRIDQµH[LVWHQWLDOWKUHDW¶WRWKHREMHFWFRQFHUQHG´QHHGVWREHPade, as Williams 
(2003) puts it. Such a declaration, however, SUHVXSSRVHVDQ³DFFHSWDQFHDVµVHFXULW\LVVXHV¶LQ
WKHVH WHUPV E\ D UHOHYDQW DXGLHQFH´ , and this point importantly links to the idea of 
structural hierarchies: It necessitates a power standing of the securitising agent and the 
acceptance tKHUHRI E\ D µUHOHYDQW DXGLHQFH¶ $W WKLV SRLQW ZH KDYH DUULYHG DW WKH ORJLF RI
power structures. Discourses securitisLQJ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDVDWKUHDWWRLQWHUQDWLRQDO
peace and security, as well as Iranian rhetoric DERXW µSUHVWLJH¶ SHUFHLYHG OHDGHUVKLS RI WKH
Islamic and non-DOLJQHG ZRUOG 7KLUG :RUOGLVP DQG µXQIDLUQHVV¶ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV
(Barzegar 2012: 233) all rely on assumptions about perceptions and interaction effects. Power 
                                                          
5
 Cf. on speech act theory also Müller (2001: 162); Risse (2000: 5). 
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relations and implicit value systems are audience-specific (cf. also Campbell 1993; Klein 
1994; Balzacq 2010), and each audience will re-define the meaning of justice (cf. Welch 
1993; Müller 2013; Gehring 1994: 366). This last inference ties in nicely with theoretical 
aspirationV WR LGHQWLI\ µKHJHPRQLF GLVFRXUVHV¶ DQG SUHYDOHQW SRZHU VWUXFWXUHV ZKRVH
usefulness for the research underlying this dissertation will be addressed further below. An 
investigation into Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward Iran in this research 
reveals different security conceptions and thereby disentangles possible correlations between 
the power to securitise the Iranian nuclear programme and the extent to which such a power 
position stands indicative for a necessary receptiveness of other actors (relevant audience as a 
precondition for the process of securitisation). While this research does not adopt and apply 
WKH µVHFXULWLVDWLRQ¶ IUDPHZRUN as a direct theoretical tool, it is imperative to understand its 
underlying logic that both policy and academic discourse is influenced and shaped by 
dominant actors. The next section will link these arguments about security discourses to a 
broader theoretical understanding of norm dynamics in international relations and thereby 
embeds the research question about security cultures into its wider normative dimension. 
3. Analysing international norm dynamics  
 
In their oft-cited work on norm acceptance and norm dynamics, Finnemore & Sikkink 
 DUJXH WKDW ³QRUPV HYROYH LQ D SDWWHUQHG µOLIH F\FOH¶ DQG WKDW GLIIHUHQW EHKDYLRural 
ORJLFV GRPLQDWH GLIIHUHQW VHJPHQWV RI WKH OLIH F\FOH´  $IWHU an initial promotion of 
norms E\ZKDW WKH\FDOO µQRUPHQWUHSUHQHXUV¶ DSURFHVVRI VRFLDOLVation sets in which they 
ODEHODµQRUPFDVFDGH¶LQZKLFKD sufficiently critical mass of actors accepts and adopts that 
SDUWLFXODU QRUP ZKHUHE\ D µWLSSLQJ SRLQW¶ LV UHDFKHG ,Q a last stage, actors internalise 
QRUPVUHQGHULQJFRPSOLDQFHDXWRPDWLFDQGWKXVFUHDWLQJDQHZµORJLFRIDSSURSULDWHQHVV¶, in 
the words of March & Olsen (1998: 949; cf. also March & Olsen 1989). 7KHµQRUPOLIHF\FOH¶
presents a framework for the emergence of norms in international politics, and sheds light on 
the mechanisms of change, albeit in a somewhat schematic fashion that fails to systematically 
account for contingent power relations. 7KH µFODVVLFDO¶ QRUP OLWHUDWXUH that draws on 
)LQQHPRUH¶V DQG 6LNNLQN¶V ZRUN SURFHHGV IURP D FRQFHSWLRQ RI UHODWLYHO\ VWDWLF VWDJHV (cf. 
also Florini 1996; Keck and Sikkink 1998; Nadelmann 1990; Johnstone 2007). Alexander 
:HQGWVSHDNVRIµ&XOWXUH¶DVDVHOI-fulfilling prophecy (184ff.), and thereby makes the 
LPSRUWDQWREVHUYDWLRQWKDWWKHH[SHFWDWLRQRIµDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRU¶FXOWXUHVWUXFWXUHVKRZ
agents behave ± itself a precondition for the preservation or alteration of culture, or, as 
*UDPVFL ZRXOG KDYH LW RI D µKLVWRULF EORF¶. Norms become D µFRQYHQWLRQDOO\¶ accepted 
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standard of appropriate behavior. ³&RQVHQVXV EHFRPHV FRPPRQ VHQVH DQG FRPPRQ VHQVH
VWUXFWXUHVRXUWKRXJKWV´$OL$QVDUL06: 5) writes in Confronting Iran DQGFDXWLRQV³>«@
conclusions are reached on what we choose to see. And often what we choose to see supports 
our preconceptions, even if they are misconceptions." (82). Questioning such dominant 
normative structures is an exercise in implicitly advocating alternative norms, or at least a 
modified norm understanding. It is the latter prospect, however, that has been largely 
neglected in the µFODVVLF¶scholarly norm literature. As Wunderlich (2014; cf. also Wunderlich 
et al. 2013) convincingly demonstrates, this has been due to a research bias towards a 
unidirectional understanding of norm diffusion. Agency-based analyses of norm dynamics 
KDYHWHQGHGWRFRQIODWHQRUPGLIIXVLRQZLWKWKHSURPRWLRQRIµSRVLWLYH¶LH:HVWHUQ liberal 
norms µDOWUXLVWLF QRUP DGYRFDF\¶ :XQGHUOLFK  . In reaction to this strand of 
literature, new studies have been written on changes in international norms as being 
essentially dispute-driven (Stiles & Sandholtz 2009: 323f.), on the contestation of norms (Bob 
2012; Sandholtz 2007; Wiener 2008; Krook & True 2012; van Kersbergen & Verbeek 2007), 
and on the link between norms and power structures (Adler-Nissen 2014; Epstein 2012a, b; 
Towns 2012). Their works thus have contributed to the advancemHQWRIDµQHZ¶JHQHUDWLRQor 
D µVHFRQG ZDYH¶ of norm literature (cf. Cortell & Davis 2000; Wunderlich 2013) that 
conceives norms as essentially contested narratives. Wunderlich (2014) reverses the 
GLUHFWLRQDOLW\RI)LQQHPRUH¶VDQG6LNNLQN¶VRULJLQDOµQRUPHQWUHSUHQHXUVKLS¶PRGHODQGDVNV
WR ZKDW H[WHQW µQRUP YLRODWRUV¶ VXFK DV ,UDQ FDQ EH FRQFHLYHG RI DV ¶URJXLVK¶ QRUP
HQWUHSUHQHXUV DQG FRQWULEXWH WR D QRUP µUHQRYDWLRQ¶ (88-89). Such scholarship weaves 
together norm dynamics, contingent power structures and fundamental issues of international 
legitimacy. 
On the latter aspect, Reus-6PLWZULWHV³,QWHUSUHWDWLYHDPELJXLW\DQGQRUPDWLYH
dissonance are reasons why social processes of legitimation and delegitimation are often 
marked by intense political cRQWHVWDWLRQ´  The social construction of identities and 
µRUGHU¶LVLQWLPDWHO\OLQNHGZLWKKHJHPRQLFOHJLWLPDF\WKHODWWHURIZKLFKZLOOEHH[SDQGHG
upon in the next section. 7KHOLQNEHWZHHQµKHJHPRQLFGLVFRXUVH¶DQGWKHVWUXFWXUHV of power 
has also been emphasised in the works of Laclau (1988) and Laclau and Mouffe (1985).6      
5HFXUULQJEXWHVVHQWLDOO\FRQWHVWHGFRQFHSWVVXFKDVµWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶WR
ZKLFKWKHQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHRIWKHµURJXHUHJLPH¶RI,UDQDOOHJHGO\SUHVHQWVDWKUHDWFDOOIRU
a critical re-evaluation of taken-for-granted assumptions about the conditions of legitimacy in 
                                                          
6
 Albeit in an explicit poststructuralist reading, where discourse and practice are constitutive of each other. This 
dissertation, however, makes a distinction between discourse and foreign policy behavior, as will be outlined in 
section 5 below.  
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international politics, as has been emphasised in the previous section on order-constituting 
effects of securitising discourses. Different narratives of a foreign policy issue under 
consideration (the Iranian nuclear programme as perceived differently by different actors) are 
reflective of underlying value and belief systems that inform and drive foreign policy. Here, 
challenging questions arise about the conditions for acceptance of and admission to an 
µLQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶7 that may give rise to critiques of the functioning of the 
international system as a reflection of selective norms of certain dominant states (cf. also 
Epstein 2012a; Widmaier & Park 2012). Jeppersen, Wendt and Katzenstein (1996) 
interestingly remark that ³:RUOGsociety carries standardised oppositional ideologies that are 
usually selective reifications of elements of dominant world ideology´ (48); of ³UHVWULFWHG
VXEVHWVRIJOREDOVRFLHW\´LQWKHZRUGVRI1LQFLF).    
 The NPT regime as a normative framework underlying much discussions surrounding 
,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU FULVLV is a case in point for such latent power structures and conceptions of 
world order. Dividing its signatories into those in possession of nuclear weapons before 1 
January 1967 and non-nuclear weapon (NNW) states that are not allowed to acquire nuclear 
weapons according to Art. II, the treaty effectively imposed an arbitrary freezing of the 
political status quo. This has created a political fault line between the developed and the 
developing, the modernised and the modernising world (Patrikarakos 2012: 30). Hurrell 
 PDNHV RXW GRXEOH VWDQGDUGV LQ WKH ZD\ WKDW GXULQJ WKH &ROG :DU ³SRVVHVVLRQ RI
QXFOHDU ZHDSRQV ZDV ZLGHO\ VHHQ DV D QHFHVVDU\ TXDOLILFDWLRQ IRU D VHDW DW WKH WRS WDEOH´
while WKHLUDFTXLVLWLRQWRGD\KDVEHFRPH³DVLJQRIXQDFFHSWDEOHEHKDYLRUDQGSRWHQWLDOVWDWXV
DVDURJXHVWDWH´7HOOLQJO\IRUPHU,$($6HFUHWDU\*HQHUDO0RKDPHG(O%DUDGHLZULWHVRI
DQ³DV\PPHWU\RIWKHJOREDOVHFXULW\V\VWHP´WKDWKHGHWHFWVLQWKHperpetuation of the 
existing global nuclear framework conditions, as emphasisHGE\WKH³OLQNDJHEHWZHHQQXFOHDU
SUROLIHUDWLRQDQGWKHVOXJJLVKSDFHRIGLVDUPDPHQW´7KLV³GLVFULPLQDWLRQEHWZHHQWKH
haves and have-QRWV´+XUUHOODQGWKHQRQ-UHFRJQLWLRQRI,UDQ¶V³LQDOLHQDEOHULJKW´
to nuclear technology for peaceful purposes by key actors in the Iranian nuclear dossier8 is a 
recurrent theme underlying all negotiation efforts with Iran (Wunderlich et al. 2013: 263-
272). This nuclear discrimination purposely built into the NPT became the bone of contention 
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 Hedley Ƶůů ?ƐǁŽƌŬ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ĨŽĐƵƐƐĞƐŽŶďƌŝĚŐŝŶŐƚŚĞĂƐƐƵŵĞĚĚŝĐŚŽƚŽŵǇďĞƚǁĞĞŶ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŶŽƌŵƐ ?
and has theorisĞĚŽŶĂ “ƚŚŝƌĚĐŽŶĐĞƉƚŝŽŶŽĨĂŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽĐŝĞƚǇ ? ?Ƶůů ? ? ? ? P ? ? ) ?tŚŝůĞƚŚŝƐŝƐĂǀĂůƵĂďůĞ
starting point, it departs from a conception of norm promotion that itself favours those states in the most 








as framed by Iranian argumentation. And it was the main reason for the dramatic failure of the 
2005 NPT review conference. The nexus between nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-
proliferation was also high on the agenda of the 2015 NPT Review conference in New York, 
which ended without a final communiqué on 22 May 2015. The Iranian delegate also 
criticised the imbalance between security concerns in the Middle East and the absence of 
Israel from the NPT. For the first time, Israel was an observer state to the NPT review 
conference in 2015. Inherent asymmetries in the NPT regime again let the conference end 
fruitlessly.            
 The Iranian nuclear crisis needs to be understood not only as a political challenge for 
the NPT regime, but as a proxy issue for a wider re-UHWKLQNLQJDERXWZRUOGRUGHUDQG³QXFOHDU
K\SRFULV\´ 2ERUQH 	 0RUULson 2013: 32f.). This dissertation sheds light on how China, 
Turkey and Russia positioned and position themselves toward these essentially normative 
questions and what they tell us about underlying conceptions of security governance, the non-
proliferation regime and world order at large. China and Russia are both nuclear weapon-
states themselves and permanent members of the UNSC. A binary distinction between nuclear 
µKDYHV¶DQGµhave-QRWV¶ WKXV IDLOV WRDFFRXQW IRUGLIIHUHQFHV LQ IRUHLJQSROLF\DSSURDFKHV WR
Iran between these two states and the West. While China, Turkey and Russia are driven by 
myriad factors and motivations in pursuing their respective Iran policies, the case studies in 
this dissertation will carve out the existence of common themes of diplomacy and foreign 
policy principles on which their positions converge and on which they potentially differ from 
µWestern¶ approaches.9 The next section turns towards a conceptualisation of such norm 
dynamics for the analytical purpose of addressing the research question whether Chinese, 
5XVVLDQ DQG 7XUNLVK IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV WRZDUG ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH DUH LQGLFDWLYH RI D
security culture that resists normative conceptions sustaining hegemonic structures.  
3.1 Conceptualising security cultures and resistance to hegemony 
 
'UDZLQJRQ.DW]HQVWHLQ¶VGHILQLWLRQRIµFXOWXUH¶DV³DVHWRIHYDOXDWLYHVWDQGDUGVVXFK
as norms and values) and a set of cognitive standards (such as rules and models) that define 
ZKDWVRFLDODFWRUVH[LVW LQDV\VWHPKRZWKH\RSHUDWHDQGKRZWKH\UHODWH WRRQHDQRWKHU´
(21), a security culture is understood as a set of evaluative and cognitive standards in the 
security governance realm, i.e,  the yardstick with which states assess legitimate means and 
                                                          
9
 Cf. Section 2.1. of Chapter 1 on the methodological approach adopted for a more detailed discussion of the 
case study selection.   
24 
 
ends in security policies. :KLOHµHYDOXDWLYHVWDQGDUGV¶LQWKHIRUPRIQRUPVDQGYDOXHVZLOOEH
IXUWKHUHODERUDWHGXSRQLQWKHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQWKHXVHRIµFRJQLWLYHVWDQGDUGV¶understood 
DVµUXOHVDQGPRGHOV¶DVWDNHQIURP.DW]HQVWHLQ¶VGHILQLWLRQPD\UHTXLUHIXUWKHUFODULILFDWLRQ
DW WKLV SRLQW ,I µQRUPV DQG YDOXHV¶ DV ZLOO EH VKRZQ DUH FRQFUHWH FRQYLFWLRQV DQG
FRQFHSWLRQV µUXOHVDQGPRGHOV¶ UHODWH WR WKHEURDGHUPDFUR-structure that regulates the way 
these norms and values are communicated, applied, or changed. An example is the UN system 
setting rules and models by way of its institutional make-up and treaty stipulations (decision-
making procedures, legal proceedings, constitution of UN bodies) that serves as a broader 
frame for the channelling of concrete norms and values that account for WKHIRUPHU¶V political 
content and are often at the heart of debate among its member states (such as sovereignty, 
non-interference). Rules and models are structures underlying norms and values. If China, 
Russia and Turkey regard US unilateral Iran sanctions as illegitimate, but accept international 
(i.e. UN-backed) Iran sanctions, they reveal their own understanding of certain norms in 
international politics, while demonstrating an adherence to the rules of the UN family. 
Likewise, acceptance of unilateral sanctions would imply adherence to the rules of hegemonic 
structures, despite a preference for alternative norms.  
Such a definition of security cultures assumes that the recognition, shaping and 
evaluation of security cultures is necessarily relational: The assessment of legitimacy here 
inherently presupposes interaction effects, as alternative discourses aiming at the modification 
of prevalent norms make no sense in an isolated system. This links up with the understanding 
set forth above in section 2 that ideas and identities are always socially (co)constructed. 
$OH[DQGHU :HQGW  ZULWHV LQ WKLV FRQWH[W ³HYHQ LI states act on the basis of the 
meanings they attach to material forces, if those meanings are not shared then the structure of 
the international system will not have a cultural GLPHQVLRQ´  To take an illustrative 
example, a different understanding of energy security reveals underlying conceptions of 
legitimacy in politics that are at the roots of diverging energy security cultures: While for 
most Western countries, energy security essentially implies security of stable supplies, energy 
security for an energy exporting country like Russia may imply the security of continued 
dependence on Russian energy companies on the part of European markets. Another example 
is that of contract security. This concept implies the general principle in public international 
law of the reliability of contract partners and an understanding that contract stipulations ought 
to be adhered to (pacta sunt servanda). Both the West and countries under investigation in 
this research project (China, Russia, Turkey) reproach each other at times of interpreting and 
consequently circumventing or even blatantly ignoring contract stipulations according to their 
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political convenience. Examples here include the reproach brought forward against Western 
countries that the insistence on a complHWH VKXWGRZQ RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH LV D
violation of the spirit and the letter of Art. IV NPT. Another example of a Western reproach 
against unwanted trade with Iran is the position that the export of certain products and 
technologies to Iran violate the spirit and the letter of pertinent UNSC sanctions resolutions 
on Iran ± whose legality may in turn be questioned by other actors, and so forth. 
7KHVHH[DPSOHVIRUFHIXOO\PDNHWKHSRLQWWKDWZKDWLVGHHPHGµDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXU¶
in international politics is always the outcome of an intersubjective evaluation and 
presupposes what Wendt (1999) calls Culture DV µVRFLDOO\ VKDUHG NQRZOHGJH¶  7KH
acceptance or rejection of a foreign policy behaviour as appropriate is the expression of 
security cultures. µ6HFXULW\¶EHFRPHVVLWXDWLRQDODQGLVLQWLPDWHO\DQGLQH[WULFDEO\OLQNHGZLWK
LPDJHVRIµ6HOI¶DQGµ2WKHU¶ 
A further conceptual element of a security culture between hegemony and resistance to 
be clariILHG KHUH LV WKDW RI µKHJHPRQ\¶ µFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶ DQG µUHVLVWDQFH¶. Aware of 
VFKRODUO\ FRQWULEXWLRQV VNHSWLFDO RI WKH SRVVLELOLW\ RI DQ DSSOLFDWLRQ RI $QWRQLR *UDPVFL¶V
FRQFHSW RI µKHJHPRQ\¶ WR LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV DV WKH H[SDQVLRQ RI D FRQFHSW RULJLQDOO\
conceived to apply to the nation-state (Femia 2005; Germain and Kenny 1998; Burnham 
1991; %HOODP\:RUWKWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQPRYHVDZD\IURP*UDPVFL¶VIRFXVRQD
dominant social class, but contends that the idea of hegemony can nevertheless be usefully 
applied to the international arena (cf. also Rupert 1995). 10 'UDZLQJRQ*UDPVFL¶VFRPSRQHQWV
of hegemony as developed in, i.a., his Prison Notebooks, hegemony essentially implies a 
dominant position in social, economic, and political structures (Gramsci 1971: 171-72). In 
*UDPVFL¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ of hegemony, a dominant class forms a relationship with subaltern 
classes that is characterised both by consent and coercion (Gramsci 1971: 55-60; 415-25).11  
*UDPVFL¶V UHIOHFWLRQV DV GHYHORSHG LQ SULVRQ PDUN D WUDQVLWLRQ IURP KLV HDUOLHU
journalistic, and politically instrumental, work, to an all-encompassing socio-political account 
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 Cf. Keohane (1984), Gilpin (1987), Jospeh (2002) for realist analyses and usages of the concept; Ikenberry 
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English school approach to hegemony; Cox (1981), Arrighi (1993), Rupert (1995), Worth (2009) for neo-
'ƌĂŵƐĐŝĂŶĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨ ‘ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? 
11
 This concept of hegemony needs to be understood in the context of their time. Written for revolutionary 
DĂƌǆŝƐƚƉŽůŝƚŝĐƐ ?ĞƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇ>ĞŶŝŶ ?ƐƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚŝŶŐŽĨŚĞŐ ŵŽŶǇǁĂƐŝŶƚĞƌĐŚĂŶŐĞĂďůĞǁŝƚŚ ‘ƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂůůĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ?
(Service 2000: 170-71; Cox 1993: 50), and Gramsci acknowledged having drawn on Lenin in theorising on 
 ‘ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?/ŶĂƐĞŶƐĞ ?ĂǁŝĚĞƐƉƌĞĂĚĂĐĐƉƚĂŶĐĞ ŽĨĂ'ƌĂŵƐĐŝĂŶĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨ ‘ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?ŝŶ/Z
(and thus outside of Marxist circles) is somewhat surprising and has, over time, acquired an academically 
instrumental meaning of its own and thus moved away intellectually from its progenitor under the wider 




of historical changes in state and society (Fiori 2013: 287-88). He understands the importance 
of the Making of Culture as key to the crafting of Order (ibid.: 130). To the extent that these 
cultural codes formulated by dominant actors get accepted throughout society and become 
common sense, hegemonic order is always based on the dual foundation of consent and 
coercion ± just like a centaur is always half man, half beast, in the analogy Gramsci borrowed 
from Machiavelli (Cox 1993: 52; Gramsci 1971: 169-70). In the same logic, ideas alone never 
create lasting order. Instead, theory (ideas) and practice are inextricably interrelated and inter-
penetrate each other (ibid.*UDPVFL¶VWKHUHIRUHQHFHVVDULO\LVDFircular understanding 
of how hegemony comes into being, and how it changes gradually. Such an ensemble of and 
arrangement between hegemonic structures and the wider society UHSUHVHQWVDµKLVWRULFEORF¶. 
In a neo-Gramscian understanding of hegemony in International Relations as developed, e.g., 
LQ &R[¶V VHPLQDO ZRUNV RQ World Order (Cox 1996: 131), the prevalence of dominant 
structures that are accepted and sustained by a sufficiently large number of other actors 
(states) can also constitute such an µKLVWRULF EORF¶ 7R WKH H[WHQW WKDW RWKHU VWDWHV DFW XSRQ
sustain and reinforce US dominant structures in the social, economic and political sphere, US 
hegemony post-1945 has brought about a historic bloc in a Gramscian understanding that is 
being upheld by the vast majority of states in the Western hemisphere. A security culture is 
understood as hegemonic if shaped by a dominant actor that holds sufficient power so as to 
induce adaption and acceptance thereof by other actors. Such an understanding draws on 
*UDPVFL¶V FRQFHSWLRQ RI cultural hegemony (Service 2007: 139-40), but adds an under-
studied dimension of the security and foreign policy realm and thus moves away from the 
strong association of neo-Gramscianism with the discipline of International Political 
Economy (cf. also Worth 2011: 386-390). Rather than focusing on narrowly materialist 
conceptions of hegemony, this dissertation holds that the perception of hegemonic legitimacy 
is crucial for the preservation or alteration of hegemonic structures.12  
By implication, a security culture is counter-hegemonic if it confronts or challenges a 
prevailing hegemonic framework and the normative pull toward socialisation with it. The 
latter, drawing on a definition by FinnemoUHDQG6LNNLQNLV³WKHGRPLQDQWPHFKDQLVP
of a norm cascade- WKH PHFKDQLVP WKURXJKZKLFKQRUP OHDGHUVSHUVXDGHRWKHUV WR DGKHUH´
(902). ³*UDPVFL¶VFRQFHUQ´6FKZDU]PDQWHOZULWHV³OD\LQFKDOOHQJLQJWKHGRPLQDQW
ideas or hegemonic concepts, and forming a new historic bloc or constellation of social forces 
WRFUHDWHDQDOWHUQDWLYHVHWRI LGHDV >«@´Resistance of normative structures underlying 
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China-U.S. relations (2011). Cf. also Rapkin  ?ƌĂĂƚĞŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůŝƐation of hegemonic legitimacy and 
Reus-^ŵŝƚ ? ? ? ? ? )ŽŶ ‘WŽǁĞƌ ?>ĞŐŝƚŝŵĂĐǇ ?ĂŶĚKƌĚĞƌ ? ? 
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hegemony lies at the root of every attempt to challenge consensual relationships, to resist a 
doPLQDQWµKLVWRULFEORF¶If hegemony is based on consent and coercion, questioning prevalent 
practice and contesting norms touches the foundational pillars of hegemonic consensus. The 
³HPSKDVLVRQWKHFRQWLQXDOFRQVWUXFWLRQPDLQWHQDQFHDQGGHIHQFHRIKHJHPony in the face of 
FRQVWDQW UHVLVWDQFHDQGSUHVVXUHV LV UHIOHFWHG LQ*UDPVFL¶VVWUDWHJLF WKHRU\DQG WKHSRWHQWLDO
IRUµFRXQWHU¶KHJHPRQ\´0RUWRQQRWHVLQUnraveling Gramsci.   
 ,WLVDWWKLVSRLQWWKDWDQLPSRUWDQWFRQFHSWXDOGLIIHUHQWLDWLRQEHWZHHQµUHVLVWDQFH¶DQG
µFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶ QHHGV WR EH PDGH ³$ FRXQWHU-hegemony would consist of a coherent 
view of an alternative world order, backed by a concentration of power sufficient to maintain 
D FKDOOHQJH WR FRUH FRXQWULHV´ 5REHUW &R[ ZULWHV   7KH QRWLRQ RI µFRXQWHU-
KHJHPRQ\¶ WKXV LPSOLHV D GULYH WRZDUGV SRZHU WUDQVLWLRQV While it may the possible 
conceptually to think of µFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶ the latter is unlikely to exist in practice. Even 
examples coming to mind such as North Korea, which has disregarded US pressure and 
hegemonic structures, left the NPT and eventually tested atomic bombs, cannot serve as an 
HPSLULFDOH[DPSOHRIDSKHQRPHQRQZHFRXOGWHUPµFRXQWHU-hegePRQ\¶,QDPRUHFRPSOH[
world, the setting up of such essentially reductionist dichotomies could not capture a more 
fine-grained picture of how states position themselves towards hegemony, and would be 
immediately vulnerable to criticism as to how one could judge whether China, Russia, or 
Turkey are moving more or less towards the extreme end of such a spectrum. It is also worth 
noting WKDW*UDPVFLKLPVHOIQHYHUXVHGWKHWHUPµFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶ 
The ideas of consent and coercion developed in Gramscian thought transcend a 
GLFKRWRPRXV MX[WDSRVLWLRQ RI µGRPLQDWLRQ¶ DQG µUHVLVWDQFH¶ ³,W LV YHU\ GLIILFXOW WR
FRQFHSWXDOL]H´6WHYH-RQHV  IRUPXODWHV³VRPHSXUHPRPHQWRI µUHVLVWDQFH¶ZLWKLQD
Gramscian framework, since the identities and representational forms of the dominated are 
IRUPHG WKURXJK DQ HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK WKH KHJHPRQLF SURMHFWV RI WKH SRZHU EORF´ 
5HVLVWDQFH LV WKHUHIRUH QHYHU D ³WRWDOL]LQJ DFW´ LELG EXW DOZD\V D TXDOLILHG IRUP RI
GLVDJUHHPHQW ZLWK D SDUW RI RU HYHQ D QXPEHU RI KHJHPRQLF SROLFLHV 7KH ³YDOXHV RI WKH
power bloc, subalterns and counter-hegemonic forces are in a constant state of negotiation, 
FRPSURPLVH DQG FKDQJH´ LELG  5HVLVWDQFH DQG KHJHPRQLF SRZHU DUH HQJDged in a 
constant process of HQJDJHPHQWZLWKHDFKRWKHU&RQWUDU\WRWKHLGHDRIµFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶
resistance is therefore conceptualised here as a qualified form of disagreement with 
hegemony, with established power constellations. It thus borrows more IURP *UDPVFL¶V
concept of a longer-WHUPµZDURISRVLWLRQ¶ in which meanings and values gradually become 
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FRQWHVWHGUDWKHUWKDQIURPKLVLGHDRIDµZDURIPDQRHXYUH¶ZKLFKSteve Jones (2006) likens 
WRDQµDOO-RXWIURQWDODWWDFN¶ 
It is therefore suggHVWHGKHUHWKDW µUHVLVWDQFH¶WRKHJHPRQ\FDSWXUHVPRUHDFFXUDWHO\
the conceptual continuum that eschews distortionary simplifications and allows for 
empirically more qualified analysis of nuanced foreign policies.13 Conceptually and 
HPSLULFDOO\ µFRXQWHU-heJHPRQ\¶ HQWHUWDLQV WKH LGHD WKDW RQH KHJHPRQ\ ZLOO HYHQWXDOO\ EH
replaced by another (dichotomous understanding). Yet, instead of an anti-American world, we 
should arguably think of post-American variants (Zakaria 2011). Contestation need not mean 
endeavors to topple the hegemonic system, but can be a first step towards reforming it. 
Another helpful distinction here may be that of radicalism (negation of the prevalent order) 
versus resistance (qualified disagreement with parts of that order).14 Moreover, the 
XQOLNHOLQHVV RI µFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶ RQ D VWDWH OHYHO PD\ EH H[SODLQHG E\ WKH WKUHHIROG
distinction of hegemony made by Gramsci: Since a hegemonic world order implies 
predominance in the social, economic and political sphere (cf. above), the attempt to resist 
KHJHPRQ\LQWKHVHFXULW\DQGSROLWLFDOVSKHUHPD\EHFXVKLRQHGE\DVWDWH¶VGHSHQGHQFHRQ
and integration in the international economic order that is predicated upon the US-inspired 
neoliberal world order (i.e., the economic sphere). It is precisely in this context that an 
analysis of Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies becomes an examination of the friction 
between consent and coercion, between resistance and hegemony.    
Lastly, both in a realist as well as in a critical undHUVWDQGLQJ µKHJHPRQ\¶ KDV EHHQ
treated largely as a state-centric concept. This dissertation, however, is more sympathetic to a 
Coxian understanding of hegemony in that it focusses on the material, ideational as well as 
institutional conditions that are underpinning hegemonic structures (Cox 1996: 97f.; 135f.; 
Gill, S. 1993, 2003; Rupert 1995, 2000; Pijl 1984). The interplay between these will help 
understand the positioning of China, Turkey and Russia towards hegemonic structures and 
shed light on what might at first sight seem to be ambiguous policies towards a monolithic 
hegemonic pole. While a security culture in a hegemonic understanding implies an expected 
adherence to the norms of this hegemonic power structure (as the set of standards by which 
behavLRU LV FRQVLGHUHG µDSSURSULDWH¶ WKH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI D VHFXULW\ FXOWXUH LQ D &KLQHVH
Russian and Turkish reading experiences a significant shift of emphasis in that security is 
understood to be security from such a normative hegemony. As will be shown, this explains 
the discursive re-iteration of the foreign policy norms of sovereignty and non-interference. 
                                                          
13
 Ĩ ?ĂůƐŽƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ? ? ?ŽĨƚŚĞĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŽŶ ‘ŵĞĂƐƵƌ ŝŶĚĞŐƌĞĞ ? ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌƚŚĂŶ ‘ŵĞĂƐƵƌĞŵĞŶƚŝŶŬŝŶĚ ? ? 
14
 Also cf. Adib-Moghaddam (2014: 116-118) on this differentiation.  
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This is not to imply that China, Russia and Turkey act in a concerted manner to craft a 
security culturHRIWKHLURZQXQGHUVWDQGLQJLQDQDWWHPSWWRRSHQO\FKDOOHQJHµWKHV\VWHP¶15 
Instead of assuming strategic convergence in their foreign policy behavior, the case studies in 
this research project will analyse adherence to a common security culture discursively, while 
their respective material interests may be different or may even be in conflict with each other.   
3.2 Conceptualising norms and norm adherence 
 
³+RZGRZHNQRZDQRUPZKHQZHVHHRQH"´)LQQHPRUH	6LNNLQNDVN
a notoriously intricate question in foreign policy analysis. The extent to which administrations 
or decision-PDNHUV DGKHUH WR µQRUPV¶RXWRI FRQYLFWLRQRU DV DGLVFXUVLYH ODEHO HJ RXW RI
strategic convenience, is ultimately impossible to tell. In the scholarly norm literature, 
µQRUPV¶ DUH JHQHUDOO\ GHILQHG DV D VWDQGDUG RI DSSURSULDWH behaviour (cf. DiMaggio 1997; 
March & Olsen 1984, 1989, 1995, 1998: 948; Katzenstein 1996: 5f.; Sandholtz 2009). 
Katzenstein (1996) formulates: 
 ³QRUP(s) >«@ describe collective expectations for proper behavior of actors with a 
given identity. In some situations norms operate like rules that define the identity of 
DQ DFWRU WKXV KDYLQJ µFRQVWLWXWLYH HIIHFWV¶ WKDW VSHFLI\ ZKDW DFWLRQV ZLOO FDXVH
relevant others to recognize a particular identity. In other situations norms operate as 
standards that specify the proper enactment of an already defined identity. In such 
LQVWDQFHVQRUPVKDYHµUHJXODWLYH¶HIIHFWV WKDWVSHFLI\ VWDQGDUGVRISURSHUEHKDYLRU
Norms thus either define (or constitute) identities or prescribe (or regulate) behavior, 
RUWKH\GRERWK´ 
 
Detecting and assessing µDSSURSULDWH EHKDYLRU¶ DV ZDV VKRZQ LQ WKH SUHFHGLQJ sections, is 
always a matter of interpretation. Analyzing reference and adherence to norms in foreign 
policy therefore becomes an inherently intricate and interpretative endeavor. To the extent 
that the discursive reference to norms can be assumed to reveal a level of conviction, the 
interplay between foreign policy identity, perceptions of legitimacy and the accompanying 
UKHWRULF DERXW LW WHOO XV ZKDW NLQG RI VHFXULW\ FXOWXUH LV XQGHUO\LQJ D VWDWH¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\
machinery ± LQRWKHUZRUGVKRZDVWDWH¶VGLVFXUVLYHUHIHUHQFH WRQRUPVERWKUHJXODWHVDQG
constitutes its behavior.   
TKH GLVFXUVLYH XVDJH RI IRUHLJQ SROLF\ µQRUPV¶ VXFK DV VRYHUHLJQW\ OHJLWLPDF\ DQG
non-interference, in other words, serve as indicators of a security culture resisting hegemony 
or the eventual emergence thereof. This is to be explained by the political controversy and 
historical legacy surrounding these particular norms. International relations in the 21st century 
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have seen the relativisation and gradual erosion of the main tenets of Westphalia; sovereignty, 
territorial integrity and non-interference in the domestic affairs of other sovereign states. 
7KHVH DUH XQGHUVWRRG DV SULQFLSOHV RI µ6RYHUHLJQ (TXDOLW\¶ LQ SXEOLF LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ16 
Sovereignty, authority and territoriality have been at the heart of definitions of modern 
statehood and the way international politics works (Zaum 2007: 28f.). The gradual erosion 
and relativisation thereof is not only attributed, as it often is in the literature, to the end of the 
Cold War, the higher risk of intra-state conflicts and ensuing controversial debates about 
rights of states to interfere in other states in order to prevent atrocities. Arguably, the 
principles of Westphalia had always been ignored or re-interpreted according to political 
convenience. This has been the case with the period of colonisation, political patronage 
systems or authoritarian federations, to name but a few examples. Arrighi (1993) has therefore 
theorised on the emergence of world hegemony from a Westphalian system based on state 
sovereignty, over an Imperialist system under the British empire to a US-crafted system of 
hegemonic world governance. Historical empires, by definition, did not face the resistance of 
national borders. Imperial rulers from Marc Aurel, Alexander the Great to Charles V. 
attempted to export their ideas of universality with the instruments of territorial domination. 
Formally since 1648, geopolitics and territorial differentiation imposes dividing lines that 
impede imperial or hegemonic politics. The latter, then, is a deliberate act of governance to 
override territorial and, by consequence, cultural borders and therewith breach the principles 
of non-interference and sovereignty. This act of often very skillful political interpretation to 
justify the breach of the afore-mentioned norms has, historically, been ascribed to those states 
that were in a powerful position to do so. Hegemony presumes system-inherent power 
asymmetries. The United States today, as will be specified in the following section, has 
followed policies that blatantly contravened the norms of sovereignty and non-interference, 
relying on hegemonic structures it had created and sustained. If we are to analyse resistance to 
such hegemony, it is illustrative to reflect on the context and way in which those norms are 
uttered and reiterated that are the utmost indications of security cultures deemed non-
hegemonic. Norm contestation, as the previous section has shown, can shake a foundational 
pillar of consensual hegemony.  
)LQQHPRUH 	 6LNNLQN  IRUPXODWH ³>«@ QRUP ODQJXDJH FDQ KHOS >«@
considering the components of social institutions as well as the way these elements are 
renegotiated into new arrangements over timH WRFUHDWHQHZSDWWHUQVRISROLWLFV´7KH
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challenge of recognising a foreign policy norm as the expression of a security culture 
alternative to a hegemonic one in practice amounts to a theoretical interpretation of recurrent 
themes found in discourse ± how and in what context they are used, and what they tell us 
DERXWDVWDWH¶VRZQIRUHLJQSROLF\LGHQWLW\DQGLWVFRQFHSWLRQRIµDSSURSULDWHEHKDYLRXU¶LQDQ
international system of states. For example, to the extent that states like China, Russia and 
Turkey renounce and oppose notions of a potential infringement of the nRUPRIµVRYHUHLJQW\¶
as epitomised by the intrusive effect of sanctions regimes, we may conclude that these states 
DGYRFDWH IRU VXFKDQRUPµVRYHUHLJQW\¶ WREH DFFHSWHGDV UHJXODWLQJ Lnternational politics. 
Norms become shapers of security policies. Analyzing in what context China, Russia and 
Turkey advocate different behavioral logics as the expression of normative understandings 
that diverge from dominant security cultures toward Iran is illustrative of their perception of 
legitimacy in international relations. Qualitative data analysis and interviewing will detect 
recurring concepts and ideas that are expressions of larger perceptions of identity and 
legitimacy.17 Interviewees (most notably official decision-makers), in this sense, serve as 
norm-carriers whose reference to the issues discussed here (pertaining to perception of other 
DFWRUV¶ IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV OHJLWLPDF\ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV HWF WHOOV XV WR ZKDW H[WHQW
µQRUPV¶LQIRUHLJQSROLF\GHFLVLRQ-making do play DUROHDQGDUHµLQWHUQDOLVed¶   
4. Whose hegemony?   
 
It has been argued so far that a security culture here is understood as hegemonic if shaped by 
a single dominant actor that holds sufficient power so as to induce adaption and acceptance 
thereof by other actors. ³+HJHPRQLFVWUDWHJLHV>«@´/HYHUHWW	/HYHUHWWZULWH³DUH
inherently expansionist: a state uses military, political, and economic power not just to defend 
LWVLQWHUHVWVEXWWREHQGRWKHUVLQWRDFFRPPRGDWLQJWKHP´Informed by the revisionist 
historiography and literature on US hegemony,18 the US is deemed such a single most 
dominant actor that, as of yet, remains unmatched in its potential to influence other actors (cf. 
also Wilkinson 1999: 142; Krahmann 2005: 533; Wicht 2002: 77). Suffice to recall that 
*UDPVFL¶VFRQFHSWLRQRIKHJHPRQ\HQWDLOVGRPLQDQFHLQWKHSROLWLFDOHFRQRPLFDQGFXOWXUDO
sphere. However difficult a comprehensive assessment is, it is fair to suggest that historical 
empires have achieved near-dominance in one or two of these spheres DWEHVW&KDUOHV9¶V
LPSHULDO YLVLRQ RI µ8QLYHUVLWDV &KULVWLDQD¶ LQ WKH th century essentially was a Christian 
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 On the methodology adopted here in document analysis and qualitative interviewing, cf. the next chapter.  
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empire,19 while the British empire can be said to have achieved imperial status in the 
economic and maybe cultural sphere at the turn of the 20th century. After the Second World 
War, however, the US arguably was the first to establish a form of hegemony that comes 
closest to an all-encompassing (neo-) Gramscian understanding of the term. +HQFHWKH³ILUVW
major successful resistance to 86KHJHPRQ\>«@´1RDP&KRPVN\KROGVZDV³¶WKH
ORVVRI&KLQD¶´LQDQGJRHVRQWRVKRZKRZWKHWHUPLQRORJ\RIµORVV¶WRFDSWXUH
political changes towards US-unfriendly governments neatly conveys the connotation of 
ZRUOGZLGH FRQWURO µ/RVLQJ¶ &KLQD 6RXWKHDVW $VLD ,UDQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW is in itself a 
KHJHPRQLFGLVFRXUVHDµSDUDQRLD¶RIWKHµVXSHUSRZHUIXO¶LQWKHZRUGVRI&KRPVN\EHFDXVH
you cannot lose what you do not own (ibid.: 60). Discussing reports of the 
telecommunications company Apple entering the Iranian market, a State Department official 
UHPDUNHGLQDQLQWHUYLHZWKDWWKH³PRWLYDWLRQLVWRSURYLGH,UDQLDQVZLWKWHFKQRORJ\WKDWLVLQ
line with broader US foreign policy goals, (with) the post-WWII idea to maintain [sic] global 
cDSLWDOLVP´20 As telling as such a statement is for the US importance attached to the 
maintenance of a global neo-liberal ideology, it also stands in striking contrast to US efforts to 
UHJXODWH WKLUG FRXQWULHV¶ WUDGH UHODWLRQV ZLWK ,UDQ IRU WKH VDNH RI XSKRlding a narrative of 
HQPLW\FDUHIXOO\FRQVWUXFWHGIRURYHUWKUHHGHFDGHVVLQFH,UDQ¶V,VODPLF5HYROXWLRQLQ 
This dissertation will analyse the effects of such hegemonic structures on the Iran 
policies of the states investigated. The US unilateral sanctions regime in place is arguably the 
ultimate expression of hegemonic power structures: the US imposed punitive measures onto 
other states that do business with Iran (Lohmann 2013) ± DQ³LPSHULDOH[WHQVLRQRI$PHULFDQ
SRZHUDQG>«@DVKHHUHIIURQWHU\E\ZKLFK$PHULFDVRXJKWWRLPSRVHLWVSROLWLFDOSRVLWLRQ´
as Ali Ansari (2006: 144) puts it. The first effort to sanction third country entities was enacted 
with the 1992 Iran-Iraq Nonproliferation Act that prohibited the transfer of goods or 
technologies that could facilitate the development of ABC weapons (Takeyh & Maloney 
2011: 1301). This sector-specific sanctions regime was significantly expanded with the Iran-
Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996, which was modified in 2001 and renamed the Iran 
Sanctions Act in 2006 (Leverett & Leverett 2013: 310).     
 Beyond the initial proliferation dimension, the ILSA imposed sanctions on third 
country entities investing more than 40 million US dollars in the development of petroleum 
resources in Iran. This extension of the scope and applicability of Iran sanctions signified a 
sea change in US Iran policies in the way these gradually served to create a comprehensive 
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regime that was to be adhered to on a global basis. The extraterritorial application of these US 
XQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQV ZDV LQWURGXFHG ZLWK WKH MXVWLILFDWLRQ RI µ,UDQLDQ VSRQVRULQJ RI
LQWHUQDWLRQDO WHUURULVP¶ DQG WKXV DFTXLUHG DQ H[SOLFLW QRQ-nuclear dimension (Lohmann 
2015). US administrations under Clinton, Bush jr. and Obama gradually expanded the scope 
of the existing Iran sanctions regime by targeting ever more commercial activities of third 
countries in Iran.           
 Hegemonic structures are also self-preserving. Even with a change in administration, 
domestic structures so far have prevented a noticeable shift in US Iran policies. President 
Clinton grudgingly had to sign the ILSA into law - against his own policy preferences - after a 
defeating legislative approval in Congress.21 The same dividing lines resurface at the time of 
writing where the US administration is negotiating a Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action 
(CJPoA) to solve the nuclear crisis and to decide over the sequencing of the lifting of 
sanctions. Knowing that Congressional legislation to remove sanctions will require a lot of 
political capital, State Secretary Kerry stated that the administration has the authority to 
suspend sanctions and that ³
LQ WKH HQG
 &RQJUHVV ZRXOG ZHLJK LQ´ (Sullivan 2014). 
Institutional structures can carry further hegemonic policies even if administrations seek to 
shift frameworks.22         
 /DWHVW H[DPSOHV RI XQLODWHUDO 86 µVHFRQGDU\¶ VDQFWLRQV FDOOHG µVHFRQGDU\¶ EHFDXVH
they do not stop at sanctioning the target state directly, but also aim to punish third country 
HQWLWLHV¶ GHDOLQJV ZLWK WKH WDUJHW VWDWH were the 2010 Comprehensive Iran Sanctions, 
Accountability, and Divestment Act (CISADA) sanctioning purchases of Iranian oil as well as 
business transactions with the Iranian Central Bank23 and the 2012 Iran Threat Reduction and 
Syria Human Rights Act. 6XFKDSURFHVVRIµH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLVLQJ¶86OHJLVODWLRQDQGHQIRUFLQJ
political conceptions onto other states through compliance under the threat of economic costs 
is the epitome of hegemonic coercion on the basis of the US predominance in the global trade, 
financial and economic system. AndreZ:LOVRQZULWHV³$PHULFD¶VKDUGSRZHUPD\
be waning and its soft power easy to criticise, but it still has a massive comparative advantage 
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 The US president can veto Congressional legislation. Such a presidential veto can be overruled by a 2/3 
majority in Congress. In the case of the ILSA, Clinton knew that his veto would not stand a chance of preventing 
the enactment of ILSA, given that the House of Representatives had unanimously passed the bill with a 415:0 
vote in favour (Parsi 2007: 188).  
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turf wars between the White House and the (Republican-controlled) Congress in 2015 forcefully underscores 
this observation. The extension of a Congressional invitation to Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu  W in breach of 
all diplomatic protocols  W and an unauthorised open letter to the Iranian government, signed by 47 Senators, 
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 CISADA also included sanctions against the sale of Iranian caviar, carpets and pistachios, which had 
previously been exempted under the Clinton administration.  
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LQ ILQDQFLDO SRZHU DQG LQ LQWHOOLJHQFH >«@ 7KH 86 PD\ QR ORQJHU ZDQW DOZD\V WR EH WKH
ZRUOG¶V SROLFHPDQ EXW LW GRHV ZDQW WR EH WKH ZRUOG¶V SULYDWH LQYHVWLJDWRU´ 24 The 
former high-level US officials Leverett & Leverett (2013) even hold that US secondary 
VDQFWLRQVDUH³DOPRVWFHUWDLQO\´LOOHJDOXQGHU:72UHJXODWLRQVEXWWKDWQRRQHKDVOLWLJDWHG
the question so far (280).25          
 ³7KHIHDURIUHSXWDWLRQDOFRVWV´*LXPHOOL	,YDQZULWH³KDVOHGEDQNVWRDGRSW
cautious behavior in order to avoid paying the costs of defying UN, EU and especially US 
ILQDQFLDOEDQV´The observation that µSV\FKRORJ\¶DQGµUHSXWDWLRQ¶KDYHOHGFRPSDQLHV
WR µRYHU-FRPSO\¶ ZLWK VDQFWLRQV OLVWV IRU IHDU RI SRVVLEOH XQLQWHQGHG YLRODWLRQV ZDV
confirmed by several officials interviewed for this study.26 µ5HSXWDWLRQDO FRVWV¶ KHUH
underlines the perceived need to adhere to such a sanctions regime (out of fear of future 
consequences) and forcefully ties in with points made above on the relational aspect of 
politics and the normative pull towards dominant discourses. Tellingly, the EU has imposed 
harsh unilateral sanctions that went beyond the sanctions regime imposed by the UNSC, such 
DV WKH (8¶V ,UDQ RLO HPEDUJR LQ -XO\  ± ³XQGHU SUHVVXUH IURP WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV´ DV
IRUPHU ,UDQLDQRIILFLDO0RXVDYLDQZULWHV LQKLVERRNDQGFRQWLQXHV³2QHRI WKH
harshest blows to the Iranian financial system came with the US Congress threatening to place 
sanctions on the Belgian-based Society for Worldwide International Financial 
7HOHFRPPXQLFDWLRQ6:,)7XQOHVVWKH\FXWWLHVZLWKDOO,UDQLDQEDQNV>«@8QVXUSUisingly, 
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ĞŶĚĂƌĞŶŽƚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƐŽǀĞƌĞŝŐŶƚǇďƵƚƚŚĞƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨĚŝƐĐŝƉůŝŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?^ƵĐŚĂŶŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶĐĂŶĨƌƵŝƚĨƵůůǇ
be transposed to the international plane. To these factors for US hegemony, Caverley (2007) adds the 
 ‘ŐůŽďĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶ ?ŽĨĚĞĨĞŶƐĞcontractors.  
25
 In order to pre-empt formal counter action by EU member states in the WTO, the US government seemed to 
have found a modus operandi over the application of the ILSA. To this effect, it is worth quoting at length from 
<ĞŶŶĞƚŚ<ĂƚǌŵĂŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )Z^ZĞƉŽƌƚĨŽƌŽŶŐƌĞƐƐ P “dƌĂĚŝƚŝŽŶĂůůǇƐŬĞƉƚŝĐĂůŽĨĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĂƉŽůŝĐǇ
tool, the European Union states opposed ILSA as an extraterritorial application of U.S. law. The EU countries 
threatened formal counter-action in the World Trade Organization (WTO), and in April 1997, the United States 
ĂŶĚƚŚĞhĨŽƌŵĂůůǇĂŐƌĞĞĚƚŽƚƌǇƚŽĂǀŽŝĚĂƚƌĂĚĞĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽǀĞƌ/>^ ?ĂŶĚĂƐĞƉĂƌĂƚĞ “,ĞůŵƐ-ƵƌƚŽŶ ?
Cuba sanctions law, P.L. 104-114). The agreement contributed to a decision by the Clinton Administration to 
waive ILSA sanctions on the first project determined to be in violation: a $2 billion2 contract, signed in 
September 1997, for Total SA of France and its minority partners, Gazprom of Russia and Petronas of Malaysia 
to develop phases 2 and 3 of the 25-ƉŚĂƐĞ^ŽƵƚŚWĂƌƐŐĂƐĨŝĞůĚ ?dŚĞĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂŶŶŽƵŶĐĞĚƚŚĞ “ŶĂƚŝŽŶĂů
ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚ ?ǁĂŝǀĞƌ ?^ĞĐƚŝŽŶ ? ?Đ )ŽĨ/>^ )ŽŶDĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ĂĨƚĞƌƚŚĞhƉůĞĚŐĞĚƚŽŝŶĐƌĞĂƐĞĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞ
United States on non-proliferation and counter-terrorism. The announcement indicated that EU firms would 
ůŝŬĞůǇƌĞĐĞŝǀĞǁĂŝǀĞƌƐĨŽƌĨƵƚƵƌĞƉƌŽũĞĐƚƐƚŚĂƚǁĞƌĞƐŝŵŝůĂƌ ? ?^ŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?h^ƉƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚKďĂŵĂ
enforced US unilateral sanctions also against European companies by way of executive orders (Lohmann 2015). 
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 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ƌĂŶĚĞƐŬŽĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ĞƌůŝŶ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚ^ƚĂƚĞ




the EU yielded to US threats and consequently cut off the Iranian Central Bank from the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOILQDQFLDOV\VWHP´ 
While section 2.2 of chapter 3 will add an important caveat on the importance not to 
conflate the EU and the US in a general µ:HVWHUQEORF¶ approach,27 suffice to mention at this 
point that the present analysis will shed light on Chinese, Russian and Turkish efforts to 
position themselves in opposition to a security culture involving a US-inspired system of 
pressure on Iran whose legitimacy is being called into question by a security culture 
advocated by China, Russia and Turkey. In doing so, however, this research rejects a 
simplistic and easily-adoptable anti-Americanism implicitly underlying some of the literature 
on US dominance that sometimes is at the boundary of analysis and advocacy.28 Against the 
backdrop of the centrality of the US for the Iranian nuclear dossier,29 it will be shown to what 
extent China, Russia and Turkey, in pursuing their Iran policies, are resisting the US as the 
single most dominant actor in the Iranian nuclear crisis and its underlying hegemonic security 
culture. The unprecedented US-Iranian rapprochement following the election of Hassan 
Rouhani DV,UDQ¶VQHZpresident in June 2013 accounts for a remarkable thawing of bilateral 
relations as a precondition for first signs of diplomatic efforts to bear fruit and led to the 
conclusion of a first agreement between the P5+1 and Iran in November 2013. $µSROLWLFDO
frDPHZRUNDJUHHPHQW¶DVDEDVLVIRU,UDQ¶VILQDOQXFOHDUVWDWXVZDVUHDFKHGRQ$SULO
In addition, political dynamics in the Middle East, above all the conflict in Syria and the 
ensuing fanning of confessional radicalisation30 implicitly foster a positive momentum for 
diplomatic progress in the Iran nuclear talks. The historical Syrian-Iranian alliance31 and 
7HKUDQ¶VVWHDGIDVWEDFNLQJRI6\ULD¶V$VVDGPDNHV,UDQDQLQHYLWDEOHµFHQWHURIJUDYLW\¶32 in 
any talks on the future of Syria, Iraq and on strategies to contain transnational violence. But 
talks with Iran on these issues, in turn, is conditioned on progress in the nuclear dossier that 
allows an at least partial rapprochement between the US and Iran (Pieper 2014: 11-12).  
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 This is true if we think of the underlying emancipatory appeal of, e.g., neo-Marxist theorising. Scharzmantel 
 ? ? ? ? ? )ĐĂƵƚŝŽŶƐĂŐĂŝŶƐƚĂ “ƐƚƌĂŝŐŚƚĨŽƌǁĂƌĚĂŶĚƌĞůĂƚŝǀĞůǇďĂŶĂůŝĚĞĂŽĨh^ŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇŝŶƚŚĞƉŽƐƚ-Cold War 
ǁŽƌůĚ ? ? ? )ĂŶĚĐĂůůƐĨŽƌĂĚŝĨĨĞƌĞŶƚŝĂƚĞĚĂƉƉůŝĐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨŶĞŽ-Gramscian thoughts in International Relations.  
29
 On this point, cf. also section 2.1 in chapter 3. 
30
 ^ǇƌŝĂ ?ƐƵŶŐŽǀĞƌŶĞĚƐƉĂĐĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝŶĨŝůƚƌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƉĂƌƚƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ǇƌŝĂŶ ‘ŽƉƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ďǇƌĞůŝŐŝŽƵƐĞǆƚƌĞŵŝƐƚƐŚĂǀĞ
allowed the creation of a fertile breeding ground for sectarian and transnational radicalisation. The rapid 
advance of the so-ĐĂůůĞĚ ‘/ƐůĂŵŝĐ^ƚĂƚĞ ?ŝŶƚŚĞƐƵŵŵĞƌŽĨ ? ? ? ?ŚĂƐƚŽďĞƐĞĞŶŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? 
31
 For an insightful analysis thereof, cf. Milani 2013.  
32
 ^ŽĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚďǇDĂƌŬWĞƌƌǇ ?/ŶƚĞƌǀĞŶƚŝŽŶĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŶĨĞƌĞŶĐĞ ‘dŚĞ^ǇƌŝĂŶƌŝƐŝƐ PĂŶŝƉůŽŵĂĐǇ^ƵĐĐĞĞĚ ? ? ?
organised by the SETA Foundation, Washington D.C., 14 February 2014 (cf. Annex II). 
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An investigation into security cultures crafted, as will be shown, as a reaction to 
dominant US-inspired paradigms on Iran as from 2002 thus also becomes an investigation 
into power shifts at historic turning points for world politics. Non-Western resistance to 
compliance with dominant power structures can eventually usher in a shift in these structures 
themselves. Asking to what extent the US security culture towards Iran itself has changed to 
allow for a US-Iranian reconciliation as from 2013, due to the above-mentioned foreign 
policy motivations, is the subject of another research project.  
5. Discourse and Behaviour: Understanding Chinese, Russian and 
Turkish Iran policies 
 
As laid out in the preceding sections, any emerging new norm or discourse has to have a 
sufficient power so as to frame illegitimate established norms and discourses which it is going 
to replace or alter. The attempt to alter normative frameworks because established norms 
become perceived as inappropriate or illegitimate presupposes a level of discontent or 
disconnect of certain actors with the status quo as represented by other actors. Attention needs 
WREHSDLGWRGLVFXUVLYHIUDPLQJVRIZKRLVFRQVLGHUHGWRµUHYROW¶DJDLQVWDQH[LVWLQJRUGHUDnd 
RQ WKH EDVLV RI ZKDW OHJLWLPDF\ VWDWXV TXR SRZHUV µKHJHPRQLF SRZHUV¶ LQ D FULWLFDO
perspective) in turn deny emerging and possibly conflicting power centers legitimacy and 
UHFRJQLWLRQDFWLQJDVWKH³FXVWRGLDQVRIWKHVHDOVRILQWHUQDWLRQDODSSURYDODQGGLVDSSURYDO´
(Claude 1966: 371-2). An analysis of changing and conflicting conceptions of security 
cultures as an expression of diverging interests and identities of different actors effectively 
becomes an investigation into alternative normative narratives of international relations at 
large.  
Resistance to hegemony, so the power transition paradigm, can lead to counter-
hegemonic struggles E\ZKLFKQHZµSRZHUFHQWHUV¶ ultimately create a system of international 
relations crafted according to their own political conceptions of legitimacy.33 Hegemonic 
transition theories and power transition theories have focused on the extent to which emerging 
new power poles replace existing dominant power structures to create new models of 
governance.34 This literature has regained much attention in the context of ³emerging powerV´ 
and in the debate about who the architects of the future global order are. Here, one needs to be 
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 Ĩ ?ŽŶƚŚŝƐĂůƐŽƐĞĐƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶĐŚĂƉƚĞƌ ?ŽŶĂĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶ ?ůŝƚĞƌĂƚƵƌĞ ? 
34
 On this, cf. also section 4 of chapter 3. Seminal examples discussing global power shifts and prospects for 
international cooperation are Gilpin (1981); Organski (1968); Organski & Kugler (1980); Kugler & Lemke (1996); 
DiCicco & Levy (2003); Jones, B. (2011); Keohane (1984); Kagan (2002, 2012); Kupchan (2012). Cf. also Chan 
(2004b); Lebow & Valentino (2009); Lemke (1997); Vezirgiannidou (2013); Clark (2014).   
37 
 
careful not to read the existence or emergence of a non-Western bloc alternative, acting as a 
monolith of resistance to the Westernisation of discourses, into any alternative voices calling 
for a more differentiated understanding of politics. While Chinese, Russian and Turkish 
foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear programme arguably breathe the ambition to 
SDUWLDOO\ µGH-:HVWHUQLVH¶VHFXULW\FXOWXUHVand discourses toward Iran,35 as will be shown in 
the chapters that follow, one must be careful not to over-theorise on indications of counter-
hegemonic forces struggling to topple the prevailing power system. As mentioned above, 
adherence to an alternative security culture is not assumed to imply a concerted action of 
VWDWHV WR FKDOOHQJH µFRUH FRXQWULHV¶ UHpresenting a hegemonic security culture. This 
dissertation aims to differentiate such a too categorical depiction of systemic power 
transitions by investigating the extent to which Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies 
toward the Iranian nuclear programme stand indicative of alternative security cultures toward 
Iran in a ³process of power de-concentration´ Tessman & Wolfe 2011: 218) in which 
dominant power structures have not been replaced by alternative governance structures (yet). 
This accounts for more continuous and nuanced power shifts in world politics and holds that 
³UHVLVWDQFH LV LPPDQHQW WR SRZHU´ $GLE-Moghaddam 2014: 91). Elsewhere, Adib-
0RJKDGGDP ZULWHV ³6XFK UHVLVWDQFH LV DV SURGXFWLYH DQG SURPLVFXRXV DV SRZHU ZKLFK LV
why both are coterminous ± UHVLVWDQFHLVZKHUHSRZHULV´LELG   
 At this juncture, this dissertation makes a distinction between a discursive and a 
behavioral level in foreign policy behavior to introduce a two-level model to better capture 
such qualified resistance to hegemony: An advocacy for a non-hegemonic security culture on 
a discursive level can be paralleled by compliance with a hegemonic security culture on a 
behavioral level. A seeming discrepancy between both levels can thus be observed.  
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 hŶĚĞƌƐƚŽŽĚŚĞƌĞŝŶĂƐŝŵŝůĂƌůŽŐŝĐĂƐ^ĐŽƚƚ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) ‘ĐŽƵŶƚĞƌ-ĚŝƐĐŽƵƌƐĞ ? ?^ƵĨĨŝĐĞƚŽŶŽƚĞ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ƚŚĂƚ^ĐŽƚƚ
rather focusses on an individual and a class level.  
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Table 1. Two-OHYHO0RGHOWR&DSWXUH³5HVLVWDQFHWR+HJHPRQ\´ 
 
1RUPDWLYH GLYHUJHQFH LQ FRQMXQFWLRQ ZLWK UXOHV GLYHUJHQFH ZRXOG EH µFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶
because it rejects hegemony on both a discursive and a behavioral level. This scenario is not 
represented in the table because the case studies that follow aim to make sense of a perceived 
discrepancy between both levels. In the same logic, it excludes the occurrence of normative 
convergence with rules convergence, because this scenario represents perfect adherence to 
hegemonic policies. Neither of these two scenarios applies to the Iran policies of China, 
5XVVLDDQG7XUNH\VRWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQLV LQWHUHVWHGLQVKHGGLQJOLJKWRQµDPELYDOHQW¶FDVHV
where the discursive level need not be a function of the behaYLRUDO OHYHO ZKHUH D VWDWH¶V
foreign policy displays incoherence, in other words. A state can advocate for a non-
hegemonic security culture discursively, but still comply with a hegemonic security on a 
behavioral level. What an actor does may not correspond with how he acts. µ1RUPV¶UHODWHWR
the discursive level as this research proceeds from the assumption that actors convey, talk 
DERXW DQG UHIHU WR QRUPV DV µHYDOXDWLYH VWDQGDUGV¶ WR WDNH XS .DW]HQVWHLQ¶V WHUPLQRORJ\
(1996: 21). Discourse differs where HYDOXDWLRQV SUHVXSSRVH GLYHUJLQJ QRUPV µ5XOHV¶ WKHQ
UHODWH WR WKH EHKDYLRUDO OHYHO LQ WKH ZD\ WKH\ FRQGLWLRQ DQG VWUXFWXUH DFWRUV¶ µFRJQLWLYH
VWDQGDUGV¶LELGPartial acceptance of hegemonic structures on a behavioral level even when 
conveying normative divergence on a discursive level may be predicated upon a level of 
perceived political and material dependence on the US. The latter observation and the extent 
to which it can be discerned in the case studies under investigation here will be qualified in 
the empirical chapters for Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies, respectively. 
 On a theoretical note, however, it is felt that an important parenthesis on the 
compatibility of materialist motivations with the overall theoretical framework as laid out 
          
         Discursive level                          
     
 Behavioral level 
Adherence to security 
culture 
Advocacy for non-hegemonic 
security culture  
Compliance with a U.S.-
inspired hegemonic security 
culture 
Degree of resistance to 
hegemony 
Normative divergence with 
hegemony 




above should be inserted at this point. Rather than subscribing to either a purely neorealist 
analysis where social mediation and ideational factors in foreign policy are treated as 
HSLSKHQRPHQDORUWRDQH[FOXVLYHO\µWKLFN¶VRFLDOFRQVWUXFWLYLVWDngle where the assumption 
RIµLGHDVDOOWKHZD\GRZQ¶GRHVQRWDOORZIRUPDWHULDOIRUFHVWRSOD\DSURPLQHQWUROHWKLV
dissertation is sympathetic to the theoretical position of moderate constructivism where 
material predispositions as well as the aspect of social mediation are recognised as playing a 
UROHLQDVWDWH¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GHFLVLRQ-making. The idea of social mediation cannot exist in 
³DPDWHULDOYDFXXP´HLWKHULQWKHZRUGVRI.RZHUW	/HJUR-1). Sørensen (2008) 
contends that 5REHUW &R[¶V 1HR-Gramscianism is an example of a theoretical framework 
DFNQRZOHGJLQJERWKPDWHULDODQGLGHDWLRQDOIRUFHVDQGIRUPXODWHV³,QWHUQDWLRQDOQRUPV
affect and shape the exercise of political and economic power and are themselves affected by 
HFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDOSRZHU´ $VZRUNHGRXWLQVHFWLRQDERYH*UDPVFL¶VWKHRU\RI
hegemony presupposes the contemporaneous forces of theory (ideas) and practice 
(institutions) ± ZKLFK*UDPVFL¶VELRJUDSKHU*LXVHSSH)LRULFDOOVDµ6RFUDWLF0HWKRG¶ (2013: 
142; cf. also 334-35). Ideas turn into practical forces, shape and change consensual orders, 
and vice versa. Adopting a purely materialist or purely idealist framework to analyse politics 
and policies, in other words, would make no sense if social and material factors co-determine 
each other (cf. Reus-Smit 2012: 532; cf. also Sørensen 2008; Nau 2002; Katzenstein & 
Okawara 2001/02; Katzenstein & Sil 2004).         
 It is this conception of correlational complementarity that allows for an analysis of 
divergences between a discursive and a behavioral level. ,Q OLQH ZLWK D µWKLFN¶ VRFLDO
FRQVWUXFWLYLVW WKLQNLQJ WKH FULWLTXHPD\EHEURXJKW IRUZDUG WKDW µHYHU\WKLQJ LV VRFLDO¶ DQG
that discourse in itself already constitutes behavior. This reading has been emphasised by 
+DEHUPDV¶(1981) writings on speech acts as communicative action. But if we are to accept 
that interests can be material as well as social, it would be an ontological fallacy to hold that 
discourse always is an empirical act. Beyond semantic hairsplitting, it is perhaps instructive to 
WKLQNRI WKHFRQFHSWRIµGRXEOHVSHDN¶36 According to this concept, what an actor says does 
not always correspond with how he acts. An actor, in other words, can fall short of acting 
upon the discourse he conveys. It is in this understanding that the present dissertation makes a 
distinction between a discursive and a behavioral level of foreign policy to arrive at a more 
FRPSUHKHQVLYHXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIDQDFWRU¶VVHFXULW\FXOWXUH    
 The XQGHUVWDQGLQJ DQG SHUFHSWLRQ RI D VWDWH¶V VWDQGLQJ LQ µWKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHP¶
                                                          
36
 The term is often traced back to GĞŽƌŐĞKƌǁĞůů ?ƐŶŽǀĞůNineteen Eighty-Four, published in 1949. While it 
ĚŽĞƐŶŽƚĂƉƉĞĂƌŝŶƚŚĞďŽŽŬĂƐƐƵĐŚ ?ƚŚĞƚĞƌŵŝƐĐŽŶĐĞƉƚƵĂůůǇĐůŽƐĞƚŽƚŚĂƚŽĨ ‘ĚŽƵďůĞƚŚŝŶŬ ? ?ǁŚŝĐŚŝƐƵƐĞĚŝŶ
the book.  
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may lead states to adopt foreign policies that they would not otherwise adopt if the system 
were such that interaction effects did not matter; if states were to regard themselves as 
LVRODWHGDFWRUVLQRWKHUZRUGV%DVHGRQDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKH86¶SRZHUSRVLWLRQDQGLWV
ability WR HQIRUFH XQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQV RQ WKLUG FRXQWULHV¶ FRPSDQLHV IRU H[DPSOH &KLQD
Russia and Turkey may adopt policies that are not beneficial economically (e.g. reduction of 
Iranian oil imports). The pursuance of materialist foreign policy objectives thus takes place at 
least next to ideational motivations; or, more often than not, as the outcome of implicit foreign 
policy identity perceptions and conceptions about legitimacy. As social context always 
FRGHWHUPLQHVDVWDWH¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\EHKDYLRUµLQWHUHVWV¶DUHLGHDWLRQDODVZHOODVPDWHULDO
$V7KRPDV'LH]IRUPXODWHV³7KHSRLQW LVQRW WKDWQRUPDWLYHSRZHULVQRWVWUDWHJLF
but that strategic interests and norms cannot be easily distinguished and that the assumption of 
a normative sphere withoXW LQWHUHVWV LV LQ LWVHOI QRQVHQVLFDO´  The advocacy for 
resistance to hegemony in Chinese, Russian and Turkish security cultures can therefore be 
accompanied by an awareness of material dependence that makes these states (temporarily) 
accept foreign policy decisions as the expression of norms of hegemonic structures (such as 
intrusive sanctions regimes). In the long-term, however, their resistance to hegemonic security 
cultures may reflect on their aspiration to bring about a non-hegemonic understanding of 




This chapter has laid out the theoretical framework adopted for the analysis in this 
dissertation. It has been argued that any analysis of security discourses and perceptions 
toward Iran needs to problematise underlying power structures not only in security 
governance but in international relations at large. This study proceeds from the assumption 
that both policy and academic discourse is influenced, shaped and reconfirmed by powerful 
actors. Especially with a view to the politically loaded discourse on the Iranian nuclear 
programme, it appears paramount to understand politics surrounding Iran as a clash of 
narratives that needs to be deconstructed with the aim to disentangle deep-seated contentions 
about legitimacy in international relations. This chapter has thus situated the research 
SURMHFW¶V WKHRUHWLFDOFRQWULEXWLRQVZLWKLQ WKHµVHFRQGZDYH¶RI LQWHUQDWLRQDOQRUPV OLWHUDWXUH
that understands norms as essentially contested narratives.     
 It is the contestedness of norms in analyses of international politics that provides the 
first key to an understanding of Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies. While China, 
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Turkey and Russia are driven by myriad factors and motivations in pursuing their respective 
multifaceted Iran policies, the case studies in this dissertation will carve out the existence of 
common themes of diplomacy and foreign policy principles on which their positions converge 
and on which they potentially differ from a dominant security culture on Iran, shaped and 
reconfirmed by hegemonic power structures. Hegemony is shaped and sustained by the 
correlating forces of consent and coercion, and this chapter has worked out how norm 
contestation is an act of resistance to a consensual hegemonic order. It will be shown how 
Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies are partially crafted and perceived as 
countering the Iran policies of other powers, most prominently the US as the single most 
dominant actor in the Iranian nuclear dossier. Drawing on a neo-Gramscian understanding of 
hegemony (Cox 1996: 97f.; 135f.; Gill, S. 1993, 2003; Rupert 1995, 2000; Pijl 1984), it will 
be analysed how China, Russia and Turkey interact with the material, ideational and 
institutional dimension of US-inspired hegemonic power structures. Here, a major caveat 
should sound a note of caution that is being reflected in the theoretical framework adopted: 
%HLQJDZDUHRIWKHGDQJHURIWKHµK\SHWUDS¶&DODEUHVHWKDWDQDQDO\VLVRIDOWHUQDWLYH
power centers as the harbinger of global power transitions might fall into, this study aims to 
FKDOOHQJHWKHDVVXPSWLRQWKDWµULVLQJSRZHUV¶DUHE\GHILQLWLRQDOZD\VUHYLVLRQLVWDVDVVXPHG
by, e.g., the power transition and hegemonic transition theory. ,WZLOOEHVKRZQKRZµULVLQJ
SRZHUV¶37, in a process of ³power de-concentration´ (Tessman & Wolfe 2011: 218) where no 
alternative world order has replaced the US-dominated governance architecture yet, resist 
hegemony and advocate for alternative security cultures, but still remain bound to the US in 
many ways. -XVWDVµUHVLVWDQFH¶LVQHYHUDEVROXWHSRZHUFKDQJHVWDNHSODFHJUDGXDOO\DQGLV
KDVEHHQVKRZQKRZµUHVLVWDQFH¶DVDTXDOLILHGIRUPRIGLVDJUHement provides a more suitable 
FRQFHSWXDOLQVWUXPHQWWRFDSWXUHVXFKSRZHUGLIIXVLRQWKDQµFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶Drawing on 
neo-Gramscian scholarship and situated in the literature on international norm dynamics, it 
will be analysed how Chinese, Turkish and Russian Iran policies are indicative of resistance 
to hegemonic structures. To that end, a two-level model to analyse foreign policy has been 
introduced. A discursive foreign policy level can be paralleled by a behavioural level that falls 
short of acting upon discursively propagated norms. Analysing which factors account for 
&KLQD¶V 5XVVLD¶V DQG 7XUNH\¶V partially diverging positioning on a discursive and a 
behavioral level, this dissertation will answer the research question how Chinese, Russian and 
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1. Introduction  
 
After the theoretical framework adopted in this research design has been outlined in the 
previous chapter, the purpose of this chapter is to give an overview of the methodology used 
in the investigation into Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian 
nuclear programme. In analyzing different approaches to the Iranian nuclear programme and 
with the aim to disentangle underlying conceptions of security cultures, analyses of Chinese, 
Russian and Turkish foreign policies serve as investigations into Iran policies that are 
different froPµWKH:HVW¶'HSDUWLQJIURPWKHJXLGLQJUHVHDUFKSX]]OHXQGHUO\LQJWKLVVWXG\
analyses of the foreign policies of China, Russia and Turkey serve as case studies to illustrate 
different approaches to the Iranian nuclear programme and the existence or possible 
emergence of security cultures resisting hegemony. The research design adopts an integrative 
comparative case study design that combines analyses of Chinese, Russian and Turkish 
foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear programme on a within-case level, respectively, 
with an eventual cross-case comparison. Research methods on the within-case level are 
process-tracing, qualitative data analysis as well as qualitative expert interviewing and 
participant observation. The analyses of the respective case studies then allows for the 
drawing of inferences about security cultures on the cross-case (macro) level.   
 Before each of these methods will be elaborated in detail, a preliminary remark on the 
nexus between theory and methodological designs precedes at this point. A relational theory 
of reference underlying much of critical theorising and as also adopted in this research has 
important methodological implications. While the interpretative camp of qualitative 
researchers occasionally prefers to speak of constitution rather than causation in making 
inferences about the empirical world (Wendt 1999: 85), this dissertation proceeds from the 
assumption that analytical eclecticism need not stand in contradiction with methodological 
rigour. While method follows from pre-existing theoretical understandings of the world, a 
mutually informing process between method and theory accounts for a constant dialogue 
between evidence and argument on the basis of a convincingly crafted research design. The 





much as material capabilities do.38 :KLOH WKHRUHWLFDO VRSKLVWLFDWLRQ DQG D FHUWDLQ µSOD\ful 
approach to creative theorisLQJ¶39 are sometimes traded for an exclusive tilt toward 
methodological craftiness, this dissertation aims to combine theoretical interpretations as 
outlined in the previous chapter with a robust methodology, the latter of which will be the 
subject of the following pages.  
2. Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian 
nuclear programme: Case studies of security cultures toward Iran 
2.1 Case selection strategy and scope conditions  
 
In this dissertation, the case study selection derives from an empirical dimension that is to be 
explained by the scope conditions of the case study research design detailed in the following 
paragraphs.40 These derive from pre-existing theoretical conceptions as laid out in the 
previous chapter that inform and narrow down the possible range of scope conditions.41 Scope 
conditions delineate the population and specify the universe of cases to be analysed (Walker 
& Cohen 1985). If the scope conditions adopted apply to all cases analysed, a degree of 
homogeneity can be assumed that is the basis for inferences about correlation in comparative 
case studies. Suffice to recall that the orientation of epistemological pluralism as advocated 
for by scientific realism allows for a more reflectivist interpretation of the evidence found 
through process-tracing on a within-case level in line with the theoretical framework as 
outlined in the previous chapter with the more general case study methodology detailed 
below. The following paragraphs will outline the scope conditions for the choice of case 
studies in this research project as derived from the theoretical framework that was presented 
in the previous chapter. 
Ǯ-ǯ. Derived from a theoretical framework examining 
SRZHUVKLIWVLQDSURFHVVRIµSRZHUGH-FRQFHQWUDWLRQ¶42 this study analyses Chinese, Russian 
DQG 7XUNLVK ,UDQ SROLFLHV DV WKUHH FDVH VWXGLHV RI µQRQ-:HVWHUQ¶ IRUHLJQ Solicies towards a 
contested issue area. A focus often placed in the scholarly literature on foreign policies of 
VWDWHVOLNH&KLQD7XUNH\DQG5XVVLDLVWKHLUSHUFHLYHGLQKHUHQWµQRQ-Western-QHVV¶&KDSWHU
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 On the use of case studies cf. i.a. Rohlfing (2012: chap. 1); Eckstein (1975); Seawright & Gerring (2008); 
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 This also corresponds to an understanding that theory should come before method. 
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 Cf. section 4 of chapter 3.  
45 
 
3 gives an indication of some of the dividing lines in the literature on foreign policy analysis 
of China, Russia and Turkey.43 Underlying many analyses of their foreign policies is a 
bifurcation into two thinkable scenarios: Either these states socialise into a Western-
dominated world, including its governance structures, or they will herald a power transition 
DQG µHPHUJH¶ DV FKDOOHQJHUV WR WKLV :HVWHUQ-dominated world.44 Acknowledging that the 
µHPHUJLQJ SRZHU¶ ODEHO has been criticised on substantial and conceptual grounds, this 
dissertation aims to shed light on the working relationship between powers that have created, 
FUDIWHG DQG VXVWDLQHG WKH SUHYDLOLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO JRYHUQDQFH DUFKLWHFWXUH DQG D µKLVWRULF
EORF¶ LQ*UDPVFLDQ WHUPLQRORJ\DQG WKRVHSRZHUV WKDWZLOORQHZD\RU WKHRWKHUSOD\DQ
important role in the gradual modification thereof. While this is not to argue that China, 
Russia and Turkey act in a concerted manner to accelerate the demise of prevalent (security) 
governance structures, it will be shown in this research how their respective foreign policies 
share commonalities in terms of normative conceptions of how international relations should 
be governed. With structural imbalances built into a system that was defined by the powerful 
position of certain :HVWHUQVWDWHVµULVLQJSRZHUV¶will have an interest in advocating security 
cultures that challenge such power asymmetries. Aware of the empirical criticism brought 
IRUZDUGDJDLQVW WKH µHPHUJLQJSRZHU¶ VWDWXV WKLV VWudy argues for a re-conceptualisation of 
the future working relationshLSEHWZHHQIRUPHUKHJHPRQLFSRZHUVDQGµHPHUJLQJSRZHUV¶
+RZHYHUPLVSODFHGWKHVHPDQWLFVRIWKHODEHOµULVLQJ¶RUµHPHUJLQJ¶WKLVVFRSHFRQGLWLRQLV
crucial for selecting cases that have a stake in formulating and discursively shaping power 
shifts, for µQRUPV-VKDSHUVLQWKHPDNLQJ¶       
 $VPXFKDVµKHJHPRQ\¶DQGµUHVLVWDQFH¶DV WKHSUHYLRXVFKDSWHUKDVFDUYHGRXWDUH
never absolute and in a continuous process of interaction, an analysis of Chinese, Russian and 
Turkish respective foreign policies tRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH EHFRPHV DQ
examination of non-Western foreign policies in processes of interaction and inter-penetration 
between allegedly exclusive camps. However, the theoretical interest in analysing resistance 
to hegemony presupposes a case selection of states that contest a US-LQVSLUHG µKHJHPRQLF
EORF¶ WKDW LV ODUJHO\ Western-dominated. While the foreign policy of a European state may 
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 Pertinent to much theorising on Turkish foreign policy, for example, is the reading that Turkey represents a 
 ‘ďƌŝĚŐĞ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶƚŚĞtĞƐƚĞƌŶǁŽƌůĚĂŶĚĂƌĞŐŝŽŶĂŶĚĐƵůƚƵƌĞƚŚĂƚŝƐŶŽƚtĞƐƚĞƌŶ ?/ŶƚŚŝƐ context, Barry Buzan 
et al. have coined the labĞů ‘tĞƐƚĞƌŶŝƐƚŝĐ ?ƚŽĐŚĂƌĂĐƚĞƌŝƐe states like Turkey or Japan that breathe the ambition 
to be perceived as a, if not Western country, then at least as being close to its political cultures (Buzan & Segal 
1998; Buzan & Diez 1999: 49).  
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 ŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨƉŽǁĞƌƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƐĚƵĞƚŽƚŚĞĞŵĞƌŐĞŶĐĞŽĨŶĞǁ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌƉŽůĞƐ ?ŝŶĐůƵĚĞSchiffer & Shorr (2009); 
Sakwa (2012); Hurrell (2006); MacFarlane (2006); Armijo (2007); Brawley (2007); Hancock (2007); Sotero & 
Armijo (2007); Morris (2011); Patrick (2010); Phillips (2008); Serfaty (2011); Subacchi (2008); Rynning & 
Ringsmore (2008); Vezirgiannidou (2013); Lieber (2014); Laidi (2012, 2014); Nel (2010). Cf. also section 4 of 
chapter 3.  
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theoretically equally be an example of a counter-hegemonic security culture, the empirical 
track record RI(XURSHDQQHJRWLDWLRQVZLWK,UDQDQGHVSHFLDOO\WKH(8¶VµRYHU-FRPSOLDQFH¶LQ
Iran sanctions rules out such an analysis for the purpose of this study already on factual 
grounds,45 DQGLWZLOOEHVKRZQDWDODWHUSRLQWLIDQGKRZµUHVLVWDQFH¶FDQWDNHSODce within 
µKLVWRULF EORFV¶ 0RVW LPSRUWDQWO\ KRZHYHU WKH VFRSH FRQGLWLRQ µQRQ-:HVWHUQ¶ LV GLFWDWHG
already by the theoretical interest of an examination of cases that are non-Western foreign 
policies as an investigation into security cultures crafted in RSSRVLWLRQWRµ:HVWHUQ¶QRUPDWLYH
frameworks.  
Political dependence on the US. This is a condition that differs across actors and policy 
domains. Political dependence relates to the power position of the US in the international 
(economic and political) system and is closely intertwined with an understanding of 
dominance that renders the US unavoidable to deal with. As laid out in the previous chapter, 
the US is acknowledged as the prevalent hegemonic point of reference whose preservation 
depends on the acceptance thereof by other states. This is the consent that actors give ± tacitly 
or explicitly ± to established power structures without which the latter could well come into 
being, but could not be sustained for long. Such an acceptance, as elaborated upon in the 
theoretical chapter, presupposes a level of dependence that lets states subscribe to dominant 
QRUPDWLYHIUDPHZRUNV7XUNH\¶VSROLWLFDOGHSHQGHQFHRQWhe US already is a more formalised 
relation due to (NATO) alliance structures and Cold War histoULFDOOHJDFLHV%XWDOVR5XVVLD¶V
DQG &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV KDYH ZLGHO\ EHHQ DQDO\VHG DV EDODQFLQJ DFWV EHWZHHQ SROLFLHV
that were not appreciated by the US and foreign policy stances that were more 
accommodating to the US and arguably crafted in reaction to or anticipation of US perception 
RI &KLQHVH DQG 5XVVLDQ SROLFLHV 5XVVLD¶V TXHVW IRU D QHZ LQWHUQDWLRQDO LGHQWLW\ DIWHU WKH
collapse of the Soviet Union underwent distinct phases of re-orientation that always involved 
a re-balancing of relations with the US (cf. Belopolsky 2009: 14-28; Casier 2006; Katz 2002; 
MacFarlane 2006: 44f.; Sakwa 2002; Trenin 2006; Tsygankov 2007; Mendras 2012; 
Nizameddin 2013: 52f.; Shakleina 2013: 166-174).      
 $QGDOVR&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFULVHHVVHQWLDOO\ZDVDQRSHQLQJ-up to and adherence to an 
international economic system that was created and dominated by the US after 1945. This 
opening-XS RI &KLQD WR D µV\VWHP¶ GHWHUPLQHG WR D ODUJH H[WHQW E\ WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV ZDV
XVKHUHG LQ XQGHU 'HQJ ;LDRSLQJ¶V OHDGHUVKLS DV IURP , but preconditioned on the re-
opening of US-Chinese relations under Nixon and Mao in 1972 (Kissinger 2011). Pertinent to 
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DQ DQDO\VLV RI IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV WRZDUG ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH IRU WKLV UHVHDUFK WKH
sanctions regime in place against Iran, as laid out before, is the epitome of a hegemonic power 
constellation: While UN-backed international sanctions require the consent of the UNSC 
permanent members China and Russia, the US unilateral sanctions regime imposes penalties 
on third country companies entertaining business relations with Iran ± so decided and adopted 
by a single state outside of UN structures (Lohmann 2013). The fact that China, Russia and 
Turkey, albeit grudgingly, accept and comply with parts of such an elaborate system of 
µH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLVHG¶86OHJLVODWLRQVXJJHVWVDVXEVWDQWLDOOHYHORISROLWLFDOGHSHQGHQFHRQWKH
US on the part of these countries, and therefore becomes an important further scope condition 
for case studies examining the friction between the advocacy for security cultures that resist 
this hegemony and the factual adherence to prevailing hegemonic structures. The case studies 
WKDWIROORZZLOODQDO\VHKRZDQGZK\WKLVLVWKHFDVHDQGKRZµSROLWLFDOGHSHQGHQFH¶RQWKH
US need not exclude resistance to US policies on other occasions.  
Interest in relations with Iran. Analyses of foreign policies that find themselves in an area of 
friction with the US over the Iranian nuclear programme condition a level of interest in 
bilateral relations with Iran. This is another scope condition that stems from the theoretical 
understanding of security cultures as expressions of sometimes conflicting normative 
frameworks in international relations: If a case study aims to examine the existence of 
security cultures resisting hegemony, there needs to be an issue at stake that can serve as an 
H[HPSODU\µHPSLULFDOHQWUDQFHSRLQW¶WRPDNHVHQVHRIZLGHUFRQFHSWLRQVRIKRZLQWHUQDWLRQDO
relations should be governed. This would be precluded, however, if China, Russia and Turkey 
did not have a stake for entertaining a disagreement about Iran policies; if they simply did not 
care about Iran and its nuclear programme, in other words. China, Russia and Turkey have 
economic, geopolitical, and broader ideational interests in relations with Iran, as will be 
FDUYHGRXWLQWKHDQDO\VLVWKDWIROORZVµ$QLQWHUHVWLQUHODWLRQVZLWK,UDQ¶LQWKHZLGHVWVHQVH
is therefore a complimentary scope condition to the previous one: For an analysis of foreign 
SROLFLHV WRZDUG ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH WR SURGXFH WKHRUHWLFDOOy and empirically 
meaningful inferences about the existence of security cultures resisting hegemony, it must be 
JLYHQWKDWWKHFDVHVDQDO\VHGKDYHERWKDOHYHORIGHSHQGHQFHRQµKHJHPRQLFVWUXFWXUHV¶DQG
stakes in the upholding of relations with Iran. It will be shown how these partially centrifugal 
forces oftentimes present a policy dilemma for China, Russia and Turkey.  
Leverage in the nuclear dossier. This final scope condition directly derives from the 




permanent UNSC members and part of the P5+1 format. The importance of these two states 
for the Iranian nuclear negotiations has become obvious with the referral of the Iran file from 
the IAEA to the UNSC in 2006 at the latest, where sanctions resolutions require the consent 
RI 0RVFRZ DQG %HLMLQJ 7KH UHVXOWLQJ EDODQFLQJ SRVLWLRQ EHWZHHQ WKH µ:HVWHUQ FDPS¶ DQG
Iran theoretically gives them what Bercovitch & Schneider (2000) in their review of the 
PHGLDWLRQOLWHUDWXUHFDOO³OHYHUDJHSRZHUSRWHQWLDODQGLQIOXHQFH´46  
 Turkey, the third case study, is often portrayed as having the potential to act as a 
µIDFLOLWDWRU¶RItalks, being embedded in Western strategic security cultures, and, at the same 
time, a geographic neighbour of Iran that, throughout history, has learnt the necessity to 
maintain good-QHLJKERXUO\UHODWLRQZLWK,UDQ³&XOWXUDODQGJHRJUDSKLFDOSUR[LPLW\WRat least 
RQH RI WKH FRQIOLFW SDUWLHV´  LV DFNQRZOHGJHG E\ %HUFRYLWFK 	 6FKQHLGHU  DV D
SRVVLEOH IDFWRU WKDW FDQ LQFUHDVH D PHGLDWRU¶V DFFHSWDQFH ,W LV WKLV SRVLWLRQ WKDW OHG VRPH
analysts to see Turkey in a bridge-building function conducive to diplomatic de-escalation. 
µ0HGLDWLRQ¶ LQ GLSORPDF\ KDV EHHQ GHILQHG LQ GLIIHUHQW ZD\V DQG LWV SUHFRQGLWLRQV DQG
required components have been discussed controversially (Bercovitch 1992: 8; Moore 2003: 
8; Blake & Mouton 1985: 15; Kleiboer 1998; Herrberg 2008). Underlying many analyses of 
the effectiveness of mediation in different conflict situations is the view that mediators should 
EHLPSDUWLDOEHLQDSRVLWLRQWRLQIOXHQFHWKHFRQIOLFWLQJSDUWLHV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRUEHKDYLRUDQG
(as a precondition for the latter) have credibility as a mediating party. The fact that Turkey is 
a NATO member and a regional neighbor of Iran inspired and informed theorisations of 
Turkey as a potential facilitator of talks and conduit of messages between Iran and the West, 
rather than as a fully-fledged mediator.47 The idea of facilitation is distinct from mediation in 
that a facilitating third party should not interfere in the process (Fisher 1972; Burton 1969). 
The perception of Turkish facilitation was given life with, e.g., the choice of Turkey as a 
venue for negotiations between the EU3 and their Iranian counterparts, and between the 
extended format of P5+1 and Iran. And with the phase of remarkable shuttle diplomacy in 
2009 and 2010 that led to the signing of the Tehran declaration in May 2010, Turkey had 
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clearly engaged in mediatory diplomatic efforts.48 The chapter on Turkish Iran policy will 
expand on these points. It follows from the theoretical interest in security cultures that resist 
hegemony that an investigation into foUHLJQ SROLFLHV WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH
becomes more meaningful if the foreign policies examined do have a certain level of 
µOHYHUDJH¶RYHUWKHGLUHFWLRQRIQXFOHDUWDONVZLWK,UDQWKDWPD\RUPD\QRWEHXVHGWRJLYH
expression to a security conception alternative of one advocated for by hegemonic structures.
 The case study selection thus derives from an empirical, yet theory-informed 
dimension. Given the above scope conditions, intentional case selection is a viable strategy. 
The cases are in and oIWKHPVHOYHVµVXEVWDQWLDOO\LQWHUHVWLQJ¶FDVHV7KHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKH
foreign policies analysed represent security cultures resisting hegemony is necessarily 
H[SUHVVHGDVµGLIIHUHQFHVLQ GHJUHH¶DQGFDQQRWEHFDWHJRULVed as positive (counter-hegemonic 
security cultures present) or negative (counter-hegemonic security culture absent) with regard 
to the outcome.49 This is also consistent with and dictated by the theoretical understanding 
outlined in Chapter 1 that power shifts in international relations take place gradually.  
2.2 Integrating the within-case with the cross-case level 
 
The cross-case analysis eventually will allow me to contribute to theoretical insights pertinent 
to an understanding of Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies as the expression of 
security cultures resisting hegemony. A mutually informing process between theory and the 
phenomena found in empirical research accounts for an appropriate blending of evidence with 
argument.50 The indeterminacy problem, according to which several causes can explain the 
same outcome (Collier et al. 2004: 47), can arguably be diminished by good theoretical 
explanations that make sense of the collected evidence and strengthens the cross-case 
comparison.           
 The small-N problem, which in essence states that due to the small number of cases 
studied, the generation of valid causal inferences is precluded or at least constrained, can 
arguably be circumvented in such a research design by a two-step approach of within-case 
process-tracing, followed by a cross-case comparison of the findings generated in the 
respective within-case studies. Such an integrative case study design allows one to generate 
causal inferences on two levels of analysis and to make comparisons on the basis of the cross-
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case scores.51 The advantage of a small-N case study selection lies in the possibility to take 
contextual power structures into account (Gerring 2007b: 172; Lieberson 1991; Mahoney 
2000; King et al. 1994: 208f.), an approach which is appropriate to the research question of a 
particular geopolitical constellation underlying this dissertation.       
 The aim in this study is thus essentially twofold. In a first step, Chinese, Russian and 
Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear programme are analysed respectively, 
standing as three in-depth analyses (within-case level) of foreign policies of three different 
states (China, Russia, Turkey) toward a particular geopolitical issue (the Iranian nuclear 
programme). In a second step, which will be the comparative aspect of this study, Chinese, 
Russian and Turkish foreign policies will ultimately be analysed with a view to overlapping 
interests that will have been carved out in the foregoing analyses (cross-case level). This 
second step fits well with the comparative methodology adopted in this research and therewith 
blends in-GHSWKDQDO\VHVRI WKH WKUHHFDVH FRXQWULHV¶ UHVSHFWLYH ,UDQSROLFLHVZLWKDEURDGHU
analysis of several cases in the search for general trends on a cross-case level. The 
comparative case study method has a long-standing history and is widely used as a viable 
strategy to generate causal inferences from small-N analyses (Lijphart 1971; Hall 2003; 
Mahoney & Rueschemeyer 2003; Savolainen 1994; Lieberson 1991, 1994; Collier 1993; 
Ragin 1987).           
 Here, the question of representativeness cannot be ignored when inferring from the 
FDVHFRXQWULHV¶VWDQFHWowards Iran to broader generalisations about security governance and 
the non-proliferation regime at large (Fleetwood 2010: 132; Ekström 2010: 80f.). Therefore, 
WKHPDLQIRFXVOLHVRQDFULWLFDODQDO\VLVRI&KLQD¶V5XVVLD¶VDQG7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLFLHVLQ
a particular situation of turbulent geopolitics. I am aware of the question of representativeness 
in inferring to this being a typical case study for the state of non-Western security conceptions 
and non-proliferation policies in the 21st century (Seawright & Gerring 2008). Much of the 
TXDOLWDWLYHVFKRODUO\ZRUNDQDO\VLQJµSDUWLFXODUFDVHV¶DGKHUHVWRDFHUWDLQ³FDXVHV-of-HIIHFWV´
approach to explanatiRQ DV FRPSDUHG WR WKH ³HIIHFWV-of-FDXVHV´ DSSURDFK XQGHUO\LQJ PXFK
quantitative work (Mahoney & Goertz 2006: 230f.).52 This dissertation analyses the foreign 
policies of the three case countries toward a particular issue area and is thus interested in 
understanding outcomes in particular cases. It is hoped that the cross-case comparison triggers 
a fruitful dialogue between the empirical data and the theoretical interpretation that enriches 
our understanding of non-Western voices in the substance studied here. Blending evidence 
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with argument, this dissertation explains Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies but 
equally aims to make a contribution to our broader understanding of non-Western foreign 
policies in the non-proliferation and the security governance realm that resist dominant power 
VWUXFWXUHV $V WKH WKUHH FDVHV DQDO\VHG KHUH DUH µVXEVWDQWLDOO\ LQWHUHVWLQJ¶ LQ WKHPVHOYHV LQ
view of the scope conditions laid out above, the question whether generalisation of the 
findings to similar cases is possible is an empirical one. On the basis of the case selection 
strategy adopted here, the interest lies more in a discipline-configurative (cross-) case study 
and less in generalisations to similar cases. While there is often a trade-off involved between 
the comparability of cases and the generalizability of the inferences made from a cross-case 
comparison (Rohlfing 2012: 126), the focus of the case study research design in this 
dissertation lies on a longitudinal within-unit comparison (policies toward the Iranian nuclear 
programme in a given timeframe), so the main interest lies in increasing the comparability of 
cases.53   
3. Identification of research methods 
 
Now that the case study research design, including the motivation for the combination of the 
within-case with the cross-case level has been laid out, the following sections will serve to 
identify the appropriate research methods for the practical carrying out of the case studies. 
The primary research methods will comprise process-tracing as well as qualitative data 
analysis of policy documents (primary sources, e.g. declassified government documents, 
international organisations documents, press releases, transcripts of speeches), memoirs of 
decision-makers, policy briefs and the scholarly literature, supplemented by semi-structured 
elite interviews with experts and decision-makers. Process-tracing is used as a research 
method on the within-case level. The identification of themes by way of constant comparison 
allows for the scoring of causes on the cross-case level.  
3.1 Process-tracing and qualitative data analysis 
 
Process-tracing is a method that enables the researcher to disarm many of the small-N 
problems associated with case studies. Process-tracing is an appropriate method to study how 
and why something has evolved over time (Van Evera 1997: 64). Process-tracing enables the 
researcher to look for causal mechanisms in single case studies, allowing us to make reasoned 
inferences on the basis of their observable implications (cf. Gerring 2007a; George & Bennett 
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2005: chap 10; Hall 2006; Mahoney 2000: 412; Brady 2004; Beach & Pedersen 2012; Collier 
(2011). In other words, this method allows for the reconstruction of a historical process via 
WKHFROOHFWLRQRISURFHVVREVHUYDWLRQV7KHVHDUHGHILQHGDVDQ³LQVLJKWRU piece of data that 
provides information about context, process or mechanism, and that contributes distinctive 
OHYHUDJHLQFDXVDOLQIHUHQFH³&ROOLHUHWDO,QWKHSUHVHQWUHVHDUFKSURFHVV-tracing as a 
method looks at the way that China, Russia and Turkey have positioned themselves toward 
the Iranian nuclear programme through an analysis of concrete foreign policy decisions by 
way of constant comparison of the data used (cf. Savin-Baden & Major 2013: 436-37). A 
reconstruction of the way that Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the 
Iranian nuclear programme have been crafted relies on the collection of observations that will 
be found in policy documents, briefs, legislative documents and through the analyses of 
process observations in qualitative interviews. Informed by the underlying theoretical 
framework and determined by the empirical substance matter, such process observations can 
be voting behaviours in relevant international organisations such as the IAEA or the UN 
Security Council, revealing trade flows, negotiation positions, remarks delivered in Security 
Council meetings, and press releases, among others. As these need to be constantly 
interpreted in light of the theory and in the framework of broader explanatory mechanisms, 
suFK DQ HQGHDYRU LV LQKHUHQWO\ FRPSOH[ DQG FRQVWLWXWHV PRUH WKDQ D IRUP RI µSUHWHQWLRXV
MRXUQDOLVP¶54           
 Employing constant comparison as a qualitative form of data analysis, the 
interpretation of the evidence found through process-tracing will be identified as themes 
around which factors in foreign policy revolve.55 These themes will be found in interview 
transcripts, official documents and the scholarly literature, and will be continually compared 
against each other. The comparison will be necessarily theory-informed and dictated by the 
identification of themes as laid out in my theoretical framework (Fereday & Muir-Cochrane 
2006: 4; Crabtree & Miller 1999). Themes thus identified by theory (sovereignty, non-
interference, legitimacy, (il)legality, hegemony) are instrumental in drawing broader 
conclusions about normative understandings of the actors examined and their conceptions of 
security cultures. Sources, in other words, are translated into themes. These themes are the 
unit of analysis in qualitaWLYHGDWDDQDO\VLV +HUPDQQI WKH³PLFUR-level for the 
HPSLULFDOLQYHVWLJDWLRQ´:LHQHU*XLGHGE\WKHXQGHUO\LQJUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQDQG
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its theoretical underpinnings, such an approach does not preclude the additional identification 
oIWKHPHVDVWKHGDWDFROOHFWLRQSURFHHGVDQGLVLQOLQHZLWKWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQ¶VDLPWRDchieve 
a fruitful cross-fertilisation between evidence and theory.56 However, conceptual templates 
for the analysis of documents and interview transcripts are largely given a priori by theory. 
By way of constant comparison, the research question underlying this dissertation helps to 
extract meaning from communication (such as interviews and policy documents). Key 
questions in interviews, for example, were structured around the key terms and themes 
identified earlier by the theoretical framework, pertaining to Chinese, Russian and Turkish 
conceptions of legitimacy in international relations, foreign policy approaches to addressing 
,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU ILOH DQG XQGHUVWDQGLQJV RI sovereignty, non-interference, power politics and 
SHUFHSWLRQV RI RWKHU DFWRUV¶ IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV57 The processing of information (transcription 
and thematic analysis of interviews, summary and analysis of documents) in light of these 
concepts then allows me to contextualise information and conclude on the accuracy of the 
theory to interpret the empirical evidence and, if needed, suggest modifications to the 
theoretical model. Such an interpretative endeavor (rather than proceeding from an inductive 
content analysis) is justified by the research question at hand and the qualitative nature of this 
research. The validity of such qualitative data analysis is also ascertained by triangulation as 
another implicit methodological approach adopted in this dissertation where all research 
PHWKRGVXVHGDUH FRPELQHGDQG µWULDQJXODWHG¶ DJDLQVW HDFKRWKHU (Campbell & Fiske 1959; 
Denzin 2009: 297; Neuman 2006: 149f.; Flick 2004: 181f.).58 In any empirical research, not 
all causal process observations might be collected due to the non-availability of certain 
interviewees, publications, or the classification of policy documents, making the collected 
sample possibly biased. The selection of sRXUFHV7KLHV FDXWLRQV³always incurs the 
SRWHQWLDOIRUFODLPVRIXQZDUUDQWHGVHOHFWLYLW\DQGLQYHVWLJDWRUELDV´:LWKWKHDLPWR
bridge such possible deficiencies, triangulation intertwines the research methods and increases 
the reliability of the methodological footing. Triangulation of sources in this context also 
PHDQV FRQVXOWLQJ D YDULHW\ RI VRXUFHV LQ RUGHU WR ³PD[LPL]H >«@ DUFKLYDO FRYHUDJH´ DQG
avoid tautological interpretations of evidence that may arise from the use of only one type of 
sources (Thies 2002: 557; 565). This method thus results in a cross-validation of the findings 
from qualitative data analysis of primary sources (official documents, declassified 
government documents, press releases, legislation, international organisations documents, 
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memoirs, transcripts of speeches), press reports and policy briefs, the scholarly literature, and 
insights gathered from interviews with experts and decision-makers, as well as post-interview 
debriefing notes, field notes and participant observation.      
 The use of interviews and interview transcripts will be further detailed in section 3.2 
below. Policy documents and declassified government documents, like Foreign Policy 
Concepts, Military Doctrines or declassified embassy cables, essentially serve a similar 
purpose in document analysis as interviews: They textually embed governmental policy and 
make it possible for the researcher to read, analyse, and compare not only how policy is 
discursively conveyed, but in some instances (especially with declassified material) also why 
this is the case. Press releases and statements, in government parlance, belong to the category 
of public relations and therefore have always to be read as socially mediated language with a 
purpose. Yet, for an investigation into possible discrepancies between discourse and 
behaviour in foreign policy, the official governmental positioning is crucial to include in the 
picture. Documents of international organisations, like minutes of Security Council meetings 
or of IAEA Board of Governors meetings, will be used to document when and how Chinese, 
Russian and Turkish officials have voiced objections, concerns or approval. And memoirs of 
former officials intimately involved in the Iranian nuclear file will be drawn upon throughout 
the chapters that follow, as these are highly informative accounts of decision-makers that 
often write from the convenient position of elder statesmen who do not have to mince their 
words because of the secretive nature of both the dossier and their official position with all 
caveats on open information that ensue.        
 $V LPSRUWDQW GRFXPHQWV HVSHFLDOO\ SUHSDUDWRU\ GRFXPHQWV IRU WKH FDVH FRXQWULHV¶
negotiation positions toward the Iranian nuclear programme) are not always available as open 
sources, interviews become a necessary supplement to base the research findings on a reliable 
footing- the methodology of which will be the subject of the next section.  
3.2 Interviewing methods 
 
For the purpose of this study, qualitative semi-structured elite interviews were conducted as a 
PHWKRG RI HPSLULFDO GDWD JHQHUDWLRQ :LWK WKH DELOLW\ WR ³ERWK PDNH XVH RI DQG VKDSH WKH
UHVRXUFHVRIWKHSXEOLFVSKHUH´:LHQHUHOLWHVFRPSULVHGHFLVLRQ-makers, policy 
consultants as well as senior scholars. The interviews involved a set of open-ended questions 
that give the interviewee the chance to talk from their perspective with as little intervention on 
the part of the interviewer as possible (Weiss 1994; Warren 2002). This is designed so as to 
ensure that the interviewee is not steered into a particular direction in answering the questions, 
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thus avoiding UHVHDUFKELDV ,QWURGXFWRU\TXHVWLRQVZRXOGXVXDOO\ UHIHU WR WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V
professional engagement with and experience of the issue area, setting the ground for more 
detailed or probing questions as the interview proceeds, establishing trust with the interviewer 
and easing the interviewee into the conversation, a factor that is intimately linked to the issue 
of rapport and neutrality between interviewee and respondent (Platt 2002: 46-47; Rapley 
2004: 19). Questions were formulated in a way that would avoid the implication of pre-
conceived assumptions, insinuating or steering questions and biased wording. As the 
conversation proceeded, questions would investigate the rationale for particular decisions or 
SROLFLHVH[SODQDWRU\SUREHVWKHLQWHUYLHZHH¶VSUDFWLFDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRISDUWLFXODUFRQFHSWV
policies or contexts (clarification probes), or a specific and in-depth decision-making process 
(Kvale & Brinkmann 2009: 135). Questions on current positions in and foreign policies 
WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUGRVVLHU DJDLQVW WKHEDFNJURXQGRI WKHPRVW UHFHQW3 WDONVZRXOG
often provide a timely introduction to the conversation. The timely dimension derived from 
the high frequency of negotiations between the P5+1 and Iran at different levels (expert, 
political directors, foreign minister) throughout the timeframe in which this research project 
was carried out (2012-2015). This initial discussion of current negotiations and the prospects 
thereof was followed by more specific questions on conceptions of the sanctions regime or 
VSHFLILF SROLF\ GHFLVLRQV WKDW KDYH EHHQ FRQWURYHUVLDOO\ GHEDWHG LQ WKH FRXQWU\¶V UHVSHFWLYH
Iran policies (such as the Russian non-delivery of the S-30 V\VWHP WR ,UDQ RU 7XUNH\¶V
decision to participate in US missile defense plans). Especially questions on the sanctions 
UHJLPH LQ SODFH ZHUH UHYHDOLQJ RI WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI OHJLWLPDWH PHDQV DQG
ends in international politics. This informatLRQ ZDV PRVW UHOHYDQW IRU WKLV GLVVHUWDWLRQ¶V
analysis of security cultures with their underlying normative disputes in international 
relations. To allow for a comparative analysis of the research findings on a cross-case level, a 
common set of questions was formulated for all interviews, and adapted slightly to the 
specificities of each and every interviewee. During some interviews, attention needed to be 
paid to the risk of feeding insights from other interviews back to the interviewee. Curious 
about the replies other (especially official) interviewees might have given me in previous 
interviews, some interviewees asked as much. With a view to the protection of this research 
project interviewees, the challenge here lay in not succumbing to the temptation to become 
WRR µFKDWW\¶ DQG UHYHDO LQIRUPDWLRQ WKDW PLJKW LQ WXUQ DOVR LPSDFW RQ WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V
response.            
 But how do we recognise adherence to certain norms in interviews? Asking a Russian 
foreign ministry official about US unilateral Iran sanctions, for example, is an indirect inquiry 
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about Russian perceptions of US security cultures and legitimacy in international relations. 
Interviewing arguably requires the capacity to detect codes behind words, which are nothing 
RWKHU WKDQ µFLSKHUHG LQYHQWLRQV¶59 The interviewer, then, needs to de-cipher the semantic 
schemes used to convey how an interviewee talks about, assesses, and implicitly evaluates 
things. Interviewees (especially officials) function as norm-carriers in this regard (cf. also 
Young & 6FKDIHU)R\OH6WDWHDJHQWV³WHQG WRDQWKURSRPRUSKL]H WKHVWDWH´/L
  ³>«@ LQGLYLGXDO HOLWHV´ $QWMH :LHQHU  IRUPXODWHV ³FDUU\ QRUPDWLYH
EDJJDJHZKLFKLQIRUPVWKHLUUHVSHFWLYHH[SHFWDWLRQVWRZDUGVWKHPHDQLQJRIQRUPV´ In 
WKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJHOLWHLQWHUYLHZVDUHQRUPFRQWHVWDWLRQLQSUDFWLFH,QWHUYLHZHHV¶VHPDQWLF
UHIHUHQFHV WRQRUPDWLYH IUDPHZRUNVDQG µDVVRFLDWLYHFRQQRWDWLRQV¶ LELGDW WKHPLFUR
level reveal broader conceptions of legitimacy at the macro level (international politics).
 Keywords and phrases relating to the conceptual framework identified earlier may not 
DSSHDUYHUEDWLPLQWKHLQWHUYLHZEXWZLOOKDYHWREHLGHQWLILHGE\WKHUHVHDUFKHU³7KHFURVV-
linkage between keywords and norms allow for a comparative distinction of individually held 
DVVRFLDWLYH FRQQRWDWLRQV´ LELG 7KH LQWUXVLYH HIIHFW RI WKH ,UDQ VDQFWLRQV UHJLPH IRU
example, is related to an understanding of sovereignty in that the effect of sanctions arguably 
curtails the sovereignty of the sanctioned nation (by cutting it off from international financial 
and trade flows, thus restricting its autonomy of policy decisions). Critically questioning the 
OHJLWLPDF\ RI VXFK D UHJLPH LV UHYHODWRU\ RI DQ LQWHUYLHZHH¶V QRUPDWLYH XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
µVRYHUHLJQW\¶DQGµQRQ-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶How do we, then, recognise resistance to hegemony in 
interviews? Resistance, as has been worked out in chapter 1LVQHYHUD³WRWDOL]LQJDFW´-RQHV
2006: 76), but always a qualified form of disagreement with parts of hegemonic policies. The 
three dimensions of hegemonic structures as borrowed from a Coxian framework (material, 
ideational, institutional) have been identified in the theoretical framework. If an interviewee 
talks about trade statistics or the economic effect of sanctions regimes, examples are given 
WKDW UHODWH WR WKH PDWHULDO GLPHQVLRQ RI WKLV WULDQJOH /DQJXDJH RQ µOHJLWLPDF\¶ QRUPDWLYH
language on sanctions and on the foreign policies of other states presupposes intersubjective 
evaluations and relate rather to the ideational dimension of hegemonic structures. And 
emphases of the institutional nature of sanctions (unilateral or multilateral), the UN system, or 
UN-FUHDWHG LQWHUQDWLRQDO ERGLHV GLVFORVH DQ LQWHUYLHZHH¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO
aspectVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFVDQGKRZKHJHPRQLFVWUXFWXUHVUHODWHWRWKHPµ5HVLVWDQFH¶WR
a particular policy like the imposition of an embargo that becomes apparent in an interview, in 
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other words, does not in itself reveal resistance to hegemony on a state level. It is only 
through the careful collection of such indicators (or the lack thereof) for resistance, both in 
every respective interview transcript internally and throughout the range of conducted 
interviews, that a more comprehensive picture of ChinHVH 5XVVLDQ RU 7XUNLVK µUHVLVWDQFH¶
emerges. The danger of reading such conceptions into the interview transcript (selectivity and 
researcher bias) is circumvented by a thorough triangulation of the data with a variety of other 
sources to cross-validate the interpretation.60     
 Depending on the flow of the conversation, the order of questions was reverted or 
changed spontaneously, selectively reacting to the answers given with thematic follow-up 
questions (cf. Johnson 2002: 111; Rapley 2004: 22). This allowed for an appropriate 
combination of structure and flexibility. Even though questions were structured around 
similar sets of topics (proliferation-related issues of the Iranian nuclear programme, recent 
developments in the nuclear negotiations, motivations for and effects of certain policies), 
interviews were always also tailored to the individual interviewee depending on his/her 
professional involvement. Interviews were conducted in English and, in cases where the 
LQWHUYLHZHH¶V DQG WKH DXWKRU¶V QDWLRQality was the same, in their mother tongue.61 No 
interpreters were used. During interviews with officials and policy-makers, a form of 
informed consent to be signed was also handed over that would ensure the confidentiality of 
the research findings as well as the non-attribution of the answers given to the interviewee in 
compliance with ethical guidelines and the UK Data Protection Act 1998 designed to 
safeguard personal data.62 This form of consent sometimes was signed only by the end of the 
conversation. The form was always signed, even when a prior consent was already given by 
WKH LQWHUYLHZHH¶V VXSHULRUV DV ZDV WKH FDVH ZLWK VRPH LQWHUYLHZV ZLWK RIILFLDOV ([SHUW
interviewees were asked whether they consent to being cited by name. The data was recorded 
in writing. No tape recorders were used so as to allow for a maximum of openness on the part 
of the interviewee.63 The interviews were transcribed shortly after the interview had taken 
place, so as to avoid lapses of memory of what has been said that may arise if tape recorders 
are not used. The transcription of interviews also included the processing of non-verbal data 
pertaining to the interview setting, such as field notes and reflections on atmosphere, non-
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verbal communication and other external factors.64 In some cases, interviews were conducted 
over the telephone or via Skype where an in-person interviewing session was not possible due 
to (travel related) financial or time constraints.65  
3.2.1 Identification of interviewees 
 
Foreign policy in all three case countries is primarily shaped and decided upon in the 
respective foreign ministries. Besides this traditional understanding of foreign policy as the 
domain reservée of the foreign ministry, foreign policy in general and Iran policies in 
particular are shaped and informed by a number of other ministries and influential actors in all 
case countries to varying degrees, respectively. The following paragraphs give an overview of 
how this played out in the identification of interviewees.     
 Interviewees have been identified through strategic sampling due to the nature of the 
present research topic. Organisational charts of the foreign ministries in the respective case 
FRXQWULHV¶FDSLWDOVJLYHDILUVWRULHQWDWLRQRIWKHUHOHYDQWGHSDUWPHQWVDQGXQLWVLQYROYHGLQWKH
Iran policy decision-making process and are thus a first step in core group targeting. In the 
Russian foreign ministry, relevant departments are the second Asia department (vtoroy 
department asii),66 covering Iran; and the department for security policy and non-proliferation 
(department po voprossom besopasnosti i rasorushenia) as the main department in charge of 
the nuclear dossier.67 Departments involved in the foreign policy-making on Iran in the 
Turkish foreign ministry are the department for the OSCE, arms control and disarmament (in 
charge of the nuclear dossier); the political department; and the economic department (dealing 
with Iranian-Turkish trade and business relations). Chinese foreign policy toward Iran is 
shaped by the foreign ministry, where the Arms Control and Disarmament department, the 
West Asian and North African Affairs department and the International Organisations and 
Conferences department are involved. Besides key persons in the respective foreign ministries 
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 A (mutually) candid exchange of information in interviews is facilitated by an atmosphere of conviviality 
where the hospitality of the hosting interviewee plays a crucial role, especially when the meeting takes place in 
a more formal setting such as a ministerial office. The proverbial Turkish hospitality allowed interviews to take 
ƉůĂĐĞŽǀĞƌdƵƌŬŝƐŚƚĞĂ ?ĂĨĂĐƚŽƌĐŽŶĚƵĐŝǀĞƚŽƚŚĞĞĨĨĞĐƚŽĨ ‘ƌĂƉƉŽƌƚ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞƌĂŶĚŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĞĞ
described above. Likewise, discussions were facilitated by tea in the Russian and the Chinese foreign ministries, 
respectively. A talk in the US State Department was facilitated by Starbucks coffee, the officially franchised 
coffee supplier in the State Department canteen.  
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interviewing process as a social interaction as described above (540).  
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since the late 1990s (Belopolsky 2009: 46-49).  
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in Ankara, Beijing and Moscow, interviewees have also been identified at the permanent 
representations of the three case countries to the IAEA in Vienna. Given their posting to key 
organisations for the topic of this research, their insights added an important dimension of 
expertise at the official policy level.         
 While names of desk officers are usually not publicly available, first contact details 
were provided by the German federal foreign office and the German embassy in Moscow.68 
This first step helped me get hold of names of diplomats working closely on the Iran nuclear 
file, including at the European External Action Service, but also in Moscow, where I had 
worked in the political department of the German embassy. Further identification of 
LQWHUYLHZHHVKDVWKHQRIWHQIROORZHGWKHSULQFLSOHRIµVQRZEDOOVDPSOLQJ¶)LUVWLQWHUYLHZHHV
referred me to further potential interviewees, either in their own institution/ministry, in their 
national representations elsewhere, e.g. at their respective permanent representation at the 
,$($LQ9LHQQDRULQRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶LQVWLWXWLRQV,QWHUYLHZVDWWKH7XUNLVKIRUHLJQPLQLVWU\
in Ankara have led to interviews at the Turkish mission to the IAEA in Vienna; interviews at 
the foreign ministry in Moscow have led to interviews and hour-long discussions at the 
Russian embassy in Washington, D.C. Interviews with the Iran desk in Berlin have led to 
interviews with the nuclear negotiation team of the EEAS, which in turn have led to an 
interview in the US State Department in Washington.      
 In a similar vein, first exploratory interviews with experts on the issue area (in 
Western capitals, but also in Ankara, Beijing and Moscow) and with senior diplomats from 
the European External Action ServLFH DV ZHOO DV FRQYHUVDWLRQV ZLWK (8 PHPEHU VWDWHV¶
diplomats have often been useful in providing further names and contact details of target 
interviewees. Given the inherent reluctance in granting access in some administrative cultures 
as an additional barrier when requesting interviews (Adler & Adler 2002: 515), such referral 
via colleagues DOVR KDG DQ LPSRUWDQW µOHJLWLPLVLQJ¶ HIIHFW DQG KHOSHG IDFLOLWDWH VHWWLQJ XS
meetings (cf. also Odendahl & Shaw 2002: 307). In contacting the Chinese foreign ministry in 
Beijing, I was thus able to refer to European (member state or EEAS) counterparts of my 
target interviewee. Name-dropping served crucially as a door-opener. Through extensive 
travelling and target interviewing, this research project benefits from face-to-face interviews 
that have been conducted with actual delegates from the respective nuclear negotiation teams, 
and/or the respective Iran desks of China, Russia, Turkey, Germany, the UK, the US, and the 
EU.            
 Additionally, after first sets of interviews and an interpretation thereof in light of the 
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 I have worked at both places as an intern- an opportunity that gave me first valuable contact details. 
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research question and theory had taken place, further sets of interviews then also followed the 
SULQFLSOHRIµWKHRUHWLFDOVDPSOLQJ¶LQZKLFKWKHGDWDDQDO\VLVSURPSWHGPHWRIXUWKHUUHVHDUFK
particular concepts or processes which could not yet be sufficiently clarified with the given 
data generated so far. This is a necessary reflexive approach to detecting patterns in interview 
responses that allows for adapted, or even new, paths of inquiry.     
 Besides these statist foreign policy actors mentioned above, research institutes and 
WKLQNWDQNVLQWKHWKUHHFDVHFRXQWULHVLQIRUPIRUHLJQSROLF\µIORDW¶SROLF\LGHDVDQGWKHUHE\
partially also shape the decision-making process. In China especially, influential think tanks 
are known to be consulted by the State Council and are providing policy analyses and 
recommendations for the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process. Since the 1980s, 
Chinese foreign policy has seen the emergence of a network of formal and informal relations 
and exchanges between decision-makers and research institutes. The latter thereby filter and 
interpret relevant information and play a certain system-legitimising role- otherwise they 
would not be invited to State Council hearings in a closed political system in which the 
Communist party decides on all major policy directions of strategic importance. This latter 
observation naturally bears out on the extent to which these think tanks can be regarded as 
independent or entirely objective. This means at the same time, however, that interviews with 
experts and policy analysts from these think tanks often generate quasi-official policy position 
responses.            
 The most influential Chinese think tanks in the realm of international relations are 
think tanks that are officially affiliated with the State Council and the foreign ministry such as 
the China Institute of International Studies (CIIS)69 and the China Institutes of Contemporary 
International Relations (CICIR). The latter enjoys close ties with the ministry for state 
VHFXULW\ ³LV WKH SULPDU\ FLYLOLDQ LQWHOOLJHQFH RUJDQ DQG KDV GLUHFW DFFHVV WR WKH 3ROLWEXUR
6WDQGLQJ &RPPLWWHH´ 'RZQV   7KH PLOLWDU\ WKLQN WDQN &KLQD ,QVWLWXWH IRU
International Strategic Studies (CIISSEHORQJV WR WKH3HRSOH¶V /LEHUDWLRQ$UP\ 3/$DQG
the Shanghai Institute for International Studies (SIIS) also regularly briefs different ministries 
of the central government as well as the Foreign Affairs Office of the Party Central 
Committee (SIIS 2013). These institutes act as foreign policy consultants and craft conceptual 
policy recommendations for the Chinese government and thus have a considerable impact on 
the Chinese foreign policy decision-making process (cf. also Lanteigne 2009: 29). Next to 
these think tanks, departments of international politics in renowned universities such as 
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Peking University, Qinghua University (which cooperates with the Beijing office of the 
Carnegie endowment for international peace), Renmin University, and the China Foreign 
Affairs University (CFAU), the latter of which is deemed a preparatory stage for the Chinese 
foreign service and has close links with the foreign ministry, regularly act as foreign policy 
consultants. I have stayed at CFAU as a visiting doctoral student for two months, which has 
helped me set up interviews and get a good grasp of the Chinese policy community.  
 Exchanges about the direction of Chinese foreign policy between Chinese ministries 
and these influential actors work in a two-way process, which makes interviews with Iran 
experts and foreign policy analysts at CIISS, CIIS, CICIR and the universities a fruitful 
empirical contribution to this research. Chinese interviewees at these think tanks also include 
former officials. Chinese think tanks thereby gradually adopt the US-LQVSLUHGµUHYROYLQJGRRU¶
principle between official positions and research fellowships.     
 To a lesser extent, the same holds true for Russian think tanks. While Russian Iran 
policy is shaped by the foreign ministry, with important strategic decisions made by the 
president who, according to the Russian constitution, holds ultimate authority in foreign 
policy matters, a number of Russian think tanks provide a considerable amount of expertise 
and consultancy related to nuclear non-proliferation and energy policy. These include 
primarily the CENESS (Center for Energy and Security Studies) and the PIR Center (the 
Russian Center for Policy Studies), the latter of which has close ties to the Russian 
government and is regularly briefing the foreign ministry and the defense ministry on foreign 
policy, nuclear proliferation and arms control. The Turkish think tank scene is somewhat less 
pronounced in terms of foreign policy consultancy. Instead, renowned experts at Turkish 
universities brief and consult their government, and it is with a number of these that 
interviews were conducted on Turkish Iran policies (i.a. at Middle East Technical University, 
Hacettepe University, Kadir Has University, IPEK University). Other experts included a 
range of policy analysts, consultants and senior academics in Brussels, Moscow, Ankara, 
Berlin, Vienna, London, Istanbul, Washington, Beijing and Shanghai.70 In total, 55 elite 
interviews (i.e., experts and decision-makers) were conducted for this research project in 9 
countries.  
3.2.2 Qualitative sampling in interviews  
As almost always with qualitative sampling, selection bias can hardly be avoided since the 
selection of interviewees and publications is oriented already beforehand towards the 
usefulness for this particular field of research (Collier & Mahoney 1996). MoreRYHUWKH³non 
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availability of interviewees as well as non-publication of certain government documents 
LQWURGXFHV µV\VWHPLF HUURU LQWR WKH VDPSOH¶´ (Burnham et al. 2008: 160). Burnham et al. 
further acknowledge that due to the nature of qualitative politics research, random sampling 
RIWHQWXUQVRXWWREHLQDSSURSULDWH³>7@KHUHVHDUFKHU>«@VHOHFWVWKHFDVHV(e.g. interviewees, 
official documents, newspapers, pictures etc.) WKDWLWPDNHVVHQVHWRVHOHFW´ibid.: 157). (Non-
probability) purposive modes of sampling are often used when the number of cases studied is 
small and process-tracing as a within-case method is used (Tansey 2007: 789). The foreign 
policy decision-making process toward Iran in the respective case countries involves a small 
number of people at different departmental levels in a few ministries, in embassies, and in 
permanent representations worldwide (to international organisations). Interviewing sampling 
methods are thus necessarily purposive for the research question underlying this dissertation 
because enlarging the group of respondents to interviewees that are not involved in or have no 
expertise in the issues at hand would be irrelevant. Moreover, much qualitative research using 
LQWHUYLHZVIROORZVWKHµVDWXUDWLRQSULQFLSOH¶DFFRUGLQJWRwhich increasing the data set if all 
WKHUHOHYDQWLQIRUPDWLRQKDVDOUHDG\EHHQJHQHUDWHGZKHQWKHGDWDVHWLWµVDWXUDWHG¶EHFRPHV
obsolete (Johnson 2002: 113).    
4. Participant observation and cultural immersion as political stance 
 
Besides qualitative interviewing, Participant observation has also been used as a more indirect 
method of research (cf. Guest et al. 2012; Kawulich 2005). Participation in numerous policy 
conferences, speeches, and roundtable discussions did not only help deepen my expertise on 
the issue areas being studied here, but also sensitised me for particular foreign policy styles, 
appearance, behaviour and rhetoric of officials relevant to my research topic. Conferences 
attended did not necessarily always directly relate to the research question underlying this 
project.71 However, the observation of the behavior and rhetoric of Chinese, Turkish and 
Russian decision-makers is instructive for a much broader understanding of their respective 
public administration and diplomatic cultures and ultimately an element conducive to a deeper 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI IRUHLJQ SROLF\ FXOWXUHV 6XFK DQ DSSURDFK KHOSV FRPSUHKHQG ³KDELWV
DWWLWXGHVDQGSURIHVVLRQDOGLVFRXUVH´-RUgensen 2001: 11), which sensitises us for (political) 
bias in primary sources and discourse. Participation in such events also facilitated 
approaching and talking to officials as well as experts (informal unstructured interviews; 
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Guest et al. 2012: 77).72          
 In the same vein, sojourns in the countries of research were deemed an important 
element to immerse not only in the political, but administrative, linguistic and historic 
respective culture. Without an awareness of country-specific cultural codes, policy analysis 
that overlaps with the discipline of Area Studies can only be shallow. I had lived, studied and 
worked in Russia for a year before embarking on this doctoral research ± time spent that my 
research on Russia benefitted from in myriad ways. My sojourn and travels to Russia also not 
only improved my Russian language skills which helped during the research, but gave me a 
useful feel for approaches to interviewing in Russia. In the absence of publicly available 
contact details of Russian officials, addressing their departments over the phone requires the 
Russian conversation skills necessary to prevent their secretaries from hanging up. The same 
holds true for contacts with Chinese interview partners. Even though I did not systematically 
study Chinese, I learned a number of phrases that allowed me to drop keywords when the 
occasion arose. This often contributed to the necessary rapport in interviewing. I also started 
learning Turkish with the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural Center in Brussels. This turned out to 
be most useful in preparation for fieldwork, interviews and other arrangements on the spot in 
Turkey. Longer stays in target countries also helped me develop a grasp of culturally 
GHWHUPLQHG WLPH DQG VSDFH FRQFHSWLRQV FRQYHUVDWLRQ VW\OHV DQG KHOSHG PH µPRYH DURXQG¶
more easily ± insights and skills essential to fruitful research that goes below the surface of 
readings in the office. While working on this research project, I travelled back to Russia three 
times, to Turkey four times, and stayed in China for field research for two months. I also 
travelled widely within each of these countries. The necessity to understand cultural codes 
holds true also, and perhaps even more so, for Iran. Even though not a case study in this 
UHVHDUFKGHVLJQEXWUDWKHUWKHREMHFWRIVWXG\WRZDUGVZKLFKWKHWKUHHFDVHFRXQWULHV¶IRUHLJQ
policies are being analysed, any research involving foreign policy towards Iran benefits from 
an understanding of a country that all too often is rendered an abstract variable in policy 
research. Without anticipating the research findings in the following case study chapters, 
suffice to retain that thHSROLWLFDOODQJXDJHRQ,UDQDVDQµLVVXH¶RUDµFDXVH¶UDWKHUWKDQDVWDWH
and a nation on equal terms) is quite instructive in this regard.73 For a necessary cultural 
understanding of Iran, I have travelled to Iran in March 2013, visiting Shiraz, Isfahan, Yazd, 
3HUVHSROLV DQG 7HKUDQ µ)LHOGZRUN¶ LQ SROLWLFDO VFLHQFH UHVHDUFK HVFKHZV HDV\ GHILQLWLRQV
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While I did not engage in qualitative interviewing in Iran as I did in China, Russia, Turkey 
and elsewhere (see section 3.2 above), I absorbed political and cultural sentiments, had casual 
conversations with ordinary Iranians, and travelled through the country as a tourist. On a bus 
driving from Isfahan to Tehran, I passed by and saw the controversial nuclear facilities at 
Natanz, whose existence was uncovered in 2002 by an Iranian exile group, sparking the 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQIOLFWDERXW WKHFRXQWU\¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH, WDONHGWR,UDQLDQFOHULFV LQD
mosque in Isfahan, interacted with Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC) patrols, and 
saw the supersized pictXUHVRIµPDUW\UV¶IURPWKH,UDQ-Iraq war (1980-1988) that still flank the 
highways in Tehran. What may seem a historical caesura in text books to the outside observer 
LVILOOHGZLWKYLYLGVXEVWDQFHRQFHWKHWUDYHOHUUHDFKHV,UDQ3UHVLGHQW5RXKDQL¶VFRPSDUison 
between Iranian soldiers in the Iran-Iraq war and Iranian diplomats in the current nuclear 
negotiations on the occasion of the anniversary of the 1979 revolution in February 2015 
becomes more comprehensible from a politico-cultural perspective. The nexus between 
political culture, culture at large, and foreign policy is a crucial one to understand 
international relations in all its structural dimensions. This is especially true when analyzing 
an international conflict whose difficulty to be resolved lay in no small part in the clash of 
political cultures and negotiation mentalities. Tim Guldimann, former Swiss ambassador to 
7HKUDQZULWHVWRWKDWHIIHFWRQWKH,UDQLDQFXOWXUH³6XIIHULQJEHLQJDYLFWLPRILOOHJLWLPDWH
power and imposed injustice, is a fundamental motif in Iranian culture. The injustice is 
ODPHQWHGQRWIRXJKWDJDLQVW>«@7KH,UDQLDQVDUHFRQYLQFHGRIWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHLURZQ
SRVLWLRQ DQG WKH LOOHJLWLPDF\ RI IRUHLJQ DFWLRQV DJDLQVW WKHP´   $EVRUELQJ DV
much of that culture through direct encounters, conversations, and exposure leads to a better 
political understanding where culture is political and the political becomes culture. 
 Sparked by the same desire to discover the cultural edifice of the countries in the 
research focus here, I travelled from Beijing to Moscow through Mongolia via the land route 
on trains, buses, horses, jeeps and ferries. Covering 7900 kilometers on Transsiberian 
railways, I had numerous conversations with Russian travelers over teas in rattling carriages, 
experienced cities and sights along the route, and stared at seemingly endless birch woods, 
getting a feel for the vastness of Siberia and the Russian hinterland that figures so prominently 
LQDWWHPSWVWRH[SODLQµWKH5XVVLDQSV\FKH¶HYHUVLQFH'RVtoyevskiy. Travelling through the 
vast territory of the Russian state helps understanding the spatial determinants of a national 
identity that inevitably impact foreign policy. The relation between space and authority was a 
recurring fault line in the history of Russian state- and nation formation, from the first 
DFFLGHQWDO QDWXUH RI VHWWOHPHQWV DQG ILHIGRPV WKH µ0RQJRO \RNH¶ EHWZHHQ WKH th and the 
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16th century, eastward territorial expansion under Katherine the Great, to Soviet forced 
mobilisDWLRQRIUHVRXUFHVLQVSLWHRIWKHFRXQWU\¶VVSDWLDOJLYHQVµ6SDFH¶EHFRPHVDFXOWXUDO
µVLWH¶DQGWKH5XVVLDQµELJVWDWH¶KDVJURZQKLVWRULFDOO\DVDUHVSRQVHWRDODUJHVSDFH7KH
LPSHUDWLYHV RI VSDFH DUH HVVHQWLDO LQ XQGHUVWDQGLQJ 3XWLQ¶V FRQVROLGDWLRQ RI WKH µUHVRXUFH
VWDWH¶ DQGFRQWHPSRUDU\SHUFHSWLRQVRI HQFLUFOHPHQW LQ WKHSRVW-Soviet space. Experiencing 
state and space in Russia on the spot was an invaluable contribution to my understanding of 
Russian foreign policy.          
 These are but a few examples of impressions that are not attached the official 
µILHOGZRUN¶ ODEHO EXW DUH XOWLPDWHO\ FRQGXFLYH WR D FRPSUHKHQVLYH JUDVS RI WKH UHVHDUFK
subject beyond the written word in sometimes intangible ways. The latter effort, it is held 
here, enriches onH¶VµHSLVWHPH¶&XOWXUHDQGQDWLRQDOVHOI-perceptions invariably play into the 
making of foreign policy. And if our filters of perceptions implicitly guide our research, ± an 
epistemological concession every researcher has to make ± broadening our horizon in 
multiple directions becomes a foundation for better-informed, and arguably more inspiring, 
research.            
 7KH HQJDJHPHQW ZLWK RQH¶V UHVHDUFK VXEMHFW KDV DQ LQKHUHQW SROLWLFDO GLPHQVLRQ E\
design, and it is at this juncture that I consciously articulate positionality. The role of a 
researcher can never be a neutral one, and the portrayal of politics and policies always is one 
of many possible ways. Especially in light of the theoretical assumptions and underlying 
conceptual frameworks developed here, the discussion that follows in the remainder of this 
dissertation will highlight how the Iranian nuclear conflict is essentially one of contested 
narratives. If a researcher can himself never be objective in the art of analyzing, the angle 
chosen is one that represents a conscious research choice. The theoretical framework outlined 
LQ WKH SUHYLRXV FKDSWHU MXVWLILHG DQG GHIHQGHG WKDW FKRLFH 7KH µSROLWLFDO¶ DPELWLRQ RI WKLV
dissertation, then, short of providing policy recommendations or engaging in political 
advocacy, is to contribute to a critical engagement with the contested issue areas at hand, and 
to reveal their inherent political nature. In other words, it is hoped that the reader is presented 
with arguments that can have the potential to trigger a change in perceptions of the Iranian 
nuclear conflict. 
5. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has laid out the methodological framework for the analysis that follows in the 
next chapters. It has been shown that its purpose is essentially twofold. Analyses of Chinese, 
Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear programme stand as three 
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respective within-case studies that are substantially interesting in themselves. Derived from 
the scope conditions specified, China, Russia and Turkey are states that are non-Western, 
politically dependent on the US, have stakes in bilateral relations with Iran, and are said to 
have leverage power in the Iran nuclear file. Even though these conditions apply in 
qualitatively different degrees to the three case studies, these scope conditions form the basis 
for a comparative analysis methodologically and are, in turn, derived from the theoretical 
framework as laid out in chapter 1. The primary research methods on the within-case level 
comprises process-tracing as well as qualitative data analysis of policy documents (primary 
sources, e.g. declassified government documents, international organisations documents, press 
releases, memoirs, transcripts of speeches), policy briefs and the scholarly literature, 
supplemented by semi-structured elite interviews with experts and decision-makers. 
Especially process-tracing as a search for causal mechanisms through the analysis of policy 
documents and process observations from qualitative interviewing are commonly used 
methods in small-N research and arguably can disarm many of the problems concerning 
causal inferences associated with comparative case study research designs.   
 Interviewees have been identified with a view to their ability to inform this research 
due to their professionaOHQJDJHPHQWZLWKDQGH[SHUWLVHRIWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQ¶VWRSLF7KHZD\
the interviewees have been identified, addressed and used was laid out in this chapter. 
'UDZLQJRQH[SORUDWRU\ DQG ILUVW LQWHUYLHZV µVQRZEDOO¶ VDPSOLQJKDV OHG WR IXUWKHU FRQWDFW
details of highly relevant interviewees, including in all foreign ministries of the three case 
countries, European nuclear negotiation teams, and the US State Department, next to a range 
of other officials and experts. It has been shown how this research project draws on a range of 
primary sources, from elite interviews to official documents to memoirs of former decision-
makers involved with Iran diplomacy. Notoriously intricate questions in qualitative (small-N) 
research such as purposive sampling and selection bias have also been addressed. While a 
range of data has been consulted for this research, the qualitative empirical work underlying 
this project requires intentional selection of documents and sources. The number of informed 
experts and officials working on and with Iran is limited by nature, as is the range of 
documents available as declassified information. The qualitative data analysis thus made use 
of the information that is both relevant and available. By triangulating the empirical data, 
tautological and reductionist interpretations will be avoided to the extent possible in social 




is politics. We are all truth-WHOOHUV´74 As every social scientist is bound to accept this 
essentially instrumental nature of research, the following chapters will necessarily present one 
way of telling the truth. While the next chapter will elaborate on the political nature of much 
Iran research, it is hoped that the conceptual framework as presented in chapter 1 provides for 
a novel triangulation of the material presented that is both empirically and theoretically 
enriching.           
 Detecting and analysing similarities in the crafting and rhetoric of foreign policies 
toward the Iranian nuclear programme on the part of China, Russia and Turkey in the 
respective within-case studies allows me to reflect on the extent to which they adhere to 
common understandings of legitimacy and normative conceptions in international relations in 
a second step of this dissertation. The research findings of the respective within-case studies 
(the next three chapters) will eventually be comparatively analysed in light of the conceptual 
framework identified in chapter 1. This macro-level comparison of process observations from 
the in-depth case studies is an approach that is deemed appropriate for the qualitative research 
angle guiding this project. The cases pUHVHQWHGKHUHDUHµVXEVWDQWLDOO\LQWHUHVWLQJ¶DQGMXVWLI\
the eventual cross-case comparison in chapter 7 IRU ZKLFK WKH µVPDOO-1 SUREOHP¶ LQ VRFLDO
science research arguably holds little relevance.       
 This comparative approach will eventually answer the research question to what extent 
Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear programme are 
indicative of security cultures resisting hegemony. As the cross-case analysis is a longitudinal 
within-unit comparison (policies toward the Iranian nuclear programme in a given 
timeframe), greater comparability of cases is favoured over generalizability. However, it is 
hoped, ultimately, that the scoring of correlations on a macro-level adds to our understanding 
of broader non-Western sHFXULW\ FRQFHSWLRQV LQ D SURFHVV RI µSRZHU GHFRQFHQWUDWLRQ¶
(Tessman & Wolfe 2011: 218) in international politics - bearing in mind the conceptual 
constraints identified, ensuing implications for external validity and the empirical specificities 
of each and every actor as research objects. The contribution to such an understanding stems 
from the recognition of the theoretical framework identified earlier as potentially applying to 
a range of cases other than those analysed within the scope of this dissertation. While the 
numbers of cases relevant for the nuclear-related Iran diplomacy is limited by design, as the 
above scope conditions make clear, the theoretical assumptions laid out in the preceding 
chapter may shed light on international relations between Western and (other) non-Western 
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actors in other policy domains, and thus provide usefulness for further research. The main 
interest of this dissertation, however, lies with an analysis of Chinese, Russian and Turkish 
foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear programme and thus with an in-depth 


















































This study focuses on the foreign policies of China, Russia and Turkey toward the Iranian 
nuclear programme and thereby draws on a vast array of disciplines, ranging from 
International Relations, Area Studies, studies of inter-regionalism to political Geography and 
Geopolitics as well as mediation, conflict resolution and security and strategic studies. This 
chapter will thus give an exploratory literature review of the state of empirical research that 
WKH SUHVHQW VWXG\ EXLOGV XSRQ 7KH GLVVHUWDWLRQ¶V H[SOLFLW Dim is to bridge disciplinary 
confines: While the three in-depth case studies draw in large parts on the respective Area 
Studies literature (both from international and Chinese, Russian, Turkish, and Iranian 
scholars), the analysis is complemented by insights from inter-regional studies, conflict 
studies and the non-proliferation literature.  
 
2. The Iranian Nuclear Programme as a regional and international 
security challenge 
 
The Iranian nuclear programme has been widely acknowledged as a regional and international 
diplomacy challenge, as testified not only by extensive media coverage, but also the 
proliferating scholarly and think tank literature on the subject.75 The following paragraphs 
will give an exploratory review thereof, outlining the most relevant dividing lines in the 
debates involved.          
 While the present research, due to its focus on the respective Iran policies of China, 
Russia and Turkey, is to be situated within a particular sub-field of that literature that will be 
discussed further below, it cannot but be informed by the growing body of literature that has 
been produced on other approaches to the Iran dossier for the sake of a more solid basis for 
comparison and point of reference, among which the US and the EU approaches are the most 
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 For a non-exhaustive overview, cf. i.a. Zak (2002); Brzezinski (2004); Howard (2004); Pollack (2004); Venter 
 ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŶƐĂƌŝ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĞůƉĞĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?<ŝďĂƌŽŒůƵ (2006); Lowe & Spencer (2006); Parasiliti (2009, 2012); 
Peimani (2006); Timmermann (2006); Biscop (2007); Jafarzadeh (2007); Melman & Jafandar (2007); 
Fayazmanesh (2008); Nasr & Takeyh (2008); Bertram (2009); Toukan & Cordesman (2010); Maloney (2010); 
Mousavian (2012); Patrikarakos (2012); Thérme & Khazaneh (2012); Parsi (2012); Joshi (2012); Kang (2013). 
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determining ones, both for Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies, as will be shown, but 
also for the direction and prospects of the nuclear talks as such.  
 ?Ǥ ?ǤǤǯ 
 
Analyses of US Iran policy commonly emphasise the diametrically opposed positions of Iran 
and the US ever since the Iranian revolution in 1979 and the subsequent hostage crisis in the 
US embassy in Tehran that led to the break-up of diplomatic relations.76 Rather than seeing 
this as the beginning of misunderstandings, US policies in the Middle East in the first half of 
the 20th century have been analysed as playing a crucial role for the Iranian perception of the 
86DVDQµDUURJDQWVXSHUSRZHU¶(VSHFLDOO\WKHFRXSDJDLQVW,UDQLDQSULPHPLQLVWHU0RKDPHG
Mosaddeq in 1953 continues to reverberate in the Iranian national memory and in the Iranian 
JRYHUQPHQW¶VUHIHUHQFHVWRKLVWRULFDOPLVGHHGVE\WKH86JRYernment.77 Haunted by a track 
record of misperceptions, slipped opportunities and relentless insistence on each respective 
exclusionary position, US-Iran relations with a view to the nuclear crisis78 have been widely 
analysed as finding expression in frustrated diplomacy, renewed US advocacy for 
international sanctions and the imposition of US unilateral sanctions on Iran.79 US attempts to 
isolate Iran increasingly violated the letter and the spirit of the 1981 Algiers Accords between 
Iran and the United States.80 For years of negotiations in the Iranian nuclear conflict, the US 
KDG XSKHOG WKH VXVSLFLRQ RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH SRWHQWLDOO\ KDYLQJ D PLOLWDU\
dimension, whereas Teheran adamantly upholds its legitimate right to nuclear enrichment for 
civilian purposes in accordance with Art. IV of the NPT.81 In her political memoirs, former 
6HFUHWDU\RI6WDWH+LOODU\&OLQWRQ¶VDFFRXQWRIWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUWDONVLPSOLFLWO\LQVLQXDWHV
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 There is an abundance of literature on US-Iranian relations. For effective accounts thereof, cf. i.a.: Ansari 
(2006); Beeman (2008); Bill (1988); Cook & Roshandel (2009); Cottam (1988); Ehrlich (2007); Emery (2013); 
Fayazmanesh (2008); Ganji (2012); Leverett & Leverett (2013); Litwack (2014); Mearsheimer & Walt (2007: 
280-305); Mousavian (2014); Murray (2010); Parsi (2012); Pollack (2004); Sick (1985); Takeyh & Maloney (2011: 
1299f.); Tarock (2006). For insightful analyses of US positions in the Iranian nuclear conflict, cf. Fitzpatrick 
(2006a: 70-73); Maloney (2010); Parsi (2012). 
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 Ĩ ?<ŝŶǌĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ďŽŽŬŽŶƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ĐŽƵƉĨŽƌĂŶŝŶƐŝŐŚƚĨƵůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚ ? 
78
 ŝ ?Ğ ?ŝŶƚŚĞĨƌĂŵĞǁŽƌŬŽĨƚŚĞŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ‘W ?A? ? ?ĨŽƌŵĂƚĨŽŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐĂƐĨƌŽŵ ? ? ? ? ?ŝƌĞĐƚďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ
have been absent since the storming of the US-American embassy in Tehran in 1979.  
79
 For an insightful analysis of the frictions between White House, State Department and Congress on these 
issues, cf. Parsi (2012).  
80
 dŚĞƐĞĐĐŽƌĚƐĨŽƌŵĂůůǇƐĞƚƚůĞĚƚŚĞŚŽƐƚĂŐĞĐƌŝƐŝƐĂŶĚƐƚĂƚĞƚŚĂƚ “ŝƚŝƐĂŶĚĨƌŽŵŶŽǁŽŶǁŝůůďĞƚŚĞƉŽůŝĐǇŽĨ
the United States not to intervene, directly or indirectly, politically or ŵŝůŝƚĂƌŝůǇ ?ŝŶ/ƌĂŶ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůĂĨĨĂŝƌƐ ? ?ůŐŝĞƌƐ
Accords available at [last accessed 8 November 2014]: http://www.parstimes.com/history/algiers_accords.pdf. 
81
 Hassan Rouhani (2011) descrŝďĞƐŝŶŚŝƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐŽĨŚŝƐƚŝŵĞĂƐĐŚŝĞĨŶƵĐůĞĂƌŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŽƌƚŚĂƚ/ƌĂŶ ?ƐƌŝŐŚƚƚŽ
enrich was an objective he sought to achieve during negotiations with the EU-3 (61; 666). The US, and other 
tĞƐƚĞƌŶŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƐĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌƚƐ ?ŚŽůĚƚŚĂƚĂ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĞŶƌŝĐŚ ?ŝƐŶŽƚŐŝǀĞŶďǇƚŚĞEWd ?^ŝŶĐĞ ‘ĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƐ
ŶŽƚĞǆƉůŝĐŝƚůǇŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƚƌĞĂƚǇƉƌŽǀŝƐŝŽŶƐ ?ĂŶŽƚŚĞƌƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƚĂŬĞŶďǇƐŽŵĞƐƚĂƚĞƐŝƐƚŚĂƚ ‘ĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ŝƐ
an implicit right. On this, cf. also footnote 320 in chapter 7.  
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,UDQLDQ PLOLWDU\ LQWHQWLRQV MXVWLILHV D µFDUURWV DQG VWLFNV¶ DSSURDFK DQG FRQYHys barely 
concealed pride in imposing hard-hitting sanctions on Iran (Clinton 2014: 416-446). When 
WKH 86 LQVLVWHG RQ D µFRPSOHWH FHVVDWLRQ¶ RI DQ ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU IXHO F\FOH DV ZDV WKH 86¶
initial position in 2003-4, it is not only violating the spirit and letter of the NPT,82 it also 
forcefully demonstrates how international law can be held victim to political narratives: The 
first steps toward an Iranian nuclear programme were made with an agreement reached in 
1957 between the US and Iran ruled by Shah Reza Pahlevi. Under the auspices of the US 
µ$WRPV IRU 3HDFH¶ SURJUDPPH WKH 86 SURYLGHG ,UDQ ZLWK D QXFOHDU UHDFWRU DQG +LJKO\
Enriched Uranium (HEU), followed by US support for Iran to acquire a reprocessing facility 
for plutonium extraction (Oborne & Morrison 2013: 38f.). After the Iranian revolution in 
1979 swept away a state that was hitherto a regional ally of the US, Washington cancelled its 
contracts and nuclear agreements with Iran. In the 2000s, an Iranian nuclear programme was 
being securitised83 whose initial stepping stones were laid with the help of the US.84 In an 
,UDQLDQ UHDGLQJ WKH 86¶ DSSURDFK WR WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH LV WKH H[SUHVVLRQ RI
Western arrogance, imperialist attitudes and nuclear double standards (Attar 2011; Soltanieh 
2011; Moshirzadeh 2007: 524; Oborne & Morrison 2013; Mousavian 2012: 468). The Iranian 
HVWDEOLVKPHQW¶VPLVWUXVWRIWKHµ%LJ6DWDQ¶86$OHDGVLWWRVXVSHFW86SROLFLHVWRZDUG,UDQDV
a cover-XS IRU UHJLPH FKDQJH SROLFLHV *RLQJ EH\RQG LQLWLDO µWDUJHWHG¶ VDQFWions against 
HQWLWLHV DQG LQGLYLGXDOV DVVRFLDWHG ZLWK ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH WKH 86 SURSDJDWHG D
comprehensive sanctions regime85 that nurtured the Iranian suspicion that not its behaviour, 
but its very regime was the problem.        
 On the American sidHJRYHUQPHQWDOGRXEWVFRQWLQXRXVO\SHUVLVWHGDVWRWKH,UDQLDQV¶
VREULHW\DQGSHDFHIXOLQWHQWLRQV$QDO\VWVWKHUHIRUHDJUHHWKDWWKHVHµSHUFHSWXDOLPSHGLPHQWV¶
(Miller 2011) need to be dismantled if one is to reach a long-term solution to the Iranian 
nuclear crisis that would be acceptable to both parties. An important first step in this direction 
was done with the conclusion RIDSROLWLFDOIUDPHZRUNDJUHHPHQWRQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUVWDWXVRQ
2 April 2015. This agreement contains basic parameters for the negotiation of a 
comprehensive nuclear agreement. These negotiations have not least been made possible due 
to changes in both US and Iranian administrations. In ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU&KHVV, Robert Litwak 
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 Iran was one of the first states to sign the NPT in 1968 and ratify it in 1970. 
83
 Jason Jones (2011) has analyzed how the Iranian nuclear issue has become securitised in US media and policy 
discourse and how this discourse impacted favorably on the Bush aĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇƐƚƌĂƚĞŐŝƐing on Iran.  
84
 For a more detailed and concise discussion of US-Iran nuclear cooperation in the 1960s and 1970s, cf. 
<ŝďĂƌŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? ? )ĂŶĚWĂƚƌŝŬĂƌĂŬŽƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŶƐĂƌŝ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
85
 tŚŝůĞ ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚ ?ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĐĂŶĚŝƐĐƌŝŵŝŶĂƚĞ ?ĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŝŵĂƚƚŚĞĐŽŵƉůĞƚĞŝŶƚĞƌƌƵƉƚŝŽŶŽĨ
trade and finance between sender and target.  
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(2014) analyses how the Obama administration has brought about a discursive shift from the 
HDUOLHU%XVKDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VODEHOOLQJRI,UDQDVDµURJXHVWDWXH¶WRDQµRXWOLHU¶VWDWH-33; 
cf. also Litwak 2008: 92). He contends that this signalled a policy shift from a unilateral 
categorisation of other actors (rogue) to a focus on Iranian non-compliance with international 
norms (outlier). It remains to be seen how actual policies will match this rhetoric.  
 Despite repeated explorations of possible direct bilateral talks even before the election 
of Rouhani86 and at times strikingly progressive US-Iranian encounters in the context of the 
nuclear talks87LWLVQRWFOHDUKRZDµJUDQG EDUJDLQ¶RI86-Iranian normalisation of relations 
ZLOOORRNOLNH:KLOHWKH2EDPDDGPLQLVWUDWLRQEHOLHYHVLQWKHµWUDQVIRUPDWLRQDO¶HIIHFWVWKDt 
a nuclear agreement with Iran could have on the regional security structure and, implicitly, on 
US-,UDQLDQUHODWLRQVWKHSROLWLFDOµIDOO-RXW¶HIIHFWVLQERWK7HKUDQDQG:DVKLQJWRQZLOOHQWDLO
intense infighting between the administrations and domestic hardliners that are opposing any 
partial rapprochement. It should be beyond doubt, however, that a long-term solution to the 
nuclear crisis is not conceivable without it. The implementation of a nuclear deal will have to 
be closely monitored by the IAEA and be embedded in a multilateral context that will require 
WKHFRQVHQWRIWKRVHVWDWHVQHJRWLDWLQJLWWKHµ¶IRUPDW$VWKHLPSOHPHQWDWLRQRIVXFKD
deal, however, will entail the lifting of UN and unilateral sanctions, Iran could undergo a 
transition tRZDUGVDµQRUPDO¶FRXQWU\7KLVSURFHVVZLOOLQHYLWDEO\KDYHUHSHUFXVVLRQVRQWKH
US-,UDQLDQ UHODWLRQV 0RXVDYLDQ  DVVHUWV WKH FHQWUDOLW\ RI WKH 86 LQ HQGLQJ ,UDQ¶V
isolation, and recalls that all Iranian attempts to negotiate with the Europeans in a ³:HVW
0LQXV 86´ DSSURDFK KDYH IDLOHG  FI DOVR 0LODQL  3HUWKHV  -96). David 
3DWULNDUDNRV  IRUPXODWHV ³>«@ WKURXJKRXW WKH PHDQGHULQJ -year history of the 
QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH IURP µ$WRPV IRU 3HDFH¶ WR 2EDPD¶V :KLWH +RXVH WRGD\ WKH 8SA has 
UHPDLQHGWKHVLQJOHPRVWLPSRUWDQWIDFWRULQGHFLGLQJZKHWKHU,UDQJRHVQXFOHDURUQRW´
Given Iranian fixations on the US, American foreign policy is thus not only crucial to 
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 In a remarkable move in 2009, Ahmadinejad had written a letter to president Obama stating the Iranian 
ƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐ “ƚŽĞŶŐĂŐĞŝŶďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶƐ ?ǁŝƚŚŽƵƚĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚŽŶƚŚĞďĂƐŝƐŽĨŵƵƚƵĂůƌĞƐƉĞĐƚ ?
(Charbonneau 2011). Cf. also Dareini (2012). Iranian Foreign Minister Salehi confirmed again in the run-up to 
ƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?ůŵĂƚǇƚĂůŬƐ/ƌĂŶ ?ƐƌĞĂĚŝŶĞƐƐƚŽĞngage in direct talks and emphasisĞĚƚŚĞ ‘ŚŽŶĞƐƚŝŶƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƐ ?ŽĨƚŚĞ
Obama administration. However, he stated, the last word regarding such a decision lies with the Supreme 
Leader (speech in Berlin, 4 February 2013, cf. Annex II).  
87
 The direct encounter between US undersecretary of state William J. Burns and Iranian nuclear negotiator 
Saeed Jalili in Geneva in 2009 was one such example of bilateral meetings (Mousavian 2012: 454) prior to 
,ĂƐƐĂŶZŽƵŚĂŶŝ ?ƐƚĞƌŵ ?dŚĞƵŶƉƌĞĐĞĚĞŶƚĞĚĚŝƌĞĐƚƚĂůŬƐďĞƚǁĞĞŶh^^ƚĂƚĞ Secretary Kerry and Iranian foreign 
ŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂƌŝĨĨŽůůŽǁŝŶŐZŽƵŚĂŶŝ ?ƐŝŶĂƵŐƵƌĂƚŝŽŶŚĂǀĞŝŶƚƌŽĚƵĐĞĚĂƋƵĂůŝƚĂƚŝǀĞůǇŶĞǁŵŽŵĞŶƚƵŵƚŽƐƵĐŚ
ďŝůĂƚĞƌĂůĞŶĐŽƵŶƚĞƌƐǁŚŝĐŚĐƵůŵŝŶĂƚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞŶĞŐŽƚŝĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĂĨŝƌƐƚŝŶƚĞƌŝŵĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚ ?ƚŚĞ ‘:ŽŝŶƚWůĂŶŽĨĐƚŝŽŶ ? )
on 23 November 2013. The strong bilateral US-Iran track in negotiations on a political framework agreement in 
March and April 2015 has also arguably been a crucial precondition for the P5+1 format to reach an agreement 
on 2 April 2015. 
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understand for a comprehensive solution of the Iranian nuclear crisis, but also if we are to 
XQGHUVWDQG,UDQLDQPRWLYDWLRQVDQGSRVLWLRQV)RUEHWWHURUIRUZRUVHWKH86KDVEHHQ,UDQ¶V
µ6LJQLILFDQW2WKHU¶7KLV UHODWLRQVKLS LV FULWLFDO WR DQ\XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKH ,UDQLDQQXFOHDU
conflict, and to how China, Russia, and Turkey relate to it.   
2.2 ǯ 
 
The foreign policy of the EU toward the Iranian nuclear programme has also been covered 
elsewhere by a range of authors. In the absence of US-Iranian bilateral relations, it fell to the 
µ(8¶ LH )UDQFH *UHDW %ULWDLQ DQG *HUPDQ\ WR OHDG QHJRWLDWLRQV ZLWK ,UDQ ZKHQ WKH
ODWWHU¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHZDVXQFRYHUHGLQZLWKWKHIRUPDWEHLQJMRLQHGE\WKH(8
+LJK5HSUHVHQWDWLYHIRU WKH8QLRQ¶V&RPPRQDQG6HFXULW\3ROLF\&)63-Dvier Solana at 
the time, in late 2003.88 The diplomatic track record thereof has been widely analysed in the 
scholarly literature as well as in memoirs and biographies of decision-makers.89 Under the 
(8¶VQHJRWLDWLRQHIIRUWVQXFOHDUWDONVVHHPHGWRKDYHEHHn making progress since the stalled 
 6D¶GDEDG QHJRWLDWLRQV DOO WKH ZD\ WR WKH LQLWLDOO\ DSSODXGHG  3DULV DJUHHPHQW
which outlined broad-based European-Iranian cooperation in a number of issue areas, 
including comprehensive cooperation in the nuclear, technological and economic field in 
UHWXUQ IRU µREMHFWLYH JXDUDQWHHV¶ LQ WKH H[FOXVLYHO\ SHDFHIXO QDWXUH RI WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU
programme. Developments as from 2005, however, accounted for a failure of the early EU-
led proposals and the eventual referral of the Iranian nuclear dossier from the IAEA Board of 
Governors to the UNSC according to Art. XII.C of the IAEA Statute. Two main impediments 
to progress in nuclear negotiations were US resistance to European and Iranian proposals90 
and the Iranian presidential elections that saw the coming into office of president 
Ahmadinejad with an ensuing turn for the worse concerning cooperation with the West. It is 
at this juncture that hopes for easily negotiable solutions were dashed at the latest.  
                                                          
88
 Mark Fitzpatrick (2006a) writes that even before the birth of the P5+1 format in 2005/2006, US Under 
^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇĨŽƌWŽůŝƚŝĐĂůĨĨĂŝƌƐEŝĐŚŽůĂƐƵƌŶƐŚĂĚ “ĐŽŶƐƵůƚĞĚĐůŽƐĞůǇǁŝƚŚŚŝƐh-3 counterparts and joined 
ƐƚƌĂƚĞŐǇƐĞƐƐŝŽŶ ? ? ? ? ) ?&ƌŽŵƚŚĞďĞŐŝŶŶŝŶŐ ?ƚŚƵƐ ?ƚŚĞh^ǁĂƐŝŶǀŽůǀĞd in the process, but not yet at the 
forefront of diplomatic activity. Fitzpatrick also confirms that Russia and China were sometimes included in 
these sessions before the P5+1 format existed (ibid.).  
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 Examples include Baalbood & Edwards (2007); Biscop (2007); Dryburgh (2008); Fischer (2011: 250f.); Sauer 
(2007, 2015); Straw (2012: 433f.); Tertrais (2006); Giumelli & Ivan (2013); Kuzmicheva (2009);  Peimani (2006); 
Keukeleire & MacNaughtan (2008: 113); Bretherton & Vogler (2006: 183); Kile (2005); Ansari (2006: 202f.); 
Barzegar (2012: 255f.); Patrikarakos (2012: 195-225); Mousavian (2012); Chirac (2011: 300).  
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 Former British Foreign Secretary Jack Straw (2012) recounts in his memoirs how in this early phase of 
negotiations over nuclear Iran, the US was hŝŐŚůǇƐƵƐƉŝĐŝŽƵƐŽĨŶŽƚŽŶůǇƚŚĞ/ƌĂŶŝĂŶƐ ?ďƵƚĂůƐŽŽĨƚŚĞƵƌŽƉĞĂŶƐ ?
approach (405; 448; 453). Tellingly, former US Defense Secretary Donald Rumsfeld (2011) calls E3 diplomacy 
ǁŝƚŚ/ƌĂŶĂ ‘ĚŝƐĂƐƚĞƌ ?ŝŶŚŝƐŵĞŵŽŝƌƐ ? ? ? ? ) ?ŶĚĨŽƌŵĞƌ /ƌĂŶŝĂŶŶƵĐůĞĂƌƐƉŽŬĞƐƉerson Mousavian (2014) 
suspected US behind-the-ƐĐĞŶĞĂĐƚŝǀŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞh ? ?ůĂĐŬŽĨĨůĞǆŝďŝůŝƚǇŝŶ ? ? ? -2005 (202-206).  
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 The referral to the Security Council in February 2006 by an IAEA board vote of 27-3 
paved the way for the eventual imposition of Chapter VII sanctions on Iran and, interestingly, 
D JUDGXDO VKLIW RI SRVLWLRQV ZLWKLQ WKH µ:HVWHUQ¶ FDPS ZLWK )UDQFH DQG *UHDW %ULWDLQ
becoming increasingly more assertive and formulating confrontational foreign policy stances 
on Iran, to an extent even that leads Oborne and Morrison (2013) WRGHVFULEHWKHPDVµFOLHQW
VWDWHV¶RI WKe US in the Iran dossier (6). Kayhan Barzegar (2012) attests a ORVVRI WKH(8¶V
µLQGHSHQGHQW DQG PHGLDWRU\ UROH LQ WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU GRVVLHU¶ DIWHU WKH IDLOHG  3DULV
DJUHHPHQWDQGREVHUYHVDFORVHUDOLJQPHQWZLWK86SRVLWLRQVWKHUHDIWHUµDGRSWLQJSULQFLSOHV
of deterrence and anti-ZHDSRQL]DWLRQ¶,QWKHsecond half of the 2000s, this even went 
as far as the imposition of EU unilateral sanctions that go well beyond the UNSC-backed 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO VDQFWLRQV RQ ,UDQ DQG DUJXDEO\ DIIHFWHG ,UDQLDQ HQWLWLHV DQG ,UDQ¶V HFRQRP\
much more than US unilateral sanctions (such as the 2012 EU oil embargo or financial 
sanctions such as the cut-off from the Belgian-based SWIFT system).  EU unilateral Iran 
sanctions have seen a qualitative change from 2010 onwards, as opposed to the human rights-
related sanctions adopted in the 1990s.91        
 7ZRFDYHDWVVKRXOGEHLQVHUWHGDWWKLVSRLQW5HIHUHQFHVWRWKHµ:HVWHUQ¶FDPSE\QR
means imply an analytical grouping or equation of EU and US positions in the Iranian nuclear 
dossier. These have been substantially different at times, which gave Iran ample opportunities 
WR³H[SORLW WKHJDSEHWZHHQ(XURSHDQG WKH8QLWHG6WDWHV WRDFKLHYH ,UDQLDQREMHFWLYHV´DV
Mousavian (2012: 180) confirms. Especially since 2006 and the formation of the P5+1, the 
WHUPµ:HVWHUQFDPS¶LVUHIHUUHGWR Ln order to differentiate between the Western (Germany, 
France, Great Britain, USA) and non-Western (China, Russia) states in this negotiation 
format. A subsumption of at times different US/EU positions LQWR D µ:HVWHUQ FDPS¶
however, does not contradict thH FRQFHSWXDO UHIHUHQFH SRLQW RI D *UDPVFLDQ µKLVWRULF EORF¶
worked out in the theoretical chapter. Such a historic bloc breaks down the above mentioned 
µ:HVWHUQ FDPS¶ LQWR KHJHPRQLF 86-inspired) structures, subalterns (European and other 
allies), and other (and perhaps even overlapping) actor constellations.    
 $VHFRQGFDYHDWFRQFHUQV WKH(8¶V ,UDQSROLFLHV ,W LVQRWDVVXPHGKHUH WKDW WKH(8
represents a homogenous bloc pursuing coherent policies toward Iran. It should not come as a 
surprise that differHQW FRXQWULHV KDYH GLIIHUHQW DSSURDFKHV 7KH µ(8-¶ IRUPDW LV
acknowledged as leading negotiations with Iran over its nuclear programme, together with the 
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 EU unilateral sanctions have been applied to more sectors, including non-proliferation, and moved from 
 ‘ƚĂƌŐĞƚĞĚ ?ƚŽĐŽŵƉƌĞŚĞŶƐŝǀĞƐĂnctions approaches. Yet, the intended effects and likely impact of EU sanctions 
lacks both public and governmental scrutiny (as admitted by government officials. EU sanctions workshop, 14 
May 2015, London. Cf Annex II). Cf. also Portela (2010).  
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8QLRQ¶V+LJK5HSUHVHQWDWLYH92 who acts both as a political representative of all 28 member 
states and a vice president of the European Commission at the same time.93 The foreign 
policies of Germany, France, and the UK in the Iran dossier, moreover, have partially been 
very different.94 7KH µ(8¶V SROLF\¶ WRZDUG ,UDQ KDV WR EH VHHQ DV WKH RXWFRPH RI SROLF\
consultation and coordination among those three and the nuclear negotiation team of the 
(XURSHDQ([WHUQDO$FWLRQ6HUYLFH(YHQWKRXJKWKH(8¶V,UDQSROLF\LVQRWWKHUHVHDUFKIRFXV
of the present analysis, cross-UHIHUHQFHVZLOOEHPDGHZKHQDQDO\VLQJ&KLQD¶V DQG5XVVLD¶V
GLSORPDF\ZLWKLQWKH3IUDPHZRUNDQG7XUNH\¶VRXWVLGHLW 
2.3 ǯǣ-Aligned Movement 
and Arab States  
 
Next to these two key players in the nuclear talks (US and EU), there is a handful of different 
perspectives on the Iranian nuclear programme that are not as determining as the US and the 
EU over the future direction of negotiations, but which are crucial to bear in mind if one is to 
contextualise Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies against the backdrop of a 
plethora of positions in the Iranian nuclear dossier.      
 The Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) is such an example of a positioning in the Iran 
dossier that is often in opposition to Western positions, and to which not least the Iranian 
leadership, especially in the Ahmadinejad period, has referred to in their quest for 
international coalitions that would form a counter-EDODQFHWRµWKH:HVWHUQEORF¶7KLVJURXS
of 120 states breathes the ambition not to be formally aligned with or against any power bloc 
in the international arena. The NAM was founded in September 1961 in a Cold War context 
between the two ideologically opposed blocs with the aim to offer an alternative middle 
course of non-DOLJQPHQWDQGDSODWIRUP³RSSRVLQJLPSHULDOLVPDQGJUHDWSRZHUKHJHPRQ\´
mainly for developing countries (Jackson 1983; Jaipal 1987). The position of the NAM in the 
,UDQLDQQXFOHDUGRVVLHUWRGD\LVEDVHGRQDQ³HPSKDVLVRQWKHPXOWLFXOturalism and challenge 
against the nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, on the one hand, and non-
compromising position on inalienable and non-discriminatory right for peaceful uses of 
QXFOHDU HQHUJ\´ 6ROWDQLHK LQ 0RXVDYLDQ   FI DOVR .LEDUoglu 2006: 222; Meier 
2014: 7; Potter & Mukhatzhanova 2012; Yew 2011; Litwak 2014: 58-59; Braveboy-Wagner 
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 And, since the coming into force of the Lisbon treaty, the nuclear negotiation team of the European External 
Action Service (EEAS). 
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 Interview with EEAS official, Brussels, 4 June 2013. 
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 ĂǀŝĚK ?^ƵůůŝǀĂŶ ?^ŚŝĞĨKƉĞƌĂƚŝŶŐKĨĨŝĐĞƌ ?ƚŚĞƌĞĨŽƌĞƌĞŵĂƌŬĞĚǁŝƚŚƌĞŐard to the difficult 
approximations of different national positions that an EU3 line usually provides a good indicator for an EU-wide 
compromise. Keynote speech at the EXACT conference, Brussels, 11 July 2013 (cf. Annex II). 
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  (VSHFLDOO\ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI WKH µ/RRNLQJ WR WKH (DVW¶ GLSORPDF\ RI WKH
Ahmadinejad administration, Iran relied on the support of the NAM for its perceived struggle 
IRUµLQDOLHQDEOH¶QXFOHDUULJKWVDQGDJDLQVW:HVWHUQKHJHPRQ\DQGVXSSUHVVLRQEHOLHYLQJLQ
LWVUROHDVWKHOHDGHURID³7KLUG:RUOGEORF´DVWKHKDUELQJHUDQGUHSUHVHQWDWLYHRIWKHUHDO
µLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶ 0RXVDYLDQ128; 190f.; Posch 2013: 15; Wunderlich et al. 
2013: 266). The lack of cooperation and support for the Iranian position, evidenced by the 
ODFNLQJVXSSRUWIRU,UDQ¶VFDQGLGDF\DVDQRQ-permanent member of the UNSC in 2008 or the 
1$0¶VVXSSRUWIRU816&5in March 2008, however, cast a damp on the perception of 
unquestionable strategic bonds between the NAM and Iran. Mousavian formulates: 
³$GRSWLRQRI5HVROXWLRQERWKUHEXWWHGWKHµORRNLQJWRWKH(DVW¶SROLF\DQGSURYHGWKDW
,UDQ¶V VWUDWHJLF IULHQGV VXFh as China, Russia, and the Non-Aligned Movement were not 
ZLOOLQJWRSD\DKLJKSULFHIRUVXSSRUWLQJ7HKUDQ´$JDLQVWWKLVEDFNJURXQG<HZ
(2011) analyses the partially instrumental nature of the NAM, and distinguishes between 
³1$0DVDQRUPDWLYHFRQFHSW´³1$0DVDQ$VVRFLDWLRQ´DQG³1$0DVD)RUHLJQ3ROLF\
7RRO´-9). While she finds little principled convergence between national positions on non-
proliferation issues and NAM positions, she carves out an associational value of Third World 
solidarity in the face of perceived unfairness and disproportionality in global proliferation 
dynamics. By implication, NAM has come to be seen as a platform for states like Iran to 
cultivate an anti-$PHULFDQLVP LQ D PXOWLODWHUDO VHWWLQJ DQG WR DFW DV WKH ³$Yenger of the 
'LVSRVVHVVHG´ :XQGHUOLFK HW DO   :XQGHUOLFK   <HZ  -10). An 
LQVLJKWIXO UHDG LQ WKLVFRQWH[W LV DOVR3RWWHU¶V	0XNKDW]KDQRYD¶V  VWXG\RQ Nuclear 
Politics and the Non-Aligned Movement, which fleshes out the internal division within NAM, 
LQFOXGLQJ GLYHUJLQJ SRVLWLRQV RQ ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH -109), and also discusses 
implications of a NAM chairmanship by Iran (143-154).    
 Another subject of scholarly and policy discussion has been the position of Arab 
States in the Middle East and, in particular, of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC). The 
GCC, founded as a reaction to and to counter-balance revolutionary Iran in 1981, did not hide 
the fact that the Iranian nuclear programme and the continuing Iranian lack of transparency 
was seen as a matter of concern.95 Arab leaders severely mistrust the Iranian leadership, and 
as revealed in the diplomatic cables disclosed by Wikileaks, Saudi King Abdullah had urged 
WKH86 WR DWWDFN ,UDQ LQRUGHU WR ³FXWRII WKHKHDGRI WKH VQDNH´ 6DQJHU*ODQ] 	 %HFNHU
2010). From an Arab perspective, the Iranian nuclear programme is often associated with 
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 On Iran-Gulf relations, cf. Bill (1996); Fürter (2002); Gargash (1996); Milani (1996); Fürtig (2002).  
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regional hegemonic ambitions of the Iranian regime (Joshi 2012: 116).96 In this context, it has 
been theorised that a nuclearised Iran would disturb regional power balances and possibly 
trigger a regional arms race.97 With a view to such a scenario, Arab states in the region have 
been adamant in stressing the need for Iranian cooperation with the IAEA and UNSC 
resolutions and have been advocating (not always publicly) for Western decisive stances on 
,UDQ¶VODFNRIFRPSOLDQFH3DUVLI*X]DQVN\	<DGOLQ-113).  
2.4 Iran as an object of study: Eschewing sensationalism and alarmism  
 
The image of Iran often encountered in Western media and press reports but also in 
LQIOXHQWLDOWKLQNWDQNDQDO\VHVDQGDFDGHPLFMRXUQDOVLVRQHRIDµURJXH¶RUµSDULDK¶UHJLPHDW
least of an internationally isolated theocracy whose intransigence, veiled intentions and lack 
of transparency with regard to its nuclear programme needs to be countered with a tough 
diplomatic stance as well as coercion. Under international law, coercing Iran includes the 
imposition of sanctions under article 42 of chapter 7 of the UN Charter as well as, if Iran is 
deHPHGDµ7KUHDWWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\¶WKHXVHRIIRUFHLIEDFNHGE\D816&
mandate under article 43 of the same chapter (enforcement action). Besides such legal 
considerations, much literature has been produced on the Israeli-Iranian official enmity, 
,VUDHO¶V VWDXQFK RSSRVLWLRQ WR DQ\ ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH DQG WKH OLNHOLQHVV DV ZHOO DV
feasibility of Israeli pre-emptive strikes against Iranian nuclear facilities even outside of 
international law stipulations.98         
 Much of the discourse on Iran and the Iranian nuclear programme is politically loaded, 
emotionally charged and ideologically gridlocked. Sometimes based on unsubstantiated 
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 Borghard & Rapp-,ŽŽƉĞƌ ‘Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐƚƵĚǇĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐĂŶŽĨƚ-mentioned side-argument of Iranian regional 
ĂŵďŝƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ?ŶĂŵĞůǇƚŚĂƚŽĨ/ƌĂŶ ?ƐƐƵƉƉŽƌƚĨŽƌ,ŝǌďŽůůĂŚ ?/Ŷŝƚ ?ƚŚĞy debunk the argument often 
found in policy analyses as well as scholarly articles that an Iranian nuclear bomb would automatically 
ĞŵďŽůĚĞŶƉƌŽǆǇŐƌŽƵƉƐƐƵĐŚĂƐ,ŝǌďŽůůĂŚ ?^ƵĐŚĂŶ ‘ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ?ƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽ ?ŽƌŐŚĂƌĚ ?ZĂƉƉ-Hooper 
find, is unlikely given both intrinsic state sponsor-proxy particularities that cannot be translated into state-level 
deterrence strategies; and the nature of the Iran-Hizbollah relationship according to which a nuclear Iran will 
entail Iranian interests that may even be at oĚĚƐǁŝƚŚ,ŝǌďŽůůĂŚ ?Ɛ ?Ĩ ?ĂůƐŽ'ƵǌĂŶƐŬǇ ?zĂĚůŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?
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 WĂƚƌŝŬĂƌĂŬŽƐ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?<ŝďĂƌŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ?<ĂǇĞ tĞŚƌĞǇ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĚĞůŵĂŶĞƚĂů ?(2011: 67); 
Fitzpatrick (2006b: 21); Guldimann (2007: 174); Clawson & Eisenstadt (2008: 18); Lippman (2012: 117); Tertrais 
(2010-11: 49- ? ? ) ?Ĩ ?ĂůƐŽ ‘^ĞĐŽŶĚ-KƌĚĞƌEƵĐůĞĂƌWƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?:ŽƐŚŝ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?Ĩ ? ) ? ‘ƌĞĂĐƚŝǀĞƉƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?
(Solingen 2012a: 38), and Khan (2002: 219- ? ? ? )ŽŶ ‘WƌŽůŝĨĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƉƌŽƉĞŶƐŝƚŝĞƐŝŶƚŚĞƌĂď^ƚĂƚĞƐ ? ?,ƵŶƚĞƌ ?Z ?
 ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ŚŽůĚƐƚŚĂƚƐƉĞĐƵůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂďŽƵƚĂƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĂƌŵƐƌĂĐĞƐŚŽƵůĚŶŽƚďĞŽǀĞƌƐƚĂƚĞĚ P “ ? Q ?ŝĨ/ƌĂŶǁĞƌĞ
ƚŽ ‘ŐŽŶƵĐůĞĂƌ ?ŝŶƚŚĞŶĞǆƚĨĞǁǇĞĂƌƐ ?ŝƚŝƐĂůƌĞĂĚǇƚŽŽůĂƚĞĨŽƌ^ĂƵĚŝƌĂďŝĂ ?ŐǇƉƚŽƌĂŶǇŽƚŚĞƌƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůĐŽƵŶƚƌǇ
to start a ŶƵĐůĞĂƌƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞƚŚĂƚĐŽƵůĚďĞƌĞĂĚǇǁŝƚŚŝŶĂĚĞĐĂĚĞŽƌŵŽƌĞ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚĞƐĞĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐ ?ŚĞ
contends, would rather look to the US as a security provider in a regional alliance structure.   
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 Pedatzur (2007); Raas & Long (2007); Ram (2009); Talmadge (2008); Therme (2012a); Clawson & Eisenstadt 
(2008); Parasiliti (2009: 9-10); Gergorin (2009: 21); Fitzpatrick (2010: 88). Tertrais (2010-11) makes the 
interesting point that an Israeli NATO membership could be a way to embed Israeli security concerns in a 
multilateral framework and dissuade Israel from unilateral military actions.  
78 
 
assumptions and pre-conceived categorisations, a number of accounts typically depict Iran as 
an anarchic and obscure place and its government as irrational and illegitimate, ranging from 
politicised and polemic commentaries by agenda-driven foreign policy practitioners and 
analysts,99 all the way to judgemental analyses by different parts of the media establishment 
and academics alike that unquestioningly reproduce a particular narrative of the Iranian 
nuclear crisis. In Confronting Iran  $OL $QVDUL UHFRXQWV KRZ WKH ,UDQLDQ µHQHP\¶
construction on the part of US administrations took place in the aftermath of the 1979 
UHYROXWLRQ DQG WKH HQVXLQJ KRVWDJH FULVLV ODUJHO\ LQ WKH DEVHQFH RI UHJXODU µUHDOLW\ FKHFNV¶
(93f.). In their book Going to Tehran (2013), the former US government officials Flynt and 
Hillary Mann Leverett analyse a powerful Iran mythology to be at work that defies logic and 
prevents objective policy recommendations.       
 Yet, not only policy circles, but also the academy is guilty of essentialising a country 
that most readers only know for the appearance of its nuclear programme in news headlines. 
³,W LV WKLV PDUNHW IRU µ,UDQLDQ SRS VWXGLHV¶ WKDW DOORZV VRPH WR EHFRPH µH[SHUWV¶ RQ WKH
country by writing a travelogue, without footnotes or quoting a few newspaper sources at 
EHVW´$GLE-Moghaddam (2010: 16) aptly complains in Iran in World Politics. This calls for 
the need for a critical reading of foreign policy discourses on Iran, precisely because 
³GLVFRXUVHRQ ,UDQ LV saturated with policy-relevant, think-tank-type analyses, which are too 
often designed to reify the caricature of Iran as a monolithic, unchangeable, eternally anarchic 
SODFH´   7KLV GLVFRXUVH LV QXUWXUHG E\ ³RQH-dimensional empirical material, 
DHVWKHWLFL]HGQDUUDWLRQRUDQHFGRWDO MRXUQDOLVWLFGHVFULSWLRQ´ ibid: 16), he states. This sorry 
VWDWH WKHQ GHPDQGV WKH ³>«@¶GH-UHLILFDWLRQ¶ RI H[LVWHQW FXOWXUDO V\VWHPV ERWK DV DQ
LQWHOOHFWXDOHIIRUWDQGSROLWLFDOSUD[LV´ibidUDWKHUWKDQ³WKH reification of apparently 
DXWKRULWDWLYHWUXLVPV´KHZULWHVLQInternational Politics of the Persian Gulf. Loyal 
to this spirit, the present study draws upon the international body of literature on the subject 
area that is distinguished by well-substantiated and convincingly argued analyses that reveal 
both analytical thoroughness and empirical rigour,100 and triangulates its own research 
observations with primary policy documents and semi-structured elite interviews.101  
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 i.a. influential US neoconservative authors such as Krauthammer (2012a, 2012b); Ledeen (2007);  Muravchik 
(2006); neoconservative politicians such as Dick Cheney (2011); John McCain (2012); or former Israeli 
ambassador and foreign policy advisor Dore Gold (2009). Khalaji (2008) is an example of how think tank 
analysis nurtures and propagates a distorted narrative about such essentially ideological classifications of 
 ‘ƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ŝƌƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƚǇ ? ? 
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 i.a. Adib-Moghaddam (2006, 2010, 2011); Ansari (2006); Bertram (2009); ElBaradei (2012); Jafari (2009); 
Katouzian (2009); Khlopkov (2007); Perthes (2008, 2009, 2010); Parsi (2012); Patrikarakos (2012); Posch (2013). 
The Iran reports by the International Crisis Group also serve as well-researched and substantiated accounts of 
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Likewise, the literature on legal aspects of the nuclear non-proliferation regime (cf. Arbatov 
2007; Kirichenko 2007; Pilat 2007; Mousavian 2012; Patrikarakos 2012: 51f.), as well as 
technical aspects related to the nuclear fuel cycle (cf. Diakov 2007, 2009; cf. also ElBaradei 
2012: 12f.; Therme & Khazaneh 2012: 104f.; Patrikarakos 2012: 42f.) will be referred to 
where necessary, feeding into the discussion about the political controversies surrounding the 
technicalities of the Iranian nuclear programme.       
 Ultimately, while Iranian foreign policy is not the main focus of this research (but 
UDWKHU&KLQD¶V5XVVLD¶VDQG7XUNH\¶VWKHDQDO\VLVWKDWIROORZVLVHTXDOO\LQIRUPHGE\WKH
literature on the Iranian perspective on the nuclear crisis as well as policy accounts and 
behind-the-scene analyses, the latter of which are particularly relevant for a broader 
understanding of the evolution of the nuclear stalemate as perceived by relevant actors 
LQYROYHG7RQDPHEXWDIHZ$OLUH]D-DIDU]DGHK¶VERRNµ7KH,UDQ7KUHDW¶ serves as an 
analysis of the Iranian nuclear programme from the Iranian exile oppositionist who uncovered 
its existence in 2002.102 6H\HG+RXVVHLQ0RXVVDYLDQ¶Vµ7KH,UDQLDQ1XFOHDU&ULVLV$
0HPRLU¶is a detailed high-level Iranian insider account of the nuclear crisis from 2002 until 
2012 from the man who served as spokesperson IRU ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU QHJRWLDWLRQ WHDP IURP
2003-6LPLODUO\ IRUPHUFKLHIQXFOHDUQHJRWLDWRU DQG WRGD\¶V ,UDQLDQSUHVLGHQW+DVVDQ
Rouhani (2011) wrote a book on diplomacy surrounding the Iranian nuclear case covering the 
WLPH VSDQ KH ZDV LQ FKDUJH RI ,UDQ¶V QHJRWLDWLRQ WHDP -2005).103 And Mohamed 
(O%DUDGHL¶V 12) elegantly and captivatingly written µ7KH $JH RI 'HFHSWLRQ 1XFOHDU
Diplomacy in Treacherous Times¶ offers an illuminating behind-the-scenes coverage of 
nuclear diplomacy with Iran from the former Director General of the IAEA.  
3. Russian, Turkish and Chinese Iran policies: State of the art in the 
literature 
 
Scarce attention has been paid so far to comparative analyses of the positions and rationale of 
the three case countries China, Russia and Turkey under consideration in the present research 
that can and do influence the process of negotiations and set the tone for the further course of 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
nuclear diplomacy with Iran (2003, 2004, 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012a, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014a, 2014b, 
2014c).  
101
 Cf. the previous chapter for a detailed discussion of the data collection methods used. 
102
 Admittedly, authors with political agendas can and should be read with an awareness of their intentions. 
dŚĞĂůĂƌŵŝƐƚůĂŶŐƵĂŐĞŽĨ:ĂĨĂƌǌĂĚĞŚ ?ƐďŽŽŬŝƐĂĐĂƐĞŝŶƉŽŝŶƚ ? 
103
 Amniyat Melli va Diplomasi-ye Hastehi Iran (National Security and Nuclear Diplomacy) was published in 2011 
and a shortened version entitled Ruayt Tadabir va Omir (Narration of Foresight and Hope) in 2013.  
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events in the Iran dossier beyond a negotiated resolution of the Iran nuclear talks. Not enough 
DWWHQWLRQKDVEHHQSDLGWRµQRQ-:HVWHUQ¶IRUHLJQSROLFLHVWRZDUGWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUFULVLV104  
3.1 Russian foreign policy toward Iran 
 
Russian-Iranian bilateral relations in the 20th century and the 2000s and in particular as from 
the 1990s have been widely analysed by a range of scholars, cutting across the disciplines of 
Area Studies, International Relations and studies in inter-regionalism.105 The Iranian 
revolution in 1979 and the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991 have been carved out as 
landmark events in bilateral relations in various ways, whose repercussions and implications 
for current foreign policies will be referred to throughout the analysis that follows. While the 
Iranian Revolution may have nurtured hopes in Soviet Russia of a looming Soviet-Iranian axis 
WRFRQIURQW$PHULFDQSUHGRPLQDQFHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDIWHUWKHIDOORIWKH6KDK.KRPHLQL¶V
LGHRORJLFDORULHQWDWLRQRIVLWXDWLQJ,UDQ³QHLWKHU(DVWQRU:HVW´WKe designation of the USSR 
DVWKH³OLWWOH6DWDQ´DQG,UDQ¶VVXSSUHVVLRQRILWV&RPPXQLVW7XGHKSDUW\SXWDQHQGWRVXFK
deliberations.106 Nevertheless, Soviet-Iranian relations quickly reached a pragmatic level of 
cooperation. Perhaps counter-intuitively, the demise of the Soviet Union then fuelled intense 
trade relations that also included the transfer of weapons and nuclear technology (Parker 
2009: 103-128; Therme 2013; Sarukhanyan 2006; Golan 1998: 30-41 ,UDQ¶V RQO\ QXFOHDU
power plant in Bushehr was built and operated by the Russian atomic industry. The 
LPSRUWDQFHRI5XVVLDIRU,UDQ¶VQXFOHDULQIUDVWUXFWXUHKDVEHHQZLGHO\DQDO\VHG (cf. Khlopkov 
& Lutkova 2010; Parker 2009: 103-128; Therme 2013; Sarukhanyan 2006; Golan 1998: 30-
38; Mizin 2004; Orlov & Vinnikov 2005; Yurtaev 2005). Chapter 5 will dwell on the 
VLJQLILFDQFHRIWKHVHWLHVIRU5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDIWHU
2002.             
 A number of analyses of Russian foreign policy following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union make out distinct phases of foreign policy re-orientation toward the West, ranging from 
DVVLPLODWLRQLVWWRPRUHDVVHUWLYHDQGLQGHSHQGHQWIRUHLJQSROLFLHVWKDWEHVSHDN5XVVLD¶VTXHVW
for a post-imperial foreign policy identity (Belopolsky 2009: 14-28; Casier 2006; Katz 2002; 
                                                          
104
 Cf. the previous chapter for a detailed discussion of the case selection strategy. 
105
 i.a., Adomeit (2007, 2009); Golan (1998); Gusher (1997); Freedman (2000); Jalali (2001); Katz (2002; 2008); 
Orlov (2010); Primakov (2009: 310; 341f.); Sakwa (2002); Naumkin (1998); Therme (2012b, 2013); Trenin & 
Malashenko (2010); Yurtaev (2005). Cf. most notably John WĂƌŬĞƌ ?Ɛ ‘Persian Dreams. Moscow and Tehran Since 
ƚŚĞ&ĂůůŽĨƚŚĞ^ŚĂŚ ? (2009) as a concise book-length analysis of Russian-Iranian relations as from the 1990s.  
106
 For analyses of Soviet-Persian and Soviet-Iranian relations, cf. i.a. Parker (2009: 1-56); Sicker (1988); Yodfat 
(1984); McCain (1987: 39-53); Chubin (1993); Yapp (1982, 1983); Vassiliev (1993); Varasteh (1991); Freedman 
(1991); Ramazani (1990); Golan (1990: 176-196); Rubinstein (1982: 57-132); Atkin (2011; Heller (1992: 38-40).  
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MacFarlane 2006: 44f.; Sakwa 2002; Trenin 2006; Tsygankov 2007; Mendras 2012; 
Nizameddin 2013: 52f.; Shakleina 2013: 166-174). 5XVVLD¶VSROLF\WRZDUGWKH&,6DQGRWKHU
Central Asian countries, including Iran, has inspired numerous case studies investigating 
5XVVLDQIRUHLJQSROLF\VKLIWVRUODFNWKHUHRILQWKHVWRZDUGLWVµ1HDU$EURDG¶&HQWUDO
Asia and the Middle East (cf. i.a. Belopolsky 2009; Freedman 1997, 1998a, 1998b; 
Lepingwell 1994; Kerr 1995; Sakwa 2002: 375f.; Trenin 2006; Dannreuther 2004, 2012).107 
Belopolsky (2009), in Russia and the Challengers, asks the question why Russia chose to 
DOLJQ LWVHOIZLWK WKH µFKDOOHQJHU¶ VWDWHV&KLQD ,UDQ DQG ,UDT DQG DQDO\VHVKRZ86 IRUHLJQ
policy has factored into Russian foreign policy decision-making. While her analysis of the 
institutional complexities involYHGLQWKHIRUPXODWLRQRI5XVVLD¶V,UDQSROLF\LVLQVLJKWIXOWKH
UHDGLQJRI5XVVLDQFORVHUµDOLJQPHQW¶ZLWK&KLQDDQG,UDQDVDFRQVHTXHQFHRI5XVVLD¶VTXHVW
for a new post-Soviet identity obfuscates rather diverse foreign policy motivations with the 
drivH WR XQGHUOLQH ³5XVVLD¶V (XUDVLDQ FKDUDFWHU´  $ VLPLODU FRQFOXVLRQ LV GUDZQ LQ
1L]DPHGGLQ¶V  3XWLQ¶V 1HZ 2UGHU LQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW 5XVVLD¶V SROLFLHV WRZDUGV
different actors in the Middle East, including Iran, are seen both in the context of respective 
bilateral relations and through the prism of US-Russian relations in their effect on the region. 
:LWKDVWURQJHUIRFXVRQWKHODWWHUWKHUHDGLQJWKDW0RVFRZ¶VSULPHPRWLYDWLRQIRULWV0LGGOH
Eastern policies is to undermine the US presence in the Middle East is a running theme of the 
book. Notwithstanding the simplified portrayal of statist identities, I consider the underlying 
assumption of exclusive alignment patterns (either pro-US or pro-Iran) problematic for a 
number of reasons that Chapter 5 RQ5XVVLD¶V,UDQSROLFLHVZLOOHODERUDWHRQ&UXFLDOO\IURPD
conceptual point of view, such depictions borrow too heavily from an IR neo-realist 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµEDODQFLQJ¶DQGSURFHHGIURPDWRRXQLGLUHFWLRQDOXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIIRUHLJQ
policy complexes aQG KRZ µUHVLVWDQFH¶ WDNHV SODFH LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV &KDSWHU  KDV
outlined a more nuanced approach whose validity will be assessed after the empirical case 
study discussions in the chapters that follow.      
 Staying within the conceptual frame outlined before, Chapter 5 will thus draw on and 
benefit from Russian Area Studies, and inter-regional studies at the interstice of Middle 
Eastern studies and post-6RYLHW VWXGLHV ,Q SDUWLFXODU 3DUNHU¶V  Persian Dreams 
provides an insightful analysis of Russian-Iranian relations in their wider regional and 
historical context. The implications of the Iranian nuclear crisis for the nuclear non-
SUROLIHUDWLRQ UHJLPH DQG E\ LPSOLFDWLRQ IRU 5XVVLD¶V SROLWLFDO DJHQGD DV ZHOO DV 5XVVLD¶V
motivations for its Iran policy, have been succinctly analysed by a number of authors (i.a., 
                                                          
107
 cf. also the writings by the influential former Russian foreign minister Yevgeny Primakov (2009: 340f.). 
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Adomeit 2009; Aras & Ozbay 2006; Arbatov 2007; Lata & Khlopkov 2003; Lucas 2008: 
248f.; Orlov & Vinnikov 2005; Stürmer 2008: 55; 113f.; 211f.; Trenin & Malashenko 2010; 
Yurtaev 2005; Mizin 2004; Katz 2006, 2008, 2010, 2012; Sarukhanyan 2006; Meier & Pieper 
2015; Pieper 2015b). It is within this burgeoning body of literature that the chapter on 
5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQWRZDUGWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHLVVLWXDWHGPDNLQJDWLPHO\HPSLULFDO 
contribution not only to the discussion of a highly topical geopolitical challenge, but arguably 
to our wider understanding of Russian foreign policy in the 21st century.108 Especially the 
Ukraine crisis and the ensuing deterioration in relations between Russia and the West as from 
ODWHFDOOVIRUDQDO\VHVWKDWPDNHVHQVHRI5XVVLD¶VSODFHRQWKHZRUOGVWDJH± the latter of 
which is critical for any resolution of the Iranian nuclear crisis. As a state member to the P5+1 
negotiation format with Iran, its nuclear expertise and nuclear commercial activities in Iran, 
Russia is critical for the successful conclusion of the Iran nuclear talks as well as for the 
implementation of an eventual nuclear agreement. This leverage gave rise to speculations that 
cooperation with Russia over the Iranian nuclear file could be endangered in the wake of the 
crisis in overall Russian-Western relations from 2013 onwards. Yet, despite allusions and 
threats to the contrary, Russia has not altered its positions in the Iran nuclear talks and has 
PDLQWDLQHG D FRQVWUXFWLYH OHYHO RI FRRSHUDWLRQ ZLWK µWKH :HVW¶ RQ UHVROYLQJ WKH ,UDQLDQ
nuclear crisis. Meier & Pieper (2015) have analysed a number of factors why that is so, and 
Chapter 5 includes a section on the impact of the Ukraine crLVLVRQ5XVVLD¶VVWDQFHLQWKH,UDQ
nuclear talks. 
3.2 Turkish foreign policy toward Iran 
 
Similarly, Turkish-,UDQLDQELODWHUDOUHODWLRQVLQFOXGLQJ7XUNH\¶VSHUVSHFWLYHRQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDU
programme, have been widely analysed.109 The formulation of the foreign policy doctrines of 
µ]HURSUREOHPVZLWKQHLJKERUV¶DQG µ6WUDWHJLF'HSWK¶XQGHU IRUHLJQPLQLVWHU'DYXWR÷OX has 
inspired such analyses of a country that is situated at the crossroads geographically between 
Europe and the Middle East, is institutionally embedded in a Western (NATO) strategic 
                                                          
108
 In the same vein, International Politics ŚĂƐƉƵďůŝƐŚĞĚĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƐƵĞŽŶ ‘Russia in the New International 
Order ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǀŽů ? ? ? ?ŶŽ ? ? ) ?ƌŐƵĂďůǇ ?ƚŚĞŽƵƚďƌĞĂŬŽĨ ǁŚĂ ĐĂŵĞ ƚŽďĞƚĞƌŵĞĚƚŚĞ ‘hŬƌĂŝŶĞĐƌŝƐŝƐ ?ŝŶůĂƚĞ ? ?
ďƌŝŶŐƐƌĞŶĞǁĞĚƐĐŚŽůĂƌůǇĂƚƚĞŶƚŝŽŶƚŽZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƌŽůĞŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂůůĞŐĞĚ ‘ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?
foreign policy agenda (cf. Wilson 2014; Sakwa 2015 for the first two book-length analyses thereof).  
109
 For an overview, cf. Pieper (2013a, 2015); Hale (2013: 170-72, 238-242); Jenkins (2012); Larrabee & Lesser 
(2003: 147-149); Larrabee & Nader (2013); Lesser (2005); ůƚƵŶŦƔŦŬ (2008); Aras (2001); Cetinsaya (1999; 2003); 
Oktav (2007); Olson (2001: 11-104, 2004); Cornell (2001); Fuller (2008); Fuller et al. (1993); Giragosian (2008); 
,ĂŬĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?<ŝďĂƌŽŒůƵ ?ĂŐůĂƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?<ŝďĂƌŽŒůƵ(2009, 2010); Kinzer (2010); Mango (1994); Önis (2009); 
Özcan & Özdamar (2010); Gürzel (2012); Bleek & Stein (2012); Udum (2012); Larrabee & Nader (2013); Ülgen 
(2011, 2012); Barkey (2013); Gürzel & Ersoy (2012); Kardas (2010). 
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culture, and has had a rich and varied history of bilateral relations with its neighbour Iran. 
$PRQJVWRFFDVLRQDOUHIHUHQFHVWRDQGFRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQVRI7XUNH\EHLQJDµSLYRWDOVWDWH¶LQ
the region (cf. Winrow 2003; Lewis 2006; Kazan 2005; Larrabee & Lesser 2003: 2-3),110 
Turkey has come to be analysed as a state pursuing a differentiated foreign policy outlook that 
did not necessarily converge with US and EU policies ± either regionally or globally. 
Mastne\¶V DQG1DWLRQ¶V HGLWHGYROXPH Turkey between East and West, and William 
+DOH¶VVHPLQDOTurkish Foreign Policy since 1774 offer politico-historical reasons for 
this observation. In practice, this made Turkey an interesting potential bridge-builder between 
WKH,VODPLF5HSXEOLF,UDQDQGWKHµ:HVWHUQFDPS¶7XUNH\¶VUROHDVDµEULGJH¶RUµIDFLOLWDWRU¶
has therefore been emphasisHGLQDQDO\VHVRI7XUNH\¶V0LGGOH(DVWHUQSROLFLHVPRUHEURDGO\
DQG LQ 7XUNH\¶V ,UDQ SROLFLHV LQ SDUWLFXODU (cf. Gürzel 2012; Gürzel & Ersoy 2012; Fuller 
*LUDJRVLDQ.LEDUR÷OX	&DJODU.LEDUR÷OX/HVVHUgQLV
Üstün 2010; Ülgen 2012).111 ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W VWXGLHV KDYH LQYHVWLJDWHG 7XUNH\¶V UROH LQ
defusing the Iranian nuclear crisis against the background of the Brazil-Turkey-Iran nuclear 
fuel swap deal agreed in 2010 (Ozkan 2010; Leverett & Leverett 2013: 361f.; Parsi 2012: 
172f.; Pieper 2013a: 85- D )LW]SDWULFN  .LEDUR÷OX 2010). Insightful reads are 
especially the accounts of former US State Department official Mark Fitzpatrick (2010), of 
Turkish proliferation expert Mustafa Kibaro÷lu  DQG7ULWD3DUVL¶V 012) analysis of 
7XUNH\¶V,UDQGLSORPDF\HQWHULQJLQWRIULFWLRQZLWK86SROLFLHVLQA Single Roll of the Dice. 
These studies have brought Turkish mediation in the Iran nuclear dossier to the forefront of 
attention. µ0HGLDWLRQ¶LQGLSORPDF\KDVEHHQGHILQHG in different ways, and its preconditions 
and required components have been discussed controversially (Bercovitch 1992: 8; Moore 
2003: 8; Blake & Mouton 1985: 15; Kleiboer 1998; Herrberg 2008). However, this has been 
done from a particular perspective indebted to conflict studies. Here, mediation becomes 
necessary once a conflict has occurred. Chapter 4 will contextualise differing assessments of 
7XUNH\¶V PHGLDWRU\ SRWHQWLDO DJDLQVW WKH EDFNJURund of this literature, and analyses 
implications of mediation for the way we conceptualise resistance, norm contestation, and 
international legitimacy. As such, the aim is to allow for a cross-disciplinary analysis of 
Turkish Iran policies, drawing on conflict and mediation literature, Turkish Area Studies, 
Middle Eastern studies, and International Relations.112     
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 Ĩ ?ĂůƐŽĂǀƵƚŽŒůƵ ?ƐŵŽŶŽŐƌĂƉŚStratejik derinlik (2001).  
111
 Cf. also ĨŽƌŵĞƌdƵƌŬŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂǀƵƚŽŒůƵ ?ƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ‘dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐMediation: Critical Reflections from the 
field ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
112
 The theoretical and conceptual framework outlined in Chapter 1 will guide this endeavor. Studies in 
 ‘/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůZĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐŽĨƚŚĞDŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚ ?ŽĨƚĞŶƉƌŽĐĞĞĚĨƌŽŵĂŶĂůŵŽƐƚĂƵƚŽŵĂƚŝĐ ?ŶĞŽ-) realist theoretical 
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 The analysis thereby also is to be positioned within the scholarly debate about 
7XUNH\¶VVWDWLVWLGHQWLW\DWWKHLQWHUVWLFHRIUHJLRQDOLPSHUDWives, global security alliances and 
ELODWHUDO SDUWQHUVKLSV %\ QDWXUH RI WKLV GLVVHUWDWLRQ¶V UHVHDUFK IRFXV D VSHFLDO HPSKDVLV LV
placed on the implications for Turkish-Iranian relations on the one hand, and Turkish-
American on the other. While Turkish-Iranian relations have deteriorated in the Erdogan-
Ahmadinejad era, the Turkish-Brazil initiative has triggered speculations that have, to varying 
GHJUHHVEURXJKWWKHµD[LV-VKLIW¶GLVFXVVLRQDERXWD7XUNLVKVHFXULW\SROLWLFDOUH-orientation 
away from the West and more towards regional engagement back to the fore. As with 
exclusionary readings of Russian foreign policies as reviewed in the previous section, such 
analyses of mutually exclusive positions risk becoming reductionist and too often caricature 
foreign policy that is driven by factors of security, economics, international and institutional 
framework conditions, and domestic politics. Underlying many studies of Turkish Iran 
policies is an understanding of a distinctive Turkish regional diplomacy that does not 
QHFHVVDULO\ FRQYHUJH ZLWK µ:HVWHUQ¶ GLSORPDWLF SUHIHUHQFHV GHVSLWH 7XUNLVK 1$72
membership.113 ,Q VRPH DQDO\VHV RI 7XUNLVK IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DQ DOOHJHGO\ LPSOLFLW µ,VODPLVW¶
foreign policy agenda of the AKP government is overstated.114 This scholarly discussion has 
partly been transposed to the political arena in the wake of the failure of the May 2010 Tehran 
declaration that chapter 4 will expand upon. Turkish foreign policy shifts arguably date back 
to at least the end of the Cold War and cannot be pinned down to 2002.115 Pieper (2015) 
WKHUHIRUH KDV DQDO\VHG 7XUNH\¶V ,UDQ SROLF\ DV D EDODQFLQJ DFW EHWZHHQ µJHRVWUDWHJLF
SUDJPDWLVP¶DQGµDOOLDQFHPDQDJHPHQW¶       
 After 2011, the deterioration in Turkish-Iranian relations in the wake of the Syrian 
civil war has inspired a number of analyses (Pieper 2013a, 2014: 3- 7DúSÕQDU 
.LEDUR÷OX  /DUUDEHH 	 1DGHU  I %DUNH\ . Naturally, Turkish-Iranian 
geopolitical disagreements and fundamentally differing conceptions of regional order impact 
XSRQ 7XUNH\¶V OHYHUDJH SRZHU WR GHIXVH WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU FULVLV ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH
unprecedented developments in US-Iranian diplomatic communications since the summer of 
2013 bring along structural limits to the usefulness of actors that previously had shown 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
lense (cf. Hinnebusch & Ehteshami 2002; Hinnebusch 2003). A notable exception of scholarly work that accepts 
ƚŚĞŽƌĞƚŝĐĂůĚŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇĂƐƐƚƌĞŶŐƚŚŝƐ&ƌĞĚ,ĂůůŝĚĂǇ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? )The Middle East in International Relations.  
113
 Cf. KŒƵǌůƵ ?Ɛ(2008) analysŝƐŽĨĂ ‘DŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚĞƌŶŝǌĂƚŝŽŶŽĨdƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇ ? ?Cf. also Aykan (1996, 
2007); Cagaptay (2004); Gunter (2005); Gürzel (2012); Hale (2013: 158- ? ? ? ) ?<ŝďĂƌŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?>ĂƌƌĂďĞĞ ?
Lesser (2003: 159-185); Lesser (1992); Mowle (2007); Ozkan (2010); Önis (2011); Ülgen (2012); Savyon (2010); 
Shenna (2010); Stein (2012); Serfaty (2011: 13); Robins (1991, 2013). 
114
 Cf., e.g., PŶŝƐ ?zŝůŵĂǌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĂŐĂƉƚĂǇ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŝůŐŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?DŽƐƚŶŽƚĂďůǇ ?,ƵŶƚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? ?-9) 
ĚĞƉŝĐƚŝŽŶŽĨdƵƌŬĞǇĂƐĂƐƚĂƚĞ ‘ƚŽƌŶ ?ďĞƚǁĞĞŶ/ƐůĂŵĂŶĚ ‘ƚŚĞtĞƐƚ ?ŝƐƐŝŵƉůŝƐƚŝĐ ? 
115
 The AKP first came to power in 2002.  
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PHGLDWRU\ FDSDFLW\ $JDLQVW WKLV EDFNJURXQG WKH FKDSWHU RQ 7XUNH\¶V VWDQFH WRZDUG WKH
Iranian nuclear programme will add a timely contribution to our understanding of a 
multifaceted and nuanced Turkish foreign policy as an influential non-Western voice even 
beyond the phase of direct mediation in 2009-2010.  
3.3 Chinese foreign policy toward Iran 
 
7KH OLWHUDWXUH RQ &KLQD¶V SRVLWLRQ ZLWK UHJDUG WR WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU FULVLV KDV EHFRPH
prolific, aiming to keep pace with the dense Sino-Iranian relations that have been intensifying 
especially since the 1990s.116 ,QYHVWLJDWLRQV LQWR&KLQD¶VFRQWHPSRUDU\0LGGOH(DVWHUQDQG
particularly Iran policies, have largely ± and one might add, monothematically - analyzed 
&KLQD¶V ,UDQ SROLF\ DV DQ H[SUHVVLRQ RI FRPPHUFLal and geostrategic interests that are 
complicated by partially clashing with US policies in the region.117 Most accounts commonly 
DQDO\VH%HLMLQJ¶VDSSURDFKWRZDUG,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDVDWUDQVODWLRQRIDJHRVWUDWHJLF
and commercial foreign policy necessity: Iran supplies the crude oil that China inevitably 
needs for its growing economy, so the conclusion conventionally found in many analyses (Bo 
2011; Burman 2009; Chen 2010; Dorraj & Currier 2008; Djallil 2011; Garver 2011; 
International Crisis Group 2008; 2010: 5f.)$VHFRQGEUDQFKRIOLWHUDWXUHRQ&KLQD¶VEURDGHU
foreign policy toward Iran emphasises Chinese arms supplies to Iran (i.a. Blumenthal 2005; 
Dorraj & Currier 2010; Gill, B. 1998, 1999; Hickey 1990). Surprisingly, relatively few 
comprehensive studies on Chinese-Iranian relations at book length have been undertaken so 
IDU$ELGL¶VDQGPRUHUHFHQWO\%XUPDQ¶VDQG*DUYHU¶VDDFFRXQWVEHLQJ
notable exceptions. Abidi¶V China, Iran, and the Persian Gulf (1982) serves as a historical 
reference work for an analysis of Sino-,UDQLDQUHODWLRQVGXULQJWKH6KDK¶VUHLJQDQGJLYHQWKH
date of publication, is a dated reference to understand current bilateral relations. He traces 
back Sino-Iranian historical interactions, cultural exchanges and political developments in 
bilateral relations between post-revolutionary China and pre-UHYROXWLRQDU\ ,UDQ *DUYHU¶V
(2006a) study, in turn, provides a most comprehensive and oft-cited overview of 
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 For an overview, cf. Calabrese (2006); Chubin (2010); Dorraj & Currier (2008, 2010); Djallil (2011); Fan 
(2011); Garver (2006a, 2011); Gentry (2005); Kemenade (2009; 2010); Lin (2009); Mazza (2011); Nourafchan 
(2010); Pieper (2013b); Razani (2012); Shen (2006); Slavin (2011); Swaine (2010); Yuan (2006).  
117
 Bo (2011); Burman (2009); Chen (2010); Djallil (2011); Garver (2011); Jin (2005); Kemenade (2010); 
Nourafchan (2010); ^ŚĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?zƵĂŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ůƚĞƌŵĂŶ ?'ĂƌǀĞƌ ?Ɛ ? ? ? ? ? ) ‘The Vital Triangle: China, the United 
States, and the Middle East ?ĂŶĂůǇǌĞƐŚŝŶĂ ?ƐDŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐ ?ŽŶ^ŝŶŽ-US relations and vice versa. For more 
ŚŝƐƚŽƌŝĐĂůĂĐĐŽƵŶƚƐŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƚŽǁĂrds the Middle East, including Iran, cf. Calabrese (1991); Emadi 
(1997); Kumaraswamy (1999, ed.); Dillon (2004). For an account of Chinese-DŝĚĚůĞĂƐƚĞƌŶƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐ ‘ĨƌŽŵƚŚĞ
^ŝůŬZŽĂĚƚŽƚŚĞƌĂď^ƉƌŝŶŐ ? ?ǇĞƚǁŝƚŚƌĂƚŚĞƌĨůŝŵƐǇĐŽǀĞƌĂŐĞŽĨŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇŽŶ/ƌĂŶ ?ƐŶƵĐůĞĂƌƉƌŽŐƌĂŵŵĞ ?ĐĨ ?
Olimat (2013).  
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contemporary Sino-Iranian relations. Having an implicit focus on policy implications for the 
86 DW WLPHV KLV LV D IDLU DQG EDODQFHG DFFRXQW WKDW HPEHGV &KLQD¶V ,UDQ SROLFLHV LQWR WKH
ZLGHU SROLWLFDO FRQWH[W RI &KLQD¶V VHFXULW\ HWKQLF DQG JOREDO SRZHU FRQVLGHUDWLRQV IURP
'HQJ ;LDRSLQJ¶V XQWLO +X -LQWDR¶V OHDGHUVKLS %XUPDQ¶V  ZRUN RQ 6LQR-Iranian 
relations also offers a critical analysis of historical, economic and political ties between China 
and Iran. Yet, part of his conclusions and scenarios appear reductionist and border the realm 
of essentialising conspiracy theories, when he writes ± SDUDSKUDVLQJ +XQWLQJWRQ¶V clash 
regime (1993, 1996) - of a strategic Sino-Iranian partnership as part of a civilisational bloc 
challenging the West (cf. p. 26-27; 159f.).118      
 A vast body of literature has been pURGXFHG RQ &KLQD¶V UHJLRQDO SROLFLHV DQG WKH
perception thereof by neighboring states,119 &KLQD¶V µULVH¶ VLQFH WKH ODXQFK RI 'HQJ
;LDRSLQJ¶VUHIRUPSHULRG120 on future scenarios of Sino-US relations121 DQG&KLQD¶VSRWHQWLDO
to fundamentally change the world order with its economic weight translated into 
commensurate political power (revisionist vs. status quo power debate).122 This burgeoning 
body of literature debating the future direction that Chinese foreign policy might take 
indicates that there is considerable uncertainty in Western policy circles about the future role 
DQG EHKDYLRU RI D µULVLQJ &KLQD¶ (LWKHU VR WKH DVVHUWLRQ &KLQa continues the path of 
socialisation with other global players, works with existing rules of the game and arranges 
itself with the global political, economic and monetary system that essentially is based on the 
post-1945 US-dominated liberal order; or it will seek to use its growing political weight to 
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 ĂůĂďƌĞƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? P ? ? )ĂůƐŽǁĂƌŶƐŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚŽĨƚŚĞ ‘ŚǇƉ ƚƌĂƉ ?ƚŚĂƚĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐŽĨƚŚĞ^ŝŶŽ-Iranian 
ĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝŽŶĂƌĞŝŶĐůŝŶĞĚƚŽƐƵĐĐƵŵďƚŽ ?zĞƚ ?ƚŚĞŝĚĞĂŽĨ ‘ĐŝǀŝůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐŽůŝĚĂƌŝƚǇ ?ŝƐŽŶĞƵŶĚĞƌĐƵƌƌĞŶƚin some 
analyses of Sino-Iranian relations and will re-appear in chapter 6.  
119
 Cf. Breslin (2009); Chan (2010); Denny (1994); Dillon (2007); Goh (2007/8); Hughes (2005); Kang (2003, 
2007); Khoo & Smith (2005); Ross (2006); Roy (1994); Shambaugh (2004) for an overview of such debates.  
120
 Seminal examples include Brown et al. (2000); Cohen (2010); Goldstein (2008); Johnston & Ross (1999); Kent 
(2007); Kissinger (2011: 321f.); Ross & Zhu (2008); Shambaugh (2005); Yan (2006); Zhang (2014).  
121
 This is a subject discussed especially in the US academia. Bernstein & Munro (1997); Ross (1997); Art (2008); 
Beeson (2009); Christensen (2001); Dobbins (2012); Foot (2006, 2009/10); Foot & Walter (2011); Friedberg 
(2005); Goldstein, A. (1997/98), Goldstein, L. (2011); Ikenberry (2008); Kagan (2009); Kissinger (2011, 2012); 
Levy (2008); Mahbubani (2013: 123-126); Ross (2006); Schweller (1999); Shambaugh (2000; 2004/05); Sinha 
(2003); Wang (2005); Zhao (2008, ed.); Zoellick (2005).              
122
 &ŽƌƌĞĂĚŝŶŐƐŽĨĂŚŝŶĞƐĞ ‘ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ĐĨ ?ŚŝŶ ?dŚĂŬƵƌ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŚƌŝƐƚĞŶƐĞŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ĞŶŐ
(2006); Economy (2010); Feng (2009); Friedberg (2005, 2011); Halper (2010); He & Feng (2012); Holslag (2011); 
Kissinger (2011: 487f.); S. Chan (2004a); Shirk (2007); Swaine (2011). For analyses of a more cooperative 
Chinese foreign policy, cf. G. Chan (2006); Gill, B. (2007); Ikenberry (2008); Johnston (2003, 2004, 2013); Kang 
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?>ŝĂŶŐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?DĞĚĞŝƌŽƐ ?&ƌĂǀĞů ? ? ? ? ? ) ?&Žƌ ‘ƉƌĂŐŵĂƚŝĐ ?ĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐ ?ĐĨ ?ƌĞƐůŝŶ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?Ă(2010); 
Geeraerts & Holslag (2007); Kastner & Saunders (2012); Wang (2011); Zhao (2006); Yan (2006). In this context, 
ĐĨ ?ĂůƐŽƚŚĞ ‘ƉŽǁĞƌƚƌĂŶƐŝƚŝŽŶƚŚĞŽƌǇ ? P>ĞǀǇ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?ŚƵ>ŝƋƵŶ ?ƐƐƚƵĚǇ ‘ŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶWŽůŝĐǇĞďĂƚĞƐ ? (2010) 
ŽĨĨĞƌƐĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞŽǀĞƌǀŝĞǁŽĨƚŚĞƐĞĂŶĚŽƚŚĞƌŵĂũŽƌĚĞďĂƚĞƐŽŶŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĨƌŽŵĂŚŝŶĞƐĞ
perspective. For an insightful overview of Chinese domestic foreign policy debates, cf. Shambaugh & Xiao 
(2012: 36-72).  
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influence the global order by gradually enforcing its own ideas of managing not only the 
international economy but global governance at large. It is in this context of power transition 
WKDWWKHGHEDWHDERXWDVKLIWIURPWKHµ:DVKLQJWRQFRQVHQVXV¶WRDµ%HLMLQJFRQVHQVXV¶LVWREH
situated (Breslin 2009: 827).123 0DUWLQ-DFTXHV¶ERRNµ:KHQ&KLQD5XOHVWKH:RUOG¶ 
offers thought-provoking ideas about a future world order marked by the decline of Western 
dominance and an increasingly assertive China, covering a range of thematic (economic, 
political, societal) as well as geographical (Southeast Asia, Central Asia, Middle East, the 
$PHULFDVGLPHQVLRQVRIZKDWKHPDNHVRXWDVD³IRUHLJQSROLF\>WKDW@EHFRPHVOHVVDGDSWLYH
and increasingly inIRUPHGE\&KLQHVH LQWHUHVWVDQGGLVWLQFWLYHYDOXHV´-DFTXHV
 6SHFXODWLRQVDQGSURMHFWLRQVDERXWWKHIXWXUHWUDMHFWRU\RI&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\KDYH
proliferated in the context of an expanding scKRODUO\µ&KLQDLQGXVWU\¶WKHRULVLQJRQµ&KLQD¶V
rLVH¶,QPDQ\VXFKDQDO\VHVWKHUHLVDQRWLFHDEOHWHQGHQF\WRWUHDWµSRZHU¶DQGµLQWHUHVWV¶LQD
neo-realist reading, and to embed analyses of Chinese foreign policy in the terminology of 
balancing, alliance structures, and deterrence. This bespeaks a general trend of such works to 
be written from an IR theory perspective, quite often unveiling a lack of cross-disciplinary 
debate between the IR theorist and the Area Studies specialist. It is at this juncture and against 
the background of the theoretical framework outlined in the first chapter that the chapter on 
&KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUG WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH ties in, adding to our 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRI&KLQD¶VFXUUHQW,UDQSROLFLHVDQGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFKWKHVHUHVLVWKHJHPRQ\
from an as yet understudied conceptual angle. 
4. Ǯǯ 
 
Analyses of the foreign policy positions of these selected states towards Iran equally 
benefit from and expand the existing literature on BRICS countries124 and emerging new 
power centres in the international system.125 These studies typically analyse the changing 
                                                          
123
 There is a tendency in the US literature on the subject to shroud Chinese intentions in a cloud of suspicion, 
ĂŶĚƚŽŝŵƉůŝĐŝƚůǇĂƐƐƵŵĞĂ ‘ƌŝƐŝŶŐ ?ŚŝŶĂƚŽĐŽŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĂƚŚƌĞĂƚƚŽƚŚĞh^ ?Ɛ>ǇŶĐŚ ? ? ? ? ? )ŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚŝŶŐůǇŽďƐĞƌǀĞ  ?
the dividing line in the scholarly literature betweeŶƚŚŽƐĞĨŝŶĚŝŶŐŚŝŶĂƚŽďĞĂ ‘ƌĞǀŝƐŝŽŶŝƐƚ ?ĂĐƚŽƌĂŶĚƚŚŽƐĞ
ƐĞĞŝŶŐŵŽƌĞŝŶĚŝĐĂƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌĂĐŽŽƉĞƌĂƚŝǀĞ ? ‘ƐƚĂƚƵƐƋƵŽ ?ďĞŚĂǀŝŽƌŝŶŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƌĞůĂƚŝŽŶƐůĂƌŐĞůǇƌĞĨůĞĐƚƐƚŚĞ/Z
theoretical divide between Realism and Neoliberalism.  
124
 Acronym referring to Brazil, Russia, India China, South Africa. Originally coined by the investment firm 
Goldman Sachs in 2001 in a report formulating predictions about the growth potential of Brazil, Russia, India, 
and China; South Africa was added in 2011. Cf. Goldman Sachs (2001); Wilson & Purushothaman (2003).  
125
 cf. i.a. Hurrell (2006); MacFarlane (2006); Armijo (2007); Brawley (2007); Hancock (2007); Sotero & Armijo 
(2007); Morris (2011); Patrick (2010); Phillips (2008); Serfaty (2011); Subacchi (2008); Rynning & Ringsmose 
(2008); Vezirgiannidou (2013); Lieber (2014); Laidi (2012, 2014); Nel (2010); Khanna (2008); Nadkarni & Noonan 
(eds., 2013). In 2006, International Affairs ĚĞǀŽƚĞĚĂƐƉĞĐŝĂůŝƐƐƵĞƚŽ ‘Perspectives on Emerging Would-Be Great 
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international economic system in a multipolar world and the shift of power equations that 
JURZLQJHFRQRPLHVRIµHPHUJLQJSRZHUV¶EULQJDORQJ7KLVVWUHDPRIOLWHUDWXUHKDVEURXJKW
the hegemonic transition theory and power transition theory in the context of systemic 
leadership contestation by newly emerging powerful states to renewed scholarly attention.126 
Drawing on this literature, the present research project aims to look into the extent to which 
Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward Iran stand indicative of resistance to 
hegemony that might herald a power transition in international security cultures. While this 
study thus also analyses power transitions between dominant actors and others that might co-
define the terms of international relations to a greater extent in the future, it does so from two 
different starting points.          
 )LUVW LW DQDO\VHV µSRZHU WUDQVLWLRQV¶ QRW LQ WKH UHDOLVW-rationalist framework that is 
predominant in this scholarship. The theoretical angle adopted in this dissertation has been 
justified at length in the first chapter. Taking away the focus from the realist fixation on the 
occurrence of wars between nation-states that herald power transitions because of ill-defined 
µQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV¶127 it will be argued that policies of dominant actors aimed at preventing 
potential challengers from arising can also be crafted around sanctions, information warfare 
and norm contestation. The latter two aspects relate to the power to convey narratives. These 
can all be instruments of hegemonic structures short of an all-out military confrontation, and it 
will be shown in the following chapters how these relate to norm contestation and rules 
compliance against the background of the theoretical framework adopted here.   
 6HFRQGWKLVVWXG\GRHVQRWSURFHHGIURPWKHDQDO\WLFDOFDWHJRU\RIµ%5,&6¶VWDWHVLQ
RUGHUWRH[SDQGLWVFRQFHSWXDOVFRSHRUILHOGVRIDSSOLFDELOLW\7KHVXLWDELOLW\RIµ%5,&6¶DV
an analytical category has already been questioned elsewhere, both out of the analytical 
simplification of subsuming rather diverse countries into one variable,128 and out of a possible 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
Powers ? ? ? ? ? ? ?ǀŽů ? ? ? ?ŶŽ ? ? ) ?Review of International Studies did the same in October 2010 (vol. 36, no. 4, 
 ‘ZĞŐŝŽŶĂůWŽǁĞƌƐĂŶĚdŚĞŝƌ^ƚƌĂƚĞŐŝĞƐ PŵƉŝƌĞ ?,ĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?ĂŶĚ>ĞĂĚĞƌƐŚŝƉ ? ) ? 
126
 The conceptual link between counter-hegemonies and power transitions adopted in this dissertation has 
been addressed in section 3.1 of chapter 1. Seminal examples discussing global power shifts and prospects for 
international cooperation are Gilpin (1981); Organski (1968); Organski & Kugler (1980); Kugler & Lemke (1996); 
DiCicco & Levy (2003); Jones, B. (2011); Keohane (1984); Kagan (2002, 2012); Kupchan (2012). Cf. also Chan 
(2004b); Lebow & Valentino (2009); Lemke (1997); Vezirgiannidou (2013); Clark (2014).   
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 ^ƵĐŚĂŶĂůǇƐĞƐƚǇƉŝĐĂůůǇůŽŽŬĂƚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůƉƌĞĐŽŶĚŝƚŝŽŶƐĨŽƌƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝƐĞ ?ŽĨĐŽƵŶƚƌŝĞƐĂŶĚƚŚĞŝƌresulting potential 
to challenge order. Kupchan (2014) has recently attempted an important step towards taking the focus away 
ĨƌŽŵƚŚŝƐĨŝǆĂƚŝŽŶŝŶƉƌĞƐĞŶƚŝŶŐ “ĂƐǇŶƚŚĞƐŝƐŽĨĐŽŶƐƚƌƵĐƚŝǀŝƐƚĂŶĚƌĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐƚĂƉƉƌŽĂĐŚĞƐďǇĚĞŵŽŶƐƚƌĂƚŝŶŐŚŽǁ
ideational, culturĂů ?ĂŶĚŵĂƚĞƌŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐĐŽŵďŝŶĞƚŽƐŚĂƉĞƚŚĞƐŽĐŝĂůƉƵƌƉŽƐĞŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶŝĐƉŽǁĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
dŚƌĞĞŽƵƚŽĨƚŚĞĨŽƵƌ ‘ůŽŐŝĐƐŽĨŚĞŐĞŵŽŶǇ ?ƚŚĂƚŚĞũƵǆƚĂƉŽƐĞƐ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ?ĂƌĞƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐŵĂƚĞƌŝĂů ? ‘ŐĞŽƉŽůŝƚŝĐĂ  ?
ƐŽĐŝŽĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐ ?ĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂů ? ) ? 
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 Cf. MacFarlane (2006); cf. also Armijo (2007); Hancock (2007); Laidi (2012, 2014); Sotero & Armijo (2007) as 
investigations into the appropriateness of including particular states (most notably Russia) in that category. Cf. 




constellations could be used, ranging from IBSA (India, Brazil, South Africa) (Nel 2010: 953) 
to BICS (Brazil, India, China, South Africa), MINT (Mexico, Indonesia, Nigeria, Turkey) to 
GIBSA (Germany, India, Brazil, South Africa). Even if one does not want to attach labels like 
%5,&6 WKHUHHPHUJHVDJURXSRIµFKDOOHQJHUV¶ WKDWKDV WKHSRWHQWLDO WREH WKH³¶EULFV¶RID
QHZ HUD´ DV 6LPRQ 6HUIDW\  SXWV LW  ,Q PRVW DFFRXQWV DQ µHPHUJLQJ SRZHU¶
status entails the connotation of a general level of unhappiness with the current global power 
configuration (cf. i.a. MacFarlane 2006), which might translate into a desire to contest and 
alter the US-dominated framework for international politics. Nadkarni (2013) writes of a 
³FRPLQJ SRZHU-shift between established (the USA, Europe, and Japan) and rising (China, 
,QGLD5XVVLDDQG%UD]LOSRZHUV>«@´%UHVOLQWKHUHIRUHZULWHVRID³¶DOOLDQFHVRI
WKH GLVVDWLVILHG¶ ZLWK RWKHU GLVWULEXWLYH-PLQGHG VWDWHV´  +HUH $QGUHZ +XUUHOO ) 
warns of the danger of reading observations of allegedly coordinated policies into 
³GHYHORSPHQWV>ZKLFK@DUHSLFNHGXSZLWKDODFULW\E\WKRVHORRNLQJIRUVLJQVRIDFRRUGLQDWHG
willingness to challenge Washington, or for evidence of emerging multipolarity and a 
UHQHZHGSRWHQWLDO IRUV\VWHPLFUHYLVLRQLVP´$QG3DROD6XEDFFKL DFNQRZOHGJHV
³,W LV LPSRUWDQW WR VWUHVV WKDW LQ WKLVGHEDWHSRWHQWLDOSOD\VDPXFKELJJHU UROH WKDQ UHDOLW\´
(491). It is precisely in this context that the theoretical framework adopted in this dissertation 
aims to provide a more nuanced interpretation of diplomatic friction between different actors 
LQD³SURFHVVRISRZHUGHFRQFHQWUDWLRQ´7HVVPDQ	:ROIH$VHODERUDWHGPRUH
extensively in section 3.1 of the theoretical chapter, analyses of power blocs allegedly 
clashing and vying for the crafting of exclusionary world orders miss the point of the dynamic 
UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ KHJHPRQLF VWUXFWXUHV µVXEDOWHUQV¶ DQG FRXQWHU-hegemonic forces that 
transcend the idea oIPRQROLWKLFEORFFODVKHVLPSOLHGLQVWXGLHVRIµWKH:HVWDQGWKH5HVW¶129 
$V 6HUIDW\  ZLVHO\ REVHUYHV ³5XVVLD &KLQD DQG ,QGLD KDYH PRUH LQWHUHVW LQ WKH
8QLWHG 6WDWHV DQG WKH (8 WKDQ LQ HDFK RWKHU WKRXJK HDFK IRU GLIIHUHQW UHDVRQV´  7KH
µSRZHU WUDQVLWLRQ¶ SURMHFWLRQ LV FRPSOLFDWHG E\ GRPHVWLF IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GHEDWHV DQG KHQFH
GLIIHULQJLGHDVRQVFRSHJRDOVDQGPHDQVRIZKDWLWPHDQVWREHµULVLQJ¶RUµJOREDO¶SRZHU
&KLQD5XVVLDDQGRWKHUFRXQWULHVQHFHVVDULO\KDYH³FRPSHWLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDl identities that try 
WR VDWLVI\ D YDULHW\ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO DQG GRPHVWLF FRQVWLWXHQFLHV´ -37) Shambaugh & 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
ĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇĂƐĂ “ŚŽůĚŝŶŐŐĂŵĞ ?ƌĂƚŚĞƌŽƌŝĞŶƚĞĚƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ “ƌĞǀĞƌƐ ?ŝŶŐ ?ƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶƚŝĂůĚĞĐůŝŶĞŽĨƚŚĞ ? ? ? ?Ɛ
ĂŶĚ ? ? ? ?Ɛ ? ? ? ?- ? ? )ǁŚŝĐŚǁŝůů “ƉĞƌŵŝƚZƵƐƐŝĂƚŽre-emerge as a great power in a pluralist inteƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƐǇƐƚĞŵ ?
(emphasis added). ƌƺƚƐĐŚ ?WĂƉĂ ? ? ? ? ? )ƐŚŽǁŚŽǁƚŚĞ ‘Z/^ ?ƐƚĂƚĞƐƐŚĂƌĞŽŶůǇĂĨƌĂŐŝůĞůĞǀĞůŽĨĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶĂů
cohesion. 
129
 EŝĂůů&ĞƌŐƵƐŽŶ ? ? ? ? ? )ǁƌŝƚĞƐŽĨƚŚĞtĞƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞ ‘ZĞƐƚĞƌŶĞƌƐ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
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;LDRZULWHLQWKHLUFKDSWHULQ1DX¶VDQG2OODSDOO\¶VHGLWHGYROXPHRQWorldviews of Aspiring 
Powers (2012). The case studies that follow show how that applies to China, Russia, and 
Turkey, and the penultimate chapter sheds light on the implications thereof for the level of 
WKHLUµUHVLVWDQFHWRKHJHPRQ\¶LQDFRPSDUDWLYHIDVKLRQ     
 Two fundamental flaws bedevil predictions of coming power transitions between a 
group of like-minded states and established powers: First, they proceed from a teleological 
reading of political developments. The history of power transition in the 21st century cannot 
be written in hindsight yet. And it certainly is no linear development. And second, the analogy 
GUDZQWKDWDJURZLQJHFRQRPLFZHLJKWZLOOQHFHVVDULO\HQWDLODJUHDWHUUROH³LQDGGUHVVLQJWKH
transnational challenges of globalisDWLRQ FOLPDWH FKDQJHDQG WHUURULVP´ 1DGNDUQL
fails to account for the faFW WKDW WKHUH DUH QR VLQJOH GHILQLWLRQV RI WKHVH µFKDOOHQJHV¶ What 
came to be termed globalisation may be perceived as American hegemony elsewhere. And 
µWHUURULVP¶ LV D UHODWLRQDO WHUP E\ GHIDXOW 7KHVH DUH ODEHOV WKDW produce reality, and it is 
argued heUH WKDW QRUP FRQWHVWDWLRQ RYHU WKHVH DQG RWKHU WHUPV OLHV DW WKH EDVLV RI µSRZHU
VKLIWV¶:KDW LVEHLQJDGYRFDWHG LQ WKHSUHVHQW UHVHDUFK LVDFHUWDLQVHQVLELOLW\ IRUHPHUJLQJ
power centers whose partially different conceptions of world order raise questions about the 
endurance of the Western-dominated international system of governance in many issue areas, 
including security cultures. In this vein, Michael Schiffer and David Schorr (2009) have 
HGLWHGDQLQVLJKWIXOYROXPHRQµ,QWHUQDWLRQDO/HDGHUVKLSLQD VKULQNLQJZRUOG¶ZLWKFKDSWHUV
H[DPLQLQJ WKH IXWXUH UROH RI VWDWHV WKDW ³ZLOO DOO OLNHO\ EH FULWLFDO IRU WKH HPHUJLQJ ZRUOG
RUGHU´  LQFOXGLQJ &KLQD 7XUNH\ DQG 5XVVLD DQG ZLWKRXW WKH REIXVFDWLQJ IRFXV RQ
rationalist terminology that the scholarly liWHUDWXUHRQµSRZHUWUDQVLWLRQV¶LVSUHJQDQWZLWK 
:ULWLQJRQ5XVVLD5LFKDUG6DNZDVSHDNVRID³VWUXFWXUDOUHYLVLRQLVPLQKHUHQWLQWKH
QHZ SDWWHUQ RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV´  WKDW FRPHV DERXW WKURXJK WKH FR-existence of 
status quo powers and those states unhappy not necessarily with the prevalent structure, but 
with its selective application in issue areas such as security governance (453f.).130 Much in 
the same logic, the following analysis is equally informed by and draws upon the concept of 
µQeo-UHYLVLRQLVP¶ 6DNZD  WR PDNH VHQVH RI IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV WKDW GR QRW GLUHFWO\
question or challenge the essence of the international system (as revisionist states would do), 
but indirectly aim to revise its functioning. In a similar vein, Serfaty (2011) describes China 
DQG 5XVVLD DV ³SUXGHQW UHYLVLRQLVW SRZHUV´  DQG %DUU\ %X]DQ  ZULWHV RI D
³UHIRUPLVWUHYLVLRQLVW´SRZHU6XFKFRQFepts aim to avoid over-theorising about foreign 
                                                          
130
 For the same argument on China, cf. Breslin (2009, 2013), and Clark (2011: 25-26). Ĩ ?ĂůƐŽ&ĞƌĚŝŶĂŶĚ ?Ɛ
 ? ? ? ? ? )ŽďƐĞƌǀĂƚŝŽŶƚŚĂƚŶĞŝƚŚĞƌŚŝŶĂŶŽƌZƵƐƐŝĂ “ŝƐƚƌǇŝŶŐƚŽŽǀĞƌƚŚƌŽǁ ? Q ?ŐůŽďĂůŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ďƵƚ “ŵĂǇďĞĂďůĞƚŽ
ďĞŶĚŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůƚƌĞŶĚƐŝŶĚŝƌĞĐƚŝŽŶƐƚŚĂƚĂƌĞŵŽƌĞĂĚǀĂŶƚĂŐĞŽƵƐƚŽƚŚĞŵ ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
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SROLFLHV WKDW GR QRW FRLQFLGH ZLWK WKDW RI WKH µV\VWHP OHDGHU¶ DV H[SUHVVLRQV RI WKH
advancement of alternative norms in international security governance and bridge the 
FRQFHSWXDOJDSEHWZHHQµQRUP-VHWWHU¶DQGµQRUP-WDNHU¶131 The coexistence of established and 
µHPHUJLQJ¶SRZHUVZLOOLQHYLWDEO\GHWHUPLQHWKHGHsign of the future world order. We are at a 
KLVWRULF MXQFWXUH ZKHUH WKH ZRUNLQJ UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ IRUPHU KHJHPRQV DQG µULVLQJ
SRZHUV¶DVSRWHQWLDOFKDOOHQJHUVLVDOUHDG\EHLQJUH-balanced. Research is needed to examine 
this relationship beyond the accommodation-confrontation spectrum.    
 In this regard, with different prioritisations and conceptions of legitimacy between 
different actors involved becoming manifest, the Iranian nuclear crisis arguably is not only a 
battle field for the survival of the NPT regime, but is a debate about differing conceptions of 
world order and security governance. A comparative analysis of the foreign policies of China, 
Turkey and Russia toward Iran fits in with debates about policy responses to the Iran puzzle 
and examines the security cultures of influential non-Western actors (China, Russia, Turkey) 
toward Iran which are informed by foreign policies that are born out of both domestic, inter-
regional and international considerations. Rather than misconstruing these as illustrations of a 
ELQDU\ IUDJPHQWDWLRQ RI VHFXULW\ SROLFLHV LQWR µ:HVWHUQ¶ DQG µQRQ-:HVWHUQ¶ WHPSODWHV DQG
depart from pre-conceived assumptions about statist identities and foreign policy intentions, 
the present analysis rejects simplistic dichotomies and will critically process-trace the Iran 
policies of China, Turkey and Russia with a view to their degree of resistance to hegemony.   
5. Conclusion 
 
This chapter explored the state of the art in the literature that the analysis in this dissertation 
draws upon. It thereby elaborated on the state of the art in empirical studies analysing politics 
surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme in general and of the three case studies chosen for 
this dissertation in particular. An interdisciplinary angle to the literature is deliberately chosen 
to allow for a fruitful cross-fertilisation. While the three in-depth case studies will draw to a 
large extent on the respective Area Studies literature from both the international and 
respective national scholarly community, the analysis is enriched by inter-regional studies 
(Middle Eastern studies, post-Soviet studies, and the interstice between these and single 
country studies), and the IR, norms, and non-proliferation literature at large.  
 While Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward Iran, respectively, have 
been analyzed by a range of scholars, no comparative analysis thereof has been produced so 
                                                          
131
 On the latter two concepts, cf. Finnemore & Sikkink (1998); March & Olsen (1989); March & Olsen (1998). 
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far. It is thus hoped that the empirical research carried out for this study will make a timely 
contribution to our understanding of multifaceted foreign policies that remain understudied in 
analyses of the Iranian nuclear crisis. Much literature has been produced on the attempts of 
µWKH :HVWHUQ ZRUOG¶ OHG E\ WKH 86 WR HQJDJH ZLWK ,UDQ RYHU LWV FRQWURYHUVLDO QXFOHDU
programme. This dissertation aims to fill the gap in comparative analyses of non-Western 
voices in the Iranian nuclear dossier. Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies are critical 
for an understanding of the diplomatic complexities involved in the Iranian nuclear talks. In 
addition, their leverage in the Iran talks will translate into their weight as actors in the 
implementation of any nuclear agreement with Iran.      
 An analysis of these important foreign policies therefore also adds to our 
understanding of non-Western foreign policies in the non-proliferation and security 
governance regime and situates itself in and makes sense of the debates involving US 
hegemony, multipolarity and emerging powers. Turkish-Iranian, Russian-Iranian and 
Chinese-Iranian relations have always to be seen in the context of their engagement with and 
FRQWHVWDWLRQRIµWKH:HVW¶,PSRUWDQWO\WKHILQDOVHFWion of this chapter has emphasised how 
WKHFDYHDWLVDWWDFKHGWKDWQROLQHDUSRZHUWUDQVLWLRQLVDVVXPHGLQDQDO\VHVRIµUHVLVtance to 
KHJHPRQ\¶ 7KLV GLVVHUWDWLRQ UHMHFWV WKH LGHD RI H[FOXVLYH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DOLJQPHQW RIWHQ
IRXQGLQUDWLRQDOLVWDFFRXQWVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVµHPHUJLQJSRZHUV¶DQGSRVVLEOHIXWXUH
power clashes. It has been shown how this dissertation is to be situated within the literature 
that aims to nuance such dichotomies, and in so doing seeks to make a contribution to the 
growing body of literature on the co-existence between hegemonic structures and actors that 
ZLOOOLNHO\EHµEULFV¶LQDQ\IXWXUHHGLILFHUHVHPEOLQJZKDWHOVHZKHUHKDVEHHQFDOOHGµJOREDO
JRYHUQDQFH¶           
 The US in particular is an actor that enters strategic policy calculations of China, 
Russia and Turkey with regard to approaches to Iran- against the backdrop of US-Iranian 
official enmity since 1979, the centrality of the US as a dominant actor in international 
politics, respective bilateral relations, and US prominence in international financial structures. 
Arguably, the US unilateral sanctions regime in place and the subsequent 
µH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLVDWLRQ¶ RI 86 OHJLVODWLRQ LV DQ XOWLPDWH H[SUHVVLRQ RI KHJHPRQLF SRZHU
structures as has been elaborated elaborated upon in the first chapter. Embedding the research 
question in the scholarly debates about the future of the international system post-Pax 
Americana, it has been shown how this dissertation aims to offer a refined picture of the 
foreign policy behavior of states that contest these hegemonic structures on the example of 
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Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the contentious issue of the Iranian 

































As the first in-depth empirical case study of this dissertation, this chapter analyzes how 
7XUNLVK IRUHLJQSROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH LV LQGLFDWLYHRI D VHFXULW\ FXOWXUH
that resists hegemony. Wanting to answer this question requires following a conceptual 
structure that was outlined in chapter 1. A first section therefore looks at the disagreements 
EHWZHHQ 7XUNH\ DQG LWV :HVWHUQ FRXQWHUSDUWV RYHU GLSORPDWLF DSSURDFKHV WR ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
SURJUDPPH IROORZLQJ WKH ODWWHU¶V GLVFORVXUH in 2002 as an illustration of normative 
disagreements between Turkey and Western governments involved in the diplomacy 
VXUURXQGLQJ ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUILOH7KHSRUWUD\DORIDQHPHUJLQJVHFXULW\FKDOOHQJH LQGLIIHUHQW
ways is revealing for the extent to which normative convictions determine discursive practice. 
It underlines how security has to be understood as a relational concept. A second section 
DQDO\]HV 7XUNH\¶V VWDQFH RQ VDQFWLRQV WKDW ZHUH LPSRVHG RQ ,UDQ as from 2006 as an 
expression of the failure of diplomacy to solve the Iranian nuclear crisis. A distinction will 
WKHUHE\EHPDGHEHWZHHQ7XUNH\¶VVWDQFHRQ LQWHUQDWLRQDODQGRQXQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQV7KLV
GLVWLQFWLRQZLOOUHYHDO7XUNH\¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHOHJLWLPDF\RIWKHQDWXUHRIVDQFWLRQVDQG
therewith already give an answer to the question how Turkish foreign policy conveys a 
QRUPDWLYH GLYHUJHQFH ZLWK ,UDQ SROLFLHV SXUVXHG E\ :HVWHUQ JRYHUQPHQWV µ1RUPV DQG
YDOXHV¶DUHFRQFUHWHFRQYLFWLRQVDQGFRQFHSWLRQVVXFKDVµVRYHUHLJQW\¶ µQRQ-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶, 
ZKLOH µUXOHV DQG PRGHOV¶ UHODWH WR WKH EURDGHU PDFUR-structure that regulates the way these 
norms and values are communicated, applied, or changed. Especially the sanctions issue 
serves as an illustrative DSSOLFDWLRQ RI WKHVH FRQFHSWV DQG 7XUNH\¶V LQWHUDction with the 
institutional framework conditions for hegemony. In the absence of a permanent UNSC 
membership, Turkey does not hold the same leverage as Russia and China over the adoption 
RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO VDQFWLRQV 7XUNH\¶V DFWLYH UROH LQ PHGLDWLRQ EHWZHHn the P5+1 and Iran, 
KRZHYHU VSDUNHG D QXPEHU RI VFKRODUO\ DQDO\VHV RI 7XUNH\¶V ,UDQ SROLFLHV DQG MXVWLILHV D
IRFXVRQ7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\ WRZDUGV WKH ,UDQLDQQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDVDFDVHVWXG\ LQ
this dissertation. Turkey is, as will be shown, on the fringes of different security cultures, and 
an analysis of its Iran diplomacy is most instructive for investigations into security cultures 
that resist hegemonic structures.        
 7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVHUHJDUGLQJLQWHUQDWLRQDOVDQFWLRQVDQGHnsuing rights 
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DQG REOLJDWLRQV RI ,UDQ DUH LQGLFDWLYH RI 7XUNH\¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI VXFK VDQFWLRQV DV SROLWLFDO
tools in international relations. Acceptance of UNSC-mandated sanctions reveal a basic 
acceptance of the rules of the UN system, while an analysis of 7XUNH\¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
unilateral sanctions that are adopted and implemented outside of UN procedures will convey 
DQLQVLJKWLQWR7XUNH\¶Vnormative conceptions that may or may not be different from those 
powers adopting such sanctions. As laid out in the methodological chapter, this will be 
analysed by way of qualitative data analysis and interviews with experts and decision-makers. 
The latter act as norm-carriers whose replies to my questions about Iran diplomacy, particular 
policy decisions and the sanctions regime allow me to substantiate the analysis of a potential 
normative divergence between Western and Turkish approaches to the Iranian nuclear file. 
Recognising the concepts identified earlier in the discourse found is an interpretative 
endeavour, and follows from the approach to qualitative data analysis as laid out in chapter 2. 
 On the basis of this analysis, the final two sections will show how a two-level 
distinction between a discursive and a behavioral dimension of foreign policy applies to 
7XUNH\¶V ,UDQ SROLF\ 7KHVH VHFWLRQV ZLOO EXLOG RQ WKH SUHFHGLQJ DQDO\VLV RI 7XUNH\¶V
sanctions policy and Iran diplomacy and identify material as well as ideational factors in 
7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\WKDWPDNHXSDFRPSOH[ZHERIIRUHLJQSROLF\PRWLYDWLRQV which in this 
research is captured by a two-level model to understand the nexus between security culture 
and the degree of resistance to hegemony, as elaborated upon in chapter 1. Turkish foreign 
SROLF\GLVFRXUVHRQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDQGRQ:HVWHUQ and especially US approaches 
WR ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH ZLOO EH FRQWUDVWHG ZLWK 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ EHKDYLRU WKDW
may be in contradiction with a security culture Turkey itself advocates for. Especially an 
DQDO\VLVRIWKHSHULRGRI7XUNH\¶VUHPDUNDEOH foreign policy activism in the Iranian nuclear 
file that culminated in the Tehran declaration of May 2010 will examine the role of Turkey as 
a mediator between the P5+1 and Iran and what it reveals about Turkish security culture on 
Iran.             
 As explained in chapter 1, resistance to hegemony is understood as disagreements with 
hegemonic structures. This disagreement necessarily is captured in degree and is composed of 
diverse discursive as well as behavioral elements: A public advocacy for norms alternative to 
those sustained by hegemonic forces can be paralleled by a foreign policy behavior that falls 
short of acting upon this discourse. Deviation from hegemonic norms, in other words, will be 
captured by a two-level model of a discursive and a behavioral dimension. Making sense of 
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7KLV VHFWLRQ ZLOO H[DPLQH 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GLVFRXUVH WRZDUGV Whe Iranian nuclear 
programme. This is a first analytical step in line with the introduced two-level model to 
analyze resistance to hegemony on a discursive and a behavioral level.    
 Turkey signed the NPT in 1969 and ratified it in 1980. Turkey also ratifLHGWKH137¶V
Additional Protocol in 2000, is a member of the Nuclear Suppliers Group (NSG),132 and has 
been supportive of the Middle East nuclear weapons-free zone initiative. Ankara was thus 
always a steadfast supporter of international nuclear non-proliferation efforts and endorses the 
,$($¶V VDIHJXDUGV UHJLPH DQG YHULILFDWLRQ PHFKDQLVPV WR HQVXUH QRQ-diversion of nuclear 
material to military purposes.133 Yet, with the revelation of the Iranian nuclear programme in 
2002, Turkey has been very cautious not to join the Western pressure on Iran (Udum 2012: 
103f.). The insistence on the principle of non-interference in the domestic affairs of its 
QHLJKERXUV WRJHWKHU ZLWK WKH DIILUPDWLRQ RI ,UDQ¶V ULJKW WR QXFOHDU SRZHU IRU SHDFHIXO
purposes was one of the main foUHLJQSROLF\OLQHVLPSOLFLWLQ7XUNH\¶VSRVLWLRQRQWKH,UDQLDQ
nuclear programme. Turkey refrained from assuming Iranian military intentions. As a foreign 
PLQLVWU\ RIILFLDO IRUPXODWHV LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ ³:H VKRXOGQ¶W MXGJH RQ WKH EDVLV RI
DVVXPSWLRQV´134 Murat Mercan, Chairman of the Foreign Affairs Committee of the Turkish 
Grand National Assembly, summarisHV7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\DVIROORZV 
³:HDGYRFDWHGLSORPDWLFDQGHFRQRPLFHQJDJHPHQWRI ,UDQUDWKHU WKDQLVRODWLRQLVW
policies as a more effective way to address the challenges that we are facing in the 
region. We will continue to encourage all our counterparts to take a conciliatory 
DSSURDFK LQ RUGHU WR EHWWHU WDFNOH WKH SUREOHPV LQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW >«@ $Q\
interference from the outside world will have a boomerang effect and will be 
counter-productive. Therefore, the international community should refrain from any 
DWWHPSWWRLQWHUIHUHLQ ,UDQWRWKHGHWULPHQWRIWKHVRFLDODQGSROLWLFDOILEHURI,UDQ´
(Mercan 2009: 18; 19).   
                                                          
132
 The NSG, created in 1974, is a group is a grouping of nuclear supplier countries that sets guidelines for 
nuclear and nuclear-related exports, aiming to strengthen the global non-proliferation regime.  
133
 Interview with high-ranking Turkish diplomat to the IAEA, over phone, 23 August 2013. 
134
 Interview with Turkish foreign ministry official, Ankara, 20 August 2014.  
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Statements coming from the Turkish foreign ministry and then-SULPH PLQLVWHU (UGR÷DQ
underscored the Turkish insistence on the upholding of Iranian sovereignty and the principle 
of non-interference, which Ankara saw at threat when an emerging US securitisation of the 
Iranian nuclear SURJUDPPH VWDUWHG WR LPSDFW RQ :HVWHUQ JRYHUQPHQWV¶ SRVLWLRQV LQ WKH
Iranian nXFOHDUGRVVLHU(UGR÷DQFULWLFLVHGZKDWKHVDZDVDQ³XQIDLU´DQGRQH-sided focus of 
WKH:HVWRQDSRVVLEOHPLOLWDU\GLPHQVLRQRIWKH,UDQLDQSURJUDPPHZKLOH,VUDHO¶VGHIDFWo 
nuclear weapons were turned a blind eye to (Hunter, R. 2010: 166). Iran, so the message, 
should not be the sole focus of nuclear security considerations. In a 2007 interview, when 
DVNHGZKHWKHUKHVKDUHG:HVWHUQIHDUVDERXWDQ,UDQLDQQXFOHDUERPE(UGR÷DQreplied with a 
VZLSHUHPDUN³:HDUHDJDLQVWQXFOHDUZHDSRQVUHJDUGOHVVRIZKHWKHUWKH\DUHLQWKHKDQGV
of Iran or Israel or any Western country. But obviously some states are allowed to have 
ZHDSRQVRIPDVVGHVWUXFWLRQZKLOHRWKHUVDUHQRW´135 Besides this emphasis on an equitable 
application of nuclear security efforts, Turkish statements also made reference to the 
principles of sovereignty and territorial integrity that should guide diplomatic approaches to 
the Iranian nuclear crisis.136 Turkey was also well aware of the regionally destabilising effect 
that a war with Iran would entail. Notwithstanding the collapsing bilateral trade, Turkey 
would most likely receive an influx of Iranian refugees crossing the Turkish-Iranian border, 
be drawn into a regional proxy war or even become the target of Iranian counterstrikes 
/DUUDEHH	1DGHUhOJHQ*LYHQWKHVWDNHV(UGR÷DQGLGQRWPLQFHKLV
ZRUGVFDOOLQJWKHSURVSHFWRIDZDUZLWK,UDQµFUD]\¶LQ3DUVL  
 With this foreign polic\GLVFRXUVH(UGR÷DQ¶VJRYHUQPHQWZDVLQOLQHZLWKLWVUHJLRQDO
IRUHLJQSROLF\IRUPXODRIµ]HURSUREOHPVZLWKQHLJKERUV¶WKDWKDGEHHQIRUPXODWHGE\IRUHLJQ
PLQLVWHU $KPHW 'DYXWR÷OX 7KLV FRQFHSW ZDV DLPHG WR FRQYH\ 7XUNH\¶V striving for good 
relations with its neighbours, including Syria, Iraq and Iran in the course of a general foreign 
policy shift toward a stronger regional commitment.137 Öniz & Yilmaz (2009) have therefore 
ZULWWHQRIDSROLF\RIµVRIW-Euro-$VLDQLVP¶WKDWFKDUDFWHULVed AKP foreign policy in the first 
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 The importance of these principles has been emphasised again by TurkisŚƉƌŝŵĞŵŝŶŝƐƚĞƌĂǀƵƚŽŒůƵĂƚĂ
keynote speech in Brussels, organised by Friends of Europe, 15 January 2015 (cf. Annex 2).  
137
Another implicit motivation in Turkish-Iranian relations likely was the fathoming of a Turkish-Iranian 
approximation of their policŝĞƐƚŽǁĂƌĚƐ ‘ƚŚĞ<ƵƌĚŝƐŚƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶ ? ?^ĐŚŽůů-Latour 2001: 177). ƐƉĞĐŝĂůůǇĂĨƚĞƌW<< ?Ɛ
ůĞĂĚĞƌďĚƵůůĂŚPĐĂůĂŶ ?ƐĞǆƉƵůƐŝŽŶĨƌŽŵ^ǇƌŝĂĂŶĚĞŶƐƵŝŶŐĂƌƌĞƐƚďǇdƵƌŬŝƐŚĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ?dƵƌŬĞǇƐƚĂƌƚĞĚ
suspecting Iran more than Syria of providing sanctuary for PKK fighters (Olson 2004: 48). At the same time, Iran 
ĨĞĂƌĞĚƚŚĂƚdƵƌŬĞǇĐŽƵůĚƉůĂǇƚŚĞ ‘ǌĞƌŝĐĂƌĚ ?ĂŶĚƐƚŝƌƵƉƐĞƉĂƌĂƚŝƐƚƐĞŶƚŝŵĞŶƚƐŝŶƚŚĞ/ƌĂŶŝĂŶEŽƌƚŚĞƌŶ
provinces with a strong Azeri population (ibid., 11). And with PJAK, an offshoot of the PKK, waging an armed 
ƐƚƌƵŐŐůĞĂŐĂŝŶƐƚ/ƌĂŶŝĂŶĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƐŝŶĐĞ ? ? ? ? ?/ƌĂŶŵĂǇŚĂǀĞŚĂĚĂƐƚƌŽŶŐĞƌŝŶĐĞŶƚŝǀĞƚŽĐŽŽƌĚŝŶĂƚĞ ‘<ƵƌĚŝƐŚ ?
policies with Turkey. 
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half of the 2000s and that was meant to imply a policy of stabilising relations with all 
neighbouring regions (13). Condemning Iran over its Iranian nuclear programme and exerting 
pressure on its neighbor, in this readingZRXOGKDYHUXQFRXQWHUWRWKHLGHDRIµ=HURSUREOHPV
ZLWKQHLJKERUV¶DQGµ6WUDWHJLF'HSWK¶LQWKHUHJLRQ6XFKDSROLF\DOVRHQWDLOHGDPRUHFULWLFDO
stance towards Western policies in the region, as illustrated by geopolitical overlaps of 
interests between Iran and Turkey in the run-up to the looming US-led Iraq war in 2003. The 
US administration was struck by the refusal of the Turkish Grand Assembly on 1 March 2003 
to approve of US troop deployments on Turkish soil for combat operations in neighbouring 
,UDT.LEDUR÷OX	&DJODU5RELQV138      
 As Turkey adopted a more US-critical foreign policy discourse publicly, it also 
became more critical of Israeli foreign policy and the Israeli settlement policy. Turkish 
officials and especially prime minister Erdo÷DQ VWDUWHG WR SXEOLFO\ FULWLFLVe Israel on harsh 
WHUPV .LEDUR÷OX 	 &DJODU   *XO  .LEDUR÷OX   %DUNH\  
Oktav 2007: 89). Turkish criticism of and alienation from the US and Israel went hand in 
hand with a warming of relations with US-defiant countries like Iran. The furtherance of 
good-neighborly relations led to the signing of a memorandum of understanding on the 
WUDQVSRUW RI ,UDQLDQ JDV WR (XURSH YLD 7XUNH\ EHWZHHQ ,UDQ¶V SHWUROHXP PLQLVWHU .D]HP
Vaziri-Hamaneh and Turkish energy minister Hilmi Guler. At their meeting, they also 
DGGUHVVHG WKH7XUNLVKGHYHORSPHQWRI ,UDQ¶V6RXWK3DUVJDV ILHOG +LUR  ,Q WKLV
FRQWH[WDKDUVKIRUHLJQSROLF\UKHWRULFRYHU,UDQ¶VODFNRIWUDQVSDUHQF\ZLWKWKH,$($ZRuld 
have sent mixed signals in a phase of Turkish-Iranian rapprochement in line with 'DYXWR÷OX¶V
new regional policy.           
 When the Iranian nuclear file was referred from the IAEA to the UNSC in 2006 and 
the imposition of chapter VII sanctions followed, Turkey was critical of the use of sanctions 
as a political instrument and emphasised that sanctions can complement diplomacy, but 
should never be an end in themselves. Such an understanding recurred in responses from 
officials interviewed for this research project.139 This position is to be explained by an 
XSKROGLQJRIWKHSULQFLSOHRIµQRQ-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶DQGWKH7XUNLVKXQGHUVWDQGLQJDQGFRQYLFWLRQ
of sovereignty that lies at the basis of its skepticism of Western pressure against a country 
with legitimate nuclear rights as an NPT member, as explained by a high-ranking Turkish 
diplomat in an interview.140 In addition, it has been pointed out that the experience of 
                                                          
138
 Cf. Cagatay (2004), Gunter (2005) for implications of this decision on Turkish-US relations. 
139
 Interview with high-ranking Turkish diplomat, Ankara, 17 June 2013; Interview with Turkish diplomat, 
Turkish embassy Beirut, 14 August 2014.  
140
 Interview with high-ranking Turkish diplomat to the IAEA, by phone, 23 August 2013.  
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destabilisLQJ VDQFWLRQV LQ QHLJKERULQJ ,UDT LV DQRWKHU IDFWRU LQ 7XUNH\¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI
sanctioQVDVDFRXQWHUSURGXFWLYHLQVWUXPHQWDQGDQRWKHUGULYLQJIRUFHIRU$QNDUD¶VLQVLVWHQFH
on the need to find political solutions (Üstün 2010: 20; Larrabee & Nader 2013: 27). A 
EULHILQJ RQ µ,UDQ¶V 1XFOHDU 3URJUDP ± 7KH 7XUNLVK 3HUVSHFWLYHV¶ LVVXHG E\ WKH 7XUkish 
IRUHLJQ PLQLVWU\ LQ -XQH  IRUPXODWHV ³)RU GHFDGHV 7XUNH\ KDV ERUQH WKH EXUGHQ RI
tragic events unfolding in its vicinity. Adverse economic and political implications of the 
VDQFWLRQV DJDLQVW ,UDT LQ WKH V EHDU WHVWDPHQW WR WKLV IDFW´ 7XUNLsh foreign ministry 
2010). At the same time, the skepticism toward sanctions carries the Turkish awareness that 
the weakening of its neighbor Iran will impact on the Turkish economy due to close trade 
OLQNV ³:H H[SODLQ WR RXU 86 SDUWQHUV ,I \RX ZDQW WR KXUW ,UDQ GRQ¶W KXUW XV DW WKH VDPH
WLPH´D7XUNLVKGLSOomat explained in an interview.141 )RUHLJQPLQLVWHU'DYXWR÷OXSXEOLFO\
stated that Turkey was against sanctions with a view to concerns over possible constraints on 
regional trade such a new sanctions regime might entail (Raphaeli 2010). It will be the subject 
RIDODWHUVHFWLRQWRDQDO\]HWKHHIIHFWRIVXFKPDWHULDOIDFWRUVRQ7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\DQGLWV
stance on sanctions.  7XUNH\¶V1$72PHPEHUVKLSLVDQRWKHUIDFWRUWRPHQWLRQLQWKLVVHFWLRQ
if one LVWRXQGHUVWDQG7XUNH\¶VGLVFXUVLYHSRVLWLRQLQJRQWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUFULVLV7XUNH\¶V
public discourse on Iran oftentimes displayed a level of friction between evolving national 
security perceptions and NATO commitments and, closely related to the latter, solidarity with 
its US ally. In 2010, the Turkish Security Council approved of the removal of Iran and Syria 
from the list of countries posing a security threat to Turkey and instead explicitly named Israel 
as a destabilising force that could potentially trigger a regional arms race (Lutz 2010; Vahedi 
2010). Military officials and politicians, such as retired General and former secretary-general 
of the National Security Council Tuncay Kilinc, openly started raising the question whether 
Turkey should withdraw from NATO and rather engage in other regional organisations 
.LEDUR÷OX	&DJODU%DUDQ	/HVVHU7KHµ0LVVLOH'HIHQVH¶HSLVRGHRI
2011 therefore introduced a major irritant into Turkish-Iranian relations. Presented as a 
missile defense shield with a missile-defense radar to be stationed in Kurecik, Turkey, the US 
introduced its new strategic missile defense plans as being directed against potential missile 
attacks coming from Iran (Barkey 2013: 154). These plans triggered a phase of irritation 
between Turkey and Iran, as the Iranian government was concerned that its neighbour Turkey 
DJUHHGWRWKHGHSOR\PHQWRIWKHUDGDURQLWVVRLO*U]HO.LEDUR÷OX142 
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 Interview, Ankara, 17 June 2013. Also formulated almost identically by another Turkish foreign ministry 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĂƚƚŚĞdƵƌŬŝƐŚĞŵďĂƐƐǇŝŶtĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
142
 Even though the Iran nuclear issue is not on the official policy planning agenda of NATO, it is always a topical 
ŝƐƐƵĞ ?ĂƐĂEdKŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĞǆƉůĂŝŶĞĚŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ? ? ?:ĂŶƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ?dĞƌƚƌĂŝƐ
100 
 
This move was preceded by the Turkish reluctance to specifically name Iran as a threat to the 
Alliance- because of the sensitivity of this issue in bilateral relations and out of an 
understanding that such a listing would give reason to Tehran to advance its missile 
capabilities as counter-balancing measures (Ülgen   .LEDUR÷OX  143 In 
gPHU7DúSÕQDU¶VDVVHVVPHQW WKH7XUNLVKGHFLVLRQ WRKRVW WKHUDGDUV\VWHPZDVHYLGHQFHRI
Turkey having become a proponent of the containment of Iran- something that boosted 
7XUNH\¶VLPDJHLQ$PHULFDQH\HV7DúSÕQDUHWal. 2012: 10).144 Under the pressure of what he 
FDOOV D µGRXEOH JUDYLW\ SUHGLFDPHQW¶ Philip Robins (2013) writes that $QNDUD FKRVH ³LWV
global strategic relationship with the United States ahead of any region-EDVHGFRQVLGHUDWLRQV´
(394).  Turkish divergence from US foreign policy on a discursive level with regards to the 
Iranian nuclear programme, especially in the latter half of the 2000s, was thus oftentimes 
paralleled by more mixed signals on a behavioral level, as the Missile Defense episode 
demonstrated. A later section will return to this question of behavioral convergence. Suffice to 
QRWH DW WKLV SRLQW WKDW WKH µ0'¶ HSLVRGH GHVFULEHG DERYH RFFXUUHG DIWHU 7XUNH\¶V IDLOHG
mediatory efforts in the Iranian nuclear crisis, and thus during a period of tacit re-alignment 
with American positions. This will be the subject of the next section.     
 In its foreign policy discourse on the emerging Iranian nuclear crisis, however, Turkey 
conveyed a normative divergence from Western governments advocating for sanctions and 
IURP DQ DSSURDFK HPSOR\LQJ SUHVVXUH RQ ,UDQ RYHU WKH ODWWHU¶V ODFN RI WUDQVSDUHQF\ ³7KH
7XUNLVKSROLF\UHJDUGLQJVDQFWLRQVLVDPLFURFRVPIRU7XUNLVKQXFOHDUGLSORPDF\LQJHQHUDO´
Sinan Ülgen (2012: 7) therefore writes. The same rhetoric was evidHQWLQ7XUNH\¶VUHDFWLRQWR
sanctions imposed on Iran: While international sanctions, backed by UNSC resolutions, are 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
 ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? )ǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚĂŶƵĐůĞĂƌ/ƌĂŶǁŽƵůĚ “ƵŶĚŽƵďƚĞĚůǇŚĂǀĞĂŶŝŵƉĂĐƚŽŶEdK ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌŶĂůŶƵĐůĞĂƌĚĞďĂƚĞ ?
possible outcome of these ĚĞůŝďĞƌĂƚŝŽŶƐǁŽƵůĚďĞĨŽƌEdKŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶƐƚŽ ‘ŵŽǀĞ^ŽƵƚŚ ? ?ƚŚĞǁĞĂƉŽŶƐ
ǁŽƵůĚďĞŵĂŝŶƚĂŝŶĞĚŝŶ/ƚĂůǇĂŶĚdƵƌŬĞǇ ? Q ? ? ? ? ? ) ?/ŶƚŚĞƌĞŵĂŝŶĚĞƌŽĨŚŝƐĂƌƚŝĐůĞ ?ŚĞĚĞǀĞůŽƉƐƐĐĞŶĂƌŝŽƐĨŽƌ
dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƌĞĂĐƚŝŽŶƚŽĂŶƵĐůĞĂƌ/ƌĂŶ ?tŝƚŚdƵƌŬĞǇďĞŝŶŐĂEdKŵĞŵďĞƌ ?dƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐƉŽůŝĐǇƉůĂŶŶŝŶŐŝŶƚŚŝƐ
regard has far-reaching implications for the alliance (55-56).  
143
 According to a Turkish high-ranking diplomat, the Turkish agreement to the radar system was also tied to 
the insistence that it should not be specified against which potential threats the defense shield was targeted. 
ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ? ? ?DĂǇ ?013. Acknowledging Iranian concerns, another Turkish foreign ministry 
ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĐŽŶĐĞĚĞĚ P “KĨĐŽƵƌƐĞ ?ƚŚĞǇĚŽŶ ?ƚůŝŬĞƌŽĐŬĞƚƐŽŶƚŚĞŝƌďŽƌĚĞƌƐ ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁŝŶŶŬĂƌĂ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ? 
144
 /ƚŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĂƌŐƵĞĚĞůƐĞǁŚĞƌĞƚŚĂƚdƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ ‘ŶƵĐůĞĂƌŝǌĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ǁŚĞŶĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂƉŽƐƐŝďůĞ/ƌĂŶŝĂŶŶƵĐůĞĂƌ
bomb, would only be prevented by the credibility of NATO and US security guarantees (Udum 2007; Ülgen 
2012: 23; Baran & Lesser 2009: 213; Perkovich & Ülgen 2015b). In the context of debates about the likeliness of 
a regional arms race with a nuclear armed Iran, Turkey would abstain from striving to counterbalance as long as 
ŝƚĐĂŶĞĨĨĞĐƚŝǀĞůǇƌĞůǇŽŶEdK ?Ɛ ‘ĞǆƚĞŶĚĞĚĚĞƚĞƌƌĞŶĐĞ ?ĐůĂƵƐĞĂŶĚƌƚŝĐůĞs of the NATO Charter (Interview 
with Sinan Ülgen, visiting scholar Carnegie Europe, Brussels, 6 May 2013; Interview with Dr. bĞďŶĞŵ Udum, 
ŶŬĂƌĂ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ) ?KƚŚĞƌƐĂƌŐƵĞƚŚĂƚĞǀĞŶEdK ?Ɛ ‘ŶƵĐůĞĂƌƵŵďƌĞůůĂ ?ǁŽƵůĚŶot prevent Turkey from 
nuclearising whĞŶĨĂĐĞĚǁŝƚŚĂŶƵĐůĞĂƌ/ƌĂŶ ?ĂƐƚŚŝƐǁŽƵůĚƐĞǀĞƌĞůǇƵŶƐĞƚƚůĞƚŚĞƌĞŐŝŽŶĂůďĂůĂŶĐĞƚŽdƵƌŬĞǇ ?Ɛ
disadvantage (Interview with Dr. Meliha ůƚƵŶŦƔŦŬ ?ŶŬĂƌĂ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚWƌŽĨ ?ƌ ?,ƺƐĞǇŝŶĂŒĐŦ ?
Ankara, 18 June 2013) ?Ĩ ?ĂůƐŽWĞƌŬŽǀŝĐŚ ?Ɛ ?můŐĞŶ ?ƐĞĚŝƚĞĚďŽŽŬ ? ? ? ? ?Ă )ŽŶdƵƌŬĞǇ ?ƐEƵĐůĞĂƌ&ƵƚƵƌĞ ?
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accepted by Turkey, Ankara views EU and US unilateral sanctions as unhelpful measures that 
have an adverse effect on the Turkish economy. They are also seen as undermining dialogue 
efforts with Iran and strengthening Iranian hardliner positions (ibid.).145 Tellingly, a Turkish 
IRUHLJQ PLQLVWU\ RIILFLDO UHPDUNHG LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ WKDW ³ZH XVH WKH VDPH WDONLQJ SRLQWV RQ
both international and unilDWHUDOVDQFWLRQV´146 If the same diplomatic language applies to all 
sanctions, regardless of the institutional basis for their adoption, so the message, the use of 
sanctions as a political instrument is viewed with categorical skepticism by the Turkish 
government.           
 Institutional constraints in global governance structure, however, explain why Turkey 
naturally is a more passive actor concerning international sanctions: While Russia and China 
are both permanent Security Council members holding veto power and have a more 
authoritative say over the adoption of such sanctions, Turkey does not need to formally adopt 
WKHPDEVHQWDSHUPDQHQW816&VHDW%XWDVWKHLUHIIHFWDOVRLPSDFWV7XUNH\¶VH[WHUQDOWUDGH
relations, Turkey¶VSXEOLFVXSSRUWDQGGLVFXUVLYHDFFHSWDQFHWKHUHRILVDQLPSRUWDQWLQGLFDWRU
for a level of solidarity with international pressure on Iran that a later section will return to 
DQGDQDO\]HLQOLJKWRIWKHTXHVWLRQKRZ7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\UHVLVWVKHJHPRQ\Before doing 
VR KRZHYHU 7XUNH\¶V LQYROYHPHQW LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO HIIRUWV WR QHJRWLDWH ZLWK ,UDQ ZLOO EH
analyzed against the background of its foreign policy rhetoric as examined in this section.  
3. Turkish mediation in the Iranian nuclear dossier?  
 
This secWLRQ ZLOO VKHG OLJKW RQ WKH SHULRG RI 7XUNH\¶V SUR-active shuttle diplomacy in the 
Iranian nuclear dossier in 2009 and 2010. For the purpose of this chapter, this is an 
illuminating period to analyze for two main reasons. First, and as pointed out above, Turkey 
ODFNVDSHUPDQHQW816&VHDW$QDO\VHVRI&KLQD¶VDQG5XVVLD¶V ,UDQSROLFLHV WKXVSURFHHG
from a somewhat different starting point structurally and institutionally. This is an important 
point to retain for an application of a Coxian understanding of hegemony, including its 
XQGHUO\LQJ PDWHULDO LGHDWLRQDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO VWUXFWXUHV 7XUNH\¶V DFWLYH GLSORPDWLF
involvement in the Iranian nuclear dossier in 2009-2010, however, allows us to analyze its 
Iran policies from a position of altered institutionaOVWDNHVWKDWDSSUR[LPDWHG7XUNH\¶VUROHWR
the P5+1. This approximation (by way of mediation) will be further detailed in this section. 
6HFRQG DQDO\]LQJ 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LQ DQG WKH UDWLRQDOH IRU WKLV DFWLYH VKXWWOH
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 Interview with high-ranking Turkish diplomat, Ankara, 17 June 2013; interview with high-ranking Turkish 
diplomat, Ankara, 20 August 2014. 
146
 Interview with Turkish foreign ministry official, Ankara, 20 August 2014. 
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diplomacy allows for a concrete analysis of the behavioral dimension of Turkish Iran policy 
in line with the two-level model introduced in chapter 1 and at the outset of this chapter. It 
allows us, in other words, to pin-SRLQW7XUNH\¶V deeds in diplomacy, next to the discursive 
edifice as worked out in the preceding section. This behavioral level also plays out in the way 
sanctions regimes are implemented, as such implementation directly and concretely translates 
security cultures into trade restrictions to be communicated to companies. While the latter 
DVSHFWZLOOEHWKHVXEMHFWRIVHFWLRQ7XUNH\¶VDFWLYHVKXWWOHGLSORPDF\LQ-2010 and its 
LPSOLFDWLRQV IRU 7XUNH\¶V VHFXULW\ FXOWXUH ZLOO EH GHDOW ZLth in the following paragraphs.
 µ0HGLDWLRQ¶LQGLSORPDF\KDVEHHQGHILQHGLQGLIIHUHQt ways, and its preconditions and 
required components have been discussed controversially (Bercovitch 1992: 8; Moore 2003: 
8; Blake & Mouton 1985: 15; Kleiboer 1998; Herrberg 2008). Underlying many analyses of 
the effectiveness of mediation in different conflict situations is the view that mediators should 
EHLPSDUWLDOEHLQDSRVLWLRQWRLQIOXHQFHWKHFRQIOLFWLQJSDUWLHV¶SHUFHSWLRQVRUEHKDYLRUDQG
(as a precondition for the latter) have credibility as a mediating party. The fact that Turkey is 
a NATO member and a regional neighbor of Iran inspired and informed theorisations of 
Turkey as a potential facilitator of talks and conduit of messages between Iran and the West, 
rather than as a fully-fledged mediator (cf. Gürzel 2012; Gürzel & Ersoy 2012; Fuller 2008; 
*LUDJRVLDQ.LEDUR÷OX	&DJODU.LEDUR÷OXgQLVhOJHQ.147 The 
idea of facilitation is distinct from mediation in that a facilitating third party should not 
interfere in the process (Fisher 1972; Burton 1969). The perception of Turkish facilitation was 
given life with, e.g., the choice of Turkey as a venue for negotiations between the EU3 and 
their Iranian counterparts, and between the extended format of P5+1 and Iran. 2Q7XUNH\¶V
mediatory potential, a Turkish foreign ministry RIILFLDOUHPDUNHG³:HDUHUHDG\WRKRVWEXW
we never invited. We only provided logistical support when we were approached. We never 
LPSRVHGRXUVHOYHVDVPHGLDWRUV´148 7DONVEHWZHHQWKH6HFUHWDU\RI,UDQ¶V6XSUHPH1DWLRQDO
Security Council Ali Larijani and EU High Representative Javier Solana in April 2007 in 
Ankara and P5+1 negotiations at the political directors-level in Istanbul on several occasions, 
the latest having taken place in April 2012, were the reason for the perception of Turkey as an 
impartial host and venue for negotiations (Önis & Yilmaz 2009: 19).    
 Yet, Erdo÷DQ¶V JRYHUQPHQW GLG QRW OHDYH LW WR WKH UROH RI IDFLOLWDWRU DQG VWDUWHG
pronouncing an interest in a more proactive diplomatic involvement in the Iranian nuclear 
GRVVLHU ³:H DUH UHDG\ WR EH WKH PHGLDWRU´ (UGR÷DQ VWDWHG WKH 7XUNLVK LQWHUHVW LQ JHWWLQJ
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Reflections from the field ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ? 
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sidelines of the negotiations in Istanbul, Turkish diplomats have not merely confined 
themselves to acting as a host, but have actively mediated between the parties in an attempt to 
broker approximations of policy positions.149 While Turkish interlocutors tend to emphasise 
7XUNH\¶VQDWXUDO UROHDV D IDFLOLWDWRUDQGDPRUHFDQGLGGLDORJXHDWPRVSKHUH WKDQ WKH3
have with Iran,150 other (mainly Western) insiders and experts are more critical. Critiques of 
the perception of Turkey acting as a conflict medLDWRUUDQJHIURPUHFWLI\LQJWKDW7XUNH\¶VUROH
PD\ UDWKHU EH FRPSDUDEOH WR WKDW RI 6ZLW]HUODQG SURYLGLQJ µJRRG VHUYLFHV¶ LH PRUH DV D
conduit of messages)151 all the way to the assertion that Turkey does not play any role 
whatsoever and that Turkey is the most overrated country in the nuclear dossier.152 As 
asserted by a high-ranking Swiss diplomat who had been directly involved in mediatory 
diplomacy between the US and Iran in the absence of US-Iranian direct diplomatic relations, 
the idea of mediation does not meet with much enthusiasm in Western capitals.153 
Switzerland, so a common comparison, possesses credible channels that Turkey does not have 
EHFDXVHRI7XUNH\¶VTXHVWLRQDEOHQHXWUDOLW\DQGSRZHUSROLWLFDOLQWHUHVWVLQWKHUHJLRQ154 The 
idea of Turkish mediation has also been questioned out of a practical understanding that 
enlarging the format makes coordination more difILFXOW³:KHQ\RXPXOWLODWHUDOLVH´'U$OL
9DH] IURP WKH ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULVLV*URXSSXWV LW ³\RXPDNH LW >WKH IRUPDW@DG\VIXQFWLRQDO
mechanism for diplomacy. It takes away capital for innovation because you are more likely to 
EHRQORZHVWFRPPRQJURXQG´155  
3.1 Brazilian-Turkish mediation and the 2010 Tehran declaration  
 
Notwithstanding these different perspectives on the idea of Turkish mediation, Turkey, 
together with Brazil, started negotiating as a mediator between Iran and the P5+1 as from 
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 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐĐŽŶǀĞƌƐĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚ'ĞƌŵĂŶĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŵŝnistry official, Berlin, 4 February 2013. 
150
 Interview with high-ranking Turkish diplomat, Ankara, 17 June 2013; Interview with Prof. Dr. Hüseyin ĂŒĐŦ, 
expert on Turkish foreign policy, head of department for International Relations, Middle East Technical 
University, Ankara, 18 June 2013; Interview with Turkish foreign ministry official, Ankara, 20 August 2014.  
151
 Interview with EEAS official,  Brussels, 4 June 2013.  
152
 Interview with Dr. Walter Posch, senior Iran analyst, SWP, Berlin, 25 June 2013; Interview with high-ranking 
European diplomat to the IAEA, Vienna, 13 August 2013. 
153
 Interview with high-ranking Swiss diplomat, Berlin, 26 August 2013. 
154
 Ibid.; Interview with former German ambassador to Tehran, Berlin, 26 August 2013; Interview with Gökhan 
ĂĐŦŬ ?ŶŬĂƌĂ ? ?^ĞƉƚĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? “ǀĞŶĂƐĂĨĂĐŝůŝƚĂƚŽƌ ?ƚŚĞŽƚŚĞƌƐŝĚĞŶĞĞĚƐƚŽĂĐĐĞƉƚǇŽƵĂƐĂŶŚŽŶĞƐƚ
ďƌŽŬĞƌ ? ?ƌ ?bebnem Udum puts her skepticism of the Turkish ability to approximate positions. Interview, 
Ankara, 9 September 2013.  
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 Interview via Skype, 25 July 2013. Similar points were made by Soli Özel, foreign affairs editor at Habertürk 
and lecturer at Kadir Has University, interview, Istanbul, 7 September 2013. 
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HDUO\  7XUNH\¶V HQWU\ LQWR WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU QHJRWLDWLRQV DV a mediator is to be 
contextualised against the background of the unsuccessful attempts in 2009 to negotiate a 
nuclear fuel swap deal, a proposal by the Vienna group in which Iran would have agreed to 
send three-quarters of its Low Enriched Uranium (LEU) out of the country to be refined in 
Russia, and would have in turn received the nuclear fuel needed for the Tehran Research 
Reactor (TRR) in the form of nuclear fuel rods from France. Even though the U.S. 
administration was hesitant to accept Turkey as a mediator at fiUVW ODUJHO\GXH WR7XUNH\¶V
QHZUHJLRQDODVVHUWLYHQHVVDQG(UGR÷DQ¶VRFFDVLRQDODQWL-Israel rhetoric (Parsi 2012: 181f.), 
the US State Department conveyed already in early 2009 the US appreciation of any Turkish 
efforts to help alleviate tensions over the Iranian nuclear case (ibid.). As the nuclear fuel swap 
proposal of the Vienna group lost momentum in late 2009, Brazil and Turkey seized their 
chance of diplomatic initiative- separate, at first, then by way of a coordinated shuttle 
diplomacy from January 2010 on (ibid.). Both, in addition, had become nonpermanent 
members of the UN Security Council in 2010- a fact that conveniently bolstered their political 
weight as mediators.           
 Turkish officials had repeatedly stressed their discontent with unhelpful pressure on 
,UDQ LQ WKH IRUP RI VDQFWLRQV IRU WKH ODWWHU¶V QRQFRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKH ,$($ DQG 816&
VWLSXODWLRQV ,Q 2FWREHU  (UGR÷DQ XQGHUOLQHG ,UDQ¶V ULJKW WR QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJ\ IRr 
peaceful purposes and criticised Western one-sided pressure on Teheran for suspected illicit 
QXFOHDUDFWLYLWLHVDQGWKHIDFWWKDW,VUDHO¶VSRVVHVVLRQRIQXFOHDUZHDSRQVZDVGHDOWZLWKDVD
political taboo at the same time (Seufert 2012: 26).156 One month later, Turkey abstained from 
condemning Iran in the IAEA Board of Governors (ibid.).      
 With the aim to propose a diplomatic initiative to ease tensions, Turkish foreign 
PLQLVWHU 'DYXWR÷OX WRJHWKHU ZLWK KLV %UD]LOLDQ DQG ,UDQLDQ FRXQWHUSDUWV QHJRWLDWHG WKH
Tehran declaration in May 2010, a declaration that guaranteed Iran the right to use nuclear 
energy for the Tehran Research Reactor (TRR) and specified the transport of 1200 kg of LEU 
from Iran to Turkish soil, an idea that, in its details, was similar to the earlier proposal of a 
nuclear swap deal by the Vienna group in late 2009, but conveyed a conception of non-
Western power constellations in the search for a solution to the Iranian nuclear crisis. Iran 
hailed the establishment of a new world order, aligning itself with the South American 
regional leader Brazil and Turkey, an influential regional actor in the Near East (cf. Savyon 
2010). Turkey, however, understood this declaration as an attempt to engage Iran and let 
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 As also reiterated by a Turkish foreign ministry official in an interview, Ankara, 20 August 2014.  
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GLSORPDF\ZRUN.LEDUR÷OXI; cf. also Santos 2011).157 The reading that Turkey had 
seized its FKDQFHWRSOD\RQWKHVWDJHRILQWHUQDWLRQDOGLSORPDF\XVXDOO\UHVHUYHGIRUµ*UHDW
3RZHUV¶DQGZDVWKXVER[LQJDERYHLWVZHLJKWLVDSROLWLFDORQHWKDWKDVPXFKWRGRZLWKWKH
presentation of certain narratives after the fact, as will be shown below.    
 As confirmed by a Turkish diplomat who was directly involved in the negotiations, the 
86ZDVEULHIHGRQWKHSODQVIRUWKH755GHDOEXWGLGQRWWKLQNWKDW7XUNH\ZRXOG³GHOLYHURQ
WKLV´VRWKH\KDGDOUHDG\³JRWWHQ&KLQDDQG5XVVLDRQERDUGIRU816&VDQFWLRQV´158 Then-
Secretary of State Clinton complacently remarked in a testimony to the Senate Foreign 
5HODWLRQV&RPPLWWHHRQ0D\ UHIHUULQJ WR WKH LPSHQGLQJ VDQFWLRQVPRPHQWXP ³,
guess that tells us all we need to know about the deal Brazil and Turkey tried to work out with 
,UDQ´ +XQWHU, R. 2010: 154). While the deal actually did meet a lot of US points content-
wise,159 WKH ³WLPLQJZDVEDG´ WKH7XUNLVKGLSORPDW LQWLPDWHO\ LQYROYHG LQ WKHQHJRWLDWLRQV
explained in an interview.160 And on a global power political level, there was a certain 
DVWRQLVKPHQWRQWKH86VLGHDVWR³ZKRWKHVHXSVWDUWV>LH%UD]LODQG7XUNH\@DUH´161  
$IRUPHU(GHOHJDWLRQPHPEHUSXWLWLQDQLQWHUYLHZ³7XUNH\LVQRWDPHGLDWRUEXW
part of the problem. The Tehran declaration was an unfortunate story. It was a good 
attempt, but it came too late. This often happens in international politics. Remember 
the 2003 Swiss initiative. It simply was not wanted politically by the Bush 
DGPLQLVWUDWLRQDWWKHWLPH,WZDVEDGWLPLQJ´162  
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 As also stated by a Turkish foreign ministry official in an interview, Ankara, 20 August 2014.  
158
 Interview with Turkish high-ranking diplomat, Brussels, 29 May 2013. In her memoir, Hillary Clinton (2014) 
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sanctions, emphasis added].  
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 The U.S. State Department and other critics of the 2010 proposed swap deal argued that the Iranian 
decision for a 20 percent uranium enrichment was left unadĚƌĞƐƐĞĚ ?ƚŚĂƚ/ƌĂŶ ?ƐƵƌĂŶŝƵŵƐƚŽĐŬƉŝůĞŚĂĚ
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and that the Tehran declaration did not address Iranian past defiance of UNSC resolutions (cf. U.S. Department 
ŽĨ^ƚĂƚĞ ? ? ? ? ) ?DĂƌŬ&ŝƚǌƉĂƚƌŝĐŬ ? ? ? ? ? )ǁƌŝƚĞƐ P “&ƌĂŶĐĞ ?ZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚƚŚĞhŶŝƚĞĚ^ƚĂƚĞƐ ?ƚŚĞŬĞǇĂĐƚŽƌƐŽĨƚŚĞ
earlier 2009 fuel-ƐǁĂƉŝŶŝƚŝĂƚŝǀĞ ? ? Q ? could hardly agree to legitimise enrichment in Iran without a limit on the 
ůĞǀĞů ? ? ? ? ) ? 
160
 Interview with Turkish high-ranking diplomat, Brussels, 29 May 2013.   
161
 Ibid.; point also made by Soli Özel, Foreign affairs editor at Habertürk and lecturer at Kadir Has University, 
interview, Istanbul, 7 September 2013. The US take on the proposed swap deal at ƚŚĞƚŝŵĞǁĂƐƚŚĂƚ “ƚŚŝƐŝƐŶŽƚ
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ƚŚĂƚ “dŚĞǇĂůƐŽŚĂƉƉĞŶĞĚƚŽŚĂǀĞƚǁŽĐŽŶĨŝĚĞŶƚůĞĂĚĞƌƐŝŶ>Ƶŝǌ/ŶĄĐŝŽ>ƵůĂĚĂ^ŝůǀĂŽĨƌĂǌŝůĂŶĚZĞĐĞƉdĂǇǇŝƉ
ƌĚŽŒĂŶ of Turkey, both of whom considereĚƚŚĞŵƐĞůǀĞƐƚŽďĞŵĞŶŽĨĂĐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞƚŽďĞŶĚŚŝƐƚŽƌǇƚŽƚŚĞŝƌǁŝůů ?
(ibid.).  
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Ironically, the Tehran declaration had gotten the US backing through a letter that president 
Obama had sent in April 2010 to Brazilian president Lula in which he welcomed a Brazilian-
Turkish diplomatic initiative (Mousavian 2012: 383; Parsi 2012: 187). The fact that Iran 
reacted positively to the proposed fuel swap deal confronted the US with a dilemma: Either to 
allow a diplomatic break-through in the nuclear dossier, or to go ahead with a new round of 
LQWHUQDWLRQDOVDQFWLRQV7KH\RSWHGIRU WKH ODWWHU³%etween instituting sanctions and getting 
RQHERPE¶VZRUWKRI/(8RXWRI,UDQ:DVKLQJWRQKDGFKRVHQWKHIRUPHU´7ULWD3DUVL
194) formulates in his detailed account of the diplomatic complexities surrounding the 2010 
Tehran declaration. Justifying hHUJRYHUQPHQW¶VGHFLVLRQWKHQ- US Secretary of State Hillary 
&OLQWRQ ODFRQLFDOO\ ZULWHV LQ KHU PHPRLU WKDW 7XUNH\¶V ³¶=HUR 3UREOHPV ZLWK 1HLJKERUV¶
IRUHLJQ SROLF\ >«@ PDGH 7XUNH\ RYHUHDJHU WR DFFHSW DQ LQDGHTXDWH GLSORPDWLF DJUHHPHQW
with its neighbor, IrDQ WKDWZRXOGKDYHGRQHOLWWOHWRDGGUHVV WKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶V
FRQFHUQVDERXW7HKUDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDP´&OLQWRQ,IDQ\WKLQJWKLVSDVVDJHLVD
prime example of a selective reading of events for political reasons that lacks empirical 
substantiation.          
 Against the background of the Tehran declaration, its commitment to diplomatic 
efforts and the conviction that this agreement was the first to have secured the approval of 
Iran and could have served as an important trust-building measure, Turkey voted against UN 
Security Council Resolution 1929 on 9 June 2010, along with Brazil. Lebanon abstained. The 
Turkish vote against this latest round of international sanctions was to be read as a frustrated 
reaction to the impatience of Western powers only one month after the Turkish-Brazilian 
diplomatic initiative, as was also formulated explicitly in (UGR÷DQ¶Vletter to the leaders of 26 
countries before the adoption of the resolution in the Security Council (Mousavian 2012: 
382). Before votLQJ DJDLQVW WKLV UHVROXWLRQ LQ WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO 7XUNH\¶V 81
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH$SDNDQH[SUHVVHGKLVJRYHUQPHQW¶VIUXVWUDWLRQZLWKWKHQHJDWLYHUHFHSWLRQRI
WKH7HKUDQGHFODUDWLRQ³6XIILFLHQWWLPHDQGVSDFHVKRXOGEHDOORZHGIRULWVLPSOHPHQWDWLRQ
We are deeply concerned that the adoption of sanctions would negatively affect the 
PRPHQWXPFUHDWHGE\WKHGHFODUDWLRQDQGWKHRYHUDOOGLSORPDWLFSURFHVV´ (UN 2010b: 3-4).
 As NATO-member Turkey had never voted against the American position since 1952, 
this constituted a watershed in American-Turkish relations and resulted in a public diplomatic 
fall-out between the Turkish and the American side (Hiro 2009: 426; Parsi 2012: 193f.; 
Leverett & Leverett 2013: 363). The sentiment of irritation and frustration was also publicly 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
the memorandum to the US State department. In the White House, however, it fell on deaf ears. The official 
reason for its rejection was the unclear natƵƌĞŽĨƚŚĞĚŽĐƵŵĞŶƚ ?ƐƉƌŽǀĞŶĂŶĐĞ ? 
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demonstrated by an op-ed that Brazilian foreign minister Amorim and his Turkish counterpart 
'DYXWR÷OX KDG SXEOLVKHG LQ WKH International Herald Tribune in late May 2010. After this 
experience of a failed diplomatic initiative, Turkey started coordinating closer with the 
Americans in the Iranian nuclear dossier163 - out of a desire to avoid such miscommunication 
in the future, but arguably also out of a frustrated understanding that its pro-active role in 
2010 did not meet much enthusiasm.164 ³7XUNH\¶V PHGLDWRU UROH HQGHG ZLWK WKH µ1R¶-vote 
DJDLQVW UHVROXWLRQ  LQ ´ 6ROL g]HO SXWV LW165 From the role of mediator, Turkey 
UHWUHDWHGWRWKHUROHRIµIDFLOLWDWRU¶DJDLQZLWK,VWDQEXOKRVWLQJWKH-DQXDU\3WDONV
with Iran. Other back channels were used thereafter, and the strong bilateral US-Iran 
negotiation track after the election of Rouhani in 2013 had brought a new momentum for 
diplomacy to the nuclear talks effectively that rendered Turkish mediation obsolete. The 
political framework agreement reached on 2 April 2015 was applauded by Turkey. Telling for 
the Turkish emphasis of missed opportunities in 2010 was the reference to the Tehran 
GHFODUDWLRQ LQ7XUNH\¶VSUHVV UHOHDVHRQHGD\DIWHU WKHVXFFHVVIXOFRQFOXVLRQRI WKH WDONV LQ
/DXVDQQH ³7urkey has actively supported the processes for a peaceful solution through 
dialogue and has contributed to them including through finalising [sic] of the Tehran Joint 
'HFODUDWLRQ LQ´ 7XUNLVK IRUHLJQPLQLVWU\ $V0XVWDID$N\RO KROGV WKH
7XUNLVK JRYHUQPHQW¶V PHPRU\ RI VHHLQJ LWV RZQ GHDO IDOO DSDUW ILYH \HDUV DJR SDUWLDOO\
explained the relative public silence in Turkey on the talks between Iran and the P5+1 in early 
2015.            
 7XUNH\¶VPRWLYDWLRQIRUWKH7HKUDQGHFODUDWLRQDV analyzed in this section, was a 
mixture of the Turkish insistence on a resolution of the nuclear conflict through dialogue and 
engagement and a pragmatic attempt to engage Iran in order to reduce tensions. In line with a 
discursive divergence from hegemonic approaches advocating pressure and sanctions on the 
Iranian government as analyzed in the first section, Turkey thereby displayed a security 
culture that resisted hegemony in its underlying ideational structure. The adherence to a non-
hegemonic security culture on a discursive level meant normative divergence from hegemony. 
Pursuing a pro-active diplomatic role in an attempt to reduce those tensions that, as Ankara 
IHOW ZHUH RQO\ VXVWDLQHG DQG LQFUHDVHG E\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO VDQFWLRQV 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLFy 
resisted hegemonic structures. While the Turkish government believed to enjoy the backing of 
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the US administration, however, it was left in the belief that it did not intentionally resist a US 
IRUHLJQ SROLF\ OLQH LH WKH EDFNLQJ IRU 7XUNH\¶V GLSORPDWLF initiative made its negotiators 
believe they were adhering to an approach approved by the US government. In the sequence 
of events, it was the failure of the West to honor and act upon the Tehran declaration and the 
subsequent adoption of sanctions that lHG WR 7XUNH\¶V SXEOLF SRVLWLRQLQJ DJDLQVW WKH 86
official position. The US reaction to the Tehran declaration, in other words, was the 
expression of suppression of diplomatic engagement because of hegemonic structures: To be 
faced with the dilemma of choosing between sanctions and acting upon a diplomatic break-
through negotiated outside of the P5+1 framework only becomes a dilemma when one 
understands the institutionalised nature of the sanctions movement. Its adoption seized a 
µPRPHQWXP¶EHFDXVHLWZDVSerceived on the US side that Russia and China would not veto 
the upcoming sanctions resolution), and it kept US domestic critics of Iran diplomacy in 
Congress happy. Choosing sanctions over diplomacy was thus the expression of hegemonic 
structural path dependency. The fact that Turkey retreated from its mediatory role thereafter 
and, as confirmed by Turkish officials, even communicated and coordinated its policies more 
closely with the American administration in the aftermath of this short episode of behavioral 
GLYHUJHQFHHYLGHQFHV7XUNH\¶VGHVLUHWRFRQYH\µVROLGDULW\ZLWKWKH86¶DQGµFRPSO\¶ with 
US positions. Despite a discursively underscored normative divergence, behavioral 
convergence eventually (and noticeably quickly) took place after the short-lived episode of a 
public alienation.           
 The next section will examine this nexus between the discursive and the behavioral 
OHYHO RI IRUHLJQSROLF\ ZLWK DYLHZ WR7XUNH\¶V FRPSOLDQFHZLWK WKH ,UDQ VDQFWLRQV UHJLPH
Against the background of a normative divergence from ideational underpinnings of 
KHJHPRQ\ DV DQDO\]HG LQ WKH ILUVW VHFWLRQ DQG 7XUNH\¶V VKRUW SKDVH RI EDODQFLQJ EHWZHHQ
EHKDYLRUDO GLYHUJHQFH DQG FRQYHUJHQFH DV WKH H[SUHVVLRQ RI 7XUNH\¶V LQWHUDFWLRQ ZLWK
hegemonic structures, such an examination with a view to the sanctions regime is an 
LPSRUWDQW DQDO\WLFDO VWHS SHUWDLQLQJ WR 7XUNH\¶V UHDFWLRQ WR WKH PDWHULDO DQG LQVWLWXWLRQDO




regarding unilateral Iran sanctions  
 
The fact that the Turkish Iran diplomacy in 2010 ended up being portrayed as a dilemma 
between diplomacy and sanctions and that diplomacy came too late in a Western reading 
drove a wedge between the US and Turkey and severely angered the Turkish side- not least 
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because Turkey was sure to enjoy the backing of the Obama administration and because of 
SULPHPLQLVWHU(UGR÷DQ¶VSHUVRQDOO\LQYHVWHGFDSLWDOLQWKLVHSLVRGHRI,UDQGLSORPDF\,WDOVR
underlined once more very clearly the Turkish position that international sanctions can 
complement diplomacy, but always complicate political negotiations and should never be an 
end in itself, as analyzed in the first section.166 The institutional nature of sanctions is thus 
relevant here: UN-mandated international sanctions are seen with skepticism, but are not 
rejected categorically by Turkey. Unilateral sanctions, however, that are adopted by actors 
outside of UN structures, pertain to a security culture that Turkey was not supportive of, as 
this section will show. It is primarily the predicament of being dependent on Iranian energy 
HFRQRPLFDOO\WKDWH[SODLQV7XUNH\¶VVRPHWLPHVDPELYDOHQWVWDnce on US unilateral sanctions.
 (VSHFLDOO\ JLYHQ $QNDUD¶V IUXVWUDWLRQ ZLWK WKH ODFk of credit for its active Iran 
diplomacy and the adoption of sanctions resolution 1929, it has therefore been speculated by 
US officials that Turkey might offset the effect of sanctions on Iran by promoting trade 
relations with Iran and thereby undermine Western sanctioning efforts. Besides the energy 
dimension which will be elucidated in the following paragraphs, Iran is economically relevant 
for Turkey as a transit for Turkish trucks heading to Central Asia, for the Turkish tourism 
industry, and for TurkLVK FRPSDQLHV¶ SODQV WR LQYHVW LQ ,UDQLDQ FRQVWUXFWLRQ DQG VHUYLFH
sectors (Ülgen 2011: 158; Larrabee & Nader 2013: 32).      
 :KDW ZDV PRUH FHQWUDO WR 86 DOOHJDWLRQV RI µVDQFWLRQV-EXVWLQJ¶ KRZHYHU ZDV WKH
perception of Turkey becoming a financial lifeline at a time when US authorities were 
stepping up their efforts to isolate Iran from international payment transfers. When Dubai 
started imposing restrictions on transit goods destined for Iran, the Turkish foreign economic 
relations board announced its willingness to step in and provide Turkish ports for those 
shipments (Raphaeli 2010), which led to US concerns about Turkish sanctions-busting and 
subterfuges to continue with trade relations that would undermine US efforts to dry up 
financial lifelines to Iran. The most publicly discussed annoyance to the US in this regard has 
EHHQ7XUNH\¶VµJROG-for-JDV¶WUDGHZLWK,UDQLQZKLFK7XUNH\KDGEHHQH[SRUWLQJJROGWR,UDQ
via Dubai as an indirect payment for Iranian natural gas deliveries and as a perceived means 
to circumvent the sanctions regime that is aimed to cut off Iran from the international banking 
system (Kandemir 2013). Relevant US sanctions legislation in this regard especially was the 
µ,UDQ7KUHDW5HGXFWLRQDQG6\ULD+XPDQ5LJKWV$FW¶WKDWHVVHntially was meant to cut 
off Iran from international payment in US dollars for its oil sales. Turkey had therefore paid 
Iran in Turkish Lira, held in Halkbank accounts, with which Iran in turn had been buying gold 
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from Turkey. When the US tightened its control on the sales of precious metals in the 
beginning of 2013, a motivation explicitly was to stop the alleged Turkish attempt to find 
loopholes in the US sanctions regime (ibid.; Daly 2013). As US Treasury Department 
undersecretary for terrorism and financial intelligence David Cohen told the House of 
5HSUHVHQWDWLYH¶V)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQV&RPPLWWHHLQ0D\³,FDQDVVXUH\RXZHDUHORRNLQJ
very carefully at evidence that anyone outside of Iran is selling gold to the government of 
,UDQ´ LELG 5DSKDHOL  HYHQ ZULWHV LQ WKLV UHJDUG ÄTurkey will watch Russia and 
China to determine how far it can go in ignRULQJ86XQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQV³$QGLQVSLWHRI
international optimism regarding the implementation of the Joint Plan of Action as part of the 
interim nuclear agreement struck between Iran and the P5+1 in November 2013 in Geneva, 
the US Treasury Department added Turkish businesses and individuals to a list of violators of 
US Iran sanctions in early February 2014 (Gladstone 2014).    
 In frank woUGVWKDWDUHTXLWHLQGLFDWLYHRIWKH7XUNLVKJRYHUQPHQW¶VSHUFHSWLRQRIWKH
OHJLWLPDF\RIXQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQVDIRUHLJQPLQLVWU\RIILFLDOFRPPHQWVRQWKHµJROG-for-JDV¶
FRQWURYHUV\ LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ DV IROORZV ³LI WKH FULWLFLVP LV WKDW ZH XQGHUPLQH XQLODWeral 
VDQFWLRQV WKHQ ,¶P VRUU\ >VLF@ QRERG\ LV DW WKH FHQWHUSLHFH RI WKH ZRUOG 7KH 86 LV QRW
PDNLQJODZVIRUWKHZRUOGFRPPXQLW\´167 7KHVDPHRIILFLDOVXPVXS7XUNH\¶VVWDQFHRQWKH
VDQFWLRQV TXHVWLRQ DV IROORZV ³&RQFHUQLQJ FRPSDQLHV¶ H[SRUWV >RI SRWHQWLally sanctioned 
goods], they always ask for approval by the foreign ministry. If sanctions are mandated by the 
UN Security Council, we say no. If companies, however, are affected by unilateral sanctions, 
LW LV WKHLU GHFLVLRQ ,Q WKH UHVROXWLRQ WH[W D µUHVWULFWLYHOLPLWHG DSSURDFK¶ LV PHQWLRQHG :H
GRQ¶WLQWHUYHQHLQFRPSDQLHV¶GHDOLQJV´       
 The distinction here is that of unilaterally adopted sanctions that run counter to norms 
Turkey subscribed to as governing international relations (sovereignty, non-interference), 
versus UN-adopted international sanctions that adhere to a rules-based international order. 
/HJLWLPDWHµLQVWLWXWLRQV¶LQD7XUNLVKXQGHUVWDQGLQJDUHWKRVH of the UN system that legitimise 
the penetration of sovereign rights, if deemed necessary and if so decided by the Security 
Council. But Turkey resisted the institutional structure of hegemony, i.e. the institutionalised 
QDWXUHRI86VDQFWLRQVHQIRUFHPHQWIRUHVVHQWLDOO\QDWLRQDOVHFXULW\LQWHUHVWV³7KH86LVQRW
making laws for the world FRPPXQLW\´       
 However, Turkish officials explain that Turkey has to strike a balance between 
VKRZLQJ VROLGDULW\ ZLWK WKH 86 GLVDJUHHLQJ ZLWK WKH ODWWHU¶V VDQFWLRQV SROLFLHV DQG WKH
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imperatives of geography.168 Official interviewees confirm that US officials regularly ask 
Turkey to reduce their oil imports from Iran.169 While Turkey shows receptiveness to the idea 
by discussing import reductions and diversification plans,170 Turkey is regarding neighboring 
,UDQDVDQLQHYLWDEOHWUDGLQJSDUWQHU³>«@,UDQVLPSO\KDVWKHEHVWRLO´DVIRUPXODWHGE\WKH
same ministerial source.171 ,UDQLV7XUNH\¶VVHFRQG ODUJHVWRLODQGJDVVXSSOLHUDIWHU5XVVLD
Turkey is importing around 20 percent of its gas and around 40 percent of its oil from Iran 
(US Energy Information Administration 2012: 6; 2013: 2), which remains an issue of 
permanent contention in Turkish-American relations with a view to unilateral US Iran 
sanctions.172 In March 2012, Turkey announced for the first time a planned reduction of oil 
imports from Iran by 20 percent and engaged in talks with Libya and Saudi-Arabia to make 
up for the resulting shortage.173 A 20 percent Iranian oil import reduction is the amount 
required to qualify IRU86µVDQFWLRQVZDLYHUV¶± which Turkey subsequently was granted on 
11 June 2012 and renewed for another 180 days on 7 December 2012 (Daly 2013).  
 7KLVZDVSHUFHLYHG DV D UHPDUNDEOHGHYHORSPHQW LQ7XUNH\¶V DSSURDFK WRXQLODWHUDO
US sanctions- Ankara had previously always stated that it saw itself bound by UN sanctions 
only (cf. Habertürk 2012). Enforcement of unilateral US and EU sanctions had always been 
OHIWXSWRWKH7XUNLVKSULYDWHVHFWRUhOJHQ7KH7XUNLVKIRUHLJQPLQLVWU\³LQIRUPV
privatH FRPSDQLHV RI WKH LPSDFW RI QHZ VDQFWLRQV´ DV IRUPXODWHG UHSHDWHGO\ E\ IRUHLJQ
ministry officials interviewed in this project.174 While leaving sanctions enforcement up to the 
private sector can be read as a convenient way to guard a political level of passivity on the 
part of the Turkish government as concerns pressure on Iran, it is worth pointing out that the 
RLO DQG JDV FRPSDQ\ %27$ù 3HWUROHXP 3LSHOLQH &RUSRUDWLRQ LV ZKROO\ VWDWH-owned since 
7XUNH\¶VRLOUHILQHU7SUDúLVDOVRJRYHUQPHQW-owned, and a Turkish diplomat confirms 
LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ WKDW ³XSRQ UHTXHVW E\ WKH 86 7SUDú KDV GHFUHDVHG LWV RLO LPSRUWV IURP
,UDQ´175 &RPSOLDQFH ZLWK XQLODWHUDO 86 HQHUJ\ VDQFWLRQV LQ RUGHU WR TXDOLI\ IRU µVDQFWLRQV
                                                          
168
 Interview with Turkish high-ranking Turkish foreign ministry official, Ankara, 17 June 2013; Interview with 
Turkish foreign ministry official, Turkish embassy, Washington, 14 February 2014. 
169
 Interview with Turkish high-ranking Turkish foreign ministry official, Ankara, 17 June 2013. 
170
 Supply diversification plans included ideas to increase oil imports from Northern Iraq. Leaving aside political 
and logistical problems, the interest was reciprocated from the Iraqi side. Interview with Dr. Meliha ůƚƵŶŦƔŦŬ ?
Ankara, 14 June 2013. Interview with Turkish foreign ministry official, Washington, 14 February 2014; Interview 
with Turkish foreign ministry official, Ankara, 20 August 2014.  
171
 Ibid.  
172
 Interview with high-ranking Turkish foreign ministry official, Ankara, 17 June 2013.  
173
 These talks with Libya and Saudi-ƌĂďŝĂ ?ŚŽǁĞǀĞƌ ? ‘ĐĂŵĞƚŽŶŽƚŚŝŶŐ ? ?ĂƐĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚďǇĂdƵƌŬŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶ
ŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ ? ? ? ? ? 
174
 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƐǁŝƚŚdƵƌŬŝƐŚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƐ ?ŶŬĂƌĂ ? ? ?:ƵŶĞ ? ? ? ? ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ?February 2014; Beirut, 14 
August 2014, Ankara, 20 August 2014.  
175
 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚdƵƌŬŝƐŚĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƚŽƚŚĞh^ ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
112 
 
ZDLYHUV¶ WKHUHIRUH LV D GHOLEHUDWH DFW RI GHPRQVtrating solidarity with the US on a 
governmental level. As confirmed by a Turkish foreign ministry official working on Turkish-
,UDQLDQ ELODWHUDO LVVXHV FXWWLQJ GRZQ RQ RLO WUDGH ZLWK ,UDQ OLNH LQ  LV ³D PLQLVWHULDO
GHFLVLRQ´ 176 US concerns, the same RIILFLDOZHQWRQWRVWDWH³DUHWDNHQLQWRDFFRXQWLQVRPH
VHFWRUV´LELG ,QDVLPLODUYHLQD7XUNLVKGLSORPDW WR WKH86SRLQWVRXW WKDW WKH7XUNLVK-
Iranian trade volume fell from 22 billion $ in 2012 to 18 billion $ in 2013 because of US 
unilateral sanctions. Scaling back trade with Iran was, the same diplomat asserts, a 
³JRYHUQPHQWDOGHFLVLRQ´DQGDGGV³<RXKDYHWRGRWKDW7KH8QLWHG6WDWHVKDVVXFKDSRZHU
LQ WKH ZRUOG HFRQRP\ WKDW \RXU FRPSDQLHV VXIIHU RWKHUZLVH´177 Despite occasional acts of 
resistance against the institutional structures of hegemony, as shown above, it is the material 
GLPHQVLRQRIKHJHPRQ\WKDWFRQVWUDLQV7XUNH\¶VSROLWLFDOOHHZD\    
 $QRWKHULQVWDQFHRIUHDFWLQJWR86SUHVVXUHZDV$QNDUD¶VGHFLVLRQLQWRFDQFHO
the agreement with Iran to invest 5.5 billion US dollars and operate in the South Pars oil fields 
.DUGDV/DUUDEHH	1DGHU6XFKDQLQYHVWPHQWZRXOGKDYHµYLRODWHG¶WKH86
Iran Sanctions Act (ISA) that foresees sanctions against foreign companies investing more 
than 20 million US dollars in the Iranian energy sector. The Turkish renouncement of the 
investment signaled that Turkish investment in the Iranian oil infrastructure was sacrificed for 
a politically higher-valued alignment with US interests concerning Iran.    
 A publicly demonstrated normative divergence from hegemonic structures, as 
examined in the first section of this chapterDQGDPELYDOHQWFDVHVVXFKDVWKHµJROG-for-JDV¶
deal covered above, did not prevent Turkey from demonstrating a behavioral convergence 
with the very same power structures. While emphasisLQJ 7XUNH\¶V FRQYLFWLRQ WKDW µQRQ-
LQWHUIHUHQFH¶ LQ ,UDQ¶VGRPHVWLFDIIDLUV VKRXOGJXLGH WKHVHDUFK IRUSROLWLFDO VROXWLRQV WR WKH
Iranian nuclear crisis, Ankara underscores the importance of solidarity with its US ally and 
even shows compliance with US unilateral sanctions. In the terminology worked out in 
section 5 of chapter 1, a relatively strong normative divergence on the discursive level was 
paralleled by rules convergence with hegemony on a behavioral level ± with occasional 
UHVLVWDQFH RQ WKH ODWWHU OHYHO HJ µJROG-for-JDV¶ 7Ke next section will contextualise this 
ILQGLQJ LQ7XUNH\¶VEURDGHUVWUDWHJLFSROLF\HQYLURQPHQWDQGGLVFXVVKRZ7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ
SROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFlear programme is indicative of a security culture that resists 
hegemony. 
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management: Resistance to Hegemony? 
 
7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\ZDVDOZD\VDEDODQFLQJDFWEHWZHHQJHRVWUDWHJLFSUDJPDWLVPideational 
foreign policy projections and Western alliance management, as this section will show. This 
balancing act helps explain the research finding of a mixed rules convergence with hegemonic 
structures which concluded the previous section. The Turkish shuttle diplomacy with Tehran 
in 2009-2010 in an effort to secure a deal as a confidence-building measure and build-up for 
IXUWKHUVXEVWDQWLYHWDONVZDVDQLOOXVWUDWLRQRIDUHPDUNDEOHIRUHLJQSROLF\DFWLYLVP³7XUNH\
has reoriented its foreign policy by means of an active, multidimensional and visionary 
IUDPHZRUN0HGLDWLRQ LVDQ LQWHJUDOSDUWRI WKLVSROLF\´ IRUPHU IRUHLJQPLQLVWHU'DYXWR÷OX
ZULWHV LQSUDLVHIXOZRUGV7XUNH\¶VPHGLDWLRQ LQ WKH ,UDQILOH VHUYHGDW OHDVW WZR
purposes strategicaOO\,WDVVXUHGWKH86RI7XUNH\¶VFRPPLWPHQWWRLQWHUQDWLRQDOGLSORPDF\
that were in line with Western security and non-proliferation priorities. This understanding 
stemmed from the communication between the US and Turkish diplomatic teams. Secondly, 
TurkH\¶VPHGLDWLRQFRQYH\HGDSULRUitisation of political dialogue and a rejection of sanctions 
as a counterproductive means of pressuring the Iranians at the same time. Seizing a moment 
where other diplomatic initiatives on Iran were scarce, the Turkish-Brazilian diplomacy was 
FRQFHLYHG WR DW OHDVW DOORZ IRU PRUH µEUHDWKLQJ VSDFH¶ EHIRUH VDQFWLRQV would become an 
option again.            
 This episode was preceded by a phase of relative alienation from unilateral US 
positions. With a foreign policy discourse that had become increasingly more critical of the 
US and of Israel under the AKP government, Turkey had started to convey a political 
regionalism that tied it closer to the Islamic republic of Iran both out of geographic proximity 
and culturalist interpretations of non-Western conceptions of international relations. It is this 
FRQFHSWLRQWKDWEULQJVWKH7XUNLVKSRVLWLRQRFFDVLRQDOO\FORVHUWR&KLQD¶VDQG5XVVLD¶VZLWK
regard to a joint hesitant approach to the use of sanctions on Iran and with regard to a shared 
FRQYLFWLRQRI WKH IRUHLJQSROLF\SULQFLSOHRI µQRQ-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶7XUNH\ LV FRPPLWWHG WR WKH
nuclear non-proliferation regime and would not want to see a nuclear Iran emerge in the 
region that would also challenge Turkey from a regional power perspective. Turkey is 
³KHGJLQJ DJDLQVW WKH ULVNV RI D QXFOHDU ,UDQ´ DV 'U ,DQ /HVVHU IRUPXODWHV178 Yet, Turkey 
makes a clear differentiation between legitimate non-proliferation concerns and what it 
perceives as unhelpful pressure on a country that has legitimate rights to nuclear energy. This 
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GLVWLQFWLRQ LQ 7XUNH\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GLVFRXUVH ZDV FDUYHG RXW DERYH LQ WKH ILUVW VHFWLRQ
 :LWKRXW D SHUPDQHQW 816& PHPEHUVKLS 7XUNH\¶V LQVLVWHQFH RQ WKH ,$($ DV WKH
main body to legitimately watch over the non-proliferation regime and hence also the Iranian 
nuclear file,179 Turkish suspicion against UN-backed pressure on Iran arguably also carries an 
element of awareness that the transfer from Vienna to New York deprives Turkey of an 
instrument to make its voice heard and takes the issue to the international arena of Great 
3RZHUSROLWLFV³7KHZRUOGLVELJJHUWKDQILYH´SUHVLGHQW(UGR÷DQUHYHDOLQJO\IRUPXODWHGKLV
general discontent of the structure of the Security Council at the 69th UN General Assembly in 
2014.180 3ULPHPLQLVWHU'DYXWR÷OXVWULNHVDVLPLODUFRUGZKHQKHSXEOLFO\FRPSODLQVWKDWWKH
3DUHGHFLGLQJRQRWKHUFRXQWULHV¶EHKDOI181 Especially when the nuclear file was eventually 
transferred to the UNSC in 2006 and calls for the imposition of sanctions grew louder, Turkey 
publicly displayed a normative divergence with a powerful hegemonic position on Iran at the 
WLPH:KLOHDGKHULQJWRWKHµUXOHVand PRGHOV¶RIWKH81V\VWHPDWODUJH7XUNH\¶VSRVLWLRQ
RQ WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU FULVLV UHYHDOHG GLIIHUHQW µQRUPV DQG YDOXHV¶ WKDW WKH 7XUNLVK
government deemed better suited to govern international relations.    
 &RXSOHG ZLWK WKH 7XUNLVK DZDUHQHVV WKDW 7XUNH\¶V JHRJUDSKLF ORFDWLRQ DQG FXOWXUDO
proximity makes Ankara a more natural interlocutor with Tehran than any Western 
negotiator,182 Turkish foreign policy activism in the Iran nuclear file in 2010 served to 
demonstrate to the Iranians that Turkey will not abuse their trust in simply advocating a 
Western agenda (Parsi 2012: 189f.). At the same time, it demonstrated to the West that 
Turkey can be a useful bridge-EXLOGHU DQG PDQDJH WR QHJRWLDWH D GHDO RYHU ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
programme that could have been a meaningful interim stepping stone to re-establish trust and 
engage in further negotiations.183 ,QWKLVVHQVH7XUNH\¶VPHdiation managed to walk the line 
between alliance management and commitment to Western non-proliferation concerns. At the 
VDPHWLPHLWDOVRZDVDQH[HUFLVHRI*UHDW3RZHUGLSORPDF\DQGGHPRQVWUDWLRQRI7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy self-perception and portrayal, and was an attempt to avert the imposition of 
VDQFWLRQV 7XUNH\¶V FULWLFLVP RI :HVWHUQ LPSDWLHQFH DQG WKH 7XUNLVK YRWH DJDLQVW 816&5
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ƌĚŽŒĂŶ Addresses the UN General Assembly. Available at [last accessed 8 January 2015]: 
http://www.tccb.gov.tr/news/397/91138/president-erdogan-addrebes-the-un-general-abembly.html. 
Elaborating on this statement in responses to his address at the World Economic &ŽƌƵŵŝŶ ? ? ? ? ?ŚĞƐĂŝĚ P “ ?dŚĞ
Security Council) should not be a platform where only five countries have a say. Such a system is not fair at all. 
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1929 in June 2010 forcefully made this point also on a behavioral level. Voting against this 
sanctions resolution as a non-permanent Security Council member at the time, Turkey 
displayed both a normative and a rules divergence from hegemonic structures and drove home 
a strong message of resistance. Turkey has consistently been criticising the imposition of 
sanctions before and after the 2010 Tehran declaration also because of economic 
interdependence with Iran and the implications for regional trade ties that an economically 
ZHDNHQHG,UDQZRXOGEULQJDERXW7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\KDVWKHUHIRUHDOZD\VEHHQDWLJKWURSH
walk between alliance management (commitment to Western security cultures through its 
NATO membership), geostrategic pragmatism and economic necessity (dependence on trade 
ZLWK ,UDQ WRJHWKHU ZLWK LGHDWLRQDO IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SURMHFWLRQV 'DYXWR÷OX¶V µ=HUR SUREOHPV
wiWKQHLJKERUV¶DQGµ6WUDWHJLF'HSWK¶FRQFHSW      
 As administrations in Western capitals following the 2010 Tehran declaration publicly 
VWDUWHG TXHVWLRQLQJ 7XUNH\¶V REMHFWLYH VWDQFH LQ WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU ILOH DQG UHSURDFKLQJ
Ankara with having been outsmarted by Iranian deception (Parsi 2012: 195f.), 184 7XUNH\¶V
DEDQGRQPHQWRIDPHGLDWRUUROHWKHUHDIWHUDQGµFORVHUFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWKWKH$PHULFDQV¶185 
as a result can be read as a desire to avoid getting their hands burnt by playing a pro-active 
role that is not wanted politically by the P5+1 format ± an eventual rules convergence, in 
other words, with those policies that Ankara had tried to overcome with its mediation in the 
first place.            
 ,Q DGGLWLRQ 7XUNH\¶V SRZHU WR GHIXVH WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU crisis and its ability to 
mediate between the P5+1 parties and Iran was further eroded in the wake of power shifts in 
WKHUHJLRQVWDUWLQJZLWKWKHRXWEUHDNRIZKDWKDVFRPHWREHFRLQHGWKHµ$UDE6SULQJ¶WKDWVDZ
Iran and Turkey oppose each other with fundamentally differing perceptions of regional order 
- as epitomised by their diametrically opposed interests especially in the Syrian civil war 
(Pieper 2013a, 2014: 3- 7DúSÕQDU  .LEDUR÷OX  /DUUDEHH 	 1DGHU  I
Barkey 2013). While Iran remaLQV RQH RI $VVDG¶V ODWHVW VWHDGIDVW DOOLHV LQ WKH UHJLRQ186 
Turkey has positioned itself increasingly more outspoken against any future prospects of 
Assad holding power in Syria. After an initial Turkish support for Assad, Ankara has 
officially called the Assad regime an illegitimate one, with (UGR÷DQeven calling on Assad to 
VWHS GRZQ 7DúSÕQDU   ,Q KDUVK WHUPV SULPH PLQLVWHU 'DYXWR÷OX FULWLFLVed the 
Western failure to find common ground in opposing Assad. With the so-FDOOHGµ,VODPLF6WDWH¶
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becoming a much bigger security challenge on the agenda of Western policy circles, 
'DYXWR÷OX ODPHQWHG FDOFXODWLRQV LQ :HVWHUQ FDSLWDOV WKDW $VVDG FRXOG HYHQWXDOO\ EH
FRQVLGHUHGDOHVVHUHYLODQGLQWKHIDFHRIWKHWHUURULVWFKDOOHQJHSRVHGE\µWKH,6¶³EHVHHn 
DVWKHJRRGJX\DQGVWD\LQ'DPDVFXV´187        
 6XFK UHVHQWPHQW RYHU ZLGHU UHJLRQDO SROLFLHV VSLOOHG RYHU LQWR ,UDQ¶V SHUFHSWLRQ RI
7XUNH\¶VUROHLQWKHQXFOHDUFULVLV7KHUHDVRQ,VWDQEXOZDVQRORQJHUZDQWHGDVDYHQXHE\
Iran for the February and April 2013 nuclear negotiations lay in differences of the two 
FRXQWULHV¶SRVLWLRQVWRZDUG6\ULD188 Only a few years after Iranian receptiveness to Turkish 
diplomatic activism, Turkey was sidelined as a credible broker in the Iran file by the course of 
events. On the one hand, Turkey started siding more pro-actively with political actors in the 
wake of societal upheavals throughout the Arab world that destroyed what was left of 
7XUNH\¶VSHUFHSWLRQDVDQHXWUDOEURNHU6HXIHUW189 On the other, Turkey and Iran face 
each other in grim opposition concerning geostrategic conceptions in the Middle East. It is 
quite telling that in 2013 and 2014, Oman acted as a conduit of messages between the US and 
Iran190 ± DUROHWKDWWHQ\HDUVDJRZDV7XUNH\¶V,QVWHDGRIµ]HURSUREOHPVZLWKQHLJKERUV¶
Turkey now faced zero neighbors without problems.      
 It was in this context of Turkish-Iranian diverging agendas for regional policies that 
president (UGR÷DQ¶VRXWEXUVWDJDLQVW,UDQIROORZLQJWKHFRQFOXVLRQRIWKHSROLWLFDl framework 
DJUHHPHQWRQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHRQ$SULOKDGWREHXQGHUVWRRG:KLOHIRUHLJQ
PLQLVWHUdDYXúR÷OXZDVRQHRIWKHILUVWWRDSSODXGWKHRXWFRPHRIWKHQXFOHDUWDONV(UGR÷DQ
ZDUQHGRIDERRVW WR ,UDQ¶V role in the region and criticised ,UDQ¶VSROLFLHV LQ<HPHQ6\ULD
and Iraq. As Sinan Ülgen contends, such statements were not linked to the negotiated 
outcome on the nuclear file per se, but were aimed at mending fences with Saudi-Arabia and a 
ZLGHU µ6XQQL EORF¶ RI $UDE VWDWHV LQ WKH UHJion (Arslan 2015). Saudi-Turkish relations had 
suffered after Turkey had taken sides for the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt, which the 
Kingdom in Riyadh considers as a terrorist organisation. Iran-critical statements coming from 
Turkey are music in the ears of the Saudi kingdom, which is a regional rival of Iran and likes 
WRVHH,UDQ¶VUROHLQWKHUHJLRQGLPLQLVKHG$VhOJHQKROGVFORVHU6DXGL-Turkish relations are 
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µWKH ,VODPLF6WDWH¶ DQG WKHSUR-Iranian Houthi militia in Yemen.191 ,Q UHDFWLRQ WR7XUNH\¶V
public support for Saudi policies in Yemen, 65 Iranian parliamentarians had demanded a 
FDQFHOODWLRQRI(UGR÷DQ¶VSODQQHGYLVLW WR ,UDQ LQ HDUO\$SULO 2015 %DU¶HO . The visit 
HYHQWXDOO\GLGWDNHSODFHGHVSLWHWKHSUHFHGLQJZDURIZRUGV7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLFLHVDVVXFK
considerations demonstrate, are often the outcome of partially conflicting policy priorities on 
a number of often diverse issues and on different levels (security, economic, global regional). 
 Fences in sour Turkish-Iranian relations had been mended a bit, at least on the surface, 
DIWHU+DVVDQ5RXKDQLZDVHOHFWHGSUHVLGHQWLQ,UDQLQ-XQH5RXKDQL¶VSOHGJHVWRIROORZ
SROLFLHVRIµSUXGHQFHDQGPRGHUDWLRQ¶HQDEOHGDWHQWDWLYH7XUNLVK-Iranian rapprochement. In 
an interview with Al-Jazeera on 12 February 2014, (UGR÷DQFDOOHG,UDQDQG7XUNH\µVWUDWHJLF
SDUWQHUV¶ DQGH[SOLFLWO\XQGHUOLQHG WKDWSXUFKDVLQJRLODQGQDWXUDO JDV LVSDUWDQGSDUFHORI
such a partnership.192 This was followed by a visit (UGR÷DQ SDLG WR ,UDQ RQ -29 January 
2014, where he signed trade deals in the hope of increasing energy ties ± much to the dislike 
of the US administration, which again must have seen the potential of its sanctions regime 
being undermined (Hafezi 2014). The visit was reciprocated in June 2014 by a visit of 
Rouhani to Turkey ± the first visit of an Iranian president to Turkey since 1996.  
 7KH FRQWURYHUVLDO µJROG IRU JDV¶ GHDO EHWZHHQ ,UDQ DQG 7XUNH\ ZDV DQRWKHU FDVe in 
point of a delicate balancing act between demonstrating to the US that Turkey is ready to go 
along with their Iran policy to an extent that it will not significantly impact on the Turkish 
economy. Resistance to hegemony on a behavioral level was therefore sometimes ambivalent 
LQ7XUNH\¶VFDVH$UHDGLQHVVWRUHGXFH,UDQLDQRLOLPSRUWVOLNH$QNDUDDQQRXQFHGLQ
can be read as a rules convergence with hegemonic structures as pertaining especially to 
existing Iran sanctions regimes. But public announcements to increase oil and gas imports 
from Iran on other occasions, like (UGR÷DQ KDV GRQH GXULQJ KLV KLJK-level visit to Tehran, 
again run counter to that perception ± as do occasional allegations of sanctions-busting like 
indirect payment methods to circumvent financial sanctions as analysed above.   
 Ultimately, it might also be worth pointing out that a tendency for public defiance of 
86SROLFLHVZDVVWURQJHULQWKHSULPHPLQLVWHU¶VRIILFHXQGHU(UGR÷DQ¶VOHDGHUVKLSWKDQLQWKH
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foreign ministry.193 Not NQRZQ IRU PLQFLQJ KLV ZRUGV (UGR÷DQ ZDV D SULPH PLQLVWHU ZKR
displays more consistency between a discursive and a behavioral level of resistance to 
KHJHPRQ\%DUNH\HYHQVWDWHV WKDW(UGR÷DQ³KDV>DW WLPHV@DUWLFXODWHGSRVLWLRQV WKDW
PLUURU7HKUDQ¶V´$QGDPRQJH[SHUWVDQG7XUNH\ZDWFKHUVLWKDVEHHQDQRSHQVHFUHW
that within the Turkish cabinet, influential actors take a more pro-Iran stance than others. The 
IRUPHUKHDGRIWKH7XUNLVKLQWHOOLJHQFHDJHQF\0LOOLøVWLKEDUDW7HVNLODWL0ø7+Dkan Fidan, 
was renowned as one of the most influential pro-Iran actors and a close confident of then-
SULPHPLQLVWHU(UGR÷DQ([SHUWVKDGORQJVSHFXODWHGWKDW7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\FRQVWLWXWHGD
certain domaine réservé IRUWKHIRUPHU0ø7-head, where he had enjoyed a disproportionately 
big leeway, 194 even to the point where he had been alleged to pass on intelligence information 
to the Iranian government (Entous & Parkinson (2013). The impression that otherwise 




7KH DUWLFOH FRQWLQXHV ³7KH LQYHVWLJDWLRQ XQHDUWKHG SUR-Iranian figures believed to 
have been working for Iran from within the Turkish government. The case file 
LPSOLFDWHG QDPHV VXFK DV IRUPHU 1DWLRQDO ,QWHOOLJHQFH 2UJDQL]DWLRQ 0ø7 KHDG
Hakan Fidan, Interior Minister Efkan Ala and ruling Justice and Development Party 
$.3DUW\VSRNHVSHUVRQ%HúLU$WDOD\´ 
Tellingly, the investigations were brought to a halt by the Turkish government.195 While 
difficult to verify, it thus cannot be excluded that persRQDOSROLWLFVDQGHYHQµQHWZRUNV¶ZLWK
YHVWHG LQWHUHVWV KDYH IDFWRUHG LQ DV D YDULDEOH WR LQIOXHQFH 7XUNH\¶V RYHUDOO IRUHLJQ SROLF\
towards Iran. Turkish diplomats in turn, in interviews for this research project and elsewhere, 
tend to emphasise the importance of solidarity with the US as an important regional and 
global ally ± even when Turkish compliance with certain US-inspired policies, as the 
VDQFWLRQVTXHVWLRQKDVVKRZQSURYHVWREHµFRVWO\¶196 At times the object of tense discussions 
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between US and TXUNLVKRIILFLDOV7XUNH\¶V UHJLRQDOSROLFLHVDUHERXQG WRSDUWLDOO\FRQIOLFW
with the US and other NATO partners.  
6. Conclusion   
 
Following a two-level model between a discursive and a behavioral level to analyse resistance 
to hegemony as outlined in chapter 1WKLVFKDSWHUKDVDQDO\VHGWKHH[WHQWWRZKLFK7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme is indicative of a security culture that 
resists hegemony. Normative divergence from hegemony, as the first section has shown, can 
be discerned most clearly on a discursive level. From the outset of the Iranian nuclear crisis in 
2002, Turkey was cautious with criticism of the Iranian government and did not follow public 
positions at the time that emphasisHG ,UDQ¶V YLRODWLRQV RI LWV ,$($ 6DIeguards Agreement. 
Reiterating instead the Iranian right for peaceful nuclear energy, Turkey warned its Western 
counterparts at the same time not to interfere with Iranian domestic politics and to respect 
,UDQLDQVRYHUHLJQW\ ,WZDVVKRZQKRZ7XUNH\¶VSXEOic positioning on the emerging nuclear 
crisis coincided with a regional foreign policy re-orientation that sought a deepening of 
UHODWLRQV ZLWK 7XUNH\¶V LPPHGLDWH QHLJKERUKRRG 7KLV QHZ IRUeign policy outlook was 
epitomisHG E\ WKH WZR FRQFHSWV RI µ6WUDWHJLF 'HSWK¶ DQG µ]HUR SUREOHPV ZLWK QHLJKERUV¶
albeit more so for public relations purposes than for operational policy implementation.  
 At the same time, it was shown how Turkish diplomats ± in interviews for this 
dissertation as well as in public statements ± hurry to emphasise their basic solidarity with the 
86JRYHUQPHQW7XUNH\¶V1$72PHPEHUVKLSDOUHDG\JLYHVLWDQLQURDGLQWR:HVWHUQVHFXULW\
perspectives. Turkey has underlined the importance of Iranian collaboration with the IAEA 
and the necessity of Iran complying with its obligations under the NPT and work toward a 
political solution of the Iranian nuclear conflict. This divergence between a level of 
appreciation for Iranian arguments about sovereign rights as an NPT member and a public 
endorsement oI :HVWHUQ VHFXULW\ FRQFHUQV FDUULHG DORQJ FKDQFH DQG EXUGHQ IRU 7XUNH\¶V
foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme. A burden was the diplomatic challenge 
to reconcile these partially conflicting standpoints. A chance, however, was given to Ankara 
in the form of its mediatory potential precisely because Turkey was seen as being situated 
between two camps. This enabled Turkey to facilitate talks between the P5+1 and Iran 
(Istanbul as a neutral venue for negotiations), and to mediate in a period of shuttle diplomacy 
in 2009-2010. It has been argued in this chapter how this period of mediation lets us discern 
Turkish foreign policy behavior from up-close for the purpose of this case study research 




thus approximated its role to that of other, institutionally more established, actors, in Iran 
diplomacy. Section 2.1 of chapter 2 KDVZRUNHGRXWKRZµOHYHUDJH¶LVDVFRSHFRQGLWLRQIRU
the case selection of this dissertation, and it has been an underlying theme of this chapter to 
VKRZKRZQRWRQO\7XUNH\¶VDFWLYHPHGLDWLRQEXWDOVRLWVIULFWLRQEHWZHHQGLIIHUHQWVHFXULW\
cultuUHVJDYHLWµOHYHUDJH¶DQGFUHGLELOLW\in nuclear diplomacy with Iran.  
 The May 2010 Tehran declaration to defuse the Iranian nuclear crisis was an intriguing 
precedent of a non-:HVWHUQ DWWHPSW WR HDVH WHQVLRQV DQG PDNH XVH RI 7XUNH\¶V SROLWLFDO
capital in Tehran- a mediatory effort by Brazil and Turkey that did not encounter much 
DSSUHFLDWLRQLQ:HVWHUQFDSLWDOV7KLVHSLVRGHVWRRGLQGLFDWLYHRI7XUNH\¶VLQVLVWHQFHRQWKH
need to resolve the Iranian nuclear crisis through political dialogue and diplomacy on a 
discursive level and resist self-perpetuating hegemonic power structures on a behavioral level 
WKDW KDG KLWKHUWR REVWUXFWHG PHDQLQJIXO DWWHPSWV DW FULVLV GLSORPDF\ 7XUNH\¶V VKRUW
mediatory role ended with UNSCR 1929 in June 2010, an outcome that infuriated Ankara 
because it illustrated the Western insincerity in finding a genuine solution to the Iran crisis, in 
D 7XUNLVK UHDGLQJ 7XUNH\¶V UHWUHDW WR WKH UROH RI IDFLOLWDWRU DQG FORVHU DOLJQPHQW ZLWK 86
positions thereafter, however, underlined again AQNDUD¶V RIILFLDO UH-iteration of the 
importance of solidarity with its US ally. Resistance to hegemony on a behavioral level, in 
other words, never was a consistent policy imperative for Turkey. µCompliance¶ with a US-
inspired security culture took precedence on a behavioral level. Rules convergence with 
hegemonic structures took place more often and more consistently so than occasional 
experiments with rules divergence as acts of resistance to a hegemonic security culture.  
 The same conclusion can be drawQ IURP WKH H[DPLQDWLRQ RI 7XUNH\¶V SRVLWLRQ RQ
LQWHUQDWLRQDO DQGXQLODWHUDO ,UDQ VDQFWLRQVSUHVHQWHG LQ WKLV FKDSWHU 7XUNH\¶VGLSORPDF\ RQ
the sanctions issue was a balancing line between disagreeing with a Western securitisation of 
the Iranian nuclear file and resulting sanctions regimes on the one hand and still complying 
with Western sanctions efforts after 2006, on the other. Here, a distinction between the 
institutional nature of sanctions has been made: While criticising the use of sanctions as 
political instruments in international relations on a normative basis, UN-mandated sanctions 
were eventually accepted as the outcome of international negotiations and the adoption 
through UN institutions. The Turkish government, however, reiterates not to be bound by 
unilateral sanctions. Imposed outside of UN structures, these are seen as circumventing the 
rules RI WKH81V\VWHP7KHJRYHUQPHQW µLQIRUPV¶ WKH7XUNLVKSULYDWHVHFWRURI WKH LPSDFW
and consequences of UN unilateral sanctions, so the official stance. Next to a normative 
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divergence from hegemony, resistance to hegemonic practices such as the 
extraterritorialisation of US legislation was carried out on a behavioral level by Turkish 
circumventions of unilateral sanctions regimes affecting Turkish-Iranian trade, as discussed in 
VHFWLRQ  6XFK FLUFXPYHQWLRQV OLNH WKH FRQWURYHUVLDO µJROG-for-JDV¶ GHDO QHYHU ZHUH
consistently outright counter-hegemonic policies by design. As has been shown, Turkey 
VKRZHGUHVSRQVLYHQHVVWR86DOOHJDWLRQVRIµVDQFWLRQV-bustLQJ¶DQGHYHQWXDOO\FRPSOLHGZLWK
US unilateral sanctions regimes affecting both Iranian and Turkish companies. As a 
FRQVHTXHQFH 7XUNH\ TXDOLILHG IRU 86 µVDQFWLRQV ZDLYHUV¶ EHFDXVH RI D UHGXFHG OHYHO RI
,UDQLDQ RLO LPSRUWV GHVSLWH 7XUNH\¶V KLJK GHSHQGHQce on Iranian oil and gas supplies. The 
fact that Turkish entities were sanctioned again by the US Treasury Department thereafter, 
and that US suspicions about Turkey undermining Iran sanctions regimes persist, 
demonstrates that Turkey is walking a tightrope walk in sanctions compliance, and that its 
record of behavioral resistance to hegemony is ambivalent.     
 The history of Turkish-Iranian relations is a history of a balancing dynamic between 
competition and cooperation. Likewise, Turkish foreign policy is a multidirectional one that 
has to reconcile regional policies of hegemonic resistance with an embeddedness in 
international alliance structures that still let Turkey comply with hegemonic policies on a 
behavioral level. In practice, such structural constraints find expression in, i.a., compliance 
with but criticism of Iran sanctions, energy trade with Iran with the simultaneous planning of 
import reductions and supply side diversifications, and US-critical discourses with a 
concurrent commitment to NATO alliance structures and security identities. Turkish Iran 
policies are the outcome of a complex calculation of economic pragmatism, regional foreign 
policy imperatives, international alliance structures and a politico-cultural sensibility for 
Iranian resentment to Western pressure as analyzed above. A public advocacy for a non-
hegemonic security culture and norms alternative to those sustained by hegemonic forces can 
be paralleled by a foreign policy behavior that falls short of acting upon this discourse. While 
7XUNH\ RQ RFFDVLRQV UHVLVWHG KHJHPRQ\ RQ D EHKDYLRUDO OHYHO DV µVDQFWLRQV-EXVWLQJ¶ WUDGH
circumventions like the gold-for-gas deal demonstrated, a basic adherence to US power 
structures eventually prevailed over the possibility of an outright resistance to hegemony. In 
SUDFWLFH 7XUNH\¶V QRUPDWLYH GLYHUJHQFH IURP KHJHPRQ\ RQ D GLVFXUVLYH OHYHO GLG QRW
translate into a consistently implemented policy objective because it was outbalanced by rules 





Russian foreign policy toward the Iranian nuclear programme 
 
1. Introduction  
 
This chapter introduces the second empirical in-depth case study and analyzes to what extent 
5XVVLDQIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHLV LOOXVWUDWLYHRIDVHFXULW\FXOWXUH
WKDW UHVLVWVKHJHPRQ\5XVVLD¶VFRQWHPSRUDU\ ,UDQSROLF\ LQJHQHUDODnd its position toward 
the Iranian nuclear programme in particular has to be understood in the context of geopolitical 
shifts brought about by the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991 and their implications for 
5XVVLD¶V VWDWLVW LGHQWLW\ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ RULHQWDWLRQV DQG 5XVVLD¶V VHOI-understanding of its 
position in the international system of states. The most determining historical dividing lines 
for an understanding of Russian-Iranian relations have already been outlined in chapter 3. 
With a view to this disVHUWDWLRQ¶V XQGHUO\LQJ UHVHDUFK TXHVWLRQ DERXW WKH QH[XV EHWZHHQ
security cultures and foreign policy behavior toward hegemonic power constellations, the 
following pages will thus analyse Russian foreign policy toward the Iranian nuclear 
programme as the oXWFRPHRIDGHOLFDWHEDODQFLQJDFWEHWZHHQVWUDWHJLFHQJDJHPHQWZLWKµWKH
:HVW¶ DQG DGKHUHQFH WR IRUHLJQ SROLF\ QRUPV WKDW SDUWLDOO\ FODVK ZLWK :HVWHUQ LQWHUHVWV
Nothing has underlined the finding that the terms of agreement between Russia and the West 
ovHUµQRUPV¶LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFVUHTXLUHDFRQVWDQWUH-negotiation more than the outbreak 
of the Ukraine crisis in 2013-4 that has evolved into the most fundamental crisis in relations 
between Russia and the West since the end of the Cold War. This chapter will thus also 
situate policy coordination in the Iranian nuclear file as an illustration of norm contestation in 
international relations in a broader context of what will be shown to be a 
compartmentalisation of foreign policy.          
 A first section therefore looks at the disagreements between Russia and its Western 
FRXQWHUSDUWV RYHU GLSORPDWLF DSSURDFKHV WR ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH IROORZLQJ WKH ODWWHU¶V
disclosure in 2002 as an illustration of Western-Russian normative disagreements. It will shed 
light on 5XVVLD¶V UHDFtion to an emerging US securitisation of the Iranian nuclear issue. A 
VHFRQGVHFWLRQZLOODQDO\]H5XVVLD¶VVWDQFHRQLQWHUQDWLRQDODQGXQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQVRQ,UDQ
against the background of Russo-Iranian bilateral relations, Russo-American relations and 
0RVFRZ¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRI WKH IXQFWLRQLQJRI LQWHUQDWLRQDO VHFXULW\JRYHUQDQFH7KLV LV DQ
LPSRUWDQW DQDO\WLFDO VWHS IRU DQ H[DPLQDWLRQ RI 5XVVLD¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI OHJLWLPDF\ LQ




broader macro-structure that regulates the way these norms and values are communicated, 
applied, or changed. As has been shown in the previous chapter, especially the sanctions 
question serves as an illustrative application of these concepts: If states accept and approve 
international sanctions as mandated by the United Nations Security Council, they convey a 
basic acceptance of the rules RI WKH 81 V\VWHP $Q DQDO\VLV RI 5XVVLD¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
unilateral sanctions that are adopted and implemented outside of UN procedures, then, 
FRQYH\VDQLQVLJKWLQWR5XVVLD¶Vnormative conceptions that may or may not be different from 
those powers adopting such sanctions.         
 On the basis of this analysis, a fourth section sheds light on the perception of Russia as 
a constructive mediator in the Iranian nuclear talks and therefore adds to the discussion of the 
behavioral dimension of Russian Iran policy. A fifth section will discuss whether the latter 
level has, and if so how, been affected by the overall deterioration in relations between Russia 
DQGWKH:HVWLQWKHZDNHRIWKHµ8NUDLQHFULVLV¶as from 2013. The findings of these sections 
will bring us to a final section that shows how a two-level distinction between a discursive 
DQGDEHKDYLRUDOGLPHQVLRQRIIRUHLJQSROLF\DSSOLHVWR5XVVLD¶V,UDQSROLF\7KLVVHFWLRQZLOO
EXLOGRQWKHSUHFHGLQJDQDO\VLVRI5XVVLD¶VVDQFWLRQVSROLF\Dnd Iran diplomacy and identify 
material as well as ideational IDFWRUVLQ5XVVLD¶V,UDQSROLF\WKDWPDNHXSDFRPSOH[ZHERI
foreign policy motivations which in this research is captured by a two-level model to 
understand the nexus between security culture and the degree of resistance to hegemony, as 
elaborated upon in chapter 15XVVLDQIRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVHRQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH
and on Western and especially US-$PHULFDQDSSURDFKHVWR,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHZLOOEH
FRQWUDVWHGZLWK5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJn policy behavior that may be in contradiction with a security 
culture Russia itself advocates for. Making sense of such a variation in compliance weaves 
together the concepts of norm divergence and rule convergence and will allow me to answer 
the question KRZ5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHLVLOOXVWUDWLYHRID
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Iranian nuclear programme in 2002: Reacting to U.S. securitisations  
 
This section sheds light on disagreements between Russia and its Western counterparts 
RYHU,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHIROORZLQJWKHODWWHU¶V disclosure in 2002. Doing so, it presents 
the Russian foreign policy discourse in this question, which is a precondition for a first 
analytical step in presenting the two-level model of a discursive and a behavioral dimension 
to understand the nexus between security culture and the degree of resistance to hegemony.
 With the revelation of an Iranian enrichment facility in Natanz and a heavy-water plant 
XQGHU FRQVWUXFWLRQ DW $UDN KLWKHUWR XQGHFODUHG WR WKH ,$($ DQG WKXV LQ EUHDFK RI ,UDQ¶V
Safeguards Agreements, Russian nuclear cooperation with Iran suddenly appeared in a 
disconcerting light (Lata & Khlopkov 2003).197 Russo-Iranian nuclear cooperation had started 
in September 1994 when a protocol was signed between the Russian Atomic Energy Minister, 
Viktor Mikhailov, and the president of the Atomic Energy Organisation of Iran (AEOI), Reza 
Amrollahi, in which the Russians expressed their willingness to complete the 1000-MW 
SRZHU UHDFWRU DW %XVKHKU ZRUWK  PLOOLRQ 86 GROODUV %XVKHKU ZDV ,UDQ¶V RQO\ QXFOHDU
power plant project that had been started by German Kraftwerk Union AG in 1970 (Yurtaev  
2005: 107), but was abandoned in the wake of the Islamic Revolution (Orlov & Vinnikov 
2005: 50). Unable to get nuclear technology from its former European partners that had 
cooperated with Iran in the starting phases of the Iranian nuclear programme under the Shah 
in the 1960s and 1970s,198 Iran had turned to China and the USSR (with Russia succeeding 
the latter). As from the mid-VDQGGHVSLWH86SUHVVXUH5XVVLDKDGEHFRPH,UDQ¶VQXFOHDU
partner (cf. also Sarukhanyan 2006: 88-108).      
 Against the backdrop of the uranium fuel sales for the construction of Bushehr, Putin 
appeared pugnacious and downplayed the revelations of a covert Iranian nuclear programme, 
FDOOLQJQRQSUROLIHUDWLRQFRQFHUQVDµPHDQVRIVTXHH]LQJ5XVVLDQFRPSDQLHVRXWRIWKH,UDQLDQ
PDUNHW¶LQ(Parker 2009: 221).199 Such a statement neatly captures the Russian zeitgeist 
at the time on the nexus between non-proliferation and legitimate nuclear cooperation that 
continued to underwrite Russian foreign policy in the Iranian nuclear dossier for the years to 
come: Russian economic benefits had to be weighed against political and security concerns of 
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technology sales to Iran that might be of a dual-XVH QDWXUH 5XVVLD¶V RIILFLDO SRVLWLRQ WKXV
indicated non-compliance with the US state of alert and apprehension regarding early signs of 
an emerging securitisation of the Iranian nuclear issue.200 A Russian diplomat told me in an 
interview, smirking ³&RQFHUQLQJ ,UDQLDQQXFOHDU LQWHQWLRQVZHDUHQRW VRK\VWHULFDODV WKH
$PHULFDQV´201 It was already at this early juncture in the Iranian nuclear crisis that different 
VHFXULW\FRQFHSWLRQV WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHEHWZHHQ WKH86DQG5XVVLDEHFDPH
apparent. If the rendition of enmity is an order-constituting and arguably hegemony-
sustaining exercise, as has been argued in chapter 1, publicly challenging such a process of 
securitisation is resistance to hegemony on a discursive level. A harsh anti-American rhetoric 
on the part of the Putin administration that is bordering on the verge of outright discursive 
counter-hegemony became noticeably strong again in 2013- LQ WKH ZDNH RI WKH µ8NUDLQH
FULVLV¶ DQG WKHHQVXLQJ UDSLGGHWHULRUDWLRQ LQ UHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ5XVVLD DQG WKH:HVWZKLFK
will be discussed in section 5 EHORZ3UHVLGHQW3XWLQ¶VVSHHFKDWWKH9aldai Discussion Club 
RQ  2FWREHU  SRZHUIXOO\ MX[WDSRVHG WKH FRQFHSWLRQ RI $PHULFDQ µXQLODWHUDO
GLNWDWV¶DQG GRPLQDWLRQ E\ D µVHOI-SURFODLPHG OHDGHU¶ DJDLQVW WKH µSULQFLSOH RI QDWLRQDO
sovereignty and non-interference in the internal affairs of any VWDWH¶DQGWKHPXWXDOUHVSHFWIRU
RWKHUVWDWH¶VKRZHYHUGHILQHGQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV3XWLQ    
 7HUPVVXFKDVWKHµSXUVXDQFHRIQDWLRQDOLQWHUHVWV¶WKHUHIRUHKDYHWREHXQGHUVWRRGDV
relational concepts: What reads as an act of defiance of hegemonic powers can be an act of 
necessary resistance against instrumental politicisations in a non-hegemonic reading. In the 
FRQWH[WRI5XVVLD¶VLQWHUHVWVLQFUHDVLQJO\FODVKLQJZLWKWKRVHRIWKH86RYHUWKHORRPLQJZDU
in Iraq in 2003, Moscow saw no reason to comply with U.S. pressure and renounce its 
commercial ties with Tehran. Tellingly, the abrogation of the 1995 Gore-Chernomyrdin 
Commission under president Putin in 1999 (Antonenko 2001) had effectively put an end to 
US-Russian consultations concerning arms and technology transfers to Iran. Russian foreign 
SROLF\ ZDV ZKDW 5LFKDUG 6DNZD FDOOV µHVVHQWLDOO\ DPELJXRXV¶ 6DNZD   +DYLQJ
RIILFLDOO\DQQRXQFHGD µVWUDWHJLFSDUWQHUVKLS¶ZLWK WKH86DQGHQGRUVHG WKH1$72-Russia 
Council in 2002 (Conrad 2011: 45), Putin continued defending the Bushehr project and 
thereby indirectly sat on the fence when it came to judging the security implications of an 
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component for a final nuclear settlement of the Iranian nuclear programme.  
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Iranian nuclear programme in a Western reading. The United States was trying hard to end 
5XVVLD¶V QXFOHDU FRRperation with Iran (Belopolsky 2009: 101-107). In a Russian reading, 
Bushehr was a legitimate civilian nuclear power plant, unconnected to any hitherto covert 
uranium enrichment facilities (Aras & Ozbay 2006: 134).202 5HFXUUHQFH WR µOHJLWLPDWH¶
projects conveys a sense of self-GHWHUPLQDWLRQDQGLQGHSHQGHQFHIURPRWKHUDFWRUV¶DODUPLVW
rhetoric about nuclear Iran and calls to mind the relational dimension of security cultures: In 
the context of a looming securitisDWLRQRI,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUGRVVLHULQWKHILUVWKDlf of the 2000s, 
5XVVLDQ UHFXUUHQFH WR µOHJLWLPDF\¶ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV DQG H[WHUQDO HFRQRPLF SROLFLHV
DLPHG WRSRVLWLRQ0RVFRZDJDLQVW WKHRXWOLQLQJ86DSSURDFK WR ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH
Russian official statements after the conclusion of the political framework agreement on 2 
April 2015, negotiated in Lausanne between the P5+1 and Iran, served as a reminder that 
5XVVLD KDG VXSSRUWHG ,UDQ¶V ULJKW WR SHDFHIXO QXFOHDU HQHUJ\ DOO DORQJ 5XVVLDQ IRUHLJQ
ministry 2015).           
 From the beginning of the nuclear stand-off in 2002, Putin had repeatedly emphasised 
the Iranian right to nuclear power (Putin 2003; Mousavian 2012: 163f.). This, as well as the 
track record of nuclear cooperation between Russia and Iran made Russia the logical 
candidate in IrDQ¶VVHDUFKIRUDOOLHVDVLQWHUQDWLRQDOSXEOLFRSLQLRQWXUQHGDJDLQVW,UDQDQGDV
Western governments grew more impatient with the Iranian lack of cooperation and 
WUDQVSDUHQF\ZKLOH WDONVRYHU WKHQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHSURFHHGHG ,QDEURDGHU µ(DVWHUQEORF
appURDFK¶HPEUDFHGHVSHFLDOO\ZLWKWKHFRPLQJLQWRRIILFHRISUHVLGHQW$KPDGLQHMDGLQ
Iran reached out to Russia, China and the Non-Aligned Movement, hoping to find an 
international coalition supportive of Iran. Especially the support of China and Russia, two 
permanent UNSC members, was deemed crucial in resisting US pressure (Mousavian 2012: 
84; 141). Suffice to recall that in a Gramscian understanding of hegemonic structures, a 
µKLVWRULF EORF¶ ZRUNV WR HQIRUFH DQG VXVWDLQ WKH GRPLQDQW SRZHU VWUXFWXUHV in place (Cox 
1996: 131). Especially in the years of the Ahmadinejad administration, it reportedly was the 
Iranian ambition to forge a counter-bloc that would include Russia and China as important 
anti-hegemonic Great Powers and thus, in a neo-Gramscian understanding, work against such 
DSUHYDOHQWµKLVWRULFEORF¶         
 This was the case in the run-up to the first IAEA Board of Governors meetings in 2003 
dealing with Iran, and in the course of the following years when referral of the Iranian nuclear 
file from the IAEA to the UNSC still might have been prevented. Ideologically inflated as a 
µORRNLQJWRWKH(DVW¶SROLF\ZLWKWKHDGYHQWRI$KPDGLQHMDGDVSUHVLGHQWDQG$OL/DULMDQLDV
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chief nuclear negotiator, Iran was trying to garner support of these states in order to build a 
broad anti-US coalition to break the format of Iran facing Western negotiation partners over 
its nuclear programme that met increasingly fierce opposition (Mousavian 2012: 190f.).
 Therewith, however, Iran was misinterpreting Russian iQWHQWLRQV )ROORZLQJ ,UDQ¶V
resumption of nuclear enrichment activities in August 2005 after a period of temporary 
suspension (Jafarzadeh 2007: 159), testimony to the failure of nuclear negotiations between 
Iran and the EU3, the file was referred to the UNSC in March 2006. Of the 35 members of the 
IAEA Board of Governors, 27 endorsed the board resolution, of which Russia was one. The 
5XVVLDQHQGRUVHPHQWEHFDPHSRVVLEOHDIWHUD UHIHUHQFH WR µLQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\¶
has been omitted. An earlier resolution had still contained the reference and was therefore 
vetoed by Russia (Fitzpatrick 2006a: 21). The Iran nuclear case now had been transferred 
from Vienna to New York. Russia, hesitant to join the negotiations at first (International 
Crisis Group 2006: 14), was forced to take a stance by now at the latest by nature of its 
permanent Security Council membership.        
 In UN Security Council negotiations, Russia found itself in a camp with China arguing 
for a less pressuring approach to Iran than the US and European countries were pushing for 
and argued against the adoption of a UNSC resolution (Patrikarakos 2012: 224; Mousavian 
2012: 235f.). In an attempt to broker a political solution to the crisis, Russia proposed a plan 
in 2006 by which Iran would have to transfer its enrichment programme onto Russian soil 
while still benefitting from its output.203 The idea of such a transfer was quickly rejected by 
the Iranians. This decision signaled to Moscow that Iran would not accept indefinite reliance 
on Russia LQ WKH ILHOG RI QXFOHDU WHFKQRORJ\ DQG FRQVWLWXWHG D ZDWHUVKHG ERWK IRU 5XVVLD¶V
perception of the Iranian goals and for US-Russian cooperation over the Iranian nuclear file: 
1RW RQO\ GLG WKLV HSLVRGH SURYH WKH ³WRWDO IDLOXUH RI WKH µORRNLQJ WR WKH (DVW¶ SROLF\´ LW
³RSHQHGDQHZFKDSWHU LQ WKHQXFOHDUVWDQGRII LQZKLFK5XVVLDEHJDQ WRPRYHFORVHU WR WKH
:HVW´DV+RXVVHLQ0RXVDYLDQZULWHVLQKLVPHPRLUV-7). And after the failure of 
renewed EU and P5+1 initiatives to reach a politically acceptable compromise in the 
following months, Russia did not make use of its veto right and approved of UNSC resolution 
 LQ -XO\  ZKLFK IRU WKH ILUVW WLPH XVHG WKH RSHUDWLYH ZRUGLQJ RI D µWKUHDW WR
LQWHUQDWLRQDOSHDFHDQGVHFXULW\¶WKDW,UDQFRQVWLWXWHG     
 Pursuing a more US-independent foreign policy line while at the same time 
increasingly aware of the Iranian delaying techniques and against the background of the 
UHMHFWLRQRIµWKH5XVVLDQSODQ¶5XVVLDYRWHGIRU816&5HVROXWLRQLQ'HFHPEHU 
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approving for the first time the imposition of chapter VII sanctions on Iran. The sanctions 
regime was intensified and reaffirmed by UNSC Resolution 1747 in March 2007, followed by 
Resolution 1803 in March 2008 and Resolution 1835 in September the same year. 
 While Russia aimed at averting or at least slowing down international pressure on Iran, 
LWDLPHGDWVORZLQJGRZQ,UDQ¶VDGYDQFHVLQLWVQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDWWKHVDPHWLPH7KLVZDV
evidenced by the constant pushing back of the date of completion of the Bushehr power plant, 
ZKLFKRQWKHVXUIDFHRILWZDVDWWULEXWHGWRµWHFKQLFDO¶LVVXHV.DW]EXW
was also read as a Russian sensitivity to US concerns (cf. also Nizameddin 2013: 266). It 
equally prolonged the Iranian dependence on Russian technology.204 Therme (2012b) 
WKHUHIRUHZULWHVWKDW5XVVLDZDVµLQVWUXPHQWDOLVLQJ¶QXFOHDUFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK,UDQLQRUGHUWR
both keep Iran dependent on Russian know-KRZDQG WRKLQGHU DQ ,UDQLDQ µQXFOHDU VXFFHVV¶
(190).205 While this strategy can be read as a rational commercial calculation, it also served to 
show responsiveness to US security perceptions at the same time and fulfilled a double 
SXUSRVHIRU5XVVLDLQWKLVVHQVH5XVVLD¶VSXEOLFVWDWHPHQWVDJDLQVWXQKHOSIXOSUHVVXUHRQ,UDQ
entailed advocacy for a security culture that resisted US hegemony, while Moscow still 
managed to steer a course that was avoiding outright rejection of US policies. In analyzing 
Russian Iran policy, it thus seems useful to make out a distinction between a discursive level 
(public advocacy for a security culture that is resisting hegemony), and a behavioral level 
(eventual approval for UNSC sanctions resolutions and a renouncement of unwavering 
support for the Iranian position), which will be elaborated upon more extensively in the 
following sections.           
 7KHQH[WVHFWLRQZLOOVKHGOLJKWRQ5XVVLD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIVDQFWLRQVDVDSROLWLFDO
LQVWUXPHQW LQ GHDOLQJ ZLWK ,UDQ DQG ZKDW WKLV UHYHDOV DERXW 5XVVLD¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI
legitimacy and norms in international relations. This will be an important intermediate 
DQDO\WLFDOIRFXVRQ5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVHSHUWDLQLQJWRWKHVDQFWLRQVUHJLPHEHIRUH
the section that follow can complement the analysis with an examination of the behavioral 
GLPHQVLRQ RI 5XVVLD¶V Ioreign policy towards Iran. The synthesis of this discursive and 
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 With Bushehr, Moscow held leverage over Iran as far as fuel and the technical operation of the plant was 
concerned. Fuel fabrication and insertion is a technically difficult process and is best carried out by the actual 
producer of the plant. In addition, Iran needed the Russian technicians to operate the plant, as was also 
evidenced by the informal prolongation of the initially contracted two-year period during which Russian 
technicians were supposed to work in Bushehr. In this sense, through its nuclear technology cooperation, 
Moscow had channels through which it was able to ŵĂŬĞŝƚƐǀŽŝĐĞŚĞĂƌĚŝŶdĞŚƌĂŶ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƌ ?
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EHKDYLRUDO OHYHO WKHQ DOORZV PH WR GUDZ D FRPSUHKHQVLYH SLFWXUH DERXW 5XVVLD¶V VHFXULW\
culture on Iran and the extent to which it is indicative of resistance to hegemony.  
3. ǯon Iran sanctions  
 ?Ǥ ?ǯǣ 
 
In accordance with the Russian hesitance when it comes to international sanctions against 
Iran, Moscow has always reiterated the importance of dialogue and diplomacy, rejecting a 
military solution to the crisis and calling on Iran to comply with the IAEA. In addition to 
braking the sanctions track, Moscow has thus (in tandem with China) worked toward 
weakening their impact by watering down provisions contained in the UNSC resolution drafts 
(Kuchins & Weitz 2009: 176).206  ³6DQFWLRQV´3UHVLGHQW3XWLQUHPLQGHGKLVDXGLHQFHDWWKH
9DOGDL&OXE LQ2FWREHU³DUHDOUHDG\XQGHUPLQLQJ WKH IRXQGDWLRQVRIZRUOG WUDGH WKH
WTO rules, and the principle of inviolability of SULYDWHSURSHUW\´3XWLQ 
 0RVFRZ¶V HYHQWXDO VXSSRUW IRU SUHVVXUH DQG VDQFWLRQV RQ ,UDQ ZDV D GRXEOH-edged 
sword: Russia appeared to heed to US concerns about the Iranian nuclear activities and, 
unofficially, made sure that it would remain the exclusive provider of nuclear fuel for Iran by 
VORZLQJGRZQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUDGYDQFHV$WWKHVDPHWLPHLWDQJHUHGWKH,UDQLDQVDQGVKDWWHUHG
any illusion that Russia was a reliable ally and would always protect Tehran from Western 
pressure. In Tehran, the impression was fuelled that the Iranian nuclear programme 
FRQVWLWXWHGDµEDUJDLQLQJFKLS¶IRU0RVFRZDQGWKDW³Russia is intentionally stalling in dealing 
with Iran to wring conFHVVLRQVIURPWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV´ (Mousavian 2012: 93). In his Third-
:RUOGLVW URPDQWLF $KPDGLQHMDG¶V µRYHUUHOLDQFH RQ 5XVVLD¶ HYHQ EHFDPH D FDXVH IRU
domestic criticism within Iranian policy circles (ibid.: 320). With Russia approving of 
successive rounds of UNSC-backed international sanctions, Iran had learnt the hard way that 
it could not rely on Russia as a diplomatic shield. But the disillusionment was mutual: Also in 
Russia, officLDO YRLFHV EHJDQ WR ZRUU\ WKDW ³7HKUDQ KDG >«@ RXWVPDUWHG 0RVFRZ E\ XVLQJ
5XVVLD¶V GLSORPDWLF VFUHHQ WR DGYDQFH Iranian goals that were inimical to 5XVVLD¶V RZQ
VHFXULW\ LQWHUHVWV´ (in Parker 2009: 249). Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation thus by no 
PHDQVLPSOLHGDQDXWRPDWLFOHQLHQFHZLWK,UDQLQWKHQXFOHDUWDONV5XVVLD¶VKLVWRU\RIQXFOHDU
partnership with Iran was fraught with mutual frustration and occasional public accusations.
 5XVVLD¶VVXSSRUWIRU81VDQFWLRQVXQGHUFKDSWHU9,,WKXVKDVWREHVHHQLQWKLVFRQWH[W
of Russian skepticism regarding Iranian intentions and of wanting to be seen as a constructive 
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partner for the Western interlocutors. The calculation was a mixture of geostrategic as well as 
global power political considerations, as will also be seen further below in sections 4 and 6. 
5HPDUNV GHOLYHUHG E\ 5XVVLD¶V 81 UHSUHVHQWDWLYH 9ODGLPLU &KXUNLQ in Security Council 
sessions that passed the sanctions resolutions, conveyed a balance between the cautious 
DGPRQLWLRQ RI ,UDQ¶V IDLOXUHV WR DGGUHVV LQWHUQDWLRQDO FRQFHUQV DERXW LWV QXFOHDU ILOH DQG D
principled reservation regarding the use of restrictive sanctions (UN 2006b: 2-3; UN 2007: 
10-11; UN 2010b: 8-9).        
 Russian approval for sanctions also was a reaction to political circumstances at the 
time that would have made resistance to sanctions difficult to sell politically.  This was the 
case witK WKH UHYHODWLRQ RI WKH H[LVWHQFH RI ,UDQ¶V VHFRQG XUDQLXP HQULFKPHQW IDFLOLW\ LQ
Fordow near Qom in September 2009, hitherto unknown to the IAEA,207 and also to Russian 
intelligence services (Parsi 2012: 126; Mousavian 2012: 397). Russia was taken by surprise 
and therefore angered by the Iranian lack of transparency, but was also not pleased by the fact 
that Western intelligence sources had not been shared with Moscow (ibid.).208 Another 
XQGHUFXUUHQWZDVWKHIDFWWKDW,UDQKDGUHMHFWHGWKH9LHQQDJURXS¶VSURSRsal in 2009 that had 
centered around Russia as a key actor in the fuel swap deal.209 The latest sanctions regime 
against Iran was approved by the UN Security Council in June 2010 with Resolution 1929. 
5XVVLD¶V YRWH IRU VDQFWLRQV WKHUHIRUH DOVR KDV WR EH VHHQ in the context of this political 
PRPHQWXPZKHUH5XVVLD¶VIUXVWUDWLRQZLWKWKH,UDQLDQODFNRIFRRSHUDWLRQZDVRQHIDFWRULQ
the calculation and where a veto in the UNSC would have constituted an outright rejection of 
(not only Western) security political concerns regarding Iranian non-compliance with 
previous resolutions and IAEA safeguards agreements, as demonstrated blatantly again with 
the revelation of the Fordow facility.        
 ,Q DGGLWLRQ 5XVVLD¶V DSSURYDO RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO VDQFWLRQV RIWHQ ZDV OLQked to 
FRQFHVVLRQV RIIHUHG E\ WKH 86 DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ LQ H[FKDQJH IRU 0RVFRZ¶V FRQVHQW LQ WKH
VDQFWLRQVTXHVWLRQ,QZKDWKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVµKRUVH-WUDGLQJ¶WDNLQJSODFHEHWZHHQWKH86
and Russia,210 the controversial Missile Defense (MD) episode in US-Russian relations may 
have become interlinked with Iran sanctions in the UN Security Council whereby the Obama 
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 therewith also supposedly breaching IAEA modified code 3.1, which stipulates the acknowledgment of new 
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Washington, 1 November 2014.  
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administration offered concessions in the MD plans (renouncement of the missile defence 
shield deployment in Poland and the Czech Republic) and would EH JXDUDQWHHG 5XVVLD¶V
cooperation in the Iran nuclear file in return, e.g. Russian green light for a new round of 
international sanctions on Iran, as some experts hold (Mousavian 2012: 335; Kuchins & 
Weitz 2009: 168; Patrikarakos 2012: 256). President MeGYHGHY¶VSXEOLF UHDFWLRQWRDVHFUHW
letter by Obama about such an Iran-missile shield bargain indicated that Moscow was not 
happy to publicly discuss the matter (France24 2009). The fact that Moscow did not 
reconsider its support for sanctions in June 2010 after the surprising Brazilian-Turkish 
diplomatic break-WKURXJK LQ 0D\  DQG 7HKUDQ¶V XQH[SHFWHG DSSURYDO RI WKH 7HKUDQ
declaration, however, goes to show that Russia had been promised too many important 
concessions by the US, as Trita Parsi contends (2012: 196). And under US pressure, Russia 
even suspended the planned sale of its S-300 long-range air-defense system to Iran (Parsi 
2012: 47). Medvedev issued presidential decree 1154 in October 2010 to that effect. The 
cancellation of the S-300 contract was a major annoyance for Iran with which Russia 
VTXDQGHUHGDJRRGGHDORI LWV µOHYHUDJHSRZHU¶RYHU7HKUDQ211 With the latter decision, the 
Medvedev administration sent a strong political signal: A positive one in a Western reading, a 
negative one in an Iranian reading. And when in May 2010, Russia approved of sanctions 
resolution 1929 in the UN Security Council, it had agreed to the toughest round of sanctions 
ever imposed on Iran over its controversial nuclear programme so far ± a seeming reversal of 
0RVFRZ¶V SRVLWLRQ IURP RQO\ ILYH \HDUV EHIore. Esfandiary and Fitzpatrick (2011) even 
FRQWHQGWKDW5XVVLD³ZHQWEeyond the strict reading of the UN sanctions by cancelling (the S-
FRQWUDFW>«@7KLVZDV a decision that may have had the most significant impact on Iran 
RI DQ\ QDWLRQDO PHDVXUH´  ± D GHFLVLRQ WKDW KDV HYHQ EHHQ OLNHQHG WR 5XVVLD¶V RZQ
unilateral sanctions on Iran (cf. Kozhanov 2015b).212 The importance of the Iran issue and the 
acknowledged necessity to work with the Russians on Iran has been an important (if not the 
most important) motivation behind the US-5XVVLDQ µUHVHW¶ SROLF\ LQ  DV FRQILUmed by 
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 While imposing a weapons embargo, paragraph 7 of UNSCR 1929 makes no mention of surface-to-air 
systems. The S-300 is such a system, so on technical grounds, Russia could have delivered the system to Iran. 
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the S-300 contract. Reportedly, the S-300 deal was subject of discussion during Russian defense minister Sergei 
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2015; Vedomosti 2015). And on 13 April 2015, two weeks after the conclusion of the political framework 
agreement with Iran in Lausanne, President Putin officially cancelled the suspension and paved the way for an 
eventual delivery (BBC 2015. On this, cf. also Kozhanov 2015a).  
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former State Secretary Clinton in her memoir (Clinton 2014: 235; cf. also Parsi 2012: 94; 
Fitzpatrick 2010: 71; Kozhanov 2015b).213  
 ?Ǥ ? ǯ     ǣ    
anti-hegemony 
 




5XVVLD¶V JUXGJLQJ DFFHSWDQFH RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO VDQFWLRQV KRZHYHU XQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQV DV
imposed by the US and the EU, it is being reiterated from the Russian foreign ministry, are 
not seen as legitimate instruments of international politics (Russian foreign ministry 2012b; 
Medvedev 2010; Reuters 2010; Sheridan 2009).214 ³:HYLHZXQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQVDVLOOHJDO´D
Russian foreign ministry official working on the Iranian nuclear dossier puts it in an 
interview.215 1H[WWR WKHILQGLQJWKDWXQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQVKDYH³RQO\EURXJKWDGLVUXSWXUHRI
WKH ( G\QDPLFV´ LELG VXFK D IUDQN VWDWHPHQW FRQYH\V 5XVVLDQ FRQFHSWLRQV RI
legitimacy in international politics. Sanctions, imposed unilaterally by the US and the EU, are 
viewed as breaching a normative framework that should govern international relations. 
³$QRWKHUULVNWRZRUOGSHDFHDQGVWDELOLW\LVSUHVHQWHGE\DWWHPSWVWRPDQDJHFULVHVWKURXJK
unilateral sanctions and other coercive measures, including armed aggression, outside the 
IUDPHZRUN RI WKH 81 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO´ WKH RIILFLDO 5XVVLDQ )RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ &RQFHSW
IRUPXODWHV 5XVVLDQ IRUHLJQ PLQLVWU\ D µ5XOHV DQG PRGHOV¶ RI WKH 81 V\VWHP LQ
.DW]HQVWHLQ¶VWHUPLQRORJ\WRXQGHUVWDQGµFXOWXUH¶DUHQRWDGKHUHGWRLIVDQFWLRQV
are adopted outside of the UN Security Council, in a Russian understanding.   
 Reacting to the EU decision to impose an oil embargo on Iran, effective from 1 July 
2012, Foreign Minister Lavrov publicly deplored what he described as unilateral steps 
GHVLJQHGWR³SXQLVK,UDQLDQVWXEERUQQHVV´5XVVLDQIRUHign ministry 2012a). He emphasised 
WKDW 5XVVLD UHJDUGHG VXFK VWHSV DV D µGHHSO\ IDXOW\ OLQH¶ DQG UHLWHUDWHG WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI
political dialogue instead of punitive measures. The EU was criticised for the fruitlessness of 
DQH[FHVVLYH WLOW WRZDUGDXQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQV WUDFNZKLFK LV UHJDUGHGDV µXQKHOSIXO¶E\ WKH
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 Dr. Alexei Arbatov, head of the Center for International Security at IMEMO, asserts that the S-300 decision 
ǁĂƐƚŚĞ ‘ƉĞĂŬ ?ŽĨƚŚĞh^-RusƐŝĂŶƌĞƐĞƚƉŽůŝĐǇ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?DŽƐĐŽǁ ? ? ?EŽǀĞŵďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
214
 This point was also persistently made in all interviews with Russian officials carried out for this research. 
Russian ambassador to the EU Vladimir Chizhov also reiterated this position at a keynote speech on 2 February 
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 Interview with Russian foreign ministry official, Moscow, 18 April 2013. 
133 
 
Russian dialogue partners and is said to complicate the search for common policy positions 
within the P5+1, as emphasised by a Russian diplomat in an interview.216  
 While presented in Russian public diplomacy as motivated by the adverse effect 
VDQFWLRQVKDYHRQGLSORPDF\5XVVLD¶V UHMHFWLRQRIXQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQVDQGKHVLWDQF\ WR use 
international sanctions is also to be explained by the adverse material effect these have on 
Russian companies: In the context of a growing anti-Iran climate in Western policy circles as 
the nuclear dossier was dragging, the U.S. criticised Russian exports of weapons and 
defensive systems and explicitly started sanctioning Russian firms for conducting such 
business with Iran. The aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi and arms exporter Rosoboronexport 
were sanctioned in 2006, 2007 and 2008 (Defense Industry Daily 2006).217 The US thereby 
ZDVDLPLQJDWKDPSHULQJZKDWZDVSHUFHLYHGDVDµF\QLFDO¶5XVVLDQWZR-track policy in which 
Moscow was officially committed to the international sanctions regime but not supporting the 
spirit of it (Patrikarakos 2012: 228). Russian weapons deliveries, however, were outlawed on 
a multilateral basis in 2010 by the weapons embargo adopted through UNSCR 1929. But 
unilateral sanctions also hampered Russian trade with Iran in other areas. As a Russian 
GLSORPDWUHPDUNVLQDQLQWHUYLHZ³2ur trade volume (with Iran) is not as high as it used to be 
because of unilateral sanctions. This is because of globalised trade: The EU SWIFT sanctions 
PDGHEDQNFRPPXQLFDWLRQZLWK,UDQPRUHGLIILFXOW´218    
 Russia, as demonstrated by its language on sanctions, is motivated by a normative 
understanding of their (il)legitimacy, but is equally motivated by the material dimension of 
WKH HIIHFW RI VDQFWLRQV 7KLV ILQGLQJ GLIIHUHQWLDWHV 5XVVLD¶V VWDQFH RQ WKH VDQFWLRns regime: 
While Moscow criticises the political effects of sanctions, its compliance with the latter 
appears to be selective and dependent on the US position, the impact of sanctions on Russia, 
and the nature of the sanctions adopted (unilateral or international). This is an important point 
to retain for an examination of a Russian security culture as resisting hegemony and its 
constituent material, ideational and institutional underpinnings (Cox 1996: 97f.; 135f.). A 
later section will come back to this point.        
 The remainder of this chapter will put such an interplay between material and 
QRUPDWLYHFRQVLGHUDWLRQVIRU5XVVLD¶VVDQFWLRQVSROLF\LQWRWKHZLGHUSHUVSHFWLYHRI5XVVLD¶V
SXEOLF GLSORPDF\ VXUURXQGLQJ WKH ,UDQ FDVH 7KLV ZLOO DQVZHU WKH TXHVWLRQ KRZ 5XVVLD¶V
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 Along with Rosoboronexport, the Bush administration also sanctioned the Tula Instrument-Making Design 
Bureau and the Kolomna Machine-Building Design Bureau in 2007 (Belopolsky 2009: 127). The sanctions 
against Sukhoi, imposed because of alleged violations of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 2000 were lifted again 
in November 2006 (Ria Novosti 2007). 
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IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V nuclear programme is illustrative of a security culture that 
UHVLVWVKHJHPRQ\$QLQWHUPHGLDWHFRQFOXVLRQVXJJHVWVWKDW5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVH
bears indications of a security culture that resists hegemony: Russia emphasises legitimate 
rights of Iran, legitimate Russian commercial ties with Iran, counterproductive sanctions 
pressure and illegal Western unilateral sanctions and therewith emphasises the sovereignty of 
Iran to be upheld. The impression on a behavioral level is more mixed: Russia was slowing 
down the sanctions track, but eventually adopted and complied with international sanctions, 
yet was blacklisted for trade with Iran that ostensibly contravened sanctions regimes. The next 
section introduces a Russian discourse of constructive mediation as a final element that adds 
WR 5XVVLD¶V VHFXULW\ FXOWXUH RQ ,UDQ EHIRUH Wwo final sections will synthesise the research 




As has been analysed in the previous sections, Russia always had to reconcile security 
perceptions with legitimate commercial aspects of Russo-Iranian relations. As much as this 
had been a source for disagreement between Russia and its Western counterparts, it had 
GHPRQVWUDWHG5XVVLD¶VGHIHQVHRIDVHFXULW\FXOture that would resist securitising discourses, 
ZKLFKZHUHSUHVHQWLQJ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDVDQLQKHUHQWWKUHDWDQGEDVLQJSROLFLHVRQ
allegations. In the second half of the 2000s, however, decisions by the Iranian leadership had 
alienated Moscow and contributed their part in bringing Moscow to agree to the imposition of 
VDQFWLRQV3UHVLGHQW0HGYHGHY¶VGHFLVLRQQRWWRGHOLYHUWKH6-300 defense system to Iran, that 
would have allowed the interception of long-range missiles, could be seen as a tilt toward a 
course more accommodating to Western security concerns.    
 7KH GHSLFWLRQ RI 5XVVLD¶V UROH LQ WKH ,UDQ GRVVLHU DV EHLQJ WKDW RI D YHWR-player 
indulgent with the Iranians would therefore be a fallacy. In its official diplomacy, Russia was 
always emphasising the need to find a political solution to the nuclear crisis through dialogue. 
Proposals such as the creation of an international fuel center on Russian soil by president 
Putin are a case in point (Diakov 2007: 135f.). Former IAEA Secretary-General Mohamed 
ElBaradei notes in his memoirs in this context:  
³&RQWUDU\ WR DOOHJDWLRQV PDGH DW WLPHV E\ WKH :HVW 3XWLQ VWURQJO\ RSSRVHG ,UDQ¶V
acquisition of nuclear weapons and questioned its need for nuclear enrichment 
capability; but he concurred that Iran should be offered attractive assistance, including 
nuclear technology, and he supported an international guarantee of reactor fuel supply. 
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Putin also put forward an idea for an international repository for spent fuel, which I 
DSSODXGHG´(O%DUDGHL: 137).  
As nuclear proliferation expert Mark Hibbs holds, a Russo-Iranian nuclear cooperation 
agreement219 ZRXOG DFKLHYH WR HPEHG ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU DFWLYLWLHV ZLWKLQ D WUDQVQDWLRQDOO\
controllable and verifiably peaceful framework and would inevitably align Russia closer with 
Western powers in emphasising the need for full Iranian cooperation with the IAEA (Hibbs 
2013). Given the failed attempts in 2009 and 2010 to negotiate fuel swap deals, however, it 
remains doubtful whether the scenario of a multilateralisation of the fuel cycle220 to prevent or 
contain Iranian domestic enrichment is still a feasible one. As reported by the New York 
Times on 3 November 2014, the shipment of parts of Iran¶s nuclear stockpile to Russia to be 
turned into fuel for Iranian nuclear power plants was apparently discussed by the delegations 
in November 2014 as part of a final nuclear settlement (Sanger 2014), and is reminiscent of 
the idea of a fuel swap deal already discussed in late 2009. While this option seemed to have 
been on the negotiation table initially in P5+1 talks with Iran in Lausanne in March 2015, the 
Iranian rejection of any shipments of its stockpile to Russia put an end to this debate (Richter 
& Mostaghim 2015). Considerations about technicalities about negotiated solutions for a final 
Iranian nuclear status aside, Russian officials stress that Moscow has introduced several 
constructive proposals throughout the process, some of which are known (like LDYURY¶VµVWHS-
by-VWHS¶ SODQ LQ  RU WKH SURSRVDO IRU DQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO IXHO FRQVRUWLXP LQ  ZKLOH
others are unknown to the public and were circulated within the P5+1 format.221   
 1H[W WR VXFK FRQFUHWH WHFKQLFDO SURSRVDOV 5XVVLD¶V SXEOLF VWDQFH RIWHntimes gave 
Moscow the role of an admonisher against a lack of cooperation on both the Western and the 
,UDQLDQVLGH³:HHQFRXUDJHERWK,UDQWRIXOO\FRPSO\ZLWKWKH,$($DQGDUHSXVKLQJERWK
VLGHV WKH 86 DQG ,UDQ WR PHHW DQG WDON´ VDLG D 5XVVLDQ GLSORmat to the US in an 
interview.222 Admonishing the Iranian leadership to show more transparency, Russia is 
adamant in its criticism of what is being perceived in Moscow as politicised and unhelpful 
pressure from the West. Reacting to the 2011 IAEA report that was read as an unusually 
outspoken expression of frustration with the Iranian lack of transparency (IAEA 2011), 
0RVFRZ ODPHQWHG LWV µGHVWUXFWLYH ORJLF¶ (Russian foreign ministry 2011) and deplored that 
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 International fuel bank or Russia as destination for the return of Iranian spent fuel rods.  
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 The first international nuclear fuel reserve bank in Angarsk, Russia, is an example of an attempt of such a 
multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle that Russia had built together with the IAEA (Meier 2014: 22).  
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 Interview with Russian foreign ministry official, Moscow, 18 April 2013. Some European observers are more 
skeptical of the rationale behind these Russian technical proposals. A European diplomat describes them in an 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁĂƐ ‘ĞĐŽŶŽŵŝĐĂůůǇƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂďůĞ ?ĂŶĚ ‘ďĂƐĞĚŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶĐŽŵŵĞƌĐŝĂůŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚƐŝŶ/ƌĂŶ ? ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ
interview, Brussels, 6 February 2015. 
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 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ? 
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the report did not contain any new evidence. And reacting to the shadow boxing exercises of 
the dialogue partners in the search for a venue for negotiations in 2012 that would be 
acceptable to all parties, Russian foreign minister Sergei Lavrov urged all parties to stop 
EHKDYLQJ³OLNHOLWWOHNLGV´DQGSUDJPDtically agree on a venue, emphasising that the Russian 
VLGH EHOLHYHG LQ WKH LPSRUWDQFH RI WKH ³HVVHQFH RI WKH WDONV´ /DYURY  7KH
unprecedented progress in nuclear talks following the Iranian presidential elections in June 
2013 that led to a historic first interim deal between Iran and the P5+1 were therefore publicly 
welcomed and appreciated by the Russian foreign ministry.223 Lavrov expressly applauded the 
constructive role of the US delegation under the leadership of State Secretary John Kerry after 




step proposal.224 Russia is thus even being ascribed the role of an intermediary and facilitator 
of talks between Iran and the West by some observers (Aras & Ozbay 2006: 139).225 In line 
ZLWK5XVVLD¶VGHVLUHWREHSHUFHLYHGDVDUHVSRQVLEOHJOREDOSRZHUVXFKLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVUHIOHFW
RQ0RVFRZ¶VZLOOLQJQHVV WREHVHHQDVDFRRSHUDWLYHDQGSUDJPDWLFGLDORJXHSDUWQHU LQ WKH
Iranian nuclear file. Seyed Hossein Mousavian (2012) even writes that it was a strategic 
PLVWDNH RI WKH :HVW QRW WR KDYH JLYHQ WKH 5XVVLDQ µVWHS-by-VWHS¶ plan more consideration 
(457).            
 Especially during the Medvedev administration, Russia managed to highlight issue 
areas for closer cooperation with the West and nurtured the impression of Moscow as a 
constructive dialogue partner in the Iran dossier, but also in the US-Russian dialogue in 
general. )ROORZLQJ3XWLQ¶VSUHVLGHQF\ WKDWKDG LQLWLDWHGDQDVVHUWLYH IRUHLJQSROLF\ OLQH WKDW
did not shy away from being increasingly more outspoken about its disagreements with 
Western strategic political interests, MedveGHY¶V SUHVLGHQF\ ZDV FKDUDFWHULVed by an 
understanding RI IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DV D µPRGHUQLVDWLRQ UHVRXUFH¶ PHDQLQJ WKH QHHG IRU FORVHU
political consultation with the US and Europe with the intent to steer Russia toward a broader 
politico-economic modernisation course.        
 This arguably impacted on the negitiations on the New-START treaty about the 
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with Russian diplomat at the Russian embassy to the US, Washington, 31 October 2014.  
225
 Interview with Dr. Anton Khlopkov, Moscow, 17 April 2013; conversation with German diplomat, Moscow, 
18 April 2013. 
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reduction of strategic nuclear weapons between the US and Russia or the granting of transit 
routes for US- and NATO troop supplies to Afghanistan. In the case of the controversy over 
the Iranian nuclear programme, as already discussed above, the non-delivery of the S-300 
defense system to Iran was such an example of a slightly more accommodating foreign policy 
toward Western security political concerns. But as was also shown above, this should not 
necessarily be attributed to an ideational convergence of security cultures, but arguably was 
the cRQFUHWHRXWFRPHRIDWDQJLEOHµTXLGSURTXR¶SROLF\EHWZHHQWKH86DQG5XVVLD³5DWKHU
WKDQµQRUPV¶DQGµSXEOLFJRRGV¶´.XFKLQV	:HLW]UHPDUNLQWKLVFRQWH[W³5XVVLDQ
OHDGHUVDQGSROLWLFDODQDO\VWVIUDPH5XVVLD¶VWHUPVRILQWHUQDWLRQDOFRRSHUDWLRn as realpolitik 
EDUJDLQV DQG µWUDGH-RIIV¶RI LQWHUHVWV´  ,I µPXOWLODWHUDOLVP¶ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV LV
understood as legitimacy by way of international socialisation, then the Russian reference to 
multilateralism is at least surprising in the fDFH RI 5XVVLD¶V GHEDWLQJ FXOWXUH RQ FRQWHVWHG
LQWHUQDWLRQDO LVVXHV WKDW LV PDUNHG PXFK PRUH E\ JHRSROLWLFDO FRQFHSWLRQV DQG µVSKHUHV RI
LQWHUHVW¶226 Despite policy-specific Russian proposals like those discussed above, Russia does 
not capitalise on such instances of Russian-OHGPXOWLODWHUDODSSURDFKHV5XVVLD¶VDSSURDFKWR
multilateral cooperation, in other words, remains ad-hoc and compartmentalised. The 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIµWUDGH-RIIV¶LQDSRVLWLYHUHDGLQJDOVRDOORZVVHOHFWLYHFRRSHUDWLRQRQVRPH
issues areas, even when conflicting interests prevail in others, as the following section will 
demonstrate.           
 ,QVSLWHRI0RVFRZ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVHVXJJHVWLQJRWKHUZLVHWKHUHVXOWRIWKLV
DV ZLWK 5XVVLD¶V HYHQWXDO DGRSWLRQ RI 816& VDQFWLRQV RIWentimes was convergence on a 
behavioral level. It is this aspect of convergence of security cultures that was cast in doubt by 
WKHRXWEUHDNRIWKHµ8NUDLQHFULVLV¶DQGWKHGHWHULRUDWLRQLQUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQ5XVVLDDQGWKH
West. The following section will sKHGOLJKWRQWKHSRVVLEOHLPSDFWRIWKLVFULVLVRQ5XVVLD¶V
Iran policies, before a final section will weave together the discursive and behavioral 
GLPHQVLRQ RI 5XVVLD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ RQ ,UDQ DQG UHIOHFW RQ WKH H[WHQW WR ZKLFK 5XVVLD¶V
foreign policy toward the Iranian nuclear programme is the expression of a balancing act 
between the desire to be perceived as a constructive intermediary between Iran and the West, 
as analysed in this section, and the advocacy for a security culture that resists hegemony. 
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 ThŝƐƉŽŝŶƚǁĂƐŵĂĚĞďǇWƌŽĨ ?ŶĚƌĞŝDĂŬĂƌǇĐŚĞǀ ?WĂŶĞůĚŝƐĐƵƐƐŝŽŶ ?hŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇŽĨ<ĞŶƚ ?Ɛh-Russia 
conference, Brussels, 3 February 2015. 
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5. The impact of the Ukraine crisis on Russian Iran policies 
 
Reports in the summer of 2014 about a Russian-Iranian oil-for-goods barter agreement worth 
1.5 billion $ raised eyebrows in Western capitals. According to the terms of the agreement, 
Russia would be importing 500.000 barrels of Iranian oil per day in exchange for Russian 
equipment and goods exported to Iran (Saul and Hafezi 2014; Arbatov 2014).227 Given that 
Russia is an oil exporting country itself, the import of additional Iranian oil would not make 
sense in pure energy political thinking, but was read as a favorable macroeconomic aid for the 
Iranians suffering from the financial effects of existing sanctions regimes.228 Just why this 
ZRXOG EH LQ 5XVVLD¶V LQWHUHVW ODFNV LQWXLWLYH REYLRXVQHVV DQG WKHUefore led to speculations 
DERXW5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQLQJ LQ UHODWLRQVZLWK ,UDQEH\RQG WKH ,UDQLDQQXFOHDUFRQIOLFW229 The 
irritation about such a posturing helps explain Russian official attempts to dispel the reading 
that Russia undermines existing sanctions regimes already before a comprehensive nuclear 
DJUHHPHQWZLWK,UDQZRXOGKDYHWKHPOLIWHG³:HKDYHRXURZQRLOZHGRQ¶WQHHGDGGLWLRQDO
,UDQLDQRLO´D5XVVLDQGLSORPDWdispersed such speculations in an interview.230 Shortly after 
the political framework agreement of 2 April 2015 was reached, however, deputy foreign 
minister Ryabkov stated that such an agreement was being implemented, at a time when 
President Putin ended the suspension over the delivery of the above-discussed S-300 system 
(Baczynska 2015). The resuscitation of the S-300 was an important indication that P5+1 unity 
is likely to erode, should a final nuclear agreement be reached. ³5XVVLDKDVEURNHQUDQNVZLWK
WKH86DQG(8´6DVQDO	6HFULHUXZULWHSpeculations about Russian future Iran 
policies in  KRZHYHU KDYH WR EH VHHQ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI ZKDW KDV EHHQ WHUPHG µWKH
8NUDLQHFULVLV¶LQEXWKDVHYROYHGLQWRWKHPRVWVHYHUHSRVW-Cold War crisis in relations 
between Russia and the West.        
 The Ukraine crisis has arguably influenced Russian strategising about external trade 
projects such as the oil-for-goods agreement with Iran. This crisis has resulted in high (EU 
DQG86SUHVVXUHRQ5XVVLDZLWKHQVXLQJLPSOLFDWLRQVIRU5XVVLD¶VQHWZRUNRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
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 Russian exports to Iran are mainly metals, food, and machinery. 
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 A European diplomat also questioned the desirability oĨƚŚĞĂŐƌĞĞŵĞŶƚŽŶƚŚĞ/ƌĂŶŝĂŶƐŝĚĞĂƐĨŽůůŽǁƐ P “tŚĂƚ
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West thereon.  Due to a clause in the Joint Plan of Action of November 2013 negotiated between Iran and the 
P5+1, the implementation of such an oil-for-goods deal would also be in contravention of the JPoA. The latter 
 “ĂůůŽǁƐ/ƌĂŶƚŽĐŽŶƚŝŶƵĞĞǆƉŽƌƚŝŶŐĂ total of 1 million barrels a day of oil to six countries: China, India, Japan, 
^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?dĂŝǁĂŶĂŶĚdƵƌŬĞǇ ? ?^ŝŶĐĞZƵƐƐŝĂǁĂƐŶŽƚĂŶŽŝů ĐŽƐƚƵŵĞƌŽĨ/ƌĂŶĂƚƚŚĞƚŝŵĞƚŚĞ:WŽǁĂƐ
negotiated, it was not included in this provision.  
230
 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ? Russian mission to the EU, 7 October 2014.  
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trade partners. Against the backdrop of the imposition of Western sanctions on Russia and the 
GRZQJUDGLQJ RI 5XVVLDQ FUHGLWZRUWKLQHVV E\ UDWLQJ DJHQFLHV VXFK DV 0RRG\¶V )LWFK DQG
6WDQGDUG 	 3RRU¶V WKH DWWUDFWLYHQHVV RI 5XVVLD DV DQ LQYHVWPHQW WDUJHW KDV GHFUHDVHG231 
WhiOH5XVVLDGLVPLVVHVVXFKGRZQJUDGLQJDVDµSROLWLFDOGHFLVLRQ¶WKH5XVVLDQHFRQRP\KDV
experienced an intensified capital flight.        
 ,Q WKLV FRQWH[W 5XVVLD¶V VHDUFK IRU QHZ DOOLDQFHV LQFOXGLQJ WKH GLVFXVVHG EDUWHU
agreement with Iran, serve to convH\WKHVLJQDO WKDW5XVVLD³GRHVQRWERWKHUDERXW:HVWHUQ
VDQFWLRQV DQG VKRZV WKDW LW KDV RWKHU WUDGH SDUWQHUV´ DV DQ ,UDQ GHVN RIILFHU KROGV LQ DQ
interview.232 Short of actual economic diversification options, such negotiations can thus put 
up a smokescreen as a reaction to Western economic isolation attempts. But the economic 
alienation is mutual: The Russian government has shown a tendency of economic alienation 
from US-inspired financial and economic instruments ± in addition to the level of political 
resentment, and in addition and reaction to Western attempts to isolate Russia economically. 
([DPSOHVDUHWKH3XWLQDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶VDQQRXQFHPHQWWRVXEVWLWXWHHPEDUJRHGPDQXIDFWXUHG
goods from the West by domestic produces; indirect taxes and direct product bans; and 
relevant changes in the customs legislation (Libman 2014).     
 As a catalyst for an unprecedented deterioration in relations between Russia and the 
West, the Ukraine crisis has affected policy coordination in almost all areas - with the notable 
exception of the Iran nuclear talks, where a constructive level of collaboration between Russia 
and the West has remained intact. Here, a partial discrepancy between a discursive and a 
behavioral level quickly became apparent. At a time where policy coordination with Russia 
was suspended in most other formats (like the G-8 group or the NATO-Russia Council), 
Russian official rhetoric alluded to the possibility that the Russian government could 
recalibrate its position in the Iran nuclear talks as a reaction to Western pressure on Moscow 
over its policies towards the Ukraine conflict. The impression that Moscow was flirting with 
the idea of using the Iran nuclear talks as a vehicle for obstructionism was nurtured when on 
19 March 2014, Russian deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov stated that Russia could 
reconsider its position on the Iranian nuclear dossier in the context of Western sanctions 
discussions directed against Russia. This was an indication for the impression that Russia 
occasionally has used thH,UDQQXFOHDUWDONVDVDµEDUJDLQLQJFKLS¶WRJHWFRQFHVVLRQVLQRWKHU
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thereby placing it below investment grade (BBC 2014; Andrianovna & Galouchko 2015). 
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issue areas (Fitzpatrick 2014).233 Importantly, as a member of the European negotiation team 
pointed out in an interview, Ryabkov didn't hint at a Crimea-Iran connection until after the 
talks in Vienna had ended, indicating that his statement was intended in an audience-specific 
(and not substantive) context.234 And again on 30 December 2014, Russia publicly warned the 
US that sanctions against Russia could harm cooperation on the Iranian nuclear dossier. 
)RUHLJQ0LQLVWU\6SRNHVPDQ$OH[DQGHU/XNDVKHYLFKFRPPHQWHGDVIROORZV³7KHDFWLRQVRI
the US call into question the prospects of bilateral cooperation in resolving the issue of the 
Iranian nuclear programme, the Syrian crisis and other urgent international problems. As 
:DVKLQJWRQ KDV EHHQ DEOH WR VHH ZH QHYHU IDLO WR UHVSRQG WR VXFK XQIULHQGO\ DFWLRQV´
5XVVLDQ IRUHLJQ PLQLVWU\  3UHVLGHQW 3XWLQ¶V 9DOGDL VSHHFK LQ 2FWREHU  ZDV
pregnant with such discursive warnings and was the strongest high-level outburst of what can 
be read as an outright counter-hegemonic positioning in the wake of the Russian-Western 
resentment in 2013-14 that takes the listener back to past times of Cold War rhetoric. The 
VSHHFK KDV EHHQ GXEEHG µ0XQLFK ,,¶ EXt arguably takes the Russian resistance-rhetoric to 
new levels.235 6SHDNLQJRIWKHµXQLODWHUDOGLNWDW¶DQGµGLFWDWRUVKLSRYHUSHRSOHDQGFRXQWULHV¶
RIDµVHOI-SURFODLPHGOHDGHU¶KHVWDWHG³,WGRHVQRWPDWWHUZKRWDNHVWKHSODFHRIWKHFHQWHU
of evil in AmeULFDQSURSDJDQGDWKH8665¶VROGSODFHDVWKHPDLQDGYHUVDU\,WFRXOGEH,UDQ
DVDFRXQWU\VHHNLQJWRDFTXLUHQXFOHDUWHFKQRORJ\&KLQDDVWKHZRUOG¶VELJJHVWHFRQRP\RU
5XVVLD DV D QXFOHDU VXSHUSRZHU´ 3XWLQ  $VNHG DERXW 5XVVLD¶V FRRSHUDWLRQ RQ the 
Iranian nuclear fLOH 3XWLQ YDJXHO\ VWDWHG WKDW ³external conditions might force us to re-
FRQVLGHUVRPHRIRXUSRVLWLRQV´ And in an interview in March 2015, deputy foreign minister 
Ryabkov (2015) was playing on a similar rhetoric, stating that Russia reserves itself a 
µPD[LPXPRIPDQHXYHUDELOLW\¶       
 Despite these public warnings and gloomy rhetoric on a discursive level, however, 
retaliatory moves affecting the Iranian nuclear talks did not materialise on a behavioral level 
yet. Officials and experts thus far share the assessment that Russian hints at a change of 
position in the Iranian nuclear talks remains symbolic politics, but are not followed by 
substantive policies.236 In the maelstrom of a deteriorating political climate between Russia on 
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ŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ P “zĞƐ ?ďƵƚƚŚĂƚǁĂƐŝŶDĂƌĐŚ ?ŽĨ ? ? ? ? ? ?dŚĞƐĞǁĞƌĞĞŵŽƚŝŽŶĂůƚŝŵĞƐ ? ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?
Washington, 31 October 2014.  
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 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞrview with EEAS official, Brussels, 20 March 2014.  
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accused the US of undermining global stability, provoking a new arms race, and toppling foreign governments 
and warned of NATO eastward expansion and unilateralism.  
236
 It should not come as a surprise that Russia diplomats emphasise this point. But also non-Russian officials 
ĂŶĚĞǆƉĞƌƚƐŚĂǀĞĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚƚŚŝƐĂƐƐĞƐƐŵĞŶƚ PƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƌ ?DĂƌŬ Fitzpatrick, London, 11 July 
141 
 
the one hand and the EU and the US on the other in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, the 
negotiations on the Iranian nuclear file have remained as a rare policy domain where 
constructive cooperation on a working level continues. The frosty relations at the time of 
ZULWLQJKDYHQRWµVSLOOHGRYHU¶LQWRWKH,UDQGRVVLHU4XLWHWRWKHFRQWUDU\5XVVLDLVQRWRQO\
supportive of the diplomatic track on a behavioral level, but is even pro-actively working on a 
politically mediated solution. This finding is indicative of the high importance that Moscow 
has attached to a political solution of the simmering Iranian nuclear conflict (cf. also Meier & 
Pieper 2015). The following section will suggest a number of reasons why that is so, and 
thereby weaves together the research findings of the previous sections with the two-level 
distinction between a discursive and a behavioral dimension of foreign policy that was 
worked out before.  
6. Russia between constructive mediation and status quo politics: 
Resistance to hegemony? 
 
A peculiar combination of factors lets Russia resist US policies, while on other occasions, US 
SUHVVXUH RQ ,UDQ DQG WKH XSKROGLQJ RI WHQVLRQV VXUURXQGLQJ ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH LV
VXSSRUWHG E\ 5XVVLD 7KLV VHFWLRQ GLVHQWDQJOHV WKLV VHHPLQJ YDULDWLRQ LQ 5XVVLD¶V foreign 
policy line by following the two-level model of a discursive and a behavioral dimension of 
5XVVLD¶V ,UDQ SROLF\ DV LQWURGXFHG HDUOLHU $ QXPEHU RI PDWHULDO IDFWRUV ZLOO WKHUHIRUH EH
DQDO\VHG WR FRPSOHPHQW WKH SUHFHGLQJ DQDO\VLV RI 5XVVLD¶V GLVFRXUse and role perception. 
Linking these two levels to the concepts of normative divergence and rules convergence as 
FDUYHGRXWEHIRUHDOORZVPHWRFRQFOXGHRQ WKHQH[XVEHWZHHQ5XVVLD¶VVHFXULW\FXOWXUHRQ
Iran and resistance to hegemony.         
 A first IDFWRULQ5XVVLD¶VVXSSRUWIRUSUHVVXUHRQ,UDQRQDEHKDYLRUDOOHYHOLV5XVVLD¶V
comparative advantage on the European gas and oil market. Skeptics have pointed out that 
this is the strongest counterargument for Moscow to be genuinely interested in a long-term 
solution to Iran's nuclear crisis. Should Iran's final nuclear status be settled, a partial 
normalisation of relations between Iran and the West would ensue. As a result, Russia could, 
in the mid- to long term, be faced with the emergence of a competitor on the European energy 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
2014; with Dina Esfandiary, London, 11 July 2014; with European diplomat, Berlin, 14 November 2014; with 
former E3 delegation member, Brussels, 29 January 2015; with European diplomat, Brussels, 6 February 2015; 
EEAS official, Brussels, 24 February 2015; with E3 official, London, 10 March 2015; with Dr. Mark Hibbs, Berlin, 
18 March 2015. 
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market.237 5XVVLD¶V FXUUHQWQHDU-monopoly position on the European gas and oil market, so 
the reading, would be endangered. The scenario of a sudden Iranian oil and gas competitor, 
however, falls short of accounting for more nuanced market structures: Even before the 
LPSRVLWLRQRI WKH(8¶VRLO HPEDUJRDJDLQVW ,UDQ LQ ,UDQSURYLGHGD VWDEOHRI WKH
(8¶VRLO LPSRUWV (Eurostat 2012)5XVVLD¶V VKDUH LV DURXQG5XVVLDQRIILFLDOVDUH WKXV
relaxed about the prospect of Iran becoming a rival on the European oil market any time soon 
± even after the lifting of Iran sanctions.238 A similar expectation prevails for the gas export 
PDUNHW5XVVLD¶VVKDUHRQWKH(XURSHDQJDVPDUNHWOLHVDW(YHQWKRXJK,UDQKROGVWKH
ZRUOG¶V VHFRnd largest gas reserves, it lacks the production and transportation structures. 
Russia also knows that the existing pipeline structure benefits Russian gas interests, while 
pipelines from Iran to Europe do not exist and would have to be built.239 Even alternative 
projects like the Trans-Anatolian Pipeline (TANAP) and the Trans-Adriatic Pipeline (TAP) 
would transport natural gas from Azerbaijan and thus circumvent Iran. Yet, the rapid 
deterioration in relations between Russia and the EU in the course of the Ukraine crisis has 
VSHG XS (XURSH¶V HIIRUWV WR GLYHUVLI\ LWV HQHUJ\ VRXUFHV DZD\ IURP 5XVVLD (XURSHDQ
Commission 2015; ECFR 2015). But also Russia is seeking to diversify its oil and gas 
customers and increasingly seeks to export LNG to the Asian market (Westphal 2014). While 
the prospect of Iran becoming an important energy supplier for Europe is still unclear, it 
FDQQRWEH H[FOXGHG WKDWSROLWLFDOG\QDPLFVKDYH WKHSRWHQWLDO WR VKDNH5XVVLD¶VSRVLWLRQ on 
the European energy market (cf. also Sasnal & Secrieru 2015).    
 A second factor explains why pressure on Iran is advantageous for Russia as long as 
this pressure upholds tensions without leading to escalation: Russia has commercial interests 
in Iran that could see tougher competition once tensions with Iran are eased in the wake of a 
comprehensive nuclear agreement. Russian economic activities in Iran are low, as are energy 
cooperations.240 The historically more significant weapons trade has shrunk as a consequence 
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 A Russian diplomat put it in an interview as follows:  “ ?dŚĞ )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 The idea of a gas-OPEC that would include both Russia and Iran and constitute an area of economic 
cooperation has been analysed as being rather illusionary (Adomeit 2007: 15f.). Despite its gas wealth, Iran is a 
gas consumer and lacks the production and transport structures to become a meaningful gas exporter.  
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of UN weapons embargoes. Yet, cooperation in the nuclear technology area (Bushehr) has 
been the flagship of Russian-Iranian economic cooperation, despite mutual accusations and 
frustrations as described in section 2 above. On 11 November 2014, Rosatom announced its 
intention to construct eight additional nuclear reactors in Iran. The Russian government 
knows that a military escalation of the Iran conflict would have destructive consequences on a 
Russian built-up of stronger economic relations including the deepening of nuclear 
technology cooperation, whereas the upholding of certain tensions could be rather beneficial 
in this regard. Western tensions with Iran guarantee Russia a certain market position that 
results from the absence of Western competition. A normalisDWLRQRI,UDQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH
West could change this equation. This is especially true if a nuclear agreement between Iran 
and the P5+1 were to pave the way for the lifting of sanctions that could bolster a renewed 
international investment in and trade with Iran. Russia, in this scenario, could stand to lose 
from a nuclear agreement from a purely commercial point of view. It is not always clear, 
however, whether the furtherance of nuclear technology cooperation is a purely 
commercially-GULYHQSURMHFWE\5RVDWRPRUZKHWKHU5RVDWRP¶V,Uan projects are not at least 
partially co-GHFLGHGE\5XVVLD¶VSROLWLFDOOHDGHUVKLS241     
 Another scenario is that of a resolution of the nuclear issue without a broader political 
normalisDWLRQRI,UDQ¶VUHODWLRQVZLWKWKH:HVWZKLFKFRXOGFUHDWHDQµHPSW\VSDFH¶LQ,UDQ
possibly to be filled by Russian investments.242 However, it has been pointed out that the 
Russian-,UDQLDQWUDGHYROXPHGRHVQRWDFFRXQWIRUDELJVKDUHRQHLWKHUVLGH¶VH[WHUQDOWUDGH
EDODQFH5XVVLD¶VWUDGHZLWK,VUDHODOPRVWUHDFKHV numbers comparable with Russian-Iranian 
WUDGHGHVSLWHWKHIDFWWKDW,VUDHO¶VSRSXODWLRQLVWHQWLPHVVPDOOHUWKDQ,UDQ¶V6D]KLQ
The Iranian-Turkish trade volume is seven times higher than the Russian-,UDQLDQ,UDQ¶VWUDGH
volume with China is eveQ WLPHVKLJKHU WKDQ WKHRQHZLWK5XVVLDDVVWDWHGE\7HKUDQ¶V
ambassador to Moscow (Sanaei 2013). In the context of a possible rapprochement between 
Iran and the West as made possible by a first interim nuclear agreement of 24 November 2013 
and the political framework agreement of 2 April 2015, experst even speculate that Russia is 
placing its bets and starting to enter into trade talks with Iran that would position Moscow into 
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Minatom, and since 2004 Rosatom, have had an important role in driving Russian Iran policy, as Belopolsky 
 ? ? ? ? ? )ŚŽůĚƐ P “'iven the economic rewards to be reaped in these markets, Minatom Ministers freelanced, 
developing policy towards these states [China, Iran, Iraq] which was not coordinated or necessarily in line with 
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 This point was made by Dr. Vladimir Sazhin, interview, Moscow, 17 April 2013. 
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a better position in the future event of an altered standing of Iran (Lukyanov 2014). Reports in 
2014 about a Russian-Iranian oil-for-goods barter agreement additionally fuelled the 
impression that Russia is not only thinking ahead for an after-sanctions scenario, but is 
working to undermine Western sanctions regimes on Iran, as discussed in the previous 
section.243 Asked about this Russian-Iranian barter deal, a US State Department official 
PHQWLRQV LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ ³,I WKH EDUWHU GHDO JRHV WKURXJK WKH 86 ZRXOG VDQFWLRQ 5XVVLDQ
FRPSDQLHV´DQGFRQWLQXHV³,QVXFKFDVHVZHPDNHDGemarche first. We give them a chance 




has an interest in expanding its cooperation with Iran concerning the development of its oil 
infrastructure and providing products to Iran that fill the void left behind by the absence of 
Western companies.245 Following an outright anti-,UDQSROLF\ZRXOG OHW5XVVLD µORVH ,UDQ WR
ChiQD¶HFRQRPLFDOO\<HWDV.R]KDQov (2015b) points outZKDWDLOVWKHSURVSHFWRI5XVVLD¶V
stronger economic activity in Iran is not the competition ZLWK&KLQDEXW5XVVLD¶VVWUXFWXUDO
economic and technological problems. The equipment and technology that Iran is in need of, 
in other words, Russia lacks itself. At the same time, the question whether China would 
exploit such a scenario and single-handedly do business with Iran, disregarding US and 
European positions on Iran is a hypothetical one. As will be shown in the next chapter on 
&KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQLQWKH,UDQQXFOHDUILOHWKLVLVTXHVWLRQDEOHJLYHQ&KLQD¶VSROLF\RIEDODQFLQJ
its commercial interests in Iran with a level of receptiveness to US positions. Such a policy 
DOVRLVLQOLQHZLWKWKHLPSUHVVLRQRI&KLQDµKLGLQJ¶EHKLQG5XVVLDLQWKH816HFXULW\&RXQFLO
(Parsi 2012: 48; International Crisis Group 2006: 13f.).246 The dynamic between Russia and 
China in the Security Council in this regard is an intriguing one, not least because of a joint 
adherence to a security culture that shows resistance to US pressure. A later comparative 
chapter will address this issue in more detail.       
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resistance or a policy of Islamic solidarity and mobilisation (at least a public outcry) from Iran 
%HUPDQ  7KDW ,UDQ VWD\HG TXLHW RQ 5XVVLD¶V &KHFKQ\D SROLF\247 can be seen as a 
ceUWDLQ µTXLG SUR TXR¶ RQ WKH VLGH RI WKH ,UDQLDQV IRU 5XVVLDQ HFRQRPLF DQG WHFKQRORJLFDO
DVVLVWDQFHDQGIRU5XVVLDQµSURWHFWLRQ¶RI,UDQIURPLQWHUQDWLRQDOSUHVVXUHDWOHDVWLQWKHILUVW
few years of the Iran dossier following 2002 as outlined above. If Russia had pressured Iran 
WRRPXFK LW FRXOGKDYH UXQ WKH ULVNRI ,UDQSOD\LQJ µWKH ,VODPLFFDUG¶ LQ WKH&DXFDVXV WKDW
ZRXOG FHUWDLQO\ QRW EH LQ 5XVVLD¶V LQWHUHVW RI UHJLRQDO VWDELOLW\ FI DOVR $NKLHYD  $
major caveat on sectarianism in political Islam VKRXOGVRXQGDQRWHRIFDXWLRQRQ,UDQ¶VDELOLW\
to stir up tensions in this region, however: While Iran is a Shia theocracy, Muslims in the 
Caucasus are predominantly Sunni. Like in Afghanistan, both Iran and Russia have an interest 
in staunching Sunni extremism in the region.248 The rise of fundamentalist Sunni groups like 
the so-FDOOHGµ,VODPLF6WDWH¶KDVXQGHUVFRUed this convergence even more.   
 Fifth, and arguably the most important reason from a global power and prestige 
SHUVSHFWLYH5XVVLD¶VVHOI-understanding of being an unavoidable global power player enters 
LQWRWKHFDOFXODWLRQDERXWWKHGLUHFWLRQ5XVVLD¶V,UDQSROLF\RXJKWWRWDNH,QWKHFRQWH[WRIWKH
VFKRODUO\ GHEDWHV DERXW 5XVVLD¶V GHFOLQH IROORZLQJ WKH GLVVROXWLRQ RI WKH 6RYLHW 8QLRQ (cf. 
i.a., MacFarlane 2006; Hancock 2007; Trenin 2001; 2006; Tsygankov 2007), Russia, as a 
permanent UNSC member, wants to be understood as a state among equals. Russian 
VNHSWLFLVPYRLFHGGXULQJWKHQXFOHDUWDONVLQ/DXVDQQHLQ0DUFKDQG$SULORYHUDµVQDS
baFN¶SURYLVLRQWKDWZRXOGDXWRPDWLFDOO\UH-impose sanctions on Iran if the latter was found 
in non-compliance with its agreements was indicative in this regard (Gordon & Sanger 2015): 
0RVFRZ¶VFRQFHUQVKLQWHGDWWKHGLOXWLRQRILWVYHWRSRZHUWKDWD6HFXULWy Council authority 
RYHU VDQFWLRQV PDWWHUV HQWDLOV 'UDZLQJ RQ 6DNZD¶V FRQFHSW RI µQHR-UHYLVLRQLVP¶ LW LV
XQGHUVWRRGKHUHWKDW5XVVLD¶VZRrking with international organisations of the UN system does 
not constitute an appeal by Moscow to fundamentally challenge the system of international 
JRYHUQDQFH EXW WR SDUWLDOO\ UHYLVH LWV IXQFWLRQLQJ 6DNZD  ³5XVVLD FRQVLGHUV LWVHOI D
µJUHDW SRZHU¶ DQG DQ DOWHUQDWLYH DOWKRXJK QRW QHFHVVDULO\ DGYHUVDULDO FLYLOL]DWLRQDO DQG
JHRSROLWLFDOSROHLQZRUOGSROLWLFV´6DNZDZULWHVDQGHODERUDWHV³7KHHVVHQFHRI
neo-revisionism is not the attempt to create new rules or dangle a vision of an alternative 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO RUGHU EXW WKH DWWHPSW WR HQVXUH WKH XQLYHUVDO DSSOLFDWLRQ RI H[LVWLQJ QRUPV´
(ibid.: 31). This observation ties in with the distinction made in chapter 1 EHWZHHQµUXOHVDQG
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Dorraj & Entessar (2013: 8) put it. 
248




1996: 21) and gives a preliminary answer to the question whether Russian foreign policy on 
Iran indicates a security culture that resists hegemony. While Russia supports and adheres to 
WKHµUXOHV¶DQGEDVLFIXQFWLRQLQJRIWKH81V\VWHPLWVGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKRWKHU81PHPEHUV
and US power structures reveals a different normative understanding of what is deemed 
OHJLWLPDWHLQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV3XWLQ¶V9DOGDLVSHHFKXQGHUOLQHGWKLVGLVWLQFWLRQDV
IROORZV ³:H PXVW FOHDUO\ LGHQWLI\ ZKHUH XQLODWHUDO DFWLRQV HQG DQG ZH QHHG WR DSply 
PXOWLODWHUDOPHFKDQLVPV>«@´ (Putin 2014). 7KHFRQFHSWRI µQHR-UHYLVLRQLVP¶ WKXVFDSWXUHV
the strife towards more equitable and thus non-hegemonic international relations, while 
IDOOLQJVKRUWRIRXWULJKWRSSRVLWLRQWRKHJHPRQ\³$VWKHH[LVWLQJRUGHULVYLVLEO\FUXPEOLQJ´
Dmitri Trenin (2009) wriWHV LQDFRPPHQWDU\ WR.XFKLQV¶	:HLW]¶FKDSWHU in Powers and 
Principles ³0RVFRZZDQWVWREHSUHVHQWDWWKHFUHDWLRQRILWVUHSODFHPHQW´DQG
WKHUHZLWK HFKRHV WKHLU DQDO\VLV RI µ5XVVLD¶V 3ODFH LQ DQ 8QVHWWOHG 2UGHU¶ LQ ZKLFK ³DQ
international system of global American hegemony [is] evaporating and being replaced by 
JHQXLQHPXOWLSRODULW\´(OVHZKHUHLQ3XWLQ¶V9DOGDLVSHHFKWKHURRWFDXVHRIWKH
QHZ LFH DJH EHWZHHQ 5XVVLD DQG WKH :HVW ZDV WKHUHIRUH IRUPXODWHG DV IROORZV ³7KH &ROG 
War ended, but it did not end with the signing of a peace treaty with clear and transparent 
agreements on respecting existing rules or creating new rules and standards´ HPSKDVLV
DGGHG:KLOHµQRUPV¶FDQGLIIHUVRWKHPHVVDJHDUXOHV-based arrangements between Russia 
and the West should have ensured an equitable co-existence.249 In practice, this implicitly 
VKRXOGHQWDLOD:HVWHUQUHFRJQLWLRQDQGDFNQRZOHGJPHQWRI5XVVLD¶VVWDWXVDVD*UHDW3RZHU
in a Russian understanding. Russia is thus very aware of its power to veto new sanctions in 
the UNSC. Combined with deliberations about the state of US-5XVVLDQ UHODWLRQV 5XVVLD¶V
Iran and Middle East policy can tip the scales in a process either towards greater consultation 
with the Russians or towards internatiRQDO LVRODWLRQRI5XVVLD .DW]5XVVLD¶V IRUHLJQ
policy towards the Syrian civil war is a case in point for the implications of Russian resistance 
to US-inspired power structures: While Western governments have increasingly started to 
articulate a strong opposition to the idea of Assad staying in power, Moscow has been 
adamant in its support for the Assad regime. This was illustrated not only by Russian repeated 
YHWR¶V LQ WKH816& WRJHWKHUZLWK&KLQD DJDLQVW UHVROXWLRQV WKDW FRXOGKDYH OHJLWLPDWHGD 
foreign military intervention in Syria, but also by Russian deliveries of arms and military 
equipment. In its support for Assad, Russian and Iranian regional interests are converging, 
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 Western responses to this reading usually hold that the Russian reference to mutual respect and equality in 
diplomacy often is upheld as a disguise to breach international obligations.  
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while the West and Russia had been further drifting apart (Trenin 2012) ³For Iran, it is an 
issue of regional balance of power and its own security, and for Russia it is an issue of 
upholding certain principles of international order and rejection of US pressure´ /XN\DQRY
(2014) reflects on this geopolitical convergence of interests between Russia and Iran over 
Syria.           
 Similar to the impact of the Ukraine crisis discussed in the previous section, experts as 
well as Russian officials assert that disagreements over the future of Syria and the Iranian 
nuclear dossier are two separate issues.250 ³:HDUHSURIHVVLRQDOHQRXJKWRNHHSWKHPDSDUW´
as formulated by a Russian foreign ministry official in an interview.251 Yet, even if one 
FRQVLGHUVDQµLVVXH OLQNDJH¶RI WKH ,UDQLDQQXFOHDUVWDQG-off with disagreements about Syria 
DQG DERXW 8NUDLQH DV XQKHOSIXO 5XVVLD¶V 6\ULD and Ukraine policies are indicative of a 
Russian security culture that advocates resistance to power structures that have not only 
defined and shaped the geopolitical mapping of the Middle East, but international relations at 
ODUJH ,QD:HVWHUQUHDGLQJ5XVVLD¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\LV WKXVSHUFHLYHGDW WLPHVDVUHEHOOLRXV
obstinate, and disruptive at worst.         
 ³7KHUH LV DQ DE\VVDO PLVWUXVW LQ WKH :HVW WRZDUG 5XVVLD´ D KLJK-ranking Swiss 
diplomat puts it in DQ LQWHUYLHZ DQGFRQWLQXHV WR DUJXH WKDW5XVVLD¶VSROLFLHV WRZDUG6\ULD
RQO\ DGG XS WR WKH LPSUHVVLRQ RI 5XVVLD¶V SRNHU JDPHV VXUURXQGLQJ WKH TXHVWLRQ RI
delimitation of the Caspian Sea, its monopolistic energy politics and the overall impression 
that Russia is playing games in the Iran dossier, but is not genuinely interested in a long-term 
solution to the crisis, as a status quo situation is far more beneficial for Russia.252 Understood 
DJDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRI5XVVLD¶V*UHDW3RZHUVWDWXVXQGHUVWDQGLQJKRZever, such a political 
holding game should not be misconstrued as a deliberate Cold War-type strategy to humiliate 
WKH:HVWRUDVDUHYLVLRQLVWDJHQGDE\DUHQHJDGH5XVVLD$V7UHQLQDUJXHV3XWLQ¶V
attempt to disperse war speculations over Syria by introducing the idea of a destruction of 
$VVDG¶V FKHPLFDO ZHDSRQV DUVHQDO LQ $XJXVW  ZDV PHDQW WR UHVWRUH HTXDOLW\ LQ 86-
5XVVLDQUHODWLRQVDQGUHDVVHUWWKHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDW5XVVLD¶VYRLFHFDQQRWEHRYHUORRNHGLQ
world politics. Moscow, so the Russian rationale, made international relations more 
µGHPRFUDWLF¶DJDLQFIDOVR$OOLVRQ$GRPHLW7KHXQGHUVWDQGLQJWKDWWKHIRUHLJQ
SROLF\ SULQFLSOHV RI µWHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\¶ DQG µVRYHUHLJQW\¶ VKRXOG JRYHUQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
                                                          
250
 Interview with Dr. Anton Khlopkov, Moscow, 17 April 2013; Interview with Russian foreign ministry official, 
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politics also has to be understood in this context of the idea that states should treat each other 
on equal terms. The official Russian Foreign Policy Concept breathes this ambition to 
µGHPRFUDWLVH¶ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV 5XVVLDQ IRUHLJQPLQLVWU\D µ'HPRFUDWLVDWLRQ¶RI
international relations would thus accurately characterisH 5XVVLD¶V XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI D
GHVLUDEOHVHFXULW\FXOWXUHWRJRYHUQLQWHUQDWLRQDOSROLWLFV,QWKHUHDGLQJWKDWµGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ¶
entails the deconstruction of power hierarchies, this is an endeavor explicitly questioning 
KHJHPRQ\ ,I LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV DUH µGHPRFUDWLF¶ H[LVWLQJ SRZHU DV\PPHWULHV DUH
smoothed out, eliminating hegemonic structures by definition. Such rhetoric underscores an 
advocacy for a non-hegemonic security culture.      
 From tKH UHDVRQVRXWOLQHGDERYH5XVVLD¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVH LV XSKROGLQJ WKH
principles of sovereignty and non-interference, cautious not to join the chorus of voices 
advocating a punitive stance on Iran over its controversial nuclear programme. The Russian 
)RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ &RQFHSW UHDGV ³5XVVLD ZLOO EH PDNLQJ D PHDQLQJIXO FRQWULEXWLRQ WR WKH
stabilization of the situation in the Middle East and North Africa and will consistently 
promote peace and concord among the peoples of all the Middle East and North Africa 
countries on the basis of respect for sovereignty, territorial integrity of states and non-
LQWHUIHUHQFHLQWKHLULQWHUQDODIIDLUV´LELG0RVFRZ¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVHDVVHFWLRQV
and 3 of this chapter have shown, displays a normative divergence with hegemonic policies 
and advocates for a non-hegemonic security culture on Iran.      
 Throughout the decade-old complexities of international politics surrounding the 
,UDQLDQQXFOHDUFDVH5XVVLDKDVDOWHUQDWHG LQDOLHQDWLQJERWK µWKH:HVW¶DQG ,Uan: Russia is 
not shying away from resuscitating potentially controversial deals at a later moment in time 
that had been temporarily halted due to US pressure and (unfavorable) international attention. 
The much-discussed S-300 deal is a case in point: Frozen under US pressure in 2009 by the 
Medvedev administration and suspended after the adoption of UNSCR 1929 in 2010, the 
Putin administration considered resuscitating the sale in September 2013 at a moment when 
the coming into office of Iranian president Rouhani and positive political signals for an easing 
of tensions constituted a convenient window of opportunity to do so (Kommersant 2013). The 
Missile Defense (MD) episode and Russian support for UNSCR 1929 in 2010 in exchange for 
US concessions was another example of a pragmatic behavior that analysts have described as 
µKRUVH-WUDGLQJ¶253  ± which was sure to have angered the Iranians. The impression thus 
occasionally prevailed that while Russia is purporting to propose plans in the P5+1/E3+3 
format (the Russian plan, the Lavrov plan), a plethora of Russian commercial interests, 
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Russian energy politics and its global role understanding obstruct a long-term solution to the 
Iranian nuclear crisis, as formulated, i.a., by former high-ranking European diplomats 
involved with the Iran file.254         
 A high-UDQNLQJ 6ZLVV GLSORPDW VXFFLQFWO\ IRUPXODWHV ³1RERG\ WUXVWV WKH
5XVVLDQV´255 5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGVWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUGRVVLHULVWRUQEHWZHHQWKH
SXEOLF DGYRFDF\ IRU PRUH µGHPRFUDWLF¶ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODtions and a security culture that 
understands security as security from hegemonic frameworks. On a behavioral level, the 
political dependence on the US makes Russia follow a partially accommodating course on 
other occasions. Dmitri Trenin (2014) speaks of DµFRPSDUWPHQWDOLVHGHQYLURQPHQW¶GHILQLQJ
US-Russian relations and a pragmatic approach to specific issue areas in which both 
cooperation and disagreement is possible at the same time.256    
 Conveying a normative divergence with the ideational framework of hegemony on a 
GLVFXUVLYHOHYHO5XVVLD¶VEDODQFHRQDEHKDYLRUDOOHYHOLVPRUHPL[HGGLVSOD\LQJFRPSOLDQFH
with international sanctions, while various material factors let Russia work towards a a 
VROXWLRQ WR ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUFULVLV with its Wesern counterparts. The behavioral level, in other 
words, does not coincide with the discursive level on which Russia advocates for a security 
culture resisting hegemony. Its foreign policy on Iran therefore is the outcome of a balancing 
act between hegemonic accommodation and resistance.257 
7. Conclusion 
 
Following the two-level distinction between a discursive and a behavioral dimension of 
foreign policy to examine the degree of resistance to hegemony as introduced in this 
dissertation, this chapter has analysHG 5XVVLD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
programme. In line with the theoretical framework of this dissertation as outlined in chapter 1, 
LW WKHUHE\ DQVZHUHG WKH TXHVWLRQ KRZ 5XVVLDQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
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10 March 2015.  
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compliance with its own discourse (behavioral inconsistency with a discursive level), instead of US positions 
seemingly undergoing changes. Concerning the latter, it is argued that hegemonic structures still remain in 
place insofar as changing negotiation positions do not yet account for an overhaul of hegemonic structures. 
The sanctions regime is a forceful case in point.  
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programme is indicative of a security culture resisting hegemony.    
 It has been shown how Russia conveys resistance to hegemony on a discursive level 
by emphasising the legitimate nuclear rights of Iran, the legitimacy of Russian commercial 
ties with Iran, the counterproductive effect of sanctions and the illegality of Western unilateral 
sanctions. On a behavioral level, Russia was slowing down the sanctions track when the 
Iranian nuclear file was referred to the UNSC in 2006, but eventually adopted and complied 
with international sanctions, yet was blacklisted for trade with Iran that ostensibly 
contravened sanctions regimes. At the same time, an occasional remarkable degree of 
pragmatic cooperation with the US on the Iran file has been observed ± not only at the peak of 
the Obama-0HGYHGHYµUHVHW¶SROLF\EXWDOVRLQGLSORPDWLFQegotiations in the P5+1 format.
 As carved out above in the analysis of Russian-Iranian relations, Russian foreign 
policy toward Iran and its nuclear programme thus has always to be seen in the context of 
5XVVLD¶VSROLWLFDOUHODWLRQVZLWKµWKH:HVW¶in general, and with the US in particular. Russian 
foreign policy makes a distinction between purely commercial and legitimate nuclear 
technology usage (e.g. Bushehr), and a security political dimension of the Iranian nuclear 
SURJUDPPH µ:HVWHUQ DOOHJDWLRQV RI PLOLWDU\ LQWHQWLRQV UHPDLQ XQSURYHQ¶ 7KLV ZDV
especially true since the revelation in 2002 of the hitherto covert nuclear programme of Iran. 
0RVFRZ¶VVWULIHWRSUHVHUYH*UHDW3RZHUVWDWXVDQGWREHVHHQDVDUHVSRQVLEle permanent UN 
Security Council member explains its voting for sanctions resolutions against Iran ± even 
though it publicly advocates a security culture WKDW EUHDWKHV WKH DPELWLRQ WR µGHPRFUDWLVH¶
international relations and resist US pressure.     
 Russia shows a reluctance to agree to international sanctions on Iran, yet conveys a 
desire to be perceived as a constructive player in the Iranian nuclear dossier. A number of 
5XVVLDQLQLWLDWLYHV3XWLQ¶V proposal for the multilateralisation of the nuclear fuel cycle, 
WKH  µVWHS-by-VWHS¶ SODQ WKH FUHDWLRQ RI D IXHO FRQVRUWLXP RQ 5XVVLDQ VRLO HWF DUH
indicative of this Russian willingness to make a constructive contribution. A new war in the 
Middle East, so the Russian rationale, is a bigger evil than Iran potentially acquiring nuclear 
weapons. Yet, iWLVDOVRWUXHWKDWLWFDQQRWEHLQ5XVVLD¶VLQWHUHVWWRVHHDQXFOHDU,UDQHPHUJH
on its Southern flank that would have obvious implications for the regional power balance and 
FKDOOHQJH 5XVVLD¶V QXFOHDU monopoly in the region. But while a nuclear Iran cannot be in 
5XVVLD¶V LQWHUHVW 0RVFRZ GRHV QRW VXSSRUW DQ\ UHJLPH FKDnge plans. While Russia 
emphasisHV WKH QHHG WR ILQG D GLSORPDWLF VROXWLRQ WR ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU FULVLV WKH XSKROGLQJ RI
tensions (and temporary non-resolution of the crisis) may even be beneficial for Russia for the 
reasons outlined in the last section of this chapter. Russian foreign policy here essentially 
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amounts to a hedging strategy that avoids alienating one side or the other too much by 
upholding the rhetoric propagating diplomatic engagement and political solutions, while 
implicitly contributing to the upholding of a certain political status quo situation.  
 Russia and its Western counterparts in the P5+1 framework occasionally appear to be 
standing on two opposite ends of the spectrum of political instruments when it comes to 
approaching Iran. As this chapter has shown, however, taking such disagreements as signs of 
an unalterable freezing into mutually opposed camps and portraying Russia as a cumbersome 
veto player in the UNSC, blocking and derailing Western negotiation efforts, does not do 
justice to much more complex foreign policy positions that have to bridge official discourse(s) 
with largely material, global power political and security motivations. This two-level foreign 
policy between a discursive level advocating non-hegemonic governance models, and a 
behavioral level on which Russia takes policy decisions that run counter to that ideal 
XQGHUOLQHVWKHFRPSOH[LWLHVRI5XVVLD¶V,UDQSROLF\WKDWFDQQRWVROHO\EHFDSWXUHGE\DSROLF\
RIµUHVLVWDQFHWRKHJHPRQ\¶        
 5XVVLD¶V ,UDQ SROLF\ LV DQ LOOXVWUDWLRQ RI D VWDWH¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WKDW FKDOOHQJHV
hegemonic structures, but works within the system of governance inspired by the US. It is an 




foreign policy identity, like that of any other state, is an iterative process as the outcome of the 
VWDWH¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRQWH[WLWVVHOI-understanding, and the perception thereof by other actors 
FI DOVR =LHJOHU  µ6HFXULW\¶ LV DOZD\V FRQWH[WXDO LGHDV DQG LGHQWLWLHV DOZD\V FR-
constructed by the social environment. This finding e[SODLQVWKHVHHPLQJYDULDWLRQLQ5XVVLD¶V
Iran policy, where the advocacy for a security culture that resists hegemony does not always 
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1. Introduction  
 
This chapter analysHV &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH DQG
introduces the third empirical case study in this research project. In line with the theoretical 
and conceptual framework outlined in chapter 1, tt answers the research question to what 
H[WHQW&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\LQWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUFDVHLVLQGLFDWLYHRIDVHFXULW\FXOWXUHWKDW
resists hegemony. This chapter follows a similar structure to the previous one.   
 A first section RXWOLQHV &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GLVFRXUVH DQG KRZ LW FRQIOLFWV ZLWK
Western discourses on the Iranian nuclear programme following the discovery of hitherto 
unknown Iranian nuclear facilities in 2002. It will be analysed to what extent normative 
divergence can be discerned. The second section analyzes Chinese conceptions of the use of 
international sanctions on Iran and analyzes to what extent Chinese foreign policy in the 
sanctions issue is torn between normative divergence and rule compliance, followed by a third 
VHFWLRQWXUQLQJWRZDUGV&KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQRQXQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQV7KHVHWZRVHFWLRQVFDUYHRXW
WKHLPSRUWDQWGLVWLQFWLRQEHWZHHQµQRUPVDQGYDOXHV¶DQGµUXOHVDQGPRGHOV¶LQXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
DQ DSSDUHQW DPELYDOHQFH EHWZHHQ &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ RQ VDnctions because of clashing 
ideational and institutional framework conditions. Following the two-level model between a 
discursive and a behavioral dimension of foreign policy introduced earlier, a fourth section 
identifies conditions that explain Chinese positions on the Iranian nuclear file that differ from 
µWKH:HVW¶EHFDXVHRIXQGHUO\LQJPDWHULDOPRWLYDWLRQV$ILQDOVHFWLRQZHDYHVWRJHWKHUWKHVH
different elements of ideational, institutional and material constraints in explaining Chinese 
Iran policy. Making sense of an observed variation in norm compliance brings together the 
concepts of norm divergence and rule convergence and allows me to answer the question how 
&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHLV LOOXVWUDWLYHRIDVHFXULW\FXOWure 
that resists hegemony.  
2. Chinese foreign policy towards the Iranian nuclear programme: 
Discursive resistance to US securitisations  
 
At a time when all eyes of the international and certainly Chinese security and non-
proliferation community were on the North Korean nuclear case in 2002, the revelation by an 
Iranian exile opposition group of the existence of a clandestine Iranian nuclear programme hit 
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WKHQHZV ,$($:KLOH WKH(8DQG86 UHDFWLRQZDVDKDUVKFRQGHPQDWLRQ&KLQD¶V
reaction was more reserved: China underlined the Iranian obligation to prove the exclusively 
peaceful character of its nuclear programme, but refrained from departing from assumptions 
over Iranian intentions that could not be proven. In its official diplomacy, China was thus 
repeatedly emphasisLQJ,UDQ¶VOHJLWLPDWHULJKWWRSHDFHIXOQXFOHDUHQHUJ\XQGHU$UWLFOH,9RI
the NPT and was critical of Western rhetoric and pressure on Tehran because of non-proven 
proliferation concerns (Dorraj & Currier 2008; Garver 2011: 81f.; International Crisis Group 
2010; Mazza 2011; Nourafchan 2010: 39; Swaine 2010: 6f.; Yuan 2006; Pieper 2013b).258
 The upholding of the principle of non-intervention and sovereignty is a recurring key 
Chinese foreign policy conception that influences the formulation of Chinese foreign policy 
and diplomacy since the 1950s. Much of ChiQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\FRQFHSWXDOLVation dates back 
to the Maoist doctrine of the Five Principles of Peaceful Co-existence articulated at the 1955 
Bandung conference.259 These principles are: 0XWXDO UHVSHFW IRU µWHUULWRULDO LQWHJULW\ DQG
sovereignty, mutual non-aggression, mutual non-interference in domestic affairs, equality and 
mutual benefit, and peaceful co-H[LVWHQFH¶/DQWHLJQH:KLOH it is not difficult 
to recognise the Westphalian perception of the centrality of state sovereignty in international 
relations in these principles, Chinese foreign policy thinking is complemented by the more 
anti-KHJHPRQLFWRQHRIWKHµIRXUQR¶V¶QDPHO\³QRKHJHPRQ\QRSRZHUSROLWLFVQRPLOLWDUy 
DOOLDQFHV DQG QR DUPV UDFLQJ´ LELG -RKQ *DUYHU D WKHUHIRUH FDOOV &KLQD¶V )LYH
3ULQFLSOHV RI 3HDFHIXO &RH[LVWHQFH DQ ³LPSOLFLWO\ DQWLKHJHPRQLVW FRGH RI EHKDYLRU´ 
Tellingly, then-SUHVLGHQW+X-LQWDRFDOOHGIRUD³FRPPRQHQGHDYRUWRSURPRWH democracy in 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV´ DW WKH &&3¶V th National Congress in 2007 (Hu 2007: 59). 
Reminiscent of the Russian plea for more democratic international relations formulated in the 
5XVVLDQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\&RQFHSWVHHSUHYLRXVFKDSWHU&KLQD¶VXnderstanding of democracy 
between states can therefore be translated as a refusal of hegemonic politics.260 This 
understanding aims at the leveling of power asymmetries in international relations. If 
internaWLRQDOUHODWLRQVDUH³GHPRFUDWLVHG´VWDWHVEHFRPHequals, just like voters nominally are 
LQ GHPRFUDWLF SROLWLFDO V\VWHPV RQ WKH GRPHVWLF OHYHO 7KH DGYRFDF\ IRU ³GHPRFUDWLF´
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 These talking points were also given in an interview with a former Chinese diplomat to Iran, Beijing, 22 April 
2014. 
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was perceived by the Chinese leadership under chairman Mao Zedong as the expression of an anti-imperialist 
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attached to ties with the developing world, especially at a time when Chinese-Soviet relations increasingly 
faltered in the wake of the Mao-Krushchev rift (Lanteigne 2009: 133).  
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international relations, in other words, checks hegemonic ambitions because it contests power 
hierarchies.          
 Ultimately, an additional discursive undercurrent in Chinese-Iranian relations in the 
1980s DQGVZDVWKDWRIDµFLYLOLVDWLRQDO¶OHYHORI7KLUG:RUOGVROLGDULW\DQGRSSRVLWLRQ
to US hegemony (Garver 2006a: 3-28; Burman 2009: 26-27, 159f.).261 Statements would 
commonly refer to the fact that both countries had to cede territory and partially lost 
sovereignty and suffered national humiliations at the hands of Western imperialism. As will 
EH VHHQ IXUWKHU EHORZ &KLQD¶V IOLUWDWLRQ ZLWK VXFK DQ RYHUWO\ DQWL-hegemonic rhetoric was 
toned down in the later part of the 1990s. The reasons were many. But as a consequence, 
&KLQD¶VELWLQJVZLSHVDW86µDUURJDQFH¶DQGµLPSHULDOLVP¶EHFDPHIHZHU LWV IRUHLJQSROLF\
discourse more cautious.262          
 7KHJXLGLQJSULQFLSOHVRIµWHUULWRULDOLQWHJULW\¶DQGWKHPXWXDOUHVSHFWIRUVRYHUHLJQW\
however, continued to serve as a discursive framework for Chinese foreign policy, recur as 
RIILFLDO WDONLQJ SRLQWV DQG WKHUHIRUH DOVR UHSHDWHGO\ UHVRQDWHG LQ &KLQD¶V DSSURDFK WR WKH
Iranian nuclear crisis. In its positioning on the Iranian nuclear issue, China thus has always 
insisted on a political dialogue (as opposed to sanctions) as the only way forward to solve the 
nuclear crisis (Calabrese 2006: 10; Garver 2011: 81f.; Mazza 2011; Nourafchan 2010: 39; 
Swaine 2010: 6f.; Yuan 2006). In a rare statement conveying the urgency of the subject matter 
and the importance of political negotiations, the Chinese delegation to the P5+1 warned of 
³ZDVWHGWLPH´VKRXOGWKHWDONVRQDSROLWLFDOIUDPHZRUNDJUHHPHQWLQ$SULOIDLO³,IWKH
QHJRWLDWLRQV DUH VWXFN DOO SUHYLRXV HIIRUWV ZLOO EH ZDVWHG´ the statement went (Reuters 
2015a).            
 China was also critical of what was perceived in Beijing as double standards in nuclear 
diplomacy, with Iran being harshly criticised for its lack of transparency, while the West 
remained silent on nuclear activities of non-NPT members such as Israel, Pakistan and 
India.263 This testified to what China criticisHGDV µQXFOHDU IDYRXULWLVP¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULVLV
Group 2010: 4). On passing UNSCR 1887 in 2009 on nuclear non-proliferation and nuclear 
GLVDUPDPHQW &KLQHVH SUHVLGHQW +X -LQWDR¶V UHPDUNV LQ WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO GLG QRW RQFH
PDNH UHIHUHQFH WR ,UDQ EXW LQVWHDG ZDUQHG DJDLQVW µGRXEOH VWDQGDUGV¶ DQG VSRNH RI WKH
strengthening of the non-proliferation regime at large (UN 2009: 11-12). Tong Zhao (2015) 
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makes the argument in this context that the Chinese interest in strengthening the nuclear non-
proliferation regime is also conditioned by its security interests in Southeast Asia: Any final 
agreement with Iran could serve as a model to be applied to other non-nuclear weapon states 
under the NPT. The virtual nuclear capability of Japan, Zhao thus holds, is a concern that 
IDFWRUV LQWR &KLQD¶V RYHUDOO LQWHUHVW LQ VHHLQJ WKH ,UDQLan nuclear conflict resolved with a 
robust IAEA verification regime. The nuclear programme of Vietnam and the possibility of a 
Philippine one were also cited in this line of argumentation.    
 It is also worth pointing out that Chinese interviewees in this research project 
mentioned the idea of a nuclear weapons-free zone (NWFZ) in the Middle East when 
discussing the Iranian nuclear issue.264 Such a zone, however, would be meaningless without 
the inclusion of Israel. Reference to the NWFZ project can therefore be read as an expression 
of dissatisfaction with selective nuclear non-SUROLIHUDWLRQSROLFLHVLQWKH0LGGOH(DVW&KLQD¶V
argumentation here echoes that of Iran (Wunderlich et al. 2013: 270). A further Chinese 
criticism was targeted at the heavy bias towards non-proliferation efforts on the part of the 
Western nuclear powers, while the unwillingness to effectively engage in nuclear 
disarmament was uncovered as hypocrisy and a lack of credibility (International Crisis Group 
2010: 4).265 With this discourse, &KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQUHVHPEOHVWKRVHRIWKH1$0PRUHWKDQDQ\
other nuclear-weapon state (NWS).266 )H\HWDOFDOOWKLVDSRVLWLRQRI³VROLGDULW\with, 
and a distanced and privileged position toward, the NA0>«@´   
 This foreign policy discourse had to be understood not only against the background of 
&KLQD¶V SXEOLFO\ IRUPXODWHG QRUPV DQG YDOXHV EXW DOVR DJDLQVW WKH EDFNJURXQG RI &KLQD¶V
µFRPSOLFLW\¶LQWKHVHW-up of controversial Iranian nuclear facilities. China passed on sensitive 
nuclear technology supplies to Pakistan and Iran in the 1980s and 1990s that were at odds 
with the efforts of the West at the time to consolidate the nuclear non-proliferation regime. 
Beijing provided a nuclear reactor for the Isfahan Nuclear Technology Centre; signed a 
memorandum whereby China committed itself to train Iranian scientists and engineers; shared 
knowledge for the design of nuclear facilities needed for uranium conversion and directly 
contributed to the building of a uranium conversion facility in Isfahan and in heavy water 
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 Ibid.; Interview with Li Xin, China Institute of contemporary international relations, Beijing, 24 April 2014. Cf. 
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production plants (Djallil 2011: 236; Garver 2006a: 139-165; Patrikarakos 2012: 122, 135-
37). The main controversy concerning Chinese contributions related to Iranian nuclear 
technology was the sale of natural uranium in 1991 - a sale that the IAEA did not know of and 
that was uncovered only in 2003 at the Jabr Ibn Hayan Multipurpose Laboratories at the 
Tehran Nuclear Research Center and that would later resurface in the charges against Iranian 
violations of its Comprehensive Safeguards Agreement (ElBaradei 2012: 117; Patrikarakos 
2012: 157; Mousavian 2012: 54).267        
 In the latter half of the 1990s, China abandoned its close cooperation with Iran in the 
nuclear realm and complied more strictly with international non-proliferation regimes. The 
RXWVLGHSHUFHSWLRQRI&KLQHVHDVVLVWDQFHWRDQ,UDQLDQQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHPLJKWVSRLO&KLQD¶V
LQWHQWLRQWREHVHHQDVDµUHVSRQVLEOH*OREDO3RZHU¶$PHULFDQLQWHUORFXWRUVH[SODLQHGWKHLU
Chinese counterparts (Garver 2006a: 201-236). During the 1990s, China therefore signed up 
to the relevant treaties and agreements concerning nuclear non-proliferation. Beijing signed 
the NPT in 1993 and the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty in 1996. China also joined 
the Zangger Committee and the Nuclear Suppliers Group in 1992 and was supportive of the 
fissile material reduction treaty (Nourafchan 2011: 42; CTBT 2013).268 With these framework 
SROLF\ VKLIWV GLVFRXUVH DQG EHKDYLRU IROORZHG VXLW ³>«@ ZKHQ &KLQD MRLQHG WKH 1XFOHDU
6XSSOLHUV *URXS LQ ´ IRUPHU ,UDnian nuclear spokesperson Hossein Mousavian (2012) 
UHFDOOV³LWFHDVHGQXFOHDUFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK,UDQXQGHU$PHULFDQSUHVVXUH´$QGLQ
China published a remarkable White Paper on Non-Proliferation Policy in which China 
FRPPLWWHG LWVHOI WR ³FRQWLQue to take an active part in international non-proliferation 
endeavours, and exert great efforts to maintain and strengthen the existing non-proliferation 
LQWHUQDWLRQDO ODZ V\VWHP ZLWKLQ WKH 81 IUDPHZRUN´269 Working through the international 
non-proliferation regLPHV LQSODFHVWUHQJWKHQV&KLQD¶s standing in international negotiations 
on Iran as well. Rather than simply resisting US Iran policies, it provides Beijing with a legal 
footing in its positioning on the Iran file. This helps both keep extralegal policy options of 
other actors in check and strengthens multilateral non-SUROLIHUDWLRQ HIIRUWV ³>«@ PDWHULDO
FRQVLGHUDWLRQV DORQH GR QRW MXVWLI\ WKH GHFLVLRQ WR MRLQ WKHVH UHJLPHV´ /L ;LDRMXQ 
underlines, and suggests that socialisLQJ HIIHFWV KDG UHSODFHG ³LQVWUXPHQWDO FDOFXODWLRQV´
(349). By choosing to sign on to these treaties and agreements, China was thus formally set on 
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a path that allowed a compatibility of interests with the West regarding Iran ± regional 
stability, non-proliferation, and compliance with global institutions like the IAEA.  
 Yet, in all its dealings with Iran in the nuclear infrastructure domain, China had never 
attached the same sense of urgency and concern to Iranian nuclear ambitions as Western 
JRYHUQPHQWVKDG%HLMLQJ¶VUHVHUYHGUHDFWLRQWRWKHGLVFRYHU\RIKLWKHUWRXQGHFODUHG,UDQLDQ
nuclear facilities in 2002 mirrored this divergence between China and the West. China 
resisted the emerging securitisation of the Iranian nuclear case and warned against the danger 
of the political nature of certain allegations.       
 &KLQD¶VRIILFLDOµ)LYH3ULQFLSOHVIRUD&RPSUHKHQVLYH6ROXWLRQRIWKH,UDQLDQ1XFOHDU
,VVXH¶RXWOLQLQJ&KLQD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJRIWKHQHFHVVDU\DSSURDFKWRDVXFFHVVIul closure of 
the Iranian nuclear file and set forth by Deputy foreign minister Li Baodong in 2013, arguably 
KDUNEDFNWRWKHWRQHDQGVSLULWRIWKHµ)LYH3ULQFLSOHVRI3HDFHIXO&R-H[LVWHQFH¶ referred to 
above: Reiterating the importance of dialogue, respect for Iranian legitimate rights, 
UHFLSURFLW\ JRRG ZLOO DQG D KROLVWLF DSSURDFK WR VHFXULW\ &KLQD¶V JRYHUQPHQW LPSOLFLWO\
rejects punitive and intrusive policies and explicitly calls for a gradual lifting of all unilateral 
and multilateral sanctions imposed on Iran (Chinese foreign ministry 2014; Hua 2014a). This 
LV DGLSORPDWLF ODQJXDJH WKDW WDNHVXS WKH µ)LYH3ULQFLSOHV¶ and applies them to the Iranian 
nuclear talks. In calling on other players with stakes in the Iranian nuclear file to act with 
restraint and on the basis of mutual respect, China resisted voices calling for a punitive 
approach to address the Iranian nuclear challenge. China discursively advocated for a security 
culture that resists hegemonic politics. Like Russia, as analyzed in the previous chapter, China 
displayed resistance to hegemony on a discursive level by publicly challenging an emerging 
process of securitisation after 2002.         
 2QWKHEDVLVRIWKLVREVHUYDWLRQWKHQH[WVHFWLRQVKHGVOLJKWRQ&KLQD¶VXQGHUVWDQGLQJ
of sanctiRQVDVDSROLWLFDOLQVWUXPHQWLQGHDOLQJZLWK,UDQDQGZKDWWKLVUHYHDOVDERXW&KLQD¶V
XQGHUVWDQGLQJRIERWK µUXOHV DQGPRGHOV¶ DQG µQRUPVDQGYDOXHV¶ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV
The imposition of sanctions on Iran clearly contravenes a security culture that China 
GLVFXUVLYHO\ IDYRUHG DV DQDO\VHG LQ WKLV VHFWLRQ $QDO\VLQJ &KLQD¶V SRVLWLRQLQJ LQ WKH
sanctions debate is therefore a revealing step in approaching a comprehensive picture of 
&KLQD¶V,UDQSROLFLHVRQDGLVFXUVLYHDQGDEHKDYLRUDOOHYHO    
 A fourth and fifth section complement the analysis with an examination of a seeming 
GLVFUHSDQF\EHWZHHQ WKHEHKDYLRUDO DQG WKHGLVFXUVLYHGLPHQVLRQRI&KLQD¶V IRUHLJQSROLF\
towards Iran and the reasons therefor. Showing how these relate to the ideational, institutional 
158 
 
DQG PDWHULDO IUDPHZRUN FRQGLWLRQV RI KHJHPRQ\ WKH FKDSWHU WKHQ FRQFOXGHV KRZ &KLQD¶V
foreign policy in the Iranian nuclear dossier resists hegemony.  
3. ǯ 
3.1 ǯ     ǣ n normative divergence 
and behavioral convergence 
 
The intrusive effect of sanctions fundamentally goes against the spirit of the Five Principles of 
Peaceful Co-existence as outlined above. Based on an understanding as outlined in the 
previous section that hegemonic power politics are seen as interfering in the internal affairs of 
other sovereign countries, China regards sanctions as a concrete expression of such an 
intrusive approach breaching the principle of non-interference.    
 US and E3 sanctions resolution initiatives on Iran therefore were continually delayed 
E\&KLQDDQGWKHFRQWHQWRIWKHUHVROXWLRQVVLJQLILFDQWO\µGLOXWHG¶E\&KLQHVHDPHQGPHQWVLQ
ZKDWKDVEHHQGHVFULEHGDVDµGHOD\-and-ZHDNHQVWUDWHJ\¶,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULVLV*URXS
12; cf. also Mousavian 2012: 236). In braking the imposition of sanctions and watering down 
their content, the Chinese government was thus not only resisting US policies, but actively 
working against them. Instead of assuming straightforward resistance to US hegemony as the 
prime foreign policy motivation, however, the eventual adoption of sanctions in the UN 
6HFXULW\&RXQFLOEHVSHDNVD&KLQHVHGHVLUH WRPDLQWDLQ WKH µSHDFHIXO ULVH¶DQG µUHVSRQVLEOH
VWDNHKROGHU¶ LPDJHU\ ZKHUHE\ WKH &KLQHVH JRYHUQPHQW HVVHQWLDOO\ VXFcumbed to pressure 
from the US rather than resisting it. In addition, the security policy argument that nuclear 
powers are reluctant to see new nuclear powers enter their exclusive club helps understand 
why international sanctions were, at a minimum, slowing down Iranian progress on its nuclear 
fuel-cycle activities. The aggressive Iranian rhetoric of the Ahmadinejad administration 
certainly was not conducive to furthering Iranian interests in seeing weaker, rather than 
stronger, international sanctions adopted. It is thus instructive to see Chinese dilution attempts 
of sanctions resolutions as an effort to water them down without emptying them.  
 In pursuing this strategy in sanctions negotiations, however, cooperation with Russia 
was crucial, as China sees µLVRODWLRQ LQ WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO DV VRPHWKLQJ WR EH VWULFWO\
DYRLGHG¶ ,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULVLV*URXSFIDOVR:XWKQRZ270 Before P5+1 
meetings, the Russian and Chinese negotiation teams convened to agree on joint approaches 
concerning the proposal of amendments of sanctions resolution texts (as did the E3+1, i.e. the 
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EU3+the US, dialogue partners).271 In practice, Chinese-Russian joint efforts consistently 
PDQDJHG WR ZDWHU GRZQ WKH LQLWLDO UHVROXWLRQ¶V SURYLVLRQV ZLWK &KLQD SURSRVLQJ ZKDW Zas 
FDOOHG µDPHQGPHQWV¶ ZKLFK LQ SUDFWLFH ZHUH GHOHWLRQV RI FRPSOHWH SDVVDJHV WR FHUWDLQ
SDUDJUDSKV ZKLOH 5XVVLD ZDV SURSRVLQJ µDPHQGPHQWV¶ UHDG GHOHWLRQV WR WKH RWKHU
remaining paragraphs.272 In a context where the momentum for sanctions increasingly gained 
WUDFWLRQLQDIWHUWKHUHIHUUDORI,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUFDVHWRWKH816&&KLQDDOVRVXSSRUWHGWKH
Russian plan in 2006 to transfer uranium enrichment to Russian soil (Mousavian 2012: 235). 
The realisation of this plan would have defused tensions and disrupted the momentum for 
sanctions in the Security Council. The lack of Chinese high-level participation in P5+1 
PHHWLQJV LQ 1HZ <RUN DW WKH WLPH ZDV DQRWKHU FOHDU SROLWLFDO VLJQDO FRQYH\LQJ &KLQD¶V
unhappiness with sanctions (Mousavian 2012: 365). Iran, for its part, knew how to play on 
differences in policy priorities within the P5+1 format. In late 2009, for example, when the 
idea of a fuel-swap plan was declared dead politically by other influential actors, China kept 
arguing its case. Fitzpatrick (201 ZULWHV ³,UDQ IHG &KLQD¶V SRVLWLRQ E\ HQJDJLQJ YDULRXV
LQWHUORFXWRUVDVSRWHQWLDOLQWHUPHGLDULHV1HHGLQJ%HLMLQJ¶VVXSSRUWRUDWOHDVWDFTXLHVFHQFH
for a new UN sanctions resolution, Washington kept the door officially open for as long as it 
FRXOG´77).             
 Yet, having worked against their imposition in the UNSC, China eventually approved 
of sanctions on Iran. Interviewees, both from government-consulting institutes as well as 
former officials, confirm that this was due to a realisation that Iran did not cooperate 
transparently enough with the IAEA, as well as a willingness to demonstrate a cooperative 
spirit to the Americans.273 It is the effect of Sino-$PHULFDQUHODWLRQVRQ&KLQD¶V ,UDQSROLF\
WKDWODUJHO\H[SODLQV&KLQD¶VYRWLQJIRU81VDQFWions resolutions. Even though Iran sanctions 
entail negative effects on Sino-Iranian commercial relations (a subject of section 5) and run 
FRXQWHUWR&KLQD¶VSULQFLSOHGRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHLQWUXVLYHHIIHFWRIVDQFWLRQV&KLQDHYHQWXDOO\
supported them. In thLV FRQWH[W -RKQ*DUYHU ZULWHVRI D µ'XDO*DPH¶ WKDW&KLQD LV
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 German foreign ministry official, conversation with author, 4 February 2013.  
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 Ibid. A comprehensive analysis of a joint Chinese-Russian negotiation behavior is beyond the scope of this 
chapter. Suffice to recall at this point that inferring from such pre-negotiations the existence of a united 
Chinese-ZƵƐƐŝĂŶ ‘ďůŽĐ ?ĐŽŶĨƌŽŶƚŝŶŐƚŚĞtĞƐƚǁŽƵůĚďĞĂŶĂŶĂůǇƚŝĐĂůĨĂůůĂĐǇ ?dŚĞƉƌĞǀŝŽƵƐĐŚĂƉƚĞƌŚĂƐĂŶĂůǇƐĞĚ
ZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶƐŽŶ/ƌĂŶŝŶƚŚĞ^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůĂƐǁĞůůĂƐZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐƌĞƐƉĞĐƚŝǀĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐŝĞƐƚŚĂƚĂre distinct 
ĨƌŽŵŚŝŶĂ ?Ɛ ?dŚĞŶĞǆƚĐŚĂƉƚĞƌǁŝůůĚƌĂǁŽŶƚŚĞĐŽŶĐůƵƐŝŽŶƐƌĞĂĐŚĞĚŝŶƚŚĞƚǁŽĐŚĂƉƚĞƌƐŽŶZƵƐƐŝĂŶĂŶĚ
Chinese Iran policies in synthesising the research findings from a comparative perspective. The following 
chapter will therefore also elaborate on the positional dynamics between China and Russia in the UN Security 
Council. Section 5 of this chapter will already introduce this aspect.  
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 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƌ ?:ŝŶ>ŝĂŶǆŝĂŶŐ ?ƐĞŶŝŽƌƌĞƐĞĂƌĐŚĨĞůůŽǁĂƚƚŚĞ^ŚĂŶŐŚĂŝ/ŶƐƚŝƚƵƚĞĨŽƌ/ŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂl 
^ƚƵĚŝĞƐ ?^ŚĂŶŐŚĂŝ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů ? ? ? ? ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƌ ?^Ƶ,ĂŽ ?ŚŝŶĂ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ĞŝũŝŶŐ ? ?
May 2014; Interview with former Chinese diplomat to Iran, Beijing, 22 April 2014. 
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playing in Iran. In other words, China displayed a behavioral convergence with policies 
Beijing was criticising from a normative point of view. There is a clear distinction between 
WKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHP¶ZKLFKGRHVQRWDOZD\VVHUYH86LQWHUHVWVDQG86GRPLQDQFHLQLW
This is important to underline as it nuances a relatively straightforward attempt to check US 
hegemony. A number of arguments, as highlighted above, add up to China`s foreign policy 
motivations to cooperate with the US once sanctions efforts were picking up momentum. And 
while the imposition of international sanctions on Iran was pushed and lobbied for by the US 
government, China could have stopped such efforts with its veto right. Knowing that the 
actual use of this veto right would have reputational political consequences, however, China 
KDVWKXVWUDGLWLRQDOO\IDYRUHG³WKHSUDFWLFHRIDEVWHQWLRQDQGDFTXLHVFHQFH´:XWKQRZ
63). Eventual support for UNSC sanctions oQ,UDQWKHUHIRUHLVLQ.DW]HQVWHLQ¶VWHUPLQRORJ\
FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK µUXOHV DQG PRGHOV¶ RI WKH 81 V\VWHP ZKLOH &KLQD¶V SXEOLF VWDWHPHQWV
LQGLFDWHGLVDJUHHPHQWZLWKWKHµQRUPVDQGYDOXHV¶XQGHUOying these sanctions policies.  
 But was China complying with the Iran sanctions regimes that the Chinese 
JRYHUQPHQW LWVHOI KDG YRWHG IRU" 5HVROXWLRQ   ³FDOOV XSRQ VWDWHV WR take 
appropriate measures´>81HPSKDVLVDGGHG@WRUHVWULFW,UDQLDQILQDQFLDOFDSDFLWLHVDQG
³GHFLGHV WKDW DOO 6WDWHV VKDOO >«@ exercise vigilance when doing business with entities 
LQFRUSRUDWHG LQ ,UDQ RU VXEMHFW WR ,UDQ¶V MXULVGLFWLRQ LQFOXGLQJ WKRVH RI WKH ,5*& DQG
,5,6/´274 (ibid., emphasis added). Such a vague wording, coupled with the absence of UN 
enforcement mechanisms, would still allow China to continue commercial interactions that 
are seen as violating sanctions provisions by other parties. Charges by the US Treasury 
'HSDUWPHQW SHUWDLQLQJ WR &KLQD¶V FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK 816&5  IRU H[DPSOH ZHUH WKDW
IRISL used front companies and transferred ownership to companies in Hong Kong in order 
to conceal its identity (US Treasury Department 2011). The US administration also hinted at 
&KLQD¶V FRQWLQXHG EXVLQHVV ZLWK ,UDQLDQ ILQDQFLDO LQVWLWXWLRQV DQG ZDUQHG &KLQD¶V ELJJHVW
banks not WR DFFHSW WUDQVIHUV IURP ,5,6/¶V LQVXUHU 0RDOOHP 5XEHQIHOG  5HSOLHV E\
Chinese authorities made reference to insufficient intelligence capabilities and the difficulty in 
identifying front companies and deceptive practices from legitimate operators (Broadhead 
2011).275 Asked about the charges that IRISL still lay anchor in Hong Kong, a Chinese 
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 UNSCR 1929 significantly expanded sanctions on the Iranian financial sector, prohibiting the establishment 
of Iranian banks abroad and froze foreign account assets of Iranian entities. It also for the first time directly 
identified the Iranian Revolutionary Guards Corps (IRGC) as a target of sanctions and imposed sanctions on the 
Iranian transport sector (Iran Air Cargo and the Islamic Republic of Iran Shipping Lines  W IRISL).  
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 hŶĚĞƌŝŶƚĞƌŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůůĂǁ ?ŝŶĂĚĚŝƚŝŽŶ ?ŝƚŝƐŚĂƌĚůǇƉŽƐƐŝďůĞƚŽƉƌĞǀĞŶƚ ‘ĨůĂŐŚŽƉƉŝŶŐ ?ďĞĐĂƵƐĞůĞŐĂů
requirements of ownership and manning of ships remain vague. The applicable 1986 Registration Convention 




relevant UN Security Council resolutions. We also have our internal laws. But sometimes 
some parties want more than what is stated in the resolution provisions. We obey the Security 
&RXQFLO UHVROXWLRQV EXW ZH GRQ¶W ZDQW WR JR PXFK EH\RQG WKDW´276 Etel Solingen (2012b) 
therefore summarisHV &KLQD¶V VWDQFH RQ 816& VDQFWLRQV DV IROORZV ³&KLQD¶V FRPSOLDQFH
with multilateral sanctions has been selective, reluctant, and intermittent, often relying on 
OLQJXLVWLFDQGEHKDYLRUDOFRQWRUWLRQVWRMXVWLI\LQFRQVLVWHQFLHV´   
 Arguably, an important factor always was the political momentum at the time of 
adoption of sanctions resolutions. Even though China has been calling for patience with Iran, 
political framework conditions made Beijing approve of sanctions when diplomatic soothing 
strategies would not work anymore against the background of a major public discontent with 
Iran. When the international tension and public attention surrounding the Iranian nuclear file 
was highest, a Chinese veto would have constituted an outright rejection of Western security 
political concerns- and international isolation was something Beijing was keen to avoid. This 
was the case with resolution 1737 in 2006, when Iran had removed IAEA seals from its 
enrichment facilities in order to re-start uranium enrichment instead of suspending it as 
stipulated in the preceding resolution 1696 (IAEA 2006; UN 2006a); with resolution 1803 in 
2008 when Iran further refused to suspend heavy-water related activities (UN 2008a); and 
with resolution 1929 in 2010, which was adopted after the revelation of yet another (hitherto 
unknown) nuclear facility near Qom in autumn 2009 (UN 2010a).    
 ,Q DOO WKHVH FDVHV PRUHRYHU &KLQD JDYH ZKDW :XWKQRZ  FDOOV D µTXDOLILHG
DFFHSWDQFH¶&KLQD¶VFRQVHQWWRWKHLPSRVLWLRQRIVDQFWLRQVZDVDFFRPSDQLHGE\UHPDUNV
conveying equivocation, as becomes clear from the minutes of relevant Security Council 
PHHWLQJV VWDWHPHQWVEHIRUHRU IROORZLQJ WKHYRWH2QSDVVLQJ816&5&KLQD¶V81
UHSUHVHQWDWLYH :DQJ *XDQJ\D VWDWHG WKDW WKH VDQFWLRQV ZHUH FRQVLGHUHG µOLPLWHG DQG
reversible¶DQGFDOOHGRQµDOOSDUWLHVFRQFHUQHG¶WRµSUDFWLFHUHVWUDLQW¶81E-8). These 
WDONLQJSRLQWV UHDSSHDUHG LQ&KLQD¶V UHPDUNRQSDVVLQJ816&5 LQZKLFK:DQJDOVR
XUJHG DOO SDUWLHV LQ D VRPHZKDW DZNZDUG SKUDVHRORJ\ WR µFUHDWLYHO\ VHHN WR UHVXPe 
QHJRWLDWLRQV¶81DQGDOVRGHHPHGLWLPSRUWDQWWRSRLQWRXWWKDW816&5GLG
not alter the exemption provisions of UNSCR 1737 (ibid.: 11). Reiterating the reversibility of 
VDQFWLRQV:DQJ¶VVWDWHPHQWDIWHUYRWLQJIRU816&5DOVRFDOOHGXSRQDOOSDUWLHVWRµJLYH
full play to initiative and creativity and demonstrate determination and sincerity in resuming 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
cannot contest. Sanctioning Iranian cargo traffic therefore involves an active enforcement on the part of port 
states.  
276
 Interview with Chinese diplomat to the US, Washington, 31 October 2014.  
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QHJRWLDWLRQV¶ 81 E  3UHVLGHQW +X -LQWDR¶V UHPDUNV IROORZLQJ &KLQD¶V YRWH IRU
UNSCR 1887 in 2009, as noted in the previous section, did not refer to Iran once, and instead 
expanded on the need for a strong global non-proliferation regime in general (UN 2009: 11-
12). And in justifying its vote for the much-GLVFXVVHG 816&5  LQ  &KLQD¶V





vote for this toughest sanctions resolution on Iran ever imposed, the argXPHQW RI µ6HFXULW\
&RXQFLOXQLW\¶VWRRGRXWDV a particularly weak pretext.      
 In its Iran policies, however, China naturally has an interest in a stable Middle East. 
Diluting sanctions and eventually adopting them may not be such a contradictory policy as it 
VHHPV RQ WKH IDFH RI LW &KLQD¶V µGHOD\-and-ZHDNHQ¶ SROLF\ WDNHV RXW WKH PRVW UHVWULFWLYH
elements of sanctions provisions, while the adoption of sanctions is a political signal that 
takes the wind out of the sails of those actors that advocated military strikes on Iran. In this 
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ &KLQD¶V ZRUN WKURXJK WKH 81 LQFOXGLQJ WKH DGRSWLRQ RI VDQFWLRQV LI
necessary) is a way to influence the US. The adoption of sanctions can thus also be seen as the 
lesser evil that, at a minimum, gives breathiQJ VSDFH WR FRXQWHUDFW µKDZNLVK¶ DFWRUV $
regional destabilisation through the outbreak of an open military conflict would severely 
endanger and disrupt Chinese oil supplies and commercial interests in the Iranian market. And 
in addition, not being pro-active itself, but waiting for Western initiatives to de-escalate the 
nuclear crisis, China can conveniently follow a strategy of maintaining its market position in 
,UDQ ZKLOH EHQHILWWLQJ SROLWLFDOO\ IURP µIUHH ULGLQJ¶ RQ :HVWHUQ GLSORPDWLF HIIRUWV DV
European officials and Iran experts explained in interviews.277  
7KH IROORZLQJ VHFWLRQ ZLOO DGG WR WKH DQDO\VLV RQ &KLQD¶V SROLF\ RQ ,UDQ VDQFWLRQV E\
H[DPLQLQJ &KLQD¶V SRVLWLRQ RQ DQG UHDFWLRQ WR XQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQV EHIRUH DQ LQWHUPHGLDWH
conclusion can be reDFKHG RQ KRZ &KLQD¶V ,UDQ SROLF\ UHODWHV WR WKH LGHDWLRQDO DQG
institutional dimension of hegemony.  
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ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?>ŽŶĚŽŶ ? ? ?:ƵůǇ ? ? ? ? ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚ-ranking Swiss diplomat, Berlin, 26 August 2013; 
ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚĨŽƌŵĞƌ ?ĚĞůĞŐĂƚŝŽŶŵĞŵďĞƌ ?ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ?29 January 2015. However, Carnegie scholar 
dŽŶŐŚĂŽ ? ? ? ? ? )ǁƌŝƚĞƐƚŚĂƚ “&ŽƌŝƚƐƉĂƌƚ ?ĞŝũŝŶŐŝƐŝŶƚĞƌĞƐƚĞĚŝŶƐŚĞĚĚŝŶŐƚŚĞůĂďĞůŽĨĨƌĞĞƌŝĚĞƌĂŶĚŵŽƌĞ
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Irrespective of oft-repeated suspicions about Chinese irregular compliance with international 
sanctions, the Chinese government publicly pledges its commitment to the institutional 
structure of the UN. China has worked through the mechanisms of the UN family and 
displayed an acceptance of its legitimacy to govern international relations since Beijing took 
the permanent membership in the Security Council from Taipei in 1971 (Zhang 1998: 73-91). 
While international sanctions adopted by the United Nations are thus adopted with the support 
of China as a permanent UNSC member, the Chinese government opposes any unilateral 
sanctions. This formulation is repeated nearly verbatim across the range of interviewees ± be 
they government consultants, academics, or Chinese officials.278 Unilateral sanctions are seen 
as the extension of domestic law onto other sovereign states and thus as breaching 
international law.          
 ³:H RSSRVH WKH LPSRVLWLRQ RI XQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQV RQ ,UDQ DQG EHOLHYH WKDW XVLQJ
VDQFWLRQV WR H[HUW SUHVVXUH FDQQRW IXQGDPHQWDOO\ UHVROYH WKH ,UDQ QXFOHDU LVVXH´ &KLQHVH
Foreign Ministry spokesman Hong Lei underlined (Reuters 2013). China was calling on all 
SDUWLHV WR VKRZ ³IOH[LELOLW\ LQFUHDVH FRPPXQLFDWLRQ DQG SXVK IRU D QHZ URXQG RI WDONV DV
VRRQ DV SRVVLEOH´ LELG &KLQD¶V UKHWRULF DJDLQVW XQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQV LPSRVHG RQ ,UDQ KDV 
FRQVLVWHQWO\ FRQYH\HG &KLQD¶V ³SULQFLSOHG RSSRVLWLRQ´ *DUYHU D  DJDLQVW ZKDW LV
VHHQDVWKHH[SUHVVLRQRI³DUURJDQWKHJHPRQLVP´LELG    
 %XW&KLQD¶VQRUPDWLYHGLYHUJHQFH IURPKHJHPRQLFDSSURDFKHVRYHU WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO
nature of unilaterDOVDQFWLRQVZDVQHYHUPHUHO\DQLGHRORJLFDOFRQYLFWLRQ&KLQD¶VGLVOLNHIRU
an extraterritorialised US legislation also had to be understood in the context of Chinese 
companies having been sanctioned unilaterally by the US for interaction with Iran that were 
seen as undermining US efforts at changing Iranian behavior. Chinese companies have been 
VDQFWLRQHGE\WKH86EHFDXVHRI&KLQHVHPLVVLOHDQGWHFKQRORJ\VXSSOLHVWKDWDVVLVWHG,UDQ¶V
ballistic missile programme,279 and because of Chinese nuclear technology transfers to Iran 
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 Interview with Chinese foreign ministry official, Beijing, 18 April 2014; Interview with former Chinese 
diplomat to Iran, Beijing, 22 April 2014; Interview with Chinese diplomat to the US, Washington, 31 October 
2014; Interview with Dr. Li Xin, China Institutes of contemporary international relations, Beijing, 24 April 2014; 
/ŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚƌ ?^Ƶ,ĂŽ ?ŚŝŶĂ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?eijing, 6 May 2014. 
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 ĞƚǁĞĞŶŚŝŶĂĂŶĚƚŚĞh^ ?ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚƚŚĞDdZďĞĐĂŵĞĂĐŽŶƐƚĂŶƚŝƐƐue of contention. China 
recognised Annex I that lists which missiles and related equipment are banned (Category 1 missiles), but not 
Annex II, which lists dual-ƵƐĞ ‘ŵŝƐƐŝůĞ-ƌĞůĂƚĞĚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇĂŶĚŝƚĞŵƐ ?ǁŚŽƐĞĞǆƉŽƌƚŝƐƚŽďĞĐŽŶƚƌŽůůĞĚďǇĂŶ
export licensing system on a case-by-case basis (Garver 2006a: 212-13). The US decision in 2003 to ban Norinco 
from the US market for several years was likely the most outspoken and decisively public sanctions effort in 
this regard. Norinco, formally China North Industries Corporation, is a Chinese manufacturing company that is 
known, i.a., for its defense products.  
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that potentially assisted the setting-up of Iranian unsafeguarded facilities, as specified in the 
first section of this chapter (thus in breach of IAEA stipulations). The Iran-Libya Sanctions 
Act (ILSA) of 1996 furthermore stipulated that investments made in the Iranian energy sector 
exceeding 20 million US dollar in one year are sanctionable activities (Katzman 2006). The 
µ&RPSUHKHQVLYH,UDQ6DQFWLRQV$FFRXQWDELOLW\DQG'LYHVWPHQW$FW¶&,6$'$RIDOVR
includes the provision of refined petroleum products to Iran as breaches of that act. The 
Chinese company Zhuhai Zhenrong was sanctioned under CISADA in 2012 (US Department 
of State 2012). The Chinese Kunlun bank, together with the Iraqi Elaf Islamic Bank, was the 
first foreign bank to be sanctioned under CISADA  in July 2012 for having financed oil-
related businesses with Iranian banks that had been blacklisted before (Lohmann 2015: 5). 
 Even though the Chinese government officially states that it does not accept the 
legitimacy of these unilateral sanctions, the effect of Chinese entities being listed carries a 
significant labeling effect that China cannot ignore. Insisting on the illegality of American 
pressure and the freedom of Chinese trade relations lies on one side of the spectrum, showing 
DFRRSHUDWLYHVSLULWDQGµLQYHVWLJDWLQJ¶LVVXHVRIFRQFHUQWRWKH86RQWKHRWKHU7KLVKROGVIRU
µFRQWURYHUVLDO¶LQYHVWPHQWSURMHFWVDVZHOODVIRURLOWUDGHZKLFKKDGEHFRPHDQDUHDWKH86
had identified as a leverage with which to dry up financial lifelines to Iran. Acknowledging 
precisely this conundrum, the US has been encouraging Arab oil exporters (like Saudi Arabia) 
³WR ERRVW RLO H[SRUWV WR &KLQD LQ DQ DWWHPSW WR GHFUHDVH UHOLDQFH RQ ,UDQLDQ RLO DQG VHFXUH
DJUHHPHQWWRVDQFWLRQV´,QWernational Crisis Group 2010: 14).280 Another idea on the part of 
the State Department was to ask Saudi Arabia to sell its oil to China at a lower price 
(Kemenade 2010: 109). And in her efforts to round up support for UNSCR 1929 in 2010, 
State Secretary Clinton told Chinese State Councilor Dai Bingguo that if China supports the 
UHVROXWLRQ DQG ³UHGXFHV LWV FRPPHUFLDO WLHV WR ,UDQ ZH FRXOG KHOS LW ILQG RWKHU VRXUFHV RI
HQHUJ\´VKHZULWHVLQKHUPHPRLU&OLQWRQ281 It is important to emphasise at this 
point, however, that Chinese reductions of oil imports from Iran were not the sole result of US 
pressure. Chinese energy security concerns, it can safely be assumed, are driven by 
diversification plans in the face of supply insecurities and domestic economic pressures, just 
like that of any other country.282 Reductions of oil purchases are also driven by desires not to 
                                                          
280
 The American attempts to persuade Saudi Arabia to increase its oil deliveries to China in order to decrease 
ŚŝŶĞƐĞŽŝůĚĞƉĞŶĚĞŶĐĞŽŶ/ƌĂŶǁĂƐĂůƐŽŵĞŶƚŝŽŶĞĚďǇƌ ?^Ƶ,ĂŽ ?ŚŝŶĂ&ŽƌĞŝŐŶĨĨĂŝƌƐhŶŝǀĞƌƐŝƚǇ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ
interview, Beijing, 6 May 2014. 
281
 President Obama also reportedly had a phone conversation with then-president Hu Jintao precisely on 
ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƉŽƐŝƚŝŽŶŽŶ/ƌĂŶƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐŝŶƚŚĞƌƵŶ-up to UNSCR 1929 (Zhao 2013: 117).  
282
 dŚŝƐŚĂƐĂůƐŽďĞĞŶĐŽŶĨŝƌŵĞĚďǇĂĨŽƌŵĞƌŚŝŶĞƐĞĚŝƉůŽŵĂƚƚŽ/ƌĂŶ ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ĞŝũŝŶŐ ? ? ?Ɖƌŝů
2014. Cf. also Downs (2004: 34).  
165 
 
become overly dependent on one type of energy (oil, gas, wind, solar, hydroelectric, nuclear).
 The extent to which the Chinese government was happy to accept such US-brokered 
supply alternatives is not publicly documented. At a minimum, however, Beijing showed 
receptiveness to US demands to decrease its purchases of Iranian oil (Tsukimori & Goswami 
2013). Such a policy both serves to respond to 86SHUFHSWLRQVRI&KLQD¶V,UDQSROLFLHVDQGWR
TXDOLI\ IRU WKH86 VDQFWLRQV µZDLYHUV¶ JUDQWHG WR WKRVH FRXQWULHV WKDW µVLJQLILFDQWO\ UHGXFH¶
their import of Iranian oil as outlined in section 1245 of the US National Defense 
Authorization Act (NDAA) (Lohmann 2013: 4; US Department of State 2013). A 20 % 
UHGXFWLRQRI ,UDQLDQRLO LPSRUWV LV FRQVLGHUHGD µVLJQLILFDQW UHGXFWLRQ¶ DFFRUGLQJ WR WKLV86
sanctions legislation. Such a reduction qualifies for a waiver granted to states that would 
otherwise be sanctioned by US authorities (Lohmann 2013: 4), even though the formulation 
suggests that the granting of such waivers comes with a considerable political leeway. Supply 
GLYHUVLILFDWLRQWDONVLQWKLVVHQVHPD\DOVRVHUYHDVµSURRI¶WKDWDGHFUHDVHRIGHSHQGHQFHon 
,UDQLDQRLOLVHQYLVDJHG&KLQD¶VUHGXFWLRQRI,UDQLDQRLOLPSRUWVDQGSODQVWRGLYHUVLI\LWVRLO
suppliers can, against the background of the US sanctions legislation, be read as a direct 
response to American policy concerns and serves to show Chinese cooperation to their 
American counterparts. This is reconfirmed by former Chinese officials as well as influential 
analysts.283 China repeatedly qualified for these periodic waivers since 2012.284  
 Yet, a caveat on the interaction between the Chinese government and state-owned oil 
companies should be inserted here: While one may read a reduction of Iranian oil imports as a 
governmental decision to comply with US pressure, some experts hold that Chinese 
companies cannot but comply with international market conditions. Even if the government 
wanted to actively disregard US unilateral sanctions, Chinese companies would still suffer 
from the secondary effects of sanctions or temporarily renounce on Iranian payments due to 
financial sanctions.285 Chinese companies therefore have a market-induced incentive to 
comply with sanctions regimes, which should not be misconstrued as a governmental 
concession to the US.286 A former Chinese diplomat to Iran explained in an interview that 
Chinese companies have an interest in enlarging their market access and profits abroad, while 
WKH&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWKDVDQLQWHUHVW LQHQODUJLQJLWVµVRIWSRZHU¶DEURDG287 Yet, this can 
DOVRVHUYHDVDFRQYHQLHQWDUJXPHQWIRU&KLQD¶VJRYHUQPHQWWRµVDYHIDFH¶ERWKYLV-à-vis its 
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domestic business lobbies as well as vis-à-vis its American counterparts. To the latter, a 
reduction in Chinese-Iranian oil trade appears as a sign of governmental cooperation in 
SUHVVXULQJ,UDQZKLOHWKHJRYHUQPHQWFDQIDOOEDFNRQWKHµHIIHFWVRIPDUNHWV¶DUJXPHQWIRU
the former. Tellingly, a Chinese diplomat to the US offered a glimpse of political frankness 
ZKHQDVNHGDERXWWKHHIIHFWRIXQLODWHUDO(8DQG86VDQFWLRQVE\VD\LQJ³(YHQLIZHGRQ¶W
admit it, EU and US sanctions do work. Chinese companies should take care. Both the 
JRYHUQPHQWDQGFRPSDQLHVKDYHWRFRPSO\´288        
 $ILQDOHOHPHQWWRNHHSLQPLQGZKHQDQDO\]LQJ&KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQRQVDQFWLRQVLVWKHLU
effect on Chinese investments in Iran. Western sanctions on Iran have allowed for the 
opening-up of the Iranian market for Chinese companies: China makes use of the economic 
vacuum created by the Western self-imposed embargo situation and sells its products that are 
XQDYDLODEOH WR ,UDQ RWKHUZLVH 3DWULNDUDNRV  ZULWHV WKDW ³7HKUDQ ZDV DQG KDV EHHQ
able to anticipate and counter any loss in EU trade by shifting the balance of its economic 
UHODWLRQV HDVWZDUGV´  ,Q D VHQVH &KLQD WKHUHIRUH EHQHILWV IURP WKH HPEDUJR VLWXDWLRQ
created by Western Iran sanctions, as it enlarges the Chinese share in the Iranian market, 
despite persistent Iranian complaints about the quality of Chinese goods.289 A protracted 
VWDOHPDWH LQ WKH ,UDQLDQQXFOHDUFULVLVHYHQ³SURYLGHVDQRSSRUWXQLW\IRU&KLQD´DUJXHV'U
Liao Baizhi of the China Institute for contemporary international relations, which is affiliated 
with the Chinese ministry for public security.290 Chinese government officials, however, are 
TXLFN WRGHQ\ VXFKFODLPV DUJXLQJ WKDWPDUNHW FRPSHWLWLRQ LV µMXVW QRUPDO¶ DQG WKDW&KLQD
would not be worse off with the prospect of increased Western investments in Iran, should the 
Iranian nuclear conflict be resolved.291 This is perhaps not surprising, given that China has an 
LQWHUHVW LQ SXEOLFO\ GLVSHUVLQJ VSHFXODWLRQV DERXW &KLQD¶V LQWHUHVW LQ D VWDWXV TXR VLWXDWLRQ
FRQFHUQLQJ,UDQ¶V LVRODWLRQIURPRWKHUPDMRULQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGLQJSDUWQHUV%XWVLQFH&KLQD¶V
µHQHUJ\ KXQJHU¶ GHWHUPLQHV LWV 0LGGOH (DVWHUQ SROLFLHV PRUH WKDQ DQ\WKLQJ HOVH DV D
European Iran desk officer remarks, China would benefit from the eventual lifting of 
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sanctions because it would allow China to import a higher amount of Iranian oil (which is 
otherwise complicated due to existing embargoes).292 A former E3 delegation member argues 
LQDVLPLODUIDVKLRQVWDWLQJWKDW&KLQD¶VLQWHUHVWLQWKH,UDQLDQPDUNHWDQG&KLQD¶V interest in 
XSKROGLQJ D GRPLQDQW SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH ODWWHU LV UHODWLYH ³&KLQD KDV FRPPHUFLDO PDUNHWV
elsewhere. A political solution would be the lesser evil for China, compared to the status quo 
DQG D PLOLWDU\ HVFDODWLRQ RI WKH FRQIOLFW´293 The interest China might have in upholding a 
level of tensions to benefit from a strong position on the Iranian market, in this line of 
argumentation, is outweighed by the argument of regional stabilisation that a comprehensive 
nuclear agreement with Iran can bring about.      
 &KLQD¶V SRVLWLRQ RQ ,UDQ VDQFWLRQV UHJLPHV DV WKLV DQG WKH SUHYLRXV VHFWLRQ KDYH
shown, is dependent on the institutional nature of the sanctions adopted. Even though China is 
critical of the use of sanctions as a political instrument and advocated for diplomacy and 
political dialogue as the primary means of addressing the Iranian nuclear issue, as shown in 
the first section of this chapter, international sanctions as adopted through the UN structures 
were eventually accepted. Importantly, this was done only after China had actively worked 
against them through the UN structures and had worked on watering down the content of the 
sanctions provisions.           
 Besides such international sanctions, China displays an ideational disagreement with 
sanctions that deviate from the structures of the UN. In its rejection of the legitimacy of 
unilateral sanctions, China conveys a normative divergence from hegemony that is also partly 
explained by US sanctions against Chinese entities directly. A partial compliance with US 
unilateral sanctions, at the same time, can be seen as behavioral convergence with hegemonic 
structures. In addition, this section has outlined a number of other factors that have an 
LQIOXHQFH RQ &KLQD¶V GHFLVLRQ WR VXSSRUW VDQFWLRQV ,W has been shown how the diverse 
FKDUDFWHU RI DVSHFWV IDFWRULQJ LQWR &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ GHFLVLRQ-making cannot be 
FRQFHLYHG DV D UHODWLYHO\ VWUDLJKWIRUZDUG µUHVLVWDQFH¶ WR 86 SROLFLHV )DFWRUV LQIOXHQFLQJ
&KLQD¶V,UDQSROLF\DQGLWVXOWLPDWHDSSURYDORI international sanctions include US flexibility 
towards China (exempting China from unilateral sanctions, introducing China to alternative 
oil suppliers), the character of Iranian noncompliance with the IAEA, and international 
market (dis)incentives. The first is a political aspect and is subject to behind-the-doors 
bargaining between Chinese and American counterparts in the administration. The second is a 
security argument: China is a nuclear-weapon state and has an in-built desire not to see the 
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number of nuclear-weapon states grow. Such a development could potentially entice other 
states to follow suit and unleash a dangerous proliferation dynamic. It also endangers stability 
conditions in the Middle East and beyond. The aspect of market disincentives relates to the 
argument put forward by Chinese officials that market dynamics are out of the hands of the 
central government. Companies decide to stay in or out of Iran business faced with sanctions, 
so the argument. This serves to dispel the point often made by non-Chinese experts and 
officials that China stands to benefit from Western embargoes against Iran. The fact that 
Chinese companies operating in Iran are big state-owned ones, however, casts a certain damp 
on this line of reasoning.          
 It will be the subject of the next section to take the latter thought further and elaborate 
on the effects of Chinese-,UDQLDQHFRQRPLF UHODWLRQVRQ&KLQD¶VSRVLWLRQRQ ,UDQ VDQFWLRQV
Such an analysis presents the third side of the Coxian triangle of hegemonic structures, the 
material dimension, and will allow me to conclude in a later section on the extent to which the 
combined effect of institutional, ideational, and material dimensions of hegemony makes 
&KLQHVH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH LQGLcative of a security culture 
resisting hegemony.     
4. The material dimension of hegemony and Chinese-Iranian economic 
relations 
 
The economic partnership between China and Iran is a dimension that has substantially 
shaped Chinese-Iranian overall bilateral relations. While China is exporting capital goods, 
engineering services and arms to Iran, the latter is primarily exporting oil to China. At the 
same time, China is shipping some of its own refined oil into northern Iran, as Iran ± despite 
its oil wealth ± does not have sufficient refining capacities.294 As from 2009, China has 
EHFRPH ,UDQ¶V PRVW VLJQLILFDQW IRUHLJQ WUDGH SDUWQHU 7KH &KLQHVH-Iranian trade volume is 
extensive. It reached a record high of 45 billion US$ in 2011 and stood at 39.4 billion US$ in 
2013.            
 The importance of oil shipments in Chinese-Iranian economic relations was underlined 
E\ D QXPEHU RI PDMRU RLO GHDOV WKDW KDYH WLHG WKH WZR FRXQWULHV¶ HFRQRPLHV WRJHWKHU HYHQ
PRUHFORVHO\FHPHQWLQJQRWRQO\ ,UDQ¶VSRVLWLRQDVRQHRI&KLQD¶VELJJHVWRLO VXSSOLHUEXW
also making China a key stakeholder and one of the largest investors in the Iranian oil 
industry. In March 2004, Chinese state oil trader Zhuhai Zhenrong signed a 25-year contract 
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to import 110 million tons of LNG from Iran worth 20 billion US$ (Shen 2006: 61). Likewise, 
a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) between China and Iran was signed on 28 October 
 IROORZLQJ ZKLFK 6LQRSHF &KLQD¶V VHFRQG-largest oil company) was allowed to start 
developing the Yadavaran fields in Southern Iran and the ensuing exploration of Liquefied 
Natural Gas (LNG). The China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) was contracted to 
explore the MIS oilfields and won the tender for a LNG project in the South Pars field in 2006 
and the construction of an extracting pipeline in 2009, and the China National Offshore Oil 
Corporation (CNOOC) participates in upstream development of the North Pars gas field 
(International Crisis Group 2010: Annex B).295 China now also is active developing the 
Azadegan field in Iran (Jacques 2012: 435),296 and it was reported that China was willing to 
finance the construction of Iranian refineries (Derakhshi 2009). Besides these activities in the 
energy field, Chinese corporations have invested in non-hydrocarbon sectors: joint ventures 
have been created;297 Chinese companies have been investing in Iranian infrastructure projects 
&DODEUHVH   &KLQD¶V ODUJHVW VWHHO IDFWRU\ GHYHORSHU LV EXLOGLQJ SODQWV LQ WKH <D]G
province (ibid.), and the China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC), 
together with Chinese Norinco, was contracted for the completion of the Tehran metro system 
(ibid. 6, 9).298 This web of economic activities is crucial to bear in mind when wanting to 
XQGHUVWDQG&KLQD¶VVWDNHVLQ,UDQDQGFRQVHTXHQWO\ in the Iranian nuclear talks. Across the 
range of interviewees for this research, the extent of economic relations always resurfaced in 
explanations of Chinese Iran policies.       
 %HLMLQJ¶VLQYROYHPHQWLQWKH,UDQLDQHFRQRP\DQGHVSHFLDOO\LQWKHRLOVHctor is to be 
H[SODLQHG E\ &KLQD¶V LQWHUHVW LQ WKH VWDELOLW\ RI RLO VXSSOLHV IRU WKH &KLQHVH HFRQRP\ HYHU
VLQFH &KLQD EHFDPH D QHW RLO LPSRUWHU LQ  6HHQ LQ WKH FRQWH[W RI &KLQD¶V ULVH DV DQ
emerging global power, this need for stable oil supplies becomes a crucial determinant in 
&KLQD¶V,UDQSROLF\µUHVRXUFHGLSORPDF\¶FI/DQWHLJQHI$V&KLQD¶VµULVH¶VLQFH
'HQJ ;LDRSLQJ¶V UHIRUPV SULPDULO\ PHDQW D µULVH¶ LQ WKH HFRQRPLF VSKHUH WKH &KLQHVH
government sees the necessity for political stability in the Middle East through the lens of 
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economic supply stability.299 :KLOH&KLQD¶VPDLQRLOVXSSOLHULV6DXGL$UDELD300 Iran usually 
ranges second. Viewed through the prism of Sino-US relations, Saudi Arabia remains a less 
controversial oil supplier because of the special alliance relationship between Washington and 
Riyadh. US security guarantees to Saudi Arabia thus also translate into energy security 
guarantees for China.           
 The history of Chinese public diplomacy suggests that Beijing kept a watchful eye on 
WKH86SHUFHSWLRQRI&KLQD¶VH[WHUQDOHFRQRPLFSROLFLHV7KHLPSRUWDQFHDWWDFKHGWRWKH86¶
SHUFHSWLRQRI&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\UHPDLQHGFUXFLDOLQ&KLQHVHIRUHLJQSROLF\VLQFHWKHUH-
establishing of relations with the US under Nixon and Mao in 1972 and, at the latest, since 
'HQJ;LDRSLQJ¶VUHIRUPSHULRGDVIURP7KH86SHUFHSWLRQRI&KLQDZDVFUXFLDOIRUWKH
ODWWHU¶V DFFHSWDQFH WR D 86-dominated capitalist system. A short period of strategic 
convergence between China and the US over Iran under the Shah ended with the ouster of a 
pro-American Iranian regime in 1979. China was cautious not to let its principled normative 
divergence from US hegemony (and ensuing sympathy with Iranian anti-hegemonism) go out 
of hand and endanger Chinese reODWLRQVZLWKWKH867KHODWWHU¶VEHQHYROHQFHZDVFUXFLDOIRU
CKLQD¶VSDWKRIHFRQRPLFPRGHUQLVation ushered in under Deng Xiaoping.  
 %HLMLQJ¶V GHVLUH WR SRUWUD\ itself DV D µUHVSRQVLEOH *UHDW 3RZHU¶ fuzeren de daguo; 
Chan 1999: 146) and to convey the imDJHRI&KLQD¶V µSHDFHIXO ULVH¶ LQGLFDWHGDGLVFXUVLYH
ZLOOLQJQHVV QRW WR HQGDQJHU WKH 86¶ DFFHSWDQFH RI &KLQD DV DQ HTXDO SRZHU RQ WKH ZRUOG
VFHQH7KHFRQFHSWRIµSHDFHIXOULVH¶DVLQWURGXFHGLQD:KLWH3DSHUZDVHYHQUHSODFHG
by the more harmonious-sounding concept RI µSHDFHIXO GHYHORSPHQW¶ *ODVer & Medeiros 
&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFGHYHORSPHQWZDVFRQGLWLRQHGRQDFFRPPRGDWLRQZLWKJOREDOSRZHU
VWUXFWXUHV,I&KLQDµGHYHORSVSHDFHIXOO\¶VRWKHQDUUDWLYHLWGRHVQRWFKDOOHQJHDSUHYDLOLQJ
status quo.             
 An illustrative material factor explaining Chinese sensitivity to the US in its conduct 
of external economic relations is the US military presence in the Malacca Strait, through 
which most of Chinese oil supplies from Iran are shipped.301 The Chinese dependence on this 
maritime bottleneck explains why a Sino-US political detune is not desirable for China 
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 Interview with Dr. Jin Lianxiang, senior research fellow at the Shanghai Institute for International Studies, 
Shanghai, 16 April 2014. 
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 In 2011, around 20 % of Chinese crude oil imports came from Saudi Arabia, while imports from Iran 
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 The Malacca Strait is a maritime strait between Indonesia, Malaysia and Singapore, linking the Indian to the 
Pacific Ocean and the South China Sea. Cf. International Energy Agency (2012b). Burman (2009) further names 




already out of important logistical reasons (Goldstein 2011: 96). While it can also be argued 
WKDW&KLQDFRQYHQLHQWO\µIUHHULGHV¶RQ86SURWHFWLRQRIVHDODQHV'RZQVLWKDVWR
be acknowledged at a minimum that China is logistically dependent on American 
EHQHYROHQFH ,Q  IRUPHU SUHVLGHQW +X -LQWDR WKHUHIRUH HYHQ VSRNH RI D µ0DODFFD
GLOHPPD¶ WKDW &KLQD IDFHV LQ FDVH RI D SRWHQWLDO EORFNDJH IURP HLWKHU WHUURULVWV RU RWKHU
states) of such an essential lifeline for the Chinese economy that connects East Asia with the 
0LGGOH (DVW +LQWLQJ DW WKH SUHVHQFH RI WKH 86 LQ WKDW ZDWHUZD\ +X QRWHG WKDW ³FHUWDLQ
powers have all along encroached on and tried to control navigation through the sWUDLW´ LQ
Lanteigne 2009: 86). In an acknowledgment of such a logistical vulnerability, China has 
invested in the construction and development of the port of Gwadar in Southwest Pakistan as 
well as in the planning of overland transportation lines like the Karakoum Highway between 
Pakistan and Western China that would allow the supply of Iranian oil from Pakistan to 
mainland China through Gwadar (Markey 2014: 10).302 Such a diversification of supply lines 
aims to secure the stability of oil supplies from the Middle East via overland routes and 
testifies a Chinese awareness of its current dependence on American benevolence (cf. also 
Garver 2006a: 289-90).          
 Other economic projects that aim to link inter-regional trade relations are affected by 
the future prospect of an altered international standing of Iran in the wake of a nuclear 
agreement: Chinese projects like the so-FDOOHGµ2QH%HOW2QH5RDG¶LQLWLDWLYHFRPSULVLQJWKH
Maritime Silk Road and the Silk Road Economic Belt are conceptualised as economic 
corridors through the Eurasian continent (Godehardt 2014). With this project, Chinese 
external trade and foreign policy planning has envisioned a joint policy towards central Asia, 
the Middle East, the Black Sea region and the Caucasus. A stable Middle East becomes a 
precondition for the implementation of such a project. Given the central geographical location 
of Iran, trade complications because of existing sanctions regimes and the prospect of military 
escalation of the conflict are an obstacle to any such project planning. Here, China has a long-
term economic interest in supporting the negotiations toward a nuclear agreement that could 
facilitate Chinese trade with and transit of goods through Iran.     
 The lifting of sanctions, including of existing weapons embargoes such as that 
imposed with UNSCR 1929, may also see Chinese material interests in Iran clash with 
Russian ones. In the past, both China and Russia invested in the Iranian nuclear infrastructure 
and were main arms suppliers to Iran. Since the late 1990s, however, Russia had surpassed 
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&KLQD DV WKH PRVW LPSRUWDQW QXFOHDU VSRQVRU RI ,UDQ DV HYLGHQFHG QRW OHDVW E\ 5RVDWRP¶V
FRQVWUXFWLRQRI ,UDQ¶VRQO\QXFOHDUSRZHUSODQW DW%XVKHKU (see previous chapter). China is 
therefore unlikely to pronounce a heightened interest in re-entering the Iranian nuclear 
market. But also Chinese attempts to restart arms deals with Iran will likely face Russian 
competition. Immediately after the conclusion of the nuclear talks in Lausanne, Russian 
foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov nurtured these speculations when he demanded that a final 
agreement must include the lifting of arms embargoes (Saunders 2015).  
 Another material factor in Sino-Iranian relations and diplomatic link-up between Sino-
US relations and material aVVLVWDQFHWR,UDQLVWKH7DLZDQLVVXH%HDULQJLQPLQG&KLQD¶VµORVW
WHUULWRU\¶ DQG µ2QH &KLQD¶ UKHWRULF DQG WKH SROLWLFR-historical importance attached to the 
µ7DLZDQ TXHVWLRQ¶ +XJKHV  RQH FRPSUHKHQGV WKH VHQVLWLYLW\ DQG VWDWH RI DOHUW ZLWK
which Chinese governments react to US support to Taiwan. This, in turn, has been linked up 
with Chinese support for Iran. In September 1992, China for the first time linked its foreign 
policy toward Iran to the Taiwan question after the US had announced the sale of 150 F-16 
fighter aircraft to Taiwan (Djallil 2011: 241). And again in 1997, Chinese arms sales to 
3DNLVWDQDQG,UDQKDYHEHHQUHDGDVDSROLF\RIµUHWDOLDWLRQ¶IRU WKH86VDOHRI6WLQJHUDQWL-
aircraft missiles to Taiwan (ibid.). On the other end of this competition-cooperation spectrum 
lies a policy of mutual consent in case both parties agree to neither supply Iran nor Taiwan 
ZLWKVHQVLWLYHWHFKQRORJ\UHVSHFWLYHO\,QVXFKDFDVH³&KLQDZRXOGDJUHHWRVDFULILFH,UDQLQ
return for Taiwan, its greater foreign policy priority. Such a deal would represent a tacit 
UHFRJQLWLRQWKDW(DVW$VLDZDV&KLQD¶VVSKHUHRILQIOXHQFHDQGWKH0LGGOH(DVW$PHULFD¶V´
Martin Jacques (2012) sums up such a tit-for-tat strategy and thereby makes an interesting 
geopolitical link to consents over regional spheres of influence (436). This can be read as a 
G\QDPLFRI µUHWDOLDWLRQ¶ LQ WKH IRUPRIZHDSRQV VDOHV WRFRXQWULHVRIKLJKVHFXULW\SROLWLFDO
FRQFHUQIRUWKHUHVSHFWLYHRWKHUDQGRIµUHZDUGLQJ¶FRRSHUDWLRQRQHLWKHUVLGHLQ the form of 
refraining from such sales if suspension of weapons sales on the respective other side is 
guaranteed.303 In a more anti-hegemonic reasoning, missile sales to developing countries 
sHUYH WR µHTXDOLVH¶ D JOREDO LPEDODQFH EURXJKW DERXW E\ 86 KHJHPRQy, as Garver writes 
(2006a: 180). A caveat should be attached to the Iran-7DLZDQ QH[XV LQ %HLMLQJ¶V DQG
:DVKLQJWRQ¶V UHVSHFWLYH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ FDOFXODWLRQV KRZHYHU $Q XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI DQ
automatic policy of retaliation in arming one side or the other fails to account for more subtle 
SROLFLHV WKDW IHHG LQWR WKHµFRPSHWLWLRQ-FRRSHUDWLRQVSHFWUXP¶DVGHVFULEHGDERYH$IWHU WKH
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 Suffice to recall that UNSCR 1929 has introduced a multilateral weapons embargo on Iran. The deliberations 
described here were pre-2010, but may resurface with the lifting of sanctions as a CJPoA is implemented. 
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1996 tensions in the Taiwan strait and US support for Taiwan, Beijing agreed to suspend its 
nuclear cooperation with Iran- in spite of continuing arms sales. Support in terms of military 
hardware is thus not to be equated with unequivocal support for Iran in the diplomacy 
VXUURXQGLQJWKHQXFOHDUGRVVLHU,PSRUWDQWO\*DUYHUDDQDO\]HV&KLQD¶VVXVSHQVLRQRI
nuclear cooperation with Iran in 1997 as part of a larger strategic period of disengagement 
from Iran due to US pressure (115-117; 151; cf. also Burman 2009: 110-11). And Goldstein 
(2011) cautions against a too stark causal link in the US-Taiwan arms sales relationship. This 
issuHKH FRQWHQGV VKRXOGQRWEHRYHUVWDWHG LQ LWV VLJQLILFDQFH DQG LV ³ODUJHO\ V\PEROLF LQ
QDWXUH´ DQG >«@ LQ DQDFWXDO FRQIOLFWZLWK&KLQD WKHVH DLUFUDIWZRXOG DOPRVW VXUHO\QHYHU
leave the ground, as their bases would likely be quickly obliterated by Chinese missile 
VWULNHV´          
 0RUHRYHU &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LV SDUWLDOO\ PRWLYDWHG DQG LQIRUPHG E\ HFRQRPLF
interest groups.304 Decision-makers in Beijing have to carefully weigh the pursuance of 
commercial interests with the perception of ChinD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\RQWKHSDUWRIRWKHUPDMRU
stakeholders. While major investment projects as mentioned above at the outset of this section 
may nurture the impression of extensive Chinese-Iranian technology transfers, part of these 
did not materialise yet or remain in the planning phase. This sometimes is the outcome of a 
&KLQHVHEHKDYLRUQRW WR HQGDQJHU WKH µUHVSRQVLEOH*UHDW3RZHU¶ LPDJH WKDW DSXUVXDQFHRI
commercial contracts in outright disagreement with US security political pressure would 
entail. ThHµH[WUDWHUULWRULDOLVDWLRQ¶RI86 OHJLVODWLRQE\ZD\RIXQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQVDIIHFWLQJ
third country companies serves as another, more material deterrent. It is also a political 
deterrent because the listing of Chinese entities is a publicly visible and therefore undesirable 
labeling. Chinese receptiveness to US legislation, in this context, is an example of an 
adherence to hegemonic structures, while its official foreign policy discourse pledges 
resistance to hegemony. However, it should also not be forgotten that the non-materialisation 
of Chinese investment projects in Iran may be the result of political decisions in Tehran. And 
in view of a politicised environment when doing business in Iran, the Chinese government 
may decide to sign legally non-binding MoU that allow for political maneuverability (read: 
commitments are easier to revoke in case of unfavorable political framework conditions).  
 However, there is a level of disagreement among experts as to the relation between 
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 ŚŝŶĂ ?ƐƐƚĂƚĞ-owned business corporations and oil traders enjoy a powerful position in lobbying the Chinese 
government. This latter observation carries with it a sound of caution from an analytical point of view not to 
equate the interests of Chinese companies with those of Chinese governments. (Interview with Dr. Jin 
Lianxiang, Shanghai, 16 April 2014.) 
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state-owned companies and the policy planning of the central government.305 While the latter 
can easily refer to the market effect of unilateral sanctions and the constraints with which 
internationally operating companies are confronted in explaining a decrease in Iranian oil 
imports, the effect can also conveniently be used to demonstrate a level of cooperation with 
the US ± depending on the audience to which such statements are uttered. Corporate interests 
QHHG QRW EH &KLQHVH µQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV¶ EXW WKH WLJKWO\ LQWHUZRYHQ GHSHQGHQFLHV between 
these two makes it difficult to assess from the outside who in China decides on sanctions 
µFRPSOLDQFH¶           
 Much in the same logic of referring to the complications of international markets, this 
reading would also explain why the Chinese government had conducted most of its material 
DVVLVWDQFHWR,UDQERWKLQWKHPLOLWDU\GRPDLQDQGLQWKHSURYLVLRQRI³GXDO-uVHWHFKQRORJ\´
e.g. nuclear infrastructure, covertly or semi-covertly (Garver 2006a: 125). When China began 
to supply arms to Iran (and Iraq) during the Iran-Iraq war, the government relied on third 
FRXQWU\LQWHUPHGLDULHV³WKXVDOORZLQJ%HLMLQJWRFODLPwith narrow accuracy that China had 
QRW VROG ZHDSRQV WR ,UDQ´ LELG  7KLV µFRYHU¶ HIIHFW WKDW *DUYHU FDOOV D ³SROLF\ RI
SODXVLEOHGHQLDO´LELGZRXOGDOORZ&KLQDWRSUHVHQWLWVGHDOLQJVZLWK,UDQLQRQHOLJKW
or the other, depending on the intended audience.306       
 Such a finding underlines the importance that the Chinese government has attached to 
the perception of China-Iran relations on the part of other actors and is an important one for 
DQLQYHVWLJDWLRQLQWR&KLQD¶VGHJUHHRIµUHVLVWDQFHWRKHJHPRQ\¶:KLOHPDWHULDOIDFWRUVFDQ
partially explain a deepening of relations between Iran and China, the importance Beijing 
attached to possible perceptions thereof by other actors (mainly the US) suggests that China 
was not going to allow this to evolve into an overt anti-hegemonic partnership. Official as 
well as expert interviewees emphasisH WKDW&KLQD ³YDOXHV´ LWV UHODWLRQVKLSZLWK WKH86DQG
wants to be a cooperative partner.307 As this section has analyzed, commercial interests in 
Sino-Iran relatLRQV SDUWLDOO\ FODVKHG ZLWK WKH GHVLUH WR XSKROG DQG IXUWKHU GHYHORS &KLQD¶V
relations with the US. Relations to the US, in a Chinese reading, should not be allowed to 
wither because China had to accommodate itself with the predominant global superpower. It 
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 In an insightful article, Downs (2004) writes that the top leadership positions in the major Chinese (state-
owned) oil companies like CNPC, Sinopec and CNOOC are appointed by the Central Committee of the CCP. This 
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 Dr. Wu Riqiang from Renmin University asserts that a central governmental decision to stop certain arms 
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that the government does not officially want to be associated with.  
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 Interview with Dr. Jin Lianxiang, Shanghai, 16 April 2014; Interview with former Chinese diplomat to Iran, 
Beijing, 22 April 2014. 
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ZDV WKH 86 RQ ZKRVH FRQVHQW &KLQD¶V DFFHSWDQFH WR WKH µLQWHUQDWLRQDO FRPPXQLW\¶ ZDV
GHSHQGHQW IROORZLQJ &KLQD¶V HFRQRPLF µRSHQLQJ XS¶ WR WKH ZRUOG LQ WKH ZDNH RI 'HQJ¶V
reforms. Sino-Iran relations were subordinated to the higher-valued Sino-US relations in cases 
where a political prioritisation was necessary. It is in this context that Garver (2006a) calls the 
Sino-,UDQUHODWLRQD³VHFRQG-RUGHUUHODWLRQVKLS´7KH86DGPLQLVWUDWLRQLV aware of this 
Chinese prioritisation, as a State Department officLDOFRQILUPHGLQDQLQWHUYLHZ³&KLQDUHDOO\
YDOXHVLWVUHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH86,WYDOXHVLWDERYHWKDWZLWK,UDQ´308 This finding suggests 
DFRPSOH[EDODQFHEHWZHHQPDWHULDODQGLGHDWLRQDOIDFWRUVLQ&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GHFLVLRQ-
making towards Iran and already anticipates an answer to the question whether Chinese Iran 
SROLF\µUHVLVWVKHJHPRQ\¶7KHIROORZLQJVHFWLRQWKXVDQVZHUVWKHUHVHDUFKTXHVWLRQWRZKDW
H[WHQW &KLQHVH IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJDUPPH LV LQGLFDWLYH RI D VHFXULW\
cultXUHUHVLVWLQJKHJHPRQ\EULQJLQJWRJHWKHUWKHSUHYLRXVDQDO\VHVRI&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\
discourse, its position on sanctions policies, and of the material dimension of China-Iran 
relations. 
5. From Triangulation to Proactivism Ȃ Resistance to Hegemony?  
 
Deng Xiaoping had outlined a pragmatic doctrine that sKRXOG DFFRPSDQ\ &KLQD¶V
modernisDWLRQ SURFHVV DV IURP  ³KLGH RXU FDSDELOLWLHV DQG ELGH RXU WLPH taoguang 
yanghui EH JRRG DW PDLQWDLQLQJ D ORZ SURILOH DQG QHYHU FODLP OHDGHUVKLS´ LQ -DFTXHV
2012: 590).309 'XULQJ+X-LQWDR¶VSUHVLGHQF\0DUF/DQWHLJQHKROGV&KLQD¶VGRFWULQH
RI µELGLQJ LWV WLPH¶ ZDV EHLQJ UHSODFHG E\ H[HUFLVHV RI JUHDW SRZHU GLSORPDF\ daguo 
zhanlue, 21). In characteristically vague wording, President Hu had announced in 2009 that 
&KLQDVKRXOG³FRQWLQXRXVO\NHHSDORZSURILOHand proactively get some things done´&KHQ
& Pu 2014: 178, emphasis added). The foreign policy mantra under president Xi Jinping 
shifted from taoguang yanghui to fenfa youwei (striving for achievement), Tong Zhao (2015) 
writes.310 The new Chinese leadership seems to be less willing publicly to join or support 
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how Chinese decision-makers were traditionally torn between bilateralism and multilateralism to address 
major foreign policy issues. A comprehensive and insightful overview over Chinese domestic foreign policy 
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ƌŽůĞĂďŽƵŶĚ ? “ŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚŽĨĨŝĐŝals in the Foreign Ministry and Central Committee Foreign Affairs Office are 
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:HVWHUQSROLFLHV WKDWDUH VHHQDV µQHR-LQWHUYHQWLRQLVP¶ &KDWKDP+RXVH7KHth 
Party Congress report (of November 2012) stressed the concepW RI &KLQD¶V µSHDFHIXO
GHYHORSPHQW¶EXWHTXDOO\ZDUQHGLQDTXLWHH[SOLFLWODQJXDJHUHPLQLVFHQWRIWKHµIRXUQR¶V¶
LQ&KLQHVHIRUHLJQSROLF\WKLQNLQJRIWKHGDQJHURIµKHJHPRQLVP¶µSRZHUSROLWLFV¶DQGµQHR-
LQWHUYHQWLRQLVP¶LELG7KLVUKHWRULFZDVHchoed by then-party general secretary Xi Jinping 
in January 2013 and was a timely positioning against the backdrop of the NATO intervention 
in Libya, attempted UNSC resolutions on Syria and sabre-rattling over Iran. 311    
 While Chinese foreign policy is being interpreted as becoming more outspoken about 
LWVGLVDJUHHPHQWVZLWKRWKHUJRYHUQPHQWVRWKHUREVHUYHUVEX\LQWRWKHDUJXPHQWRIµSHDFHIXO
GHYHORSPHQW¶ DFFRUGLQJ WR ZKLFK &KLQD LV DQ LQKHUHQWO\ LQZDUG-looking country whose 
Confucian behavior prevents LWIURPVHHNLQJKHJHPRQ\RUH[SDQVLRQ³7KLQJVLQWKHH[WUHPH
GRQRWODVWORQJMXVWDVGUDJRQVVXIIRFDWHIUHH]HDQGIDOOZKHQWKH\IO\WRRKLJK´DGLFWXP
by Lao Tse was given in an interview with a Chinese scholar as an analogy for the dangers of 
too assertive foreign policies.312 Analyses of Chinese foreign policy tend to be couched in 
terms of status quo versus revisionist policies.313 Against this background, the analysis of 
&KLQD¶V ,UDQ SROLFLHV SUHVHQWHG LQ WKLV FKDSWHU KDV VKRZQ KRZ &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ policy can 
display elements of resistance to hegemony as well as hegemonic accommodation.
 &KLQD¶V SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH DV KDV EHHQ VKRZQ DERYH
EHVSHDNVDGLSORPDWLFWLJKWURSHZDONLQZKLFK&KLQHVHJRYHUQPHQWVKDGWR³WULDQJXODWHWKHLr 
YDULRXV LQWHUHVWVZLWK:DVKLQJWRQDQG7HKUDQ´ZLWKRXWZDQWLQJ WRFKRRVHEHWZHHQ WKH WZR
6KHQ   &KLQD¶V DFW RI WULDQJXODWLQJ WKH HIIHFWV RI 6LQR-US relations on Sino-Iran 
UHODWLRQVDQGYLFHYHUVDHPHUJHGDVD FRQWLQXLQJSDWWHUQ LQ&KLQD¶V UHODWLons between these 
two countries after the Islamic revolution in 1979 and during the Iran-,UDT ZDU ³,W LV RXU
SULQFLSOH WKDW ZH KRSH QRW WR VHH DQ\ QRUPDO FRPPHUFLDO FRRSHUDWLRQ EHLQJ SROLWLFL]HG´
foreign ministry spokesperson Hua Chunying (2014b) formulates. But in practice, commercial 
interests in Iran were weighed against US pressure and the perception of Chinese foreign 
policy in Washington. As was confirmed in interviews for this research project, it always was 
the anticipation of possible effects on relations to the US that determined how far China was 
willing to go in courting Iran by publicly lending support. Anti-hegemonic sympathies with 
                                                                                                                                                                                     
pragmatically centered between these two schools (Major Powers and Global South), but they must respond to 
Nativist and Realist voices in society, the military, and the Communist WĂƌƚǇ ? ?ƚŚĞǇǁƌŝƚĞ ? ? ? ) ? 
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new Chinese leadership.  
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 Interview with Dr. Zhang Lihua, resident scholar at Carnegie Beijing, Tsinghua University, Beijing, 25 April 
2014. 
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 Cf. section 3.3. of Chapter 3 for an overview of the scholarly discussion.   
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Iran always were balanced against the importance China attached to the Sino-US relationship 
and the possible detrimental effHFWRQ&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFPRGHUQLVation path that an alienation 
from Washington could have entailed. On the material side of the Coxian triangle of 
hegemonic structures, China showed accommodation with hegemonic conditions even when 
in ideational disagreement ± and even though other material interests could have otherwise led 
China to deepen its relations with Iran.         
 With regard to the sanctions question, Beijing therefore knows that its voting pattern 
in the UNSC is a positioning with far-reaching political implications in one way or the other. 
Voting for UNSC resolutions imposing sanctions on Iran lets Beijing lose political capital in 
Iran, while voting against them would have alienated those powers pushing for a tougher 
stance toward IUDQDQGWKHµVDQFWLRQVVSRQVRUV¶PRVWQRWDEO\WKH86$EVWDLQLQJIURPDYRWH
might be a way for China to circumnavigate this dilemma, but does not do justice to Chinese 
claims to being seen as an influential power taking responsibility on issues of global 
security.314 A Chinese foreign ministry official explained in an interview that the Chinese 
delegation is engaging in mediation between the US and the Iranian position in P5+1 nuclear 
negotiations with Iran.315 And a former Chinese diplomat to Iran even remarked in an 
interview that China was pressing Iran to compromise on the question of the uranium 
enrichment level ± a crucial point of contention in P5+1 talks with Iran.316 It is important to 
note, however, that this is Chinese official rhetoric. As former Iranian officials recall, China 
was even more at the periphery of the negotiations than Russia (Mousavian 2012: 182, 264). 
Asked about the dynamic and relationship between Russia and China in the Iran diplomacy, 
serving as well as former officials working on Iran confirmed in interviews that the 
LPSUHVVLRQ SUHYDLOV WKDW &KLQD LV ³IROORZLQJ 5XVVLD¶V OHDG´ LQ WKH 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO317 A 
former E3 delegation member formulates: 
 ³$WWLPHV&KLQDZDVKLGLQJEHKLQG5XVVLDDQGRQRWKHURFFDVLRQVLWZDVWKHRWKHU
way around. China had Russia built up a counter-position to the West. China 
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 Interview with Chinese foreign ministry official, Beijing, 18 April 2014. 
316
 Interview with former Chinese diplomat to Iran, Beijing, 22 April 2014. 
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generally has an observing and restrained role. China is tackling problems with a 
long-WHUPYLHZ7KH\GRQ¶WZDQWWRIDOORXWZLWKWKH$PHULFDQV´318  
 
This is an observation that emphasises the perception that China did not want to be seen at the 
forefront of diplomatic activity. This puts China into an intricate position. Its institutional 
ZHLJKW DV D SHUPDQHQW 6HFXULW\ &RXQFLO PHPEHU PDNHV LW WRR µELJ¶ D VWDWH WR KLGH EHKLQG
rhetorical contortions and act in the shadow of a publicly more assertive Russia. Yet, at a time 
where relations between Russia and its Western interlocutors are undergoing their most 
fundamental post-Cold War crisis in the wake of the Ukraine crisis, China will likely have to 
walk a tightrope walk between publicly siding with Russia on Iran, and distinguishing itself 
from Russian positions in other issues areas. As a consequence, Chinese foreign policy may 
HQWHUDQHZµPDWXULQJ¶SKDVHWKDWFDQFRQWULEXWHWRGLVSHOWKe fallacy often made in Western 
capitals of assuming a Chinese-5XVVLDQ µEORF SRVLWLRQ¶ 1DWXUDOO\ D VWURQJHU &KLQHVH
dissociation from Russian positions in public posturing comes at the expense of convenient 
µFRYHUV¶:KHWKHU WKLVPHDQV WKDW&KLQHVHSRVLWions will clash more openly with American 
ones is doubtful: The analysis presented in this chapter has carved out cautious characteristics 
of the Chinese foreign policy machinery. At a minimum, however, it can be assumed that the 
evolving nature of Chinese-Russian dynamics will have an impact on Sino-US relations as 
well.            
 ,QDGGLWLRQ&KLQD¶VJURZLQJHFRQRPLFZHLJKWERWKLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWDQGJOREDOO\
forces China to make choices and adopt public positions in line with its geopolitical influence. 
Close economic ties with Iran and a perception of sanctions as an interference into the 
domestic politics of sovereign states on the one hand needed to be reconciled with the desire 
WR EH SHUFHLYHG DV D µUHVSRQVLEOH *UHDW 3RZHU¶ WKDW LV DFWLYHO\ VXSSRrting and endorsing 
nuclear non-proliferation efforts on the other hand. The latter meant an eventual Chinese 
endorsement of sanctions resolutions against Iran, even though such a policy went against the 
Chinese public discourse on how to approach the Iranian nuclear issue. Displaying a norm 
divergence, China showed a rule convergence with hegemonic approaches. While this is not 
to argue that China shared an American approach on an ideational basis, this factual 
observation has been qualified throughout this chapter: A number of economic, security, and 
SROLWLFDOUHDVRQVH[SODLQZK\&KLQD¶VLQWHUHVWVDUHEHVWVHUYHGE\ZRUNLQJWKURXJKWKH3
format. The latter has meant working with and responding to influential American policy 
preferences, but entailed a means for China to exercise institutional control over them. 
&KLQD¶VµULVH¶ZLOOFRQWLQXHWRVSXUGHEDWHVDQGDWWHPSWVDWSUHGLFWLQJWKHIXWXUHGLUHFWLRQRI
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its foreign policy. As this chapter has shown, however, the complex picture of Chinese 
foreign policy in the Iranian nuclear file eschews an easy categorisation of either status quo or 
revisionist policies.   
6. Conclusion   
 
Following the same two-level distinction between a discursive and a behavioral dimension of 
foreign policy as introduced in chapter 1 and as applied in the previous two, this chapter has 
DQDO\]HG WR ZKDW H[WHQW &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH LV
indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony. It has been analysHG KRZ &KLQD¶V
foreign policy towards the emerging nuclear crisis after 2002 resisted hegemony on a 
discursive level by emphasising the importance to respect the principles of non-interference 
and sovereignty, Iranian legitimate nuclear rights and political negotiations on equal terms.
 This discursive resistance directly countered US attempts to push the Iranian nuclear 
file to the UN Security Council. China conveyed a normative divergence from what was 
SHUFHLYHG DV µKHJHPRQLVP¶ LQ $PHULFDQ IRUHLJQ SROLF\ &R[¶ DQDO\WLFDO IUDPHZRUN WR
understDQG KHJHPRQ\ UHVWV RQ WKH µWULDQJOH¶ RI LWV XQGHUO\LQJ LGHDWLRQDO LQVWLWXWLRQDO DQG
PDWHULDOGLPHQVLRQVDQGLWKDVEHHQDQDO\VHGWRZKDWH[WHQW&KLQD¶VVHFXULW\FXOWXUHUHVLVWV
hegemony along those dimensions. Re-iterating that China regards sanctions as a violation of 
the principle of non-LQWHUIHUHQFHDQGDQLQIULQJHPHQWRI,UDQ¶VVRYHUHLJQW\&KLQHVHGHFLVLRQ-
makers made it clear that US attempts to punish Iran for its lack of cooperation and 
WUDQVSDUHQF\RYHU LWVQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHUDQDJDLQVW&KLQD¶VXnderstanding of an ideational 
framework that should govern international politics. Nothing captures this normative 
GLYHUJHQFH PRUH FOHDUO\ WKDQ &KLQD¶V UHFXUUHQFH WR LWV µ)LYH 3ULQFLSOHV RI 3HDFHIXO
&RH[LVWHQFH¶ DV JXLGLQJ SULQFLSOHV RI IRUHLJQ SROLF\ ZKLch represent an explicitly anti-
hegemonic posture. And ultimately, an additional discursive undercurrent in Chinese-Iran 
relDWLRQVLVWKHDVSHFWRIµFLYLOLVDWLRQDO¶VROLGDULW\WKDWFDSWXUHVWKHMRLQWKLVWRULFDOH[SHULHQFH
of humiliation at the hands of Western imperialism (Garver 2006a: 3-28; Burman 2009: 26-
 I %HVLGHV LWV REYLRXV SXEOLF GLSORPDF\ XWLOLW\ IRU ,UDQ RI µNHHSLQJ &KLQD DV D
IULHQGO\ YRLFH LQ WKH QHJRWLDWLRQV¶ DV RQH ( RIILFLDO SXW LW319 however, this must not be 
confused with an ideological stylisDWLRQ RI DQ µ(DVWHUQ EORF¶ SROLF\ DV SXUVXHG E\ WKH
Ahmadinejad administration and that did not meet much enthusiasm on the Chinese side 
0RXVDYLDQ    0RXVDYLDQ IRUPXODWHV ³&KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LV EDVHG RQ
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development advancemeQW ZKLOH $KPDGLQHMDG¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ LV EDVHG RQ LGHRORJLFDO
DGYDQFHPHQW´  $QG LQ D IUDQN MXGJPHQW DERXW KLV FRXQWU\¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ IRUPHU
,UDQLDQ DPEDVVDGRU WR &KLQD -DYDG 0DQVRXUL GHVFULEHG WKH µORRNLQJ WR WKH (DVW¶ SROLF\ D
mistake (in: Mousavian 2012: 443). The recurring &KLQHVH UKHWRULF DERXW µFLYLOLVational 
VROLGDULW\¶ LW WKXV DSSHDUV GRHV QRW FRUUHVSRQG ZLWK ,UDQLDQ SUHIHUHQFHV 'HVSLWH VXFK
rhetoric, cooperation in bilateral relations is mostly limited to economic (energy) cooperation.
 The Iran sanctions issue, as has been analyzed in the second and third section of this 
FKDSWHU LOOXVWUDWHV &KLQD¶V GHJUHH RI UHVLVWDQFH WR WKH LQVWLWXWLRQDO QDWXUH RI KHJHPRQLF
politics. Conveying a serious discontent with international sanctions as legitimate instruments 
WRSUHVVXUH,UDQ&KLQDKDVHQJDJHGLQDµGHOD\DQGZHDNHQ¶VWUDWHJ\ZLWKUHJDUGVWRVDQFWLRQV
resolutions in the UNSC. As has been shown, it was largely the effect of Sino-American 
UHODWLRQVRQ&KLQD¶V ,UDQSROLF\WKDWH[SODLQHG&KLQD¶s eventual adoption of UN resolutions 
imposing sanctions on Iran, even though these entail negative effects on Sino-Iranian 
FRPPHUFLDOUHODWLRQVDQGUXQFRXQWHUWR&KLQD¶VSULQFLSOHGRSSRVLWLRQWRWKHLQWUXVLYHHIIHFW
of sanctions. Despite its normative divergence from hegemony, China showed an eventual 
rule compliance with hegemonic positions. The institutional nature of sanctions (multilateral 
versus unilateral), however, is decisive for Chinese official compliance: While acceptance of 
UN-sponsored sanctiRQVZDV WKHRXWFRPHRID µWULDQJXODWLRQ¶RI WKH LPSRUWDQFHRI6LQR-US 
and Sino-Iranian relations, unilateral sanctions are rejected outright by China. Unilateral 
sanctions, as has been analysed, are seen as an illegitimate extension of domestic law onto 
otKHU VRYHUHLJQ VWDWHV &KLQD¶V SDUWLDO FRPSOLDQFH ZLWK WKHVH ODWWHU VDQFWLRQV OLNH WKH
reduction of Iranian oil imports as stipulated by US sanctions regimes) is a matter of 
FRQWURYHUV\DQGDFNQRZOHGJHGWDFLWO\DWEHVWDVLQWHUYLHZVFRQILUP&KLQD¶VTXDOLfication for 
86VDQFWLRQVµZDLYHUV¶ LVDVPXFKDVLJQDORIFRRSHUDWLRQZLWK$PHULFDDV LW LVDPDWWHURI
LGHQWLW\ SROLWLFV :DQWLQJ WR DYRLG WKH ODEHO RI D µVSRLOHU¶ DQG LQ OLQH ZLWK D µUHVSRQVLEOH
VWDNHKROGHU¶UKHWRULF&KLQD¶V,UDQSROLF\KHUHZDONVDILne line between pursuing significant 
commercial relations with Iran and tacitly conceding to US positions. Resistance to 
hegemony, in other words, was strong on the discursive dimension, but more mixed on the 
behavioural dimension.        
 Lastly, this chaSWHU KDV DQDO\]HG PDWHULDO IDFWRUV WKDW LQIOXHQFH &KLQD¶V ,UDQ SROLF\
These are particularly relevant in the contH[W RI &KLQD¶V HFRQRPLF PRGHUQLVation. The 
Chinese government has an interest in good economic relations and in securing its energy 
supplies fURP ,UDQ¶VKXJHRLO DQG JDV ILHOGV ,UDQ LQ WXUQ LPSRUWVSDUWRI LWV UHILQHGSHWURO
from China due to its own limited refining capacities. Iranian-Chinese bilateral trade is 
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intensive. Iran used to be an important buyer of Chinese military exports before the 
imposition of UN embargoes. Iran also received capital goods that it cannot receive from the 
West because of imposed unilateral embargoes (Blumenthal 2005; Dorraj & Currier 2010; 
Gill, B. +LFNH\&KLQD¶VWUDGHUHODWLRQVZLWK,UDQH[SODLQZhy mounting tensions 
VXUURXQGLQJWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDUHQRWLQ&KLQD¶VLQWHUHVWLQDVWDEOH0LGGOH(DVW
Some interviewees, however, also held that China stands to benefit economically from a 
protracted stalemate surrounding the Iranian nuclear file. Against this background, the 
material dimension of hegemony towards Iran (keeping Western embargoes in place in order 
to increase pressure on the Iranian government) may be supported by China, rather than 
resisted. Irrespective of which side of this argument one is on, it seems fair to suggest that 
China resists the material dimension of hegemony to the extent that resistance is conducive to 
WKHIXUWKHUDQFHRI&KLQD¶VRZQFRPPHUFLDOLQWHUHVWVLQ,UDQ   
 Chinese-Iranian relations, both in the economic and in the political sphere, were 
periodically subordinated to the higher-valued importance attached to Sino-US relations. 
&KLQHVHIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHWKXVH[KLELWVHOHPHQWVRIERWKQRUP
divergence from hegemony and partial rule compliance with its underlying institutional and 
PDWHULDO GLPHQVLRQV &KLQD¶V IRUHLJQ SROLF\ WRZDUGV WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH LV WKH














Comparing the Cases: Chinese, Russian and Turkish Policies in the 
Iranian Nuclear Dossier 
1. Introduction 
 
On the basis of the previous three chapters that have provided three in-depth case 
studies, this chapter compares the foreign policies of China, Russia and Turkey towards the 
controversial Iranian nuclear programme. This cross-case comparison carves out the 
VLPLODULWLHV DQG GLIIHUHQFHV LQ WKH WKUHH FDVH FRXQWULHV¶ ,UDQ SROLFLHV DQG ZLOO DOORZ PH WR
answer the research question how these are indicative of a security culture resisting 
hegemony.            
 The first section briefly outlines similarities in the foreign policies of China, Russia 
and Turkey towards the Iranian nuclear programme that was uncovered in 2002. Taking up 
the Coxian concept of hegemony as introduced in the theoretical chapter and as discussed in 
the respective case studies, this section analyzes how China, Russia and Turkey engage in 
normative disagreement with Iran sanctions regimes over their institutional nature as well as 
material impact. ThHVHFRQGVHFWLRQVKRZVKRZWKHµGH-:HVWHUQLVDWLRQ¶ of Iran discourses is 
related to divergence from hegemony in its ideational dimension. A third section makes sense 
of Chinese, Russian and Turkish partial convergence with hegemony in its material 
dimension, while their discourse suggests a normative divergence. It will be shown here how 
µFRPSOLDQFH¶ LV LQKHUHQWO\ VLWXDWLRQDO DQG KRZ SHUFHSWLRQV RI OHJLWLPDF\ DQG GHSHQGHQF\
create permissive margins for hegemonic policies. On the basis of this analysis, the final 
section analyzes the seeming ambiguity between the advocacy for counter-hegemonic security 
cultures on a discursive level and the partial adherence to U.S.-dominated governance 
structures on a behavioral level, and draws conclusions on the extent to which the Iran 
policies of China, Russia and Turkey resist hegemony.  
2. Contesting Hegemony: Normative and Material Disagreements with 
Iran Sanctions Regimes 
 
Russian, Chinese, and Turkish foreign policies towards the controversial nuclear programme 
of Iran display a security culture that is different from what has been carved out as a U.S.-
inspired hegemonic security culture. When Iranian nuclear facilities were uncovered in 2002, 
hitherto undeclared to the IAEA DQG WKHUHIRUH LQEUHDFKRI ,UDQ¶V6DIHJXDUGV$JUHHPHQW LW
did not take long for discursive dividing lines to emerge. While the Bush administration was 
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pursuing an assertive foreign policy line on Iran, going so far as to threaten Iran with an attack 
and UHJLPHFKDQJHWKHLQFRUSRUDWLRQRI,UDQLQWRWKHLQIDPRXV³$[LVRI(YLO´EHLQJDUJXDEO\
the most dramatic and tangible discursive step in this process of securitisation, cf. Bush 2002), 
China, Russia and Turkey reacted with caution and were more hesitant to assume Iranian 
intentions on the basis of contested proliferation concerns. Yet, Russia, China and Turkey 
held that pressure was not conducive to achieving greater cooperation by the Iranians 
concerning their nuclear file with the IAEA, and publicly reiterated that diplomacy was of the 
utmost importance for working towards a political solution of the emerging nuclear crisis. In 
their foreign policy discourse, they counteracted a reading of the NPT and of Iranian rights as 
an NPT member that was perceived as a politicised one. In Articles II and III of the NPT, 
non-nuclear weapons states commit themselves not to acquire nuclear weapons, while 
$UWLFOHV ,9DQG9PDNHPHQWLRQRIDQ³LQDOLHQDEOHULJKW´D IRUPXODWKDW ,UDQFRQWLQXRXVO\
referred to) of all parties to use nuclear technology for peaceful purposes.320 The crux of the 
Iranian nuclear crisis for many years lay in whether non-nuclear weapon states (like Iran) 
KDYHD³ULJKW WRHQULFK´&KLQD5XVVLD7XUNH\ DQGRWKHUQRQ-Western actors regarded the 
86¶DQGRWKHU:HVWHUQVWDWHV¶LQVLVWHQFHRQWKHGHQLDORIWKDWULJKWDVDKHJHPRQLFH[HUFLVH
DV³DQHIIRUWWRUHZULWHWKH137XQLODWHUDOO\´DVIRUPHUVHQLRUGLUHFWRUIRU0LGGOH(DVWDIIDLUV
on the US National Security Council Flynt Leverett (2013) formulates (260).321 This stand-off 
lay at the basis of years of semantic hairsplitting as to how to interpret the relevant treaty 
provisions. International treaty law was instrumentalised by diametrically opposed factions. 
µ&RPSOLDQFH¶ZLWKLQWHUQDWLRQDOODZLVVHOHFtive and situational (on this, cf. also Litwak 2012: 
34-39), a point to which section 5 below will return. 
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 Now-president Hassan Rouhani (2011) writes in his memoirs on his time as chief nuclear negotiator that 
 “ĂŶǇŐŽǀĞƌŶŵĞŶƚƚŚĂƚĂĐĐĞƉƚƐůŽŶŐ-ƚĞƌŵƐƵƐƉĞŶƐŝŽŶŽƌƐƚŽƉƉŝŶŐĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚŝƐĚŽŽŵĞĚƚŽĐŽůůĂƉƐĞ ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ? ) ?
In a similar fashion, Hossein Mousavian (2014) writes that Iran would never accept denial of access to 
ĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞEWd ? ? ? ? ) ?dŚŝƐ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚ ?ŚĂƐďĞĞŶůŝŬĞŶĞĚŝŶŝŵƉŽƌƚĂŶĐĞƚŽƚŚĞŶĂƚŝŽŶĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨƚŚĞ
Iranian oil industry in 1951 under prime minister Mossadegh (cf. Parasiliti 2012: 35). Possibly aware of the 
fruitlessness of maximalist positions, governments may change the language used in negotiations (without 
ĂĨĨĞĐƚŝŶŐƚŚĞƐƵďƐƚĂŶĐĞ ) ?&ŽƌŝŶƐƚĂŶĐĞ ?ĂƵƌŽƉĞĂŶ/ƌĂŶĚĞƐŬŽĨĨŝĐĞƌĐĂůůƐƚŚĞ ‘ƌŝŐŚƚƚŽĞŶƌŝĐŚ ?ƋƵĞƐƚŝŽŶĂƉƐĞƵĚŽ
debate, and instead ƐƚĂƚĞƐƚŚĂƚǁŚĂƚŝƐƌĞůĞǀĂŶƚŝƐ ‘ĨĂĐƚƵĂůŽŶ-the-ŐƌŽƵŶĚ ?ĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?
Berlin, 14 November 2014.  
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 dŚĞKďĂŵĂĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐƚĂĐŝƚƌĞĐŽŐŶŝƚŝŽŶŽĨ/ƌĂŶŝĂŶƵƌĂŶŝƵŵĞŶƌŝĐhment has to be read as a realisation 
of the political untenability oĨƚŚĞƵƐŚĂĚŵŝŶŝƐƚƌĂƚŝŽŶ ?ƐŝŶƐŝƐƚĞŶĐĞŽŶ ‘ǌĞƌŽĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚ ? ? “tĞůŽƐƚƚŚĂƚďĂƚƚůĞ ? ?
ĨŽƌŵĞƌh^EĂƚŝŽŶĂů^ĞĐƵƌŝƚǇŽƵŶĐŝůŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůƌ ?ZŽďĞƌƚ>ŝƚǁĂŬĂĐŬŶŽǁůĞĚŐĞĚŝŶĂŶŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ
interview, Washington, 31 October 2014. And former high-level US diploŵĂƚtŝůůŝĂŵƵƌŶƐĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞƐ P “ ? Q ?
The reality is that the Iranians have developed over the course of the last decade or more the know-how to 
ĞŶƌŝĐŚ ?ƚŚĞǇŬŶŽǁƚŚĞŝƌǁĂǇĂƌŽƵŶĚďĂƐŝĐĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚƚĞĐŚŶŽůŽŐǇ ?ĂŶĚǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚǁŝƐŚƚŚĂƚĂǁĂǇ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚ
dismantle ŝƚĂǁĂǇ ?ǇŽƵĐĂŶ ?ƚďŽŵďŝƚĂǁĂǇ ? ? Q ?/ƵŶĚĞƌƐƚĂŶĚƚŚĞĂƌŐƵŵĞŶƚĨŽƌŶŽĞŶƌŝĐŚŵĞŶƚ ?ďƵƚ/ũƵƐƚƚŚŝŶŬ
ƚŚĂƚƚƌĂŝŶůĞĨƚƚŚĞƐƚĂƚŝŽŶ ? ?ƵƌŶƐ ?'ůĂƐƐĞƌ ? ? ? ? ) ? 
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&RQWUDU\ WR 1RUWK .RUHD¶V ZDON DZD\ IURP WKH 137 LQ  WKH ,UDQ FDVH LV GLIIHUHQW LQ
nature.322 Rather than weakening the treaty regime through another withdrawal from the 
treaty, the Iranian case is challenging the regime from within. The impasse in diplomatic 
SURJUHVV WRZDUGV D VHWWOHPHQW RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU VWDWXV VRRQ PDGH LW FOHDU WKDW WKH OHJDO
contestation on the surface gave way to a much deeper-seated malaise in international power 
constellations. In their positions towards the Iranian nuclear programme, China, Russia and 
Turkey implicitly started to question the legitimacy of US-dominated power structures to 
decide over legality and illegality in international relations. They began to resist hegemony. 
 A Coxian understanding of hegemony proceeds from an analysis of its underlying 
material, ideational, and institutional structures. According to &R[KHJHPRQ\LV³EDVHGRQD
coherent conjunction or fit between a configuration of material power, the prevalent collective 
image of world order (including certain norms) and a set of institutions which administer the 
order with a certain semblance of unLYHUVDOLW\´  139). The cases presented in this 
research project show all three dimensions of a U.S. hegemonic security culture towards Iran 
that is being contested by China, Russia and Turkey in different adaptations. Drawing on 
*UDPVFL¶VFRPSRQHQWVof hegemony as developed in, i.a., his Prison Notebooks, hegemony 
implies a dominant position in social, economic, and political structures (Gramsci 1971: 171-
72). And in addition to the use of coercion to maintain such a dominant position, hegemonic 
structures can only be sustained when coupled with the tacit consent of a critical mass of the 
KHJHPRQ¶VVXEDOWHUQV$Vargued in section 4 of chapter 1, the United States were the first to 
establish a form of hegemony that corresponds closest with a Gramscian understanding of the 
term. To the extent that other states act upon, sustain and reinforce US-American dominant 
structures in the social, economic and political sphere, US hegemony post-1945 has brought 
DERXWDµKLVWRULFEORF¶LQD*UDPVFLDQXQGHUVWDQGLQJthat is being upheld by the vast majority 
of states in the Western hemisphere.       
 Suffice further to recall that a distinction between norms and rules was made in the 
WKHRUHWLFDO IUDPHZRUN RI WKLV GLVVHUWDWLRQ 'UDZLQJ RQ .DW]HQVWHLQ¶V  GHILQLWLon of 
FXOWXUH DV ³D VHW RI HYDOXDWLYH VWDQGDUGV VXFK DV QRUPV DQG YDOXHV DQG D VHW RI FRJQLWLYH
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 Attempts at political negotiations to end the first North Korean nuclear crisis that culminated in the 1994 
Agreed Framework did not produce reliable guarantees to ensure that North Korea was not using nuclear 
material to manufacture a nuclear weapon. A second crisis in 2002 led to the expulsion of IAEA inspectors from 
the country, and the eventual withdrawal of North Korea as a state party to the NPT in January 2003. Ensuing 
UN sanctions and several rounds of six-party talks (between the US, Russia, China, Japan, North Korea and 
^ŽƵƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ )ĐŽƵůĚŶŽƚƉƌĞǀĞŶƚEŽƌƚŚ<ŽƌĞĂ ?ƐŵĂƌĐŚƚŽĂŶƵĐůĞĂƌǁĞĂƉŽŶ ?dŚĞƚĞƐƚŝŶŐŽĨŵŝƐƐŝůĞƐĂŶĚ
underground nuclear tests in 2006 drove the final nail in that coffin (cf. Bulychev & Vorontsov 2007: 13-29). 
Contrary to North Korea, Iran does not claim to have nuclear weapons ambitions and wants its nuclear 
programme to be accepted as legal and legitimate. Effective comparisons between the North Korean and the 
Iranian nuclear case are Fitzpatrick (2006) and Litwak (2008).  
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standards (such as rules and models) that define what social actors exist in a system, how they 
RSHUDWH DQG KRZ WKH\ UHODWH WR RQH DQRWKHU´ LELG  ³QRUPV DQG YDOXHV´ DUH KHUH
XQGHUVWRRGDV FRQFUHWH FRQYLFWLRQV DQGFRQFHSWLRQVZKLOH ³UXOHV DQGPRGHOV´ UHODWH WR WKH
broader macro-structure that regulates the way these norms and values are communicated, 
applied, or changed. All three states investigated here advocate an adherence to the 
institutional framework of the UN system as embodying the underlying rules and models of 
international politics. Unilateral sanctions regimes, however, circumvent these rules and 
models. In what became contested as an essential exercise of hegemonic power, the US 
started imposing intrusive sanctions not only on a target country (Iran), but also onto third 
countries that are engaged in business with Iran (cf. Lohmann 2013) - DQ³LPSHULDOH[WHQVLRQ
RI $PHULFDQ SRZHU DQG >«@ D sheer effrontery by which America sought to impose its 
SROLWLFDOSRVLWLRQ´DV$OL$QVDULSXWVLW8QLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQVWKXVSURSRVHµUXOHV
DQG PRGHOV¶ WKDW UXQ FRXQWHU WR WKRVH RI WKH 8QLWHG 1DWLRQV EHFDXVH WKH\ UHOLQTXLVK 81
mandates for their adoption ± D IDFW ZKLFK LPSOLFLWO\ XQGHUPLQHV µUXOHV DQG PRGHOV¶ RI
multilateral decision-making. Contesting the legitimacy of extraterritorialised U.S. legislative 
action, therefore, becomes a normative divergence from hegemony. The cases under 
investigation here have resisted hegemony on a discursive dimension ± on the basis of the 
institutional nature of sanctions.         
 With regard to unilateral sanctions, a European External Action Service (EEAS) 
RIILFLDO UHPDUNHG LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ ³&KLQD DQG 5XVVia explicitly do not share this sanctions 
SROLF\´323 Chinese, Russian and Turkish conceptions of legitimacy in this regard pertain to a 
desirable security culture that resists hegemonic politics, that resists established power 
constellations reserving the rLJKWWR³PDNH >«@ODZVIRUWKHZRUOGFRPPXQLW\´324 outside of 
UN structures. The respective language (diplomatic talking points) used on unilateral Iran 
sanctions by Chinese, Russian, and Turkish officials, respectively, is quite revealing in this 
regard. In interviews conducted for this dissertation, Turkish diplomats described these 
VDQFWLRQVDV³XQKHOSIXO´RU³FRXQWHUSURGXFWLYH´ZKLOH WKHGLVFXUVLYHGLYHUJHQFH IURPVXFK
policies went noticeably further in statements by Chinese and Russian officials. The former 
³RSSRVH´ VXFK PHDVXUHV ZKLOH 5XVVLDQ RIILFLDOV HYHQ GHVFULEHG WKHP DV ³LOOHJDO´325 Thus, 
µVRYHUHLJQW\¶DQGµQRQ-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶DUHQRUPVWKDWVKRXOGJRYHUQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVWKH\
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 EEAS ŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ƌƵƐƐĞůƐ ? ?:ƵŶĞ 2013.  
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 ^ŽĨŽƌŵƵůĂƚĞĚďǇĂdƵƌŬŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ŶŬĂƌĂ ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
325
 Interview with Russian foreign ministry official, Moscow, 18 April 2013; Interview with Russian diplomat, 




are the ideational underpinning of what would be a counter-hegemonic movement. In this 
context, interference is not only understood as the physical intrusion into the territory of 
another state, as in the case of a military invasion, but equally captures the intrusive effect that 
a comprehensive sanctions regime can have on a country. In the case of Iran, the US has 
woven a web of a truly intrusive sanctions regime composed of different sub-regimes of 
sanctions for different charges (human rights abuses, terrorism charges, nuclear-related) that 
VHHNVWKHFRXQWU\¶VFRPSOHte international isolation. The use of political discourse to capture 
WKLV GHJUHH RI µLQWUXVLRQ¶ LV PRVW UHYHDOLQJ DQG QHHGV QR IXUWKHU H[SODQDWRU\ FRPPHQWDU\
ZKHQ WKH 86 6HFUHWDU\ RI 6WDWH FDOOV IRU µFULSSOLQJ¶ VDQFWLRQV326 ,Q DGGLWLRQ µVHFRQGDU\
sanctionV¶ even have an intrusive effect on third countries because of undesired interactions 
with the sanctioned entities. These secondary sanctions affect China, Russia and Turkey in 
different sectors of the economy, respectively. As the previous three chapters have shown, 
their stakes in Iran sanctions are different, and so are their stakes in resisting not only the 
ideational, but also the material dimension of these sanctions. Arms trade constituted a bigger 
part of the Russian-Iranian trade volume than it did in the Chinese-Iranian trade volume. 327 
Both Russian and Chinese weapons deliveries, however, were to be suspended by a gradually 
expanded UN arms embargo. Determined to restrict Russian arms exports to Iran already 
before the imposition of UN embargoes, the US sanctioned the Russian aircraft manufacturer 
Sukhoi and arms exporter Rosoboronexport in 2006 and 2008. On balance, though, Russian 
µFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWKGLIIHUHQW,UDQ VDQFWLRQVZDVµHDVLHU¶HFRQRPLFDOO\EHFDXVHRIWKHUHODWLYHO\
negligible Russian-Iranian trade volume than it was for China.328 China has bigger stakes in 
trade with Iran and in energy relations in particular that make it hard to renounce on Iranian 
oil imports. The attempt to dry up financial lifelines to Iran by gradually hampering its access 
to the financial markets as well as the US prohibitions to invest significantly in the Iranian 
economy thus proved to be more of a challenge to China than to Russia. As was discussed in 
chapter 6, The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA) of 1996 stipulated that investments made in 
the Iranian energy sector exceeding 20 million US dollars in one year are deemed 
VDQFWLRQDEOHDFWLYLWLHV.DW]PDQ7KHµ&RPSUHKHQVLYH,UDQSanctions, Accountability, 
                                                          
326
 ƐĨŽƌŵĞƌh^^ƚĂƚĞ^ĞĐƌĞƚĂƌǇ,ŝůůĂƌǇůŝŶƚŽŶŚĂƐĚŽŶĞ “ĨŽƌǇĞĂƌƐ ? ?ĂƐƐŚĞǁƌŝƚĞƐŝŶŚĞƌŵĞŵŽŝƌƐ ?^ŚĞĂĚĚƐ
with barely conĐĞĂůĞĚƉƌŝĚĞŚŽǁƚŚĞh^ĂƐƐĞŵďůĞĚĂ ‘ĐŽĂůŝƚŝŽŶ ?ƚŽĂĚŽƉƚƚŚĞŵ ?ĂŶĚƚŚĂƚ “ŝďŝEĞƚĂŶǇĂŚƵƚŽůĚ
ŵĞŚĞůŝŬĞĚƚŚĞƉŚƌĂƐĞƐŽŵƵĐŚƚŚĂƚŚĞŚĂĚĂĚŽƉƚĞĚŝƚĂƐŚŝƐŽǁŶ ? ?ůŝŶƚŽŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ? ? ) ? 
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 Cf. the arms trade databases at SIPRI (http://armstrade.sipri.org/armstrade/page/trade_register.php). 
Subsequent UNSC resolutions, especially UNSCR 1929, have imposed arms embargoes that impede Russian 
ĂƌŵƐƐĂůĞƐƚŽ/ƌĂŶ ?ƐŬĞĚĂďŽƵƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐe with Iran arms embargoes, a Russian official states in an 
ŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁƚŚĂƚZƵƐƐŝĂ ?ƐĂƌŵƐĞǆƉŽƌƚĐŽŶƚƌŽůƌĞŐŝŵĞƐĂƌĞŶŽǁĞǀĞŶƐƚƌŝĐƚĞƌƚŚĂŶƚŚĞh^ĂŶĚhEŽŶĞƐ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?Ɛ
interview, Washington, 31 October 2014.  
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products to Iran as breaches of that act, and the Chinese company Zhuhai Zhenrong was 
sanctioned under the CISADA in 2012 (US Department of State 2012). &KLQD¶V increased 
sensitivity to US sanctions in the energy field is to be explained by the need for oil imports, 
while Russia is endowed with its own natural resources. Their vulnerability to US unilateral 
sanctions and, consequently, their material resistance to them, therefore differs because of 
different economic framework conditions.        
 $QG7XUNH\¶VHFRQRPLFGHSHQGHQFHRQ ,UDQDOVRSULPDULO\ OLHV LQ WKHHQHUJ\VHFWRU
With roughly 20 percent of gas imports and 40 percent of oil imports coming from Iran, 
7XUNH\¶V JRYHUQPHQW KDG WR ILQG D EDODQFH LQ FRQWLQXLQJ WUDGH UHODWLRQV ZLWK ,UDQ DQG
ZDQWLQJ WR VKRZ UHFHSWLYHQHVV WR 86 FRQFHUQV 7XUNH\¶V µJROG-for-JDV¶ WUDGH ZLWK ,UDQ LQ
which Turkey had been exporting gold to Iran via Dubai as an indirect payment for Iranian 
natural gas deliveries was perceived in Washington as an attempt to circumnavigate US 
financial sanctions on Iran, and Turkish businesses continue to be on the watch list of US 
legislators and sanctions-enforcement agencies (Daly 2013).329      
 The interstice of and interaction between different economic and political policy 
prioritisations can thus lead to frictions between various domestic actors in the formulation of 
foreign policy ± DIDFWVRFRPSODFHQWO\GLVPLVVHGE\,5µUHDOLVW¶VFKRROVRIWKRXJKW,WVKRXOG
QRWFRPHDVDVXUSULVHWR)RUHLJQ3ROLF\DQDO\VWVWKDWDVWDWH¶Vµ,UDQSROLF\¶LVWKHDJJUHJDWH
outcome of a debate between various domestic actors, often with partially clashing agendas. 
Governmental politics is often path-dependent in respective institutional contexts (Welch 
1992: 116) and enriched by varied domestic foreign policy debates (Nau 2012). Perhaps 
QRZKHUHZDVWKLVPRUHQRWLFHDEOHWKDQLQ5XVVLDGXULQJ<HOWVLQ¶VDGPLQLVWUDWLRQ-1999). 
In a climate of administrative chaos and economic decline during the early Yeltsin years, 
foreign policy with regard to nuclear export control regimes oscillated as competing voices 
ZLWKLQ 5XVVLD UHQGHUHG 0RVFRZ¶V ,UDQ SROLF\ DPELJXRXV DW EHVW330 While the Ministry of 
Atomic Energy (MinAtom), headed by Viktor Mikhaylov, approved of nuclear technology 
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  “h^ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĞŶĨŽƌĐĞŵĞŶƚĂŐĞŶĐŝĞƐĂƌĞƉƌŝŵĂƌŝůǇƚŚŽƐĞĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐƚŚĂƚŵŽŶŝƚŽƌƚŚĞŝŵƉůĞŵĞŶƚĂƚŝŽŶŽĨh^
financial sanctions. The Bureau of Industry and Security in the US Department of Commerce monitors the 
export of dual-use goods, the Directorate of Defense Trade Controls in the State Department monitors the sale 
of military hardware, and the Office of Terrorism and Financial Intelligence (and here especially the Office of 
Foreign Asset Control, OFAC) in the US Finance Department monitors compliance with US financial sanctions 
 ? Q ? ?/ŶĐůŽƐĞĐŽŶƐƵůƚĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚƚŚĞh^^ƚĂƚĞĞƉĂƌƚŵĞŶƚ ?K&ĐŽŶƚƌŽůƐ ?ĐŽŵƉůŝĂŶĐĞǁŝƚŚ )h^ĨŝŶĂŶĐŝĂů
ƐĂŶĐƚŝŽŶƐĂŶĚĞŶĨŽƌĐĞƐƚŚĞŵŝŶĐŽůůĂďŽƌĂƚŝŽŶǁŝƚŚĨĞĚĞƌĂůĂƵƚŚŽƌŝƚŝĞƐ ? ?>ŽŚŵĂŶŶ ? ? ? ? P ? ?ĂƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐƚƌĂŶƐůĂƚŝŽŶ ) ? 
330
 dŚŝƐǁĂƐƚŚĞĐĂƐĞĚĞƐƉŝƚĞzĞůƚƐŝŶ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐŝĂůĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŽĨĨŽƌĞŝŐŶƉŽůŝĐǇƵŶĚĞƌƚŚĞĂƵƐƉŝĐĞŽĨƚŚĞ
WƌĞƐŝĚĞŶƚ ?ƐŽĨĨŝĐĞ ?dŚŝƐĂƚƚĞŵƉƚĞĚĐĞŶƚƌĂůŝƐĂƚŝŽŶŝŶĞĨĨ ĐƚƐŝĚĞůŝŶĞĚƚŚĞĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇ ?ƚŚƵƐĞŶĐŽƵƌĂŐŝŶŐ
Minatom and the defence ministry to engage in their own diplomacy (Belopolsky 2009: 32-33, 35-38).  
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sales to Iran331 without consulting President Yeltsin, Moscow officially committed itself 
through the Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission to consult the Americans about arms and 
technology transfers to Iran of a dual-XVHQDWXUH$QWRQHQNR$QGDQDO\VHVRI5XVVLD¶V
contemporary Iran diplomacy, as chapter 5 has shown, have to take into account inter-
ministerial (and within ministries, inter-departmental) differences in approaches and shifting 
priorities between the Kremlin, the foreign ministry, and the Ministry of Atomic Energy 
NQRZQDV5RV$WRPVLQFH7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\LVWRUQEHWZHHQFRQIOLFWLQJSULRULWLHVRI
WKHSULPHPLQLVWHU¶VDQGSUHVLGHQW¶VRIILFH WKHIRUHLJQPLQLVWUy, the ministry of economics, 
and commercial (albeit state-RZQHG DFWRUV VXFK DV WKH RLO DQG JDV FRPSDQ\ %27$ù
3HWUROHXP 3LSHOLQH &RUSRUDWLRQ DQG WKH RLO UHILQHU 7SUDú ,Q DGGLWLRQ WKH 7XUNLVK
governmental position is complicated by the presence of cabiQHW PHPEHUV ZLWK PRUH µSUR-
,UDQ¶V\PSDWKLHVWKDQVRPHRIWKHLUFROOHDJXHV      
 As for the Chinese case, chapter 6 has demonstrated that there is a considerable degree 
of confusion over the relation between the Chinese government and companies such as 
Norinco, the China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC) or the China National Offshore 
Oil Corporation (CNOOC). Tellingly, companies were sanctioned unilaterally by the US 
administration, as mentioned above (e.g. the Chinese company Zhuhai Zhenrong or Russia¶V
aircraft manufacturer Sukhoi and arms exporter Rosoboronexport), while the respective 
diplomatic machinery (primarily, but not exclusively, the foreign ministry) pledged 
cooperation with their US counterparts. If material resistance to hegemony depends on 
economic framework conditions, as worked out above, such framework conditions as well as 
institutional (read: bureaucratic and ministerial) structures also always provide a level playing 
field for domestic actors to act out disagreements over approaches to Iran and US hegemony.
 The states under investigation here (China, Russia, Turkey) are thus by no means to be 
understood as respective monolithic blocs, and the preceding case studies have process-traced 
the outcomes of domestic decision-making processes and the occasional plethora of voices on 
WKHIRUPXODWLRQRIDQRYHUDOOJRYHUQPHQWDOµ,UDQSROLF\¶,QWKHUHPDLQGHURIWKHFKDSWHUWKH
commonalities and differences of Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies will therefore be 
compared on a cross-case level with a view to the aggregate outcome, i.e. to the degree of 
resistance to hegemony that the totality of their respective foreign policies in the Iranian 
nuclear crisis generates.         
 &KLQD¶V5XVVLD¶VDQG7XUNH\¶VHFRQRPLFLQWHUHVWVLQ,UDQDV analysed in this section, 
KHOS H[SODLQ D PDWHULDO UHVLVWDQFH WR KHJHPRQ\ DQG DQ LQVLVWHQFH RQ WKH SULQFLSOH RI µQRQ-
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 such as the delivery of a gas centrifuge needed to enrich weapons-grade uranium (cf. Parker 2009: 116).  
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LQWHUIHUHQFH¶ /LNHZLVH VRYHUHLJQW\ LV D FRQFHSW ZKRVH OLQN WR KHJHPRQ\ LV FUXFLDO 7KH
rendition of enmity is an order-constituting exercise because it presupposes an acceptance 
thereof by a relevant audience (Williams 2003: 514; Campbell 1993; Klein 1994; Balzacq 
2010). Being able to exert control over transgressions thus means being truly sovereign (cf. 
Agamben 2002: 25; Schmitt 1993: 19). If China, Russia and Turkey, therefore, reiterate 
legitimate Iranian rights to develop nuclear energy, they implicitly raise questions of 
sovereignty in that they question the non-granting of such rights on the part of hegemonic 
powers. Placing restrictions on nuclear fuel cycle development is perceived as encroachments 
on sovereignty, and it is here that their rhetoric becomes congruent with Iranian 
argumentation. The challenge in the stand-RIIRYHU ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHPH D7XUNLVK
foreign ministry RIILFLDO UHIOHFWV LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ LV WR ³VWUHQJWKHQ WKH 137 UHJLPH ZLWKRXW
LQIULQJLQJVRYHUHLJQULJKWV´332 The contested nature of the legal dispute over Iranian nuclear 
ULJKWVLQWKLVFRQWH[WDOVRFDVWVGRXEWVRQWKHµOHJDOLW\¶RI816HFXULW\&RXQFLOUHsolutions 
calling on Iran to suspend enrichment (UN 2006a, 2008a, 2010a). Because it is here that the 
crux of the international stand-RIIRYHU ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH OLHV VXFKSURYLVLRQVFDQ
and have been, read as an act of hegemonic instrumentalisation of the UN system.333
 5XVVLD¶VDQG&KLQD¶VDGYRFDF\ IRUPRUH³GHPRFUDWLF´ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV LQ WKLV
context, is indicative of an effort to advance the ideational dimension of a security culture that 
resists hegemony, eliminates power asymmetries in international relations, and hence 
³GHPRFUDWLVHV´ WKHP6SHHFKHVE\&KLQHVHKLJK-UDQNLQJRIILFLDOVRQHQGHDYRUV WR³SURPRWH
GHPRFUDF\LQLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV´+XDQGWKHLGHDRIGHPRFUDWLFLQWHUQDWLRQDO
relations as put forward in the official Russian Foreign Policy Concept (2013) are seminal 
cases in point. And when Turkish president Erdogan reminds the assembled delegates at the 
81*HQHUDO$VVHPEO\WKDW³WKHZRUOGLVELJJHUWKDQILYH´KHLVEUHDWKLQJWKHVDPHVSLULWDQG
invokes the ambition to decentralise hierarchical relations. Turke\¶VQRQ-inclusion in the UN 
Security Council, however, gives such statements coming from the Turkish head of state 
another dimension absent in the Chinese and Russian rhetoric because these directly challenge 
institutionalised power such as that of the perPDQHQW816&PHPEHUV&KLQD¶VDQG5XVVLD¶V
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is empowered under the constituent treaty (i.e. the UN Charter) to pass resolutions binding on all members of 
the organisation (cf. Art. 24(1); Art. 25). With these institutional provisions, SC resolutions are binding even 
when in conflict with another treaty  W such as the NPT  W provided that resolutions are passed as decisions 
pursuant to Chapter VII (cf. the supremacy clause of Art. 103). Iran has rejected the legality of Security Council 
Resolutions demanding that it halts uranium enrichment. Then-permanent representative of Iran to the UN 
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asymmetrical power disposal in international relations beyond such concrete institutionalised 
forms of power.  This PLUURUVWKHGLVWLQFWLRQPDGHEHWZHHQWKHµLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHP¶ZKLFK
GRHV QRW DOZD\V VHUYH 86 LQWHUHVWV DQG 86 GRPLQDQFH LQ LW 7KH FDOO IRU µGHPRFUDWLF¶
LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV UHIOHFWV*HRUJH2UZHOO¶V IDPRXVGLFWXPIURP Animal Farm WKDW³$OO
animals aUHHTXDO%XWVRPHDUHPRUHHTXDO WKDQRWKHUV´'HVSLWH IRUPDOHTXLW\FRQWLQJHQW
power relations between states create asymmetrical hierarchies. Depending on political 
VWDQFHV DQG RULHQWDWLRQV WKHVH PRUH SRZHUIXO VWDWHV FDQ EH ODEHOHG µSULPHV LQWHU SDUHV¶
superpoweUVRUKHJHPRQV7KHµGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQ¶RILQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVLQWKLVUHDVRQLQJ
would bring about the leveling of such power relations.334 This is thus not to be confused with 
the translation of democracy as a societal model for international emulation.335 Quite on the 
FRQWUDU\ &KLQHVH DQG 5XVVLDQ FDOOV IRU µGHPRFUDWLF¶ LQWHUQDWLRQDO SROLWLFV SUHVXSSRVH WKH
adherence to rules on an equitable basis internationally, while domestic rules can and should 
stay distinct, and while norm conceptions can differ.       
 Chinese, Russian and Turkish warnings of the counterproductive effect of punitive and 
pressuring policies that undermine diplomacy are indicative of the same intent. China, Russia 
and Turkey have publicly advocated for a security culture that rejects politics of aggression 
vis-à-vis Iran and therewLWKKDYHVRXJKWWRµde-WesternisH¶ discourse on Iran. This will be the 
subject of the next section, which links such a Chinese, Russian and Turkish discursive 
divergence to the extent of their resistance to hegemony. This intermediate step will be an 
important analytical one to conceptually synthesise their degree of resistance along the 
discursive and behavioral level according to the two-level model introduced in this 
dissertation. 
3. The De-Westernisation of Iran Discourses 
 
³5DWLRQDOLW\´ DQG ³UHVSRQVLELOLW\´ LQ WKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHP DUH LQKHUHQWO\ VXEMHFWLYH
notions. The discursive usage of these terms, therefore, presupposes intersubjectively shared 
meanings. The narrative of an irrational, irresponsible Iranian leadership is a powerful 
example for the instrumentalisation of a discourse on logic. States that do not share 
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oppose such concepts for demographic reasons: Should a representational formula for international 
organisations based on population be applied, the Western predominance therein would substantially shift in 
favor of non-Western states. 
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 Given Chinese and Russian domestic politics, the choice for such semantics on the part of China and Russia 
thus does not come without irony.   
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hegemonic values or political structures are labeled irresponsible, unreasonable, renegade 
counter-poles. As was carved out in chapter 1, a critical reading of international politics needs 
to ask who is µUHYROWLQJ¶DJDLQVWDQH[LVWLQJRUGHUDQGZKRJHWV WRDFWDV³FXVWRGLDQVRIWKH
VHDOV RI LQWHUQDWLRQDO DSSURYDO DQG GLVDSSURYDO´ &ODXGH  371-2). Since the Islamic 
Revolution propelled an anti-American regime to power in 1979, Iran has been positioning 
itself in opposition to policies crafted by the West, and the United States in particular. Both 
sides (Iran and the United States) have used this official rhetoric of mutual stigmatisation for 
SROLWLFDO UHDVRQVIRU WKH ODVW WKUHHGHFDGHV7KH³D[LVRIUHVLVWDQFH´UKHWRULFXVHG WRGHQRWH
resistance to Israel and American presence in the Middle East, is illustrative of such a 
discursive construction of competing worldviews (Posch 2013: 27). The social construction of 
statist identities for public relations purposes is often simplistic and even dualistic when 
FRPELQHG ZLWK WKH PHDQV IRU IRUHLJQ SROLF\ SRUWUD\DO RI DQ ³HQHP\´ :KDW FDQ EH D VHOI-
proclaimed axis of resistance may be an Axis of Evil in an antagonistic discourse. The 
ODQJXDJH RQ µURJXH VWDWHV¶ IORXWLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO QRUPV QRW EHFDXVH RI WKHLU EHKDYLRU EXW
because of the nature of their regime (Litwak 2008: 92; 2012: 9-19; 2014: 17-33) is 
juxtaposed on the other VLGH E\ WKH ODQJXDJH RQ µJOREDO DUURJDQFH¶ GHQRWLQJ DQ DOO-
encompassing, almost Orwellian, reach of a roughshod superpower. Regimes of exception 
DQG WUXWK DUH SURGXFHG DQG UHSURGXFHG WKURXJK SRZHUIXO QDUUDWLYHV 7KH µVWDWH VSRQVRU RI
WHUURULVP¶ODEHOXVHGE\86DGPLQLVWUDWLRQVWRGLVFDUGWKHµUDWLRQDOLW\¶RI,UDQ¶VJRYHUQPHQWLV
another indicator for the political nature of a mutual demonisation, of labels that produce 
reality: Successive US governments have deliberately supported regimes and governments 
WKDW E\ DQ\ DFFRXQW KDYH WR EH FRQVLGHUHG µWHUURULVW¶ +LVWRULFDO H[DPSOHV DERXQG
³¶WHUURULVP¶DVDQRXQDQGµWHUURULVWLF¶DVDQDGMHFWLYH´DV$GLE-Moghaddam (2014) therefore 
FRQFLVHO\ SXWV LW ³DUH WKH WHUPLQRORJLFDO VXUIDFH HIIHFW RI GLVFXUVLYH UHSUHVHQWDWLRQV >«@´
(167). Foreign policy discourse and state identities thus always have to be understood in a 
relational context. Asked about the sequencing of the eventual lifting of sanctions as an 
integral part of a CJPoA336 against the background of the tightly interwoven and overlapping 
network of sanctions regimes for different charges (nuclear-related, Human Rights abuses, 
µWHUURULVP¶ D 6WDWH 'HSDUWPHQW RIILFLDO WHOOLQJO\ UHPDUNHG LQ DQ LQWHUYLHZ ³(YHQ LI WKH
nuclear sanctions were lifted, there would VWLOO EH WKH VWDWH VSRQVRU RI WHUURULVP ODEHO >«@
&RPSDQLHV DUH DIUDLG RI JHWWLQJ LQYROYHG ZLWK ,UDQ >«@ EHFDXVH RI UHSXWDWLRQDO
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 Comprehensive Joint Plan of Action. This would be a more comprehensive follow-up agreement to the Joint 
Plan of Action (JPoA) negotiated between the P5+1 and Iran on 24 November 2013 in Geneva. After two 
extensions of earlier deadlines (on 21 July 2014 and on 24 November 2014), the seven negotiation teams are 
reconvening at the time of writing to negotiate a CJPoA.  
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FRQVHTXHQFHV´337 The hegemonic narrative of Iran has woven a dense tapestry of enemy 
projection that is very difficult to unravel ± HYHQ LIDQDJUHHPHQWRYHU ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDU VWDWXV
will eventually be achieved. In addition, once adopted and implemented, sanctions often tend 
to take a life of their own that is difficult to unravel bureaucratically.338   
 In their advocacy for the non-interference of external actors in the fabric of a third 
country, states like China and Russia thus advance an essentially relational understanding of 
security. Publicly rejecting the idea of interventionism, they mould security cultures that 
counteract WKHDWWHPSWWRµLQWHUQDWLRQDOLVH¶QRUPV&KLQD¶V³four QR¶V´GLVFXVVHGLQFKDSWHU, 
DUHDQDWWHPSWWRSURYLGHDQHJDWLYHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQIRUZKDWZDVFUDIWHGDVµXQLYHUVDOYDOXHV¶
by Western states, and to portray them as destabilisinJ WR &KLQD¶V µQDWLRQDO¶ FXOWXUH 7KH
nationalist underbelly (more or less pronounced at different times in the last two decades) of 
5XVVLD¶V RIILFLDO GLVFRXUVH LQ WKH VHDUFK IRU D SRVW-Soviet identity is another such example 
ZKHUH µFRXQWHU-FXOWXUHV¶ WDNH Vtate identities and societal orders to a level that, by design, 
VKXWV RXW µWKH LQWHUQDWLRQDO¶ 6DNZD  7KH REVHUYHG GLVFUHSDQF\ EHWZHHQ RIILFLDO
UKHWRULFDQG WKHXQGHUPLQLQJRI WKHSULQFLSOHRI µQRQ-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶RQRWKHURFFDVLRQV LV DQ
intriguing one. Publicly pledging for equitable international relations and the non-interference 
LQRWKHUFRXQWU\¶VGRPHVWLFDIIDLUV5XVVLDDQG&KLQDPDNHVHOI-GHILQHGH[FHSWLRQV5XVVLD¶V
WHUPLQRORJ\ RI D µQHDU DEURDG¶ LV PRVW LQGLFDWLYH LQ WKLV UHJDUG DQG 5XVVLDQ Vemi-covert 
interference in politics in neighboring Ukraine has only been the most emblematic of 
H[DPSOHV $QG FRQWHVWHG WHUULWRULDO GLVSXWHV LQ 6RXWKHDVW $VLD WHVWLI\ WR &KLQD¶V SDUWLDOO\
particularistic definitions of sovereignty. While a thorough examination of such cases is 
EH\RQG WKH VFRSH RI WKLV GLVVHUWDWLRQ VXIILFH WR UHWDLQ KHUH WKDW µQRQ-LQWHUIHUHQFH¶ DQG DQ
XQGHUVWDQGLQJ RI µQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV¶ DUH KLJKO\ FRQWHVWHG DQG UHODWLRQDO WHUPV :KLOH WKH
preceding chapters have cast light on varying domestic motivations in Russian, Chinese, and 
Turkish foreign policies, further research is needed to illuminate the nexus between foreign 
SROLFLHVDQGWKHLQWHUQDOGHWHUPLQDQWVRIµLQWHUQDWLRQDOQRUPV¶GLVFRXUVHV ,QWKHLUDJJUHJDWH
effect on the international level however, as the preceding case studies have shown, norm 
contestation becomes an act of resistance to hegemony. In this context, the academic debate 
DERXWµGHFOLQLQJ¶SRZHUVVKRXOGQRWEHPLVFRQVWUXHGDVH[FOXVLYHO\HQFRPSDVVLQJµV\VWHPLF¶
power transitions (mostly framed in rationalist terminology), but should be inclusive of the 
fragmentation of interpretative frameworks to World Order.    
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 SWP nuclear proliferation expert Dr. Oliver Meier observes a tendency of bureaucracies to focus on the 
strengthening of sanctions without necessarily formulating mechanisms for the eventual lifting of sanctions. 
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 China, Russia and Turkey advocate for security cultures that do not necessarily 
coincide with hegemonic conceptions of the need to counter an irrational Iranian leadership 
said to pose a threat to peace and international security. Doing so, they have positioned 
themselves between an actor that explicitly resists hegemony (Iran) and the hegemon itself 
(United States). In this, their foreign policy discourse has occasionally shown more 
appreciation for the Iranian perspective according to which the West aims to deprive Iran of 
technology that it has a legal right to use. Chinese, Russian and Turkish public diplomacy can 
be read as a discursive attempt at desecuritisation of the Iranian nuclear file. This diplomacy 
was also meant as an act of de-escalation of what was felt to be an emotionally charged, 
politicised discourse emanating especially from Washington. The Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Treaty (NPT), as Patrikarakos (2012: 30) aptly writes, created a political faultline between the 
developed and the developing, the modernised and the modernising world (cf. also 
Guldimann 2007: 171). Beyond technical and legal dispuWHVDERXW,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH
and its rights and obligations as an NPT member, it is thus of paramount importance to 
understand the political and ideological GLPHQVLRQVRI,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUFULVLV7KLVLVDOVRNH\LQ
understanding security cultures that resist political hierarchies created and sustained by a 
KHJHPRQLF³KLVWRULFEORF´LQWKHWKFHQWXU\DQGRIZKLFKWKH137DVDIUHH]LQJUHJLPHRI
WKH QXFOHDU VWDWXV TXR LV D SULPH H[DPSOH 7KH ³YDOXHV RI WKH SRZHU EORF VXEDOWHUQV DQG
counter-hegemonic fRUFHV DUH LQ D FRQVWDQW VWDWH RI QHJRWLDWLRQ FRPSURPLVH DQG FKDQJH´
-RQHVUHPLQGVXV86µDOOLHV¶LQWKLVXQGHUVWDQGLQJDUHµVXEDOWHUQV¶WKDWVXEVFULEH
to the hegemonic projects of such a power bloc (ibid.: 42). Europe has lent its consent to US 
hegemonic project, as the evolving Iran diplomacies in the Western hemisphere has shown. 
Critical of US unilateral attempts to sanction Iran that increasingly also affected Iranian-
(XURSHDQ WUDGHUHODWLRQVµVHFRQGDU\VDQFWLRQV¶ LQ WKHV WKH(8¶s stance on unilateral 
VDQFWLRQVKDVEHHQVXFK WKDWDQ LQLWLDO FULWLFLVPKDV OHG WRDQ µRYHUFRPSOLDQFH¶ LQ-12. 
)HDURIµUHSXWDWLRQDOFRVWV¶*LXPHOOL	,YDQKDVOHWWKH(8WRDGRSWXQLODWHUDO,UDQ
sanctions that went beyond UN-mandated ones and affected the Iranian economy much 
stronger than US unilateral ones did (the 2012 EU oil embargo and cut-off of the Iranian 
&HQWUDO%DQNIURP6:,)76RZKLOHµUHVLVWDQFH¶FDQDQGGRHV WDNHSODFH within a historic 
bloc, and even between hegemonic forces DQG µVXEDOWHUQV¶ WKH HPSLULFDO WUDFN UHFRUG RI
European Iran diplomacies suggests the conclusion that despite differences in policy 
preferences, the EU has fully subscribed to hegemonic structures.339 This has created the 
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necessary consent RI µVXEDOWHUQV¶ to sustain and reinforce hegemonic constellations. The 
referral to the Security Council in February 2006 by an IAEA board vote of 27-3 paved the 
way for the eventual imposition of Chapter VII sanctions on Iran and, interestingly, a gradual 
shift of positioQV ZLWKLQ WKH µ(XURSHDQ¶ FDPS ZLWK )UDQFH DQG *UHDW %ULWDLQ EHFRPLQJ
increasingly more assertive and formulating confrontational foreign policy stances on Iran, to 
DQH[WHQWHYHQWKDWOHDGV2ERUQHDQG0RUULVRQWRGHVFULEHWKHPDVµFOLHQWVWDWHV¶RIWKH86 in 
the Iran dossier (2013: 6). EU sanctions were a manifestation of the consent of the subaltern 
to US hegemony. Between the US and the EU, there is a close collaboration on the areas 
targeted by their respective unilateral sanctions so as to maximise theLUHIIHFW³7KLVPDNHVLW
QRWWKH81EXWDVPXOWLODWHUDODVSRVVLEOH´DQ(GHOHJDWLRQPHPEHUUHPDUNHG340 Another 
E3 official put this as follows:  
We coordinated with the US before every round of sanctions. This has a political 
effect: You want to maximise the shock effect. If you want to shock the market, if 
you want to bankrupt a country, (and) if you do it yourself, it takes a hell of a lot of 
time.341  
 
 The intended outcome of sanctions, thus, is not to induce a change in behavior anymore, but 
WR µEDQNUXSW D FRXQWU\¶ 7KH PHDQV EHFRPHV VHOI-satisfactory without much instrumental 
scrutiny. Another E3 government official formulated that EU Iran sanctions served to 
³FRQVWUDLQ ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU FDSDFLWLHV FRHUFH ,UDQ WR WKH QHJRWLDWLQJ WDEOH DQG WR signal 
dLVDSSURYDORI,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH´ (emphasis added).342 Disapproval is not expressed 
of a possible military dimension (PMD)EXWRI,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHSHUVH<HWDQRWKHU
(JRYHUQPHQWRIILFLDOQRWHG WKDW³JLYHQ WKDW >«@ WKH(8 LVDNH\DOO\ IRU WKH86 WKH\¶UH
H[SHFWLQJ XV WR FRRUGLQDWH WKH VFRSH DQG JRDOV RI VDQFWLRQV ZLWK WKHP´343$QRWKHU DFWRU¶V
(US) expectancy is thus being internalised and structures European decision-making. Beyond 
legitimate proliferation concerns, a powerful narrative of regime disapproval has become a 
transatlantic consensus.344           
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 EU Sanctions workshop under Chatham House rules, 14 May 2015, London. Cf. Annex II. 
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 Note that this consensus relates to the governmental level. A private sector representative remarked that 
the US State Department had been anxious of the European Court of Justice being too interventionist with 
regard to unilateral sanctions legislation, as a number of case challenging the legality of targeted sanctions 
against entities or individuals have been successful before the ECJ. While there is often a lack of evidentiary 
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 At the same time, US financial threats (secondary sanctions, threats to exclude trading 
partners from US financial institutions) served to coerce other actors into acceptance of 
hegemonic policies. While the US had agreed to exclude European companies from US 
unilateral secondary sanctions at first, presidential executive orders under Obama as from 
2010 affected European entities with full force again (Lohmann 2015). ³:H SUHVHQW RXU
partners with a choice: You either trade with the Bank of Iran or you trade with the Bank of 
$PHULFD´IRUPHU861DWLRQDO6HFXULW\&RXQFLORIILFLDODQG:RRGURZ:LOVRQVFKRODU5REHUW
Litwak bluntly stated in an interview.345 On the basis of the US dominance in the global 
financial system, and of that of the US dollar as the international reserve currency, US 
legislation is being extraterritorialised. Violations of US unilateral financial sanctions carry 
high penalties, and the fines levied against the French bank BNP Paribas in 2014 for having 
executed money transfers of companies, including Iranian ones, that are on US sanctions lists, 
was but the most recent and publicised example among a plethora of others (Lohmann 2014: 
6). Asked about the imposition of EU unilateral sanctions in addition to UN and US sanctions, 
a European diplomat thus explains the rationale in an interview as follows:  
³(XURSH ZDV DOVR XQGHU VHULRXV SUHVVXUH %XW ZH DUH SDUW RI WKH  IRUPDW 7KH
Americans like to impose sanctions, but have little trade with Iran. So they are 
looking at their partners to put pressure on Iran. It was only logical that we followed 
VXLW´346  
7KHSRZHURIH[FOXVLRQDU\ORJLFKDVDVWURQJQRUPDWLYHSXOODµKLVWRULFEORF¶LVPRXOGHGDQG
sustained through the complimentary forces of consent and coercion. Against this 
background, the preceding chapters have shown how China, Russia and Turkey have resisted 
WKH KHJHPRQLF SROLFLHV RI WKLV SRZHU EORF ,Q WKHLU IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
programme, China, Russia and Turkey are resisting the ideational dimension of hegemonic 
structures. The hegemonic project to impose the acceptance of policies under coercion as 
GHVFULEHG DERYH FRXSOHG ZLWK :HVWHUQ DODUPLVP FRQFHUQLQJ ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU ILOH ZDV
decisively rejected and resisted by China, Russia and Turkey on normative grounds. Their 
acceptance of the rules of the UN system, however, demonstrates their adherence to the 
institutional dimension of the broader macro-structure through which international politics are 
chaQQHOHGFRQYH\HGDQGFRPPXQLFDWHGDVVKRZQLQWKHSUHYLRXVVHFWLRQ³>«@,QVWLWXWLRQV
µPHGLDWH¶EHWZHHQWKHUXOLQJJURXSDQGLWVLQWHQGHGDXGLHQFH´-RQHV-77) writes in 
this regard. The Chinese and Russian approval of international sanctions in the UNSC is a 
case in point. While UNSC-backed international sanctions were approved with their consent, 
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additional unilateral sanctions efforts are seen as illegitimate, as essentially hegemonic 
policies. On the basis of these ideational and institutional dynamics analyzed in this, and the 
material dimension of Coxian hegemonic structures as analyzed in the previous section, the 
next section seeks to make sense of a seeming contradiction in the advancement of such a 
UHVLVWDQFHWRKHJHPRQ\DQG&KLQD¶V5XVVLD¶VDQG7XUNH\¶VLQWHUDFWLRQZLWKµWKHKHJHPRQ¶ 
4. Non-Western Iran Policies in Interaction with Hegemonic Structures   
 
The previous sections have examined the extent of Chinese, Russian and Turkish adherence to 
the ideational, material, and institutional aspects of the Coxian triangle of hegemonic 
structures. The following paragraphs will analyse how these factors relate to the investigated 
VWDWHV¶µFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWKKHJHPRQLFSROLFLHV,WZLOOEHVKRZQKRZHVSHFLDOO\WKHTXHVWLRQRI
µVDQFWLRQV FRPSOLDQFH¶ LV PRVW LQGLFDWLYH RI WKHLU GHJUHH RI µUHVLVWDQFH WR KHJHPRQ\¶ $
perceived dependence on the U.S.-dominated world economy explains behavioral deviation 
from foreign policies that resist hegemony. Disentangling the discursive from the behavioral 
level of foreign policy, this section demonstrates how a non-hegemonic discourse can be 
paralleled by partial compliance with hegemonic policies.347 The official Russian Foreign 
Policy Concept, for example, bears a strong counter-hegemonic mark, as do repeated public 
VWDWHPHQWVLQGLFDWLQJ5XVVLD¶VDYHUVLRQWRXQLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQVSROLFLHV³$QRWKHUULVNWRZRUOG
peace and stability is presented by attempts to manage crises through unilateral sanctions and 
other coercive measures, including armed aggression, outside the framework of the UN 
6HFXULW\&RXQFLO´ WKHRIILFLDO5XVVLDQ)RUHLJQ 3ROLF\ FRQFHSW IRUPXODWHV 5XVVLDQ)RUHLJQ
Ministry 2013a8QLODWHUDOVDQFWLRQVDUHUHJDUGHGDV³LOOHJLWLPDWH´DVFRQILUPHGE\5XVVLDQ
foreign ministry officials.348 7KHODWWHUQRWRQO\FRPSOLFDWHGLSORPDF\LQ0RVFRZ¶VWKLQNLQJ
EXWDOVRKDYHDQHJDWLYHHIIHFWRQ5XVVLDQFRPSDQLHV¶EXVLQHVVGHDOLQJVZLWK ,UDQ5XVVLDQ
companies have been sanctioned for being seen as undertaking unwanted trade relations with 
Iran (Defense Industry Daily 2006).349 Yet, Russia showed flexibility and (temporary) 
compliance with U.S. approaches towards Iran, when it suspended the delivery of the S-300 
defense system as a result of the U.S.-5XVVLDQµUHVHWSROLF\¶ that allowed closer cooperation 
on the Iranian nuclear file, as chapter 5 has outlined.350      
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 Cf. section 3 of chapter 5. 
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 The sanctions against Sukhoi, imposed because of alleged violations of the Iran Nonproliferation Act of 
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 China is dependent on Iranian oil imports, and its trade with Iran in the weapons and 
nuclear technology fields has long been regarded with suspicion in the West. However, 
Beijing shows a receptiveness to direct and indirect pressure coming from Washington:  As 
much as China is dependent on Iranian crude oil supplies, policy-makers in Beijing are 
cautious not to overstep the mark set out by U.S. Iran sanctions (Pieper 2013b: 315). The 
Chinese reduction of Iranian oil imports in order to qualify for U.S. sanctions waivers against 
Chinese companies (Lohmann 2013: 4) is a forceful case in point for an adherence to a U.S. 
normative framework. Besides the material motivation, such compliance arguably has to do 
ZLWKWKHSHUFHSWLRQRI&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\DQGZLWKWKHLPSUHVVLRQWKDW&KLQDLVVWULYLQJWR
EHKDYHOLNHD³UHVSRQVLEOHVWDNHKROGHU´LQDKHJHPRQLFUHDGLQJ351 Having become de facto 
nuclear partners of Iran in the 1990s, both China and Russia also had halted cooperation under 
pressure from the United States, as the previous chapters have shown.352 This Chinese and 
Russian receptiveness to American pressure has also been noticed with disgruntlement in Iran 
and is being recalled by Iranian officials (cf. Mousavian 2012: 54- ³$IWHUDOO´+RVVHLQ
0RXVDYLDQ  ZULWHV ³DOWKRXJK 5XVVLD &KLQD DQG WKH 1RQ-Aligned Movement 
exercised considerable clout in international diplomacy, they could not be relied on as a 
dynamic coalition leading the way WRZDUG D UHVROXWLRQ RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU LVVXH´  7KH
GHSLFWLRQ WKDW&KLQDDQG5XVVLDKDYHHIIHFWLYHO\ IXQFWLRQHGDV ,UDQ¶VGLSORPDWLFFRYHUVDQG
spoiled efforts to exert pressure on Iran is thus too short-sighted and is disproved by their 
track record of cooperation with the US. From a hegemonic perspective, responsibility is 
attributed to actors that subscribe to the norms of the hegemon, irresponsibility to those that 
disregard them.          
 Turkey shares with China and Russia an aversion for Western pressure on Iran. Thus, 
the government in Ankara has always found itself at a strategic crossroads dictated by its 
geographic location on the one hand, and its integration into NATO alliance structures and a 
commitment to Western security policies on the other. Emphasising that sanctions are 
counterproductive political tools to force Tehran to the negotiating table, Turkey engaged in a 
phase of proactive mediation in 2009 and 2010. This was intended to reduce tensions and 
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 Former US National Security Council official Dr. Robert Litwak confirms this in his 2012 book Outlier States: 
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the cutoff of U.S. aid to Russia to get the Kremlin to forgo the sale of fuel-cycle technology (163-64). 
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propose diplomatic initiatives to the Iranian nuclear stand-off. Even though securing the 
historic first Iranian agreement to a proposed deal in May 2010, this episode of Turkish 
mediation ended as a policy failure when UNSCR 1929 was adopted only a month later. The 
subsequent retreat from an active role as mediator²while not shying away from venting its 
disappointment with Western impatience²ZDV SURRI RI 7XUNH\¶V DOLJQPHQW ZLWK 86
positions. Given this stance, Turkey constantly finds itself in need of justification for its 
imports of Iranian oil²contrary to U.S. efforts to convince its allies of its economic isolation 
policies vis-à-vis Iran. While showing receptiveness to U.S. intentions, Turkey does not cut 
off the most cost-effective oil imports from neighboring Iran. Geography and economic 
considerations partially trump perceptions of solidarity with U.S. policies.   
 This is an important observation that explains perceived inconsistencies in the Iran 
policies of states like China, Russia and Turkey when filtered through a Western lens. While 
WKHVH VWDWHV KDYH DGYRFDWHG IRU IRUHLJQ SROLF\ DSSURDFKHV WR DGGUHVV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
programme differently from those of the United States, they have still faced the imperatives of 
certain material constraints: Turkey cannot ignore the geographic imperatives that come from 
LWV ORFDWLRQ DV ,UDQ¶V QHLJKERU DQG LWV HQVXLQJ GHSHQGHQFH RQ ,UDQLDQ RLO LPSRUWV 7KH
integration into the international financial system as part of the U.S.-dominated international 
economic governance structures is another such material constraint. This is illustrated by the 
effect of unilateral sanctions on Chinese, Turkish and Russian companies trading with Iran. 
³:DVKLQJWRQ¶VH[SDQGLQJUHOLDQFHRQVHFRQGDU\VDQFWLRQV>«@´/HYHUHWW	/HYHUHWW
ZULWH ³UHVWV RQ DQ DVVXPSWLRQ WKDW HYHQ FRXQWULHV UHVLVWDQW WR $PHULFDQ KHJHPRQ\ ZLOO JR
along, in the belief that participation in the global economy requires access to the U.S. 
ILQDQFLDOV\VWHP´:HUH&KLQD7XUNH\DQG5XVVLDFXWRIIIURPWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOWUDGH
and financial system, the sanctions regime would not affect them to the extent that it intends. 
Consequently, it is not unreasonable to assume that their reaction to, and public diplomacy 
regarding, such intrusive measures would be different.     
 Finally, however, it is important to stress that differences in political prioritisations 
between the states investigated here persist and account for varying degreeVRIµUHVLVWDQFHWR
KHJHPRQ\¶EH\RQGREVHUYHGSDWWHUQVRI VLPLODULW\ LQGLVFRXUVH DQGEHKDYLRU DV FDUYHGRXW
above. The three previous chapters have given ample empirical evidence of the multilayered 
nature of Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies towards Iran. China and Russia, for 
H[DPSOHKDYHGLIIHUHQWLQWHUHVWVLQDµVWDWXVTXR¶VLWXDWLRQRQWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUFULVLVWKDWLV
to be explained by their material motivations for trade ties with Iran. While there have 
repeatedly been arguments for Chinese and Russian interests in a protracted stalemate of an 
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internationally isolated and sanctioned Iran because of economic advantages, Russia has 
much more an interest in such a protracted status quo situation than China has. Chinese-
Iranian trade ties are substantial (aggregate bilateral trade flows ranging between a record 
high of 45 billion US dollars in 2011 and around 39.4 billion US dollars in 2013), whereas 
Russian-Iranian trade ties are comparatively negligible (with bilateral trade worth 3.6 billion 
US dollars constituting a high in 2010, which fell to a trade flow of 1.6 billion US dollars in 
2013).353 Chinese-Iranian trade ties might even be made easier with the eventual lifting of 
Western Iran sanctions (it would ease Chinese payments for Iranian oil deliveries if Iran was 
allowed into the SWIFT banking system again). This need not be the case for Russian-Iranian 
trade relations, as Western firms could constitute economic competitors for Russian ones. 
5XVVLD¶V LQWHUHVW LQ µVSRLOLQJ¶ WKH QHJRWLDWion track of the P5+1, as alluded to by Russian 
deputy foreign minister Ryabkov in March 2014, are thus greater from a purely material point 
of view than would be the case for China.354 Aware of such arguments and their political 
significance, Russian officials emphasise that a transition to fully-normalised trade relations 
EHWZHHQ,UDQLDQDQG:HVWHUQFRPSDQLHVLQWKHHYHQWRIDQHJRWLDWHGQXFOHDUVROXWLRQ³ZRQ¶W
KDSSHQ LQ D GD\´ DQG WKDW WKHVH DUH PHUHO\ QRUPDO PDUNHW G\QDPLFV WKDW 5XVVLD GRHV QRW
have to fear.355 Instead, so the official assertion, Russia would stand to gain from developing 
cooperation with Iran in other spheres, including investments in the Iranian oil and gas 
production (ibid.).           
 Turkey repeatedly called for a political solution to the Iran nuclear crisis, emphasised 
the importance of diplomacy, and warned of the counterproductive effect of sanctions, but 
nevertheless showed solidarity with the United States, as Turkish announcements about the 
reduction of Iranian oil imports demonstrated (Habertürk 2012). Turkey complied with Iran 
VDQFWLRQV HYHQ WKRXJK WKLV FRPSOLDQFH ZDV ³FRVWO\,´ DV IRUPXODWHG E\ D 7XUNLVK IRUHLJQ
ministry official.356 China and Russia put the brakes on sanctions efforts in the UNSC, 
watered down resolutions and condemned pressure on Iran, and showed a stronger public 
anti-U.S. posturing and anti-sanctions stance than Turkey did.357 On a behavioral level, 
however, China and Russia also demonstrated partial compliance with U.S. policies, as the 
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examples cited above have demonstrated.        
 It is the construction of norms that influences material imperatives pertaining to 
adherence or rejection of hegemonic structures, and vice versa. This observation harks back to 
the reciprocal effects between ideational, material and institutional underpinnings of power 
structures in a Coxian understanding of hegemony.358 Rather than singling out one dominant 
side of the equation, it is the joint effect of these factors that needs to be taken into account for 
an understanding of Chinese, Russian and Turkish policies in relation to Iran.  
5. Ǯǯ  Ǯ ǯ   
structures?   
 
A discrepancy between discursive and behavioral levels in Chinese, Russian and 
Turkish Iran policies can be observed, as the previous section has concluded. A public 
advocacy for resistance to hegemonic policies is paralleled by partial compliance on a 
behavioral level. Advocacy for an explicitly non-hegemonic security culture discursively here 
can be paralleled by compliance with parts of a US-inspired hegemonic security culture on a 
behavioral level. Grudging acceptance of a U.S.-inspired sanctions regime on Iran allows 
&KLQD5XVVLDDQG7XUNH\FROOHFWLYHO\WR MRLQWKHFDPSRI³UHVSRQVLEOH´VWDWHVEHFDXVHWKH\
adhere to material structures put in place for politico-ideological reasons. A normative 
disagreement with U.S. hegemonic structures, therefore, did not entail an all-out rejection of 
U.S. policies towards Iran. It was, instead, the relative dependence on the United States that 
led China, Russia and Turkey to tacitly accept parts of a hegemonic security culture despite 
this being against their normative conceptions. Normative divergence and rules convergence 
take place concurrently. Variation in norm compliance on the part of the case study states has 
to be seen in the context of their respective bilateral ties with the United States, the perception 
of their foreign policies toward Tehran and elsewhere, and their stakes in avoiding a 
confrontation with Iran. These stakes are, as has been shown, both material and ideational. As 
different material and ideational factors weigh differently for China, Russia, and Turkey, 
UHVSHFWLYHO\WKHLUGHJUHHRIµFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWK86SRZHUVWUXFWXUHVLQHYLWDEO\GLIIHUV, as also 
shown in section 2 above. As analysed in the previous chapter, China heavily depends on 
Iranian crude oil imports, which explains its indirect disregard for certain (unilateral) Iran 
sanctions regimes. The Chinese eventual approval of multilateral sanctions (and therewith 
compliance with US demands) was attributed to the higher value Beijing attaches to the US 
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than to Iran.359 Turkey, as analysed in chapter 4, did not face the dilemma of formally having 
to approve of UN sanctions on Iran, yet still emphasises its alliance solidarity with the US. By 
ZD\RILQVWLWXWLRQDOLPSHUDWLYHV1$727XUNH\DOUHDG\KDVDVWURQJHUµEXLOW-LQFRPSOLDQFH¶
with the US JRYHUQPHQW HYHQ WKRXJK WKLV LV VXEMHFW WR 7XUNH\¶V VRPHWLPHV PDUNHGO\
GLIIHUHQW µQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV¶ DVQRWRQO\ WKHFase study presented in chapter 4, but also the 
sectarian violence in neighboring Iraq, diverging approaches to transnational Islamism and 
other regional political and security issues have demonstrated. And of the three cases 
SUHVHQWHGLQWKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQ5XVVLDLVWKHRQHZKHUHSXEOLFO\DUWLFXODWHGµQRUPVDQGYDOXHV¶
DUHLQVWDUNHVWFRQWUDVWWR86SUHIHUHQFHVµ&RPSOLDQFH¶ZLWK86SRZHUstructures at the time 
of writing is low as never seen since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Tensions over the 
future of Ukraine loom large in any recent attempts to explain the deterioration in relations 
between the US and Russia, and between the West and Russia in general (but should not be 
seen as sole explanatory factors). Despite allusions to the contrary,360 Russia has not allowed 
this general state of frosty relations to affect the Iran nuclear talks (cf. Meier & Pieper 2015). 
Clearly, however, differently layered ideational and material conditions give Russia the least 
LQFHQWLYHWRµFRPSO\¶ZLWK86SROLF\7KHIDFWWKDWWKH5XVVLDQJRYHUQPHQWKDVQRWµVSRLOHG¶
the Iran nuclear talks is indicative of its understanding carved out in chapter 5 that the closure 
RI,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUILOHLVLQ5XVVLD¶VRZQVHFXULW\LQWHUHVWDQGWKDWZRUNLQJWKURXJK the P5+1 
format is legitimised by UNSC resolutions. Constructive collaboration in this format is thus 
QRW WREHPLVFRQVWUXHGDV µFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWK86LQWHUHVWVEXt underscores the Russian (and 
&KLQHVH DSSURYDO RI PXOWLODWHUDO LQVWLWXWLRQDO VWUXFWXUHV WR DSSURDFK ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU
SURJUDPPH,Q.DW]HQVWHLQ¶VGLVWLQFWLRQµUXOHVDQGPRGHOV¶WKDWKDYHWKHSRZHUWRconstrain 
hegemonic projects institutionally are adhered WRZKLOHµQRUPVDQGYDOXHV¶FDQGLIIHU%RWK
China and Russia have eventually approved of UN-mandated Iran sanctions because they 
ZHUH QHJRWLDWHG WKURXJK 81 VWUXFWXUHV 7KH\ GLG QRW µFRPSO\¶ ZLWK WKHP IRU LGHDWLRQDO
reasons, but for the institutional reason that their governments co-decided on them. 
µ&RPSOLDQFH¶ZLWKSROLFLHVLVWKHUHIRUHQRWWREHPLVFRQVWUXHGDVµFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWKµQRUPV¶
of an ill-GHILQHGµLQWHUQDWLRQDOFRPPXQLW\¶1RUPFRQFHSWLRQVGLIIHUZLWKLQWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO
system. Asking who is µFRPSO\LQJ¶ZLWKZKDWQRUPVDQGIRUZKDWSXUSRVHQHFHVVDULO\EULQJV
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up the question of contingent power constellations. Russian president Putin underlined this 
point in his 2014 Valdai speech in stark anti-hegemonic terms:  
³,QDVLWXDWLRQZKHUH\RXKDGGRmination by one country and its allies, or its satellites 
rather, the search for global solutions often turned into an attempt to impose their own 
XQLYHUVDOUHFLSHV7KLVJURXS¶VDPELWLRQVJUHZVRELJWKDWWKH\VWDUWHGSUHVHQWLQJWKHLU
policies they put together in their corridors of power as the view of the entire 
international community. But this iVQRWWKHFDVH´ 
µ&RPSOLDQFH¶ LV WKXV D WHUPLQRORJ\ WKDW VXJJHVWV KLHUDUFKLFDO UHODWLRQVKLSV 3XWLQ¶V VQLGH
UHPDUN DERXW µVDWHOOLWHV¶ RI RQH GRPLQDQW FRXQWU\ Eears a striking resemblance to the 
FRQFHSWLRQRIKHJHPRQLFµVXEDOWHUQV¶ZKRVHFRQVHQWKHOSVVXVWDLQDSUHYDOHQWKLVWRULFEORF
7KHFDVHVWXGLHVH[DPLQHG LQ WKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQKDYHVKRZQKRZµFRPSOLDQFH¶RQ WKHSDUWRI
China, Russia and Turkey with approaches to the Iranian nuclear conflict that they object 
from an ideational standpoint has been selective, and how US policy preferences in the Iran 
dossier have been resisted on other occasions. The aggregate result from an analytical point of 
view, then, is thH HURVLRQ RI WKH FRQFHSW RI µFRPSOLDQFH¶ DQG D UHODWLRQDO WDNH RQ WKH
legitimacy of policies with a global impact.      
 Suffice it to note that this is not meant to imply that the Iran policies of China, Russia 
and Turkey are crafted in a joint effort to challenge the U.S.-dominated system of governance. 
Interviewees confirm that consultations between their governments are made, but equally with 
all parties involved.361 :KLOH D7XUNLVKGLSORPDW DFNQRZOHGJHV WKDW IRU LQVWDQFH ³RXU >WKH
Turkish] position is FORVHU WR WKH 5XVVLDQ GLVFRXUVH WKDQ WR WKH :HVWHUQ RQH´362 a Russian 
GLSORPDW VWDWHV WKDW ³RXU >WKH 5XVVLDQ DQG WKH &KLQHVH@ SRVLWLRQV DUH FORVH DQG ZH
FRRUGLQDWHSRVLWLRQVDQGKDYHVLPLODUJRDOV´363DQGD&KLQHVHGLSORPDWDIILUPVWKDW³ZH>WKH
Chinese] DUH FORVHU WR WKH 5XVVLDQV WKDQ WR WKH RWKHU IRXU >3 PHPEHU VWDWHV@´364, their 
foreign policies are seen as separate tracks. And also the extent of diplomatic engagement and 
contestation differs: Turkey is less involved institutionally than the UNSC permanent 
members Russia and China, and was engaged in diplomatic mediation between Iran and the 
established negotiating format of the P5+1. This position allows Turkey to be more critical of 
the imposition of multilateral sanctions, which it does not have to decide on itself (in the 
absence of a Security Council seat). But also between the two non-Western P5+1 states, 
China and Russia, there are nuances in official diplomatic contestation that distinguish their 
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positions from each other, as has become clear by the preceding two in-depth case studies. An 
LPSUHVVLRQ SUHYDLOV WKDW &KLQD LV µKLGLQJ EHKLQG¶ D PRUH DVVHUWLYH 5XVVLDQ GLSORPDWLF
positioning.365 Rather than theorising on counter-hegemonic bloc movements, it is therefore 
arguably a more insightful endeavor to analyze the respective interactions of foreign policies 
with hegemonic power structures and to examine their collective effect on the crafting of a 
security culture that resists those structures--even though these foreign policies have their 
different motivations, constraints and preconditions.  
6. Contesting Hegemony and Moving into a Post-American World  
 
,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU FULVLV ZDV QHYHU RQO\ DERXW QXFOHDU SK\VLFV ,WV VLJQLILFDQFH FDQ DOVR QRW EH
fully grasped by an exclusive public international law perspective, which is inevitably 
doomed to reproduce the circular semantic analyses that have bedeviled international 
QHJRWLDWLRQVVLQFH,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUFULVLVLVDERXWSHUFHLYHGKHJHPRQLFSROLWLFVDQGDERXW
a conflict whose resolution will have far-reaching implications for the dialectic between the 
modernising and the modernised world. It will also affect perceptions of world order in a 
process where the U.S. role as a shaper of world hegemony is declining. Writing on the US 
practice of sanctioning third country entities for their interactions with Iran, Leverett & 
/HYHUHWW  UHPDUN ³>«@ $merican policy is now incentivising emerging powers to 
develop alternatives to established, U.S.-dominated mechanisms for conducting, financing, 
and settling international transactions. As Washington continues on this course, it will hasten 
WKHVKLIWRIHFRQRPLFSRZHUIURP:HVW WR(DVW´6XFKDOWHUQDWLYHPHFKDQLVPVFDQEH
the Chinese and Turkish payments to Iran in currencies that circumvent the 2010 CISADA 
and the 2012 Iran Threat Reduction Act (like Turkish Lira or Chinese renminbi) or the use of 
IURQW FRPSDQLHV IRU ³VDQFWLRQV-EXVWLQJ´ SXUSRVHV $QG IDFHG ZLWK 86 DQG (8 XQLODWHUDO
financial sanctions that complicate payment modalities for Iran, China and Iran had to revert 
to oil-for-goods barter agreements (much to the dislike of the Iranians).    
 It is no wonder, then, that Western observers of Russian, Chinese or Turkish foreign 
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2014; with Dr. Dina Esfandiary, International Institute for Strategic Studies, London, 11 July 2014; with EEAS 
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Director of the Institute of Middle East Studies of the China Institute for Contemporary International Relations 
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policies cannot but conclude that their policies appear ambiguous. States that sit on fences 
because they are torn between different security cultures, strategic circles, or geographic 
crossroads are bound to pursue multidirectional foreign policies. To the outside observer, 
these policies occasionally appear incoherent, or opportunistic at best and politically 
unfaithful at worst. Contesting norms that seem common sense because they represent a 
consensual relationship is an act of questioning a hegemonic order that is based on consent 
and coercion. Status quo actors, as dominant forces in this order, have an inherent interest in 
domesticating alternative initiatives. Exclusive and essentially simplistic categorisations are a 
recurring mantra of foreign policy projections and rhetoric. It has been shown in this research 
how an investigation into Chinese, Russian and Turkish policies toward Iran can offer more 
nuanced understandings of foreign policies between such exclusive camps.    
 $WWKHKHDUWRIWKH&ROG:DURYHU,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHOLH over three decades of 
traumatised U.S.-Iranian relations. Technical solutions to end this nuclear crisis have been 
proposed, discussed and rejected. It is the mistrust on both sides that prevent any politically 
easy solution to a crisis whose resolution will entail a new chapter in U.S.-Iranian relations. 
Iranian Foreign Minister Zarif once more reminded the assembled decision-makers at the 50th 
Munich security conference in January 2014 WKDW WKH :HVW GRHV QRW KDYH D µmonopoly on 
mistrust.¶ Only mutually acceptable proposals to craft a nuclear µHQGJDPHVFHQDULR¶ for Iran 
will succeed in ending what =DULIFDOOHGLQODWHDQµunnecessary FULVLV¶ (Warrick 2013). 
The replacement of the confrontational rhetoric of the Ahmadinjad administration by a more 
FRQFLOLDWRU\WRQHXQGHU5RXKDQL¶VOHDGHUVhip has allowed a historically constructive dialogue 
with Iran that marks a new phase in the decade-old nuclear crisis, and that led to the first 
LQWHULPDJUHHPHQWRQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHLQ1RYHPEHU$JDLQVWWKHEDFNGURSRI
these dynamics, a Russian foreign ministry official remarked in an interview that the U.S. 
position had embraced an approach that Moscow had already been advocating for years.366 
'PLWUL7UHQLQHYHQZULWHVWKDW³WKH86DGRSWLRQRIDJUDGXDOLVWDSSURDFKWRZDUG,UDQ
that RuVVLDKDGORQJIDYRUHGUHVXOWHGLQDEUHDNWKURXJKRQWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDULVVXH´+LVWRULF
developments beginning in the late summer 2013 thus make it all the more relevant to reflect 
on foreign policies that resist hegemony. This is a most timely endeavor at a time when the 
world witnesses a shift in hegemonic structures as P5+1 talks with Iran aim to hammer out a 
comprehensive nuclear solution with Iran to succeed the Joint Plan of Action of November 
2013 and the political framework agreement of 2 April 2015.  
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 Accommodation with hegemony, as the political disputes over the Iranian nuclear 
crisis have shown, is a temporal and temporary phenomenon and can take place at the same 
WLPHDVUHVLVWDQFHWRKHJHPRQ\LQRWKHULVVXHDUHDV7KH5XVVLDQµJRRGIRUJDV¶VFheme that 
ZDV UHSRUWHG RQ LQ WKH VXPPHU RI  &KLQHVH µMXQN IRU RLO¶ DQG 7XUNLVK µJROG IDU JDV¶
schemes all speak one language: The isolation of Iran over its controversial nuclear 
programme has been resisted commercially. With what Khanna (2014) calls D³EUHDNEHWZHHQ
FRPPHUFLDO DQG QXFOHDU GLSORPDF\´ VWDWHV OLNH &KLQD 5XVVLD DQG 7XUNH\ KDYH FUDIWHG D
security culture that resists hegemony. Resistance to hegemony here transcends a material 
dimension (commercialisation of relations) and can see the eventual emergence of a new 
security culture towards Iran.         
 The commercialisation of relations between Iran and other states that criticise the use 
of economic and financial power for political leverage has been a recurring discursive theme 
in the AhPDGLQHMDG DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ 7KH µORRNLQJ WR WKH (DVW¶ SROLF\ KDV EHHQ WKH H[SOLFLW
attempt to diversify Iranian trade relations in order to better resist US pressure (Mousavian 
2012: 190f.). A subject of domestic criticism, and in the realisation of its relative fruitlessness, 
this policy objective has eventually been dropped. But the Iranian reference to vocabulary like 
WKDW RI D µUHVLVWDQFH HFRQRP\¶ LQ  .KDMHSRXU  EHDUV D VWULNLQJ UHVHPEODQFH WR
earlier such attempts of commercial resistance (at least discursively) to denote not only a 
political disagreement with US-GRPLQDWHGZRUOGRUGHUWKDW LVSDUWRIWKH,VODPLF5HSXEOLF¶V
IRXQGDWLRQDOQDUUDWLYHEXW DOVR DQ HFRQRPLFPRGHO WKDW µUHVLVWV¶:HVWHUQ HFRQRPLFSRZHU
As such, it has been a strong illuVWUDWLRQ RI µFRXQWHU-KHJHPRQ\¶ :KLOH WKLV LV PRUH
propagandistic rhetoric than an actually preferable policy option on the Iranian side, China, 
Russia and Turkey cannot but arrange themselves with global financial and economic 
structures that they depend on ± not only economically more so than Iran, but also politically, 
as the preceding chapters have shown.367 ³&RQWHVWDWLRQRYHUSULPDU\LQVWLWXWLRQV>«@´%DUU\
Buzan (2010) formulates,368 ³LV LWVHOI RQH RI WKH GULYLQJ IRUFHV EHKLQG WKH HYROXWLRQ RI
internatioQDO VHFXULW\´  7KLV GLVVHUWDWLRQ KDV VKRZQ KRZ UHVLVWDQFH WR SRZHU VWUXFWXUHV
relates to the interaction effects between these power structures and perceptions of legitimacy 
                                                          
367
 The fast-changing nature of international framework conditions and bilateral relations demands a caveat 
here. In the wake of the deterioration of relations between Russia and the West, the Russian government has 
shown a tendency of economic alienation from US-inspired financial and economic instruments  W in addition to 
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LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQV DW ODUJH &ODUN5DSNLQ	%UDDWHQ¶V5HXV-Smit 2014). 
Perceptions of the illegitimacy of UN-GHI\LQJXQLODWHUDO VDQFWLRQVPD\ UHVRQDWH LQ&KLQD¶V
5XVVLD¶VDQG7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\GLVFRXUVHEXWWKHSHUFHSWLRQRIHFRQRPLFDQGSROLWLFDO
dependence on the very structures propagating a UN-rules contesting behavior prompts the 
same states to comply with its stipulations.        
 7KH 2EDPD DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ¶V VXEWOH UHIUDPLQJ RI WKH FKDOOHQJH HPDQDWLQJ IURP ,UDQ
IURP µURJXH¶ WR µRXWOLHU¶ /LWZDN  -33) signals a shift from purely unilateral 
approaches towards Iran to one that embeds US foreign policy in an international framework. 
China, Russia, Turkey and others have resisted a language that could be conceived as a 
pretext for military actions against Iran (Litwak 2014: 28). The US approach towards Iran, in 
turn, underwent a shift towards a more multilateral diplomacy and an international norm 
discourse. The inclusion of China and Russia in the P5+1 negotiation format was vital in pre-
HPSWLQJ WKH LPSUHVVLRQ RI µ:HVWHUQ SRZHUV¶ DWWHPSWLQJ WR QHJRWiate away Iranian rights. 
Analysing how resistance of non-Western voices to US Iran policies may have created a new 
µORJLFRI DSSURSULDWHQHVV¶ FIMarch & Olsen 1998: 949) through the prism of US foreign 
policy therefore merits further research.369 This ties in to the wider literature on power 
transition and power diffusion (Gilpin 1981; Organski 1968; Organski & Kugler 1980; 
DiCicco & Levy 2003; Jones, B. 2011; Keohane 1984; Kagan 2002, 2012; Kupchan 2012. cf. 
also Lebow & Valentino 2009; Lemke 1997; Vezirgiannidou 2013; Clark 2014). These are no 
linear processes. Conceptions of security cultures change gradually. And rather than assuming 
a coherent bloc challenge to US hegemony, the cases analysed here have disentangled 
qualified resistance along the material, ideational and institutional dimensions of hegemony, 
respectively. Chinese, Russian, and Turkish Iran policies have different rationales, 
respectively, and are often in conflict with each other. The scenario of the lifting of sanctions 
in the FRXUVHRI D FRPSUHKHQVLYH -RLQW3ODQRI$FWLRQRYHU ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHPD\
entail economic competition between Chinese and Russian companies in some sectors on the 
Iranian market, as the previous chapter has argued. Chinese companies may enter the Iranian 
market in sectors where Russian ones were hitherto dominant. In addition, the lifting of 
economic sanctions can have implications for oil price dynamics that affect Russia and China 
reversely: Russia has an interest in high oil prices, while China benefits from low oil prices as 
a net oil importer. As for Turkey, Russian-Iranian trade volumes are surpassed by a 
significantly higher Russian-Turkish trade volume. Even with the lifting of Iran sanctions, 
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Iran policy can be Iranian policies, regional and international framework conditions and changes in foreign 
policy prioritisations due to changes in the administration.  
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Turkey might therefore constitute a competitor for Iran in expanding economic relations with 
5XVVLD&KLQD¶V5XVVLD¶VDQG7XUNH\¶VELODWHUDOUHODWLRQVZLWKHDFKRWKHUWKXVFRPSOLFDWHWKH
idea of a unified bloc challenge to US policies.         
 As such, the contribution to the theoretical literature is one that aims to break down the 
VFKHPDWLF IUDPHZRUN RI µV\VWHPLF¶ DQDO\VHV RI SRZHU VKLIWV LQ DUHDV RIWHQ PLVOHDGLQJO\
ODEHOOHGµJOREDOJRYHUQDQFH¶7KHGHFOLQHRIKHJHPRQ\DQG³WKHULVHRIWKHUHVW´DUHWRRRIWHQ
portrayed in dichotomous terms. Studies of WKH %5,&6 DQG ³HPHUJLQJ SRZHUV´ W\SLFDOO\
analyze the changing international economic system in a multipolar world and the shift of 
power equations that growing economies of emerging powers bring along. This stream of 
literature has brought hegemonic transition theory and power transition theory--in the context 
of systemic leadership contestation by newly emerging powerful states--to renewed scholarly 
attention. Understanding foreign policies that DUHQRWµ:HVWHUQ¶ and do not necessarily share 
the same normative framework with a Gramscian historic bloc--but still work with the rules of 
the system instead of working to overthrow them²requires a more differentiated perspective 
RQ WKH G\QDPLFV RI JUDGXDO SRZHU VKLIWV 7KH VFKRODUO\ GHEDWH DERXW µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ Ls a 
VHPLQDOH[DPSOHKHUH8QGHUO\LQJDQDO\VHVRIDµULVLQJ&KLQD¶LVDQLPSOLFLWDVVXPSWLRQWKDWD
more pronounced Chinese foreign policy in international relations could come at the expense 
RI 86 SRZHU 7KH µLQWHUQDWLRQDO V\VWHP¶ ZRXOG H[SHULHQFH D VKLIW IURP WKH µ:DVKLQJWRQ
FRQVHQVXV¶ WR D µ%HLMLQJ FRQVHQVXV¶ 7KH µ&KLQD 7KUHDW¶ VFKRRO IRUPXODWHV PRVW
HPEOHPDWLFDOO\ WKDW µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ LV D QHJDWLYH GHYHORSPHQW *HUW]  6XFK VFKRODUO\
interpretations are misconstrued. The coexistence of established and emerging powers will 
inevitably determine the design of the future world order. Research is needed to examine this 
relationship beyond the accommodation-confrontation spectrum.     
 It is in this context that Richard Sakwa (2011) has coined the concept RI ³QHR-
UHYLVLRQLVP´WRPDNHVHQVHRIIRUHLJQSROLFLHVWKDWGRQRWGLUHFWO\TXHVWLRQRUFKDOOHQJHWKH
essence of the international system (as revisionist states would do), but indirectly aim to 
revise its functioning (cf. also Sakwa 2015: 30-35). In a similar vein, Serfaty (2011: 18) 
GHVFULEHV&KLQDDQG5XVVLDDV³SUXGHQWUHYLVLRQLVWSRZHUV´6XFKFRQFHSWVDLPWRDYRLGRYHU-
theorisLQJ DERXW IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV WKDW GR QRW FRLQFLGH ZLWK WKDW RI WKH ³V\VWHP OHDGHU´ DV
expressions of the advancement of alternative norms in international security governance.370
 Torn between resistance and accommodation, and under the constraints of the current 
political momentum, temporary as well as structural perceptions, and the imperatives of 
history, the foreign policies of China, Turkey and Russia in the Iranian nuclear dossier cannot 
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 In a similar vein, cf. also Breslin (2009, 2013); Clark (2011: 25-26).  
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EXW DSSHDU DV ³HVVHQWLDOO\ DPELJXRXV´ ZKHQ ILOWHUHG WKURXJK D :HVWHUQ OHQV371 The U.S. 
leadership role is declining, but an entirely alternative international order is not yet in sight. 
As long as the U.S.-dominated historic bloc exists, China, Russia and Turkey will work with 
and through the international architecture in place. This does not mean that these states will 
accept the same norms. Despite disagreements with the United States at the macro level, 
China, Russia and Turkey do not appear as revisionist states constituting a bloc challenge to 
American dominance.372 An acknowledgment thereof allows for the debunking of 
confrontational policy rhetoric and for more nuanced research on post-hegemonic power 
VKLIWV ,W DOVR WUDQVFHQGV WKHXQKHOSIXOGLYLGHEHWZHHQ³QRUP-VHWWHU´ DQG³QRUP-WDNHU´ DQG
helps us to reflect more accurately on the future coexistence between former hegemonic and 
emerging powers. The policy task is to accept diverging national cultures, but still craft rules 
and models that allow actors to coordinate policies that allow peaceful co-existence.373  
7. Conclusion  
 
This chapter has carved out the commonalities in Russian, Chinese and Turkish resistance to a 
consensual hegemonic order as demonstrated by a comparative analysis of their foreign 
policies towards the Iranian nuclear programme. For hegemonic power structures to become 
established and sustained over time, they presuppose an acceptance by a sufficiently large 
number of other actors. The acceptance of such structures constitutes what Cox calls a 
³KLVWRULF EORF´ &R[   %\ LPSOLFDWLRQ WKH UHQGLWLRQ RI HQPLW\ EHFRmes order-
constituting in hegemonic systems; i.e., it serves to sustain the structures in place and to 
reconfirm prevalent ideologies (Campbell 1993; Klein 1994; Balzacq 2010). Challenging such 
a rendition of enmity, therefore, is resistance to hegemony, as this chapter has shown. This is 
QRW WR VXJJHVW WKDW VXFK UHVLVWDQFH LQHYLWDEO\ XVKHUV LQ FKDQJHV LQ WKH µKLVWRULF EORF¶ EXW
rather demonstrates the continuous engagement and interaction between hegemony, its 
subalterns, and counter-hegemonic forces, cauJKW LQ ³D FRQVWDQW VWDWH RI QHJRWLDWLRQ
FRPSURPLVHDQGFKDQJH´DV-RQHVSXWVLW     
 This chapter has picked up the twofold distinction between a discursive and a 
behavioral level that has been worked out in the theoretical chapter and applied to the three 
empirical case studies throughout this dissertation: While Chinese, Russian and Turkish 
officials publicly advocate for an adherence to a security culture that emphasises compliance 
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 Sakwa (2002: 366) has used this formulation to capture Russian foreign policy reorientations 
following the breakup of the Soviet Union. 
372
 dŚŝƐǁĂƐĂůƐŽƚŚĞƌĞĨůĞĐƚŝŽŶŽĨĨĞƌĞĚďǇƌ ?ZŽďĞƌƚ>ŝƚǁĂŬ ?ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ?KĐƚŽďĞƌ ? ? ? ? ?
373
 :ŽƐŚƵĂŽŽƉĞƌZĂŵŽ ? ? ? ? ? )ŚĂƐƵƐĞĚƚŚĞƚĞƌŵ ‘ĐŽ-ĞǀŽůƵƚŝŽŶ ?ŝŶƚŚŝƐĐŽŶƚĞǆƚ ? 
209 
 
ZLWKWKHQRUPVRI³VRYHUHLJQW\´DQG³QRQ-interference,´WKeir level of perceived material and 
political dependence on the United States prompts them to follow foreign policies that still 
comply with parts of U.S. hegemonic structures. The U.S. unilateral sanctions regime and 
compliance with an extraterritorialised U.S. legislation is the most prominent case in point.
 5XVVLDVLQFHWKHGLVFRYHU\RI,UDQ¶VKLWKHUWRFRYHUWQXFOHDU programme in 2002, has 
emphasised the Iranian right to use peaceful nuclear energy and, until the referral of the 
Iranian nuclear file to the UNSC and the adoption of first Security Council resolutions, has 
largely shielded Tehran from international pressure--as has China. While Western 
governments observed Russian-Iranian nuclear technology cooperation with a watchful eye, 
Moscow continued making a distinction between legitimate commercial ties and an alleged 
PLOLWDU\GLPHQVLRQRI,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH/LNHZLVHWKH&KLQHVHSURYLVLRQRIVHQVLWLYH
nuclear technology to Iran, as well as its commercial exploitation of Western embargoes on 
Iran and its dense ties with the Iranian oil economy, have been seen as undermining Western 
attempts to increase international pressure on Iran. Turkey presents itself as a U.S. ally in the 
region and is committed to NATO alliance structures. Materially, its location as a geographic 
neighbor of Iran and the imperatives of economy, however, impose constraints on Turkey that 
allow Ankara to disagree with Western politics of securitisDWLRQRI,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH
In political discourse, Turkey has emphasised the importance of political dialogue to solve the 
Iranian nuclear crisis and has been sceptical of the use of pressure and sanctions on Iran.
 Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear programme 
arguably breathe the ambitioQ WR SDUWLDOO\ µGH-:HVWHUQLVH¶ security cultures and discourses 
toward Iran. On a discursive level, their foreign policies display a normative divergence with 
a U.S.-inspired security culture towards Iran. At the same time, one must be careful not to 
over-theorise on indications of counter-hegemonic forces struggling to topple the prevailing 
power system. Respective foreign polic\PRWLYDWLRQVDUHGLYHUVH7KHµGH-:HVWHUQLVDWLRQ¶ of 
Iran discourses is therefore not to be confused with a joint endeavor to create a counter-
hegemonic bloc opposing U.S. leadership.        
 China, Russia and Turkey resist a hegemonic security culture on a discursive level. 
Advocating for a non-hegemonic security culture conveys a normative divergence, a deviation 
from hegemonic normative frameworks. Their relative dependence on the United States, 
however, leads China, Russia and Turkey to follow foreign policies that accept parts of this 
hegemonic security culture. The implementation of the international sanctions regime, even 
though potentially contrary to their economic interests, are cases in point. Even more 
tellingly, China and Turkey have reduced their oil imports from Iran in order to qualify for 
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U.S. sanctions exemptions. Partial acceptance of such hegemonic structures is predicated 
upon a level of perceived political and material dependence on the United States. And the 
acceptance of UN-backed international sanctions explains a convergence of rules that are still 
DFFHSWHGDVJRYHUQLQJ LQWHUQDWLRQDO UHODWLRQVDW ODUJH ,W H[SODLQVDQDGKHUHQFH WR µUXOHVDQG
PRGHOV¶ WKDW KDYH WKH SRZHU WR constrain hegemonic policies because they have to be 
channeled through multilateral institutions.        
 The coexistence of established and emerging powers will inevitably determine the 
design of the future world order. The working relationship between former hegemons and 
³ULVLQJSRZHUV´DVSRWHQWLDOFKDOOHQJHUVLVFRQVWDQWO\EHLQJUH-balanced and re-negotiated. In 
this regard, with different prioritisations and conceptions of legitimacy by the different actors 
involved becoming manifest, the Iranian nuclear crisis arguably is not only a battlefield for 
the survival of the NPT regime, but is a debate about differing conceptions of world order and 
security governance. Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the Iranian nuclear 
programme, as analysed in this chapter, stand indicative of alternative security cultures 
WRZDUG ,UDQ LQ D ³SURFHVV RI SRZHU GH-FRQFHQWUDWLRQ´ 7HVVPDQ and Wolfe 2011: 218) in 
which dominant power structures have not been replaced by alternative governance structures 
(yet).             
 The resulting seemingly ambiguous variation in compliance with the norms advocated 
by the case study states themselves is to be explained by the friction between resistance and 
accommodation with established power constellations where power is not exercised in a linear 
way. Precisely because the dialectic between hegemony, its subalterns and counter-hegemonic 
movements produces a constantly shifting and interacting pattern of re-negotiation over the 
terms of World Order, it proves impossible to pin-SRLQWUHVLVWDQFHDVDµWRWDOL]LQJDFW¶-RQHV
  $V PXFK DV µKLVWRULF EORFV¶ DUH VXVWDLQHG WKURXJK WKH FRPSOLPHQWDU\ IRUFHV RI
consent and coercion, hegemony ± conceptually and empirically ± can never be absolute. By 
implication, it is impossible to conceive of its contrary extreme ± counter-hegemony ± in the 
absolute. ³$ FRXQWHU-hegemony would consist of a coherent view of an alternative world 
order, backed by a concentration of power sufficient to maintain a challenge to core 




*UDPVFL¶V 7KRXJKW KDV EHHQ VKRZQ WR DSSO\ WR WKH ,UDQ SROLFLes of China, Russia and 
7XUNH\ µ5HVLVWDQFH¶ KDV EHHQ FRQFHSWXDOLVed as a qualified disagreement with parts of the 
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hegemonic order, and it has been shown how such resistance takes place across ideational, 
material and institutional dimensions of such an order. At a time when U.S. foreign policy on 
Iran seems to be undergoing a paradigm shift, such a finding sheds light on the dynamics of 
international power shifts that will, one way or another, determine international politics and 





























Much scholarly attention has been paid to foreign policy approaches to the Iranian nuclear 
crisis. Yet, no comprehensive analyses have been done so far that use the Iranian nuclear case 
as an illustration to conceptualise the interaction between what in this dissertation is called 
µKHJHPRQLFVWUXFWXUHV¶DQGWKRVHDFWRUVUHVLVWLQJWKHPThis doctoral dissertation is a first step 
to fill this gap in the literature. It has analysed the foreign policies of China, Russia and 
Turkey towards the Iranian nuclear programme and thereby answered the research question to 
what extent these policies are indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony across its 
ideational, material and institutional framework conditions.    
 Doing so, this dissertation has drawn on neo-Gramscian scholarship in its 
FRQFHSWXDOLVDWLRQ RI µKHJHPRQLF VWUXFWXUHV¶ 7his approach has been complemented by a 
social constructivist theoretical framework that situates itself in the scholarly literature on 
international norm dynamics and change. Neither have neo-Gramscian approaches to 
international relations been consistently combined with the norm literature in such a way, nor 
has this fruitful cross-fertilisation been applied to interactions between the US and actors that 
display norm contestation with US paradigms. This novel theoretical angle has been applied 
to the contested politics of the Iranian nuclear crisis, which has been shown to be a battle 
ground for much wider disagreements about the functioning of international relations at large. 
Such a theoretical angle has not previously been used in foreign policy analysis pertaining to 
the Iranian nuclear conflict.          
 7KHFDVHVWXGLHVH[DPLQHGVKRZKRZµFRPSOLDQFH¶RQWKHSDUWRI&KLQD5XVVLDDQG
Turkey with approaches to the Iranian nuclear conflict has been selective and situational, and 
how US policy preferences in the Iran dossier have been resisted on other occasions, 
depending on the ideational, material, and institutional framework conditions at hand. To 
XQGHUVWDQG VXFK YDULDWLRQ LQ µQRUP FRPSOLDQFH¶ WKLV GLVVHUtation introduced a two-level 
model to understand foreign policy discrepancies between a discursive and a behavioural 
level. An advocacy for a non-hegemonic security culture on a discursive level can be 
SDUDOOHOHGE\µFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWKKHJHPRQLFSROLFLHVRQDEHKDYLRXUDOOHYHO7KLVGLVVHUWDWLRQ
has situated such variations between norm divergence and rules compliance in a conceptual 
framework that aims to understand the interactions between hegemonic structures and those 
actors engaging with their effects of coercion and consent in a neo-Gramscian understanding.
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 Based on 55 semi-structured elite interviews with experts and decision-makers closely 
involved with the Iranian nuclear file, analyses of Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies 
have served as three in-depth case studies, respectively, to illustrate resistance to hegemony. 
Through target interviewing, this project benefitted from face-to-face interviews that have 
been conducted with delegates from the respective nuclear negotiation teams in Ankara, 
Beijing and Moscow, and the respective Iran desks of China, Russia, Turkey, Germany, the 
US, and the EU. Additional experts interviewed included a range of policy analysts, 
consultants and senior academics in Brussels, Moscow, Ankara, Berlin, Vienna, London, 
Istanbul, Washington, Beijing and Shanghai. This research method has been complemented 
by qualitative data analysis of a range of primary sources (declassified government 
documents, international organisations documents, press releases, transcripts of speeches), 
memoirs of decision-makers, policy briefs and the scholarly literature. Research has already 
been produced on the Iran policies of China, Russia and Turkey, as well as on the Iran 
policies of the EU and the US. Scarce attention, however, has been paid so far to comparative 
analyses of the three actors presented here that have played important political roles at 
different stages in the Iranian nuclear crisis. The dissertation is an attempt to fill this gap in 
the literature.           
 Doing so, this research project has drawn on and triangulated a range of material in a 
way that generated empirically novel insights. It has been argued that the coexistence between 
dominant powers and powers that favour revisions to international security governance is 
characterised by contestation and accommodation at the same time. The Iran nuclear case has 
served as an illustration to show the contemporaneous interaction of the forces of consent and 
coercion WKDW FRQVWLWXWH KHJHPRQ\ LQ *UDPVFL¶V DQDO\VLV, an observation that nuances the 
oftentimes too schematic scholarly terms of debate surrounding power transitions between the 
West and non-:HVWHUQSRZHUVHUURQHRXVO\FDOOHGµHPHUJLQJSRZHUV¶ 
&KLQHVH 5XVVLDQ DQG 7XUNLVK IRUHLJQ SROLFLHV WRZDUGV ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH
have been analysed as three in-depth case studies. The research findings of these within-case 
studies have then been compared on a cross-case level in the preceding chapter. The following 
paragraphs will summarise the research findings of the respective empirical case studies first. 
A second section will summarise the answer to the research question to what extent Chinese, 
Russian and Turkish Iran policies are indicative of a security culture that resists hegemony, 
based on the theoretical and conceptual framework identified in chapter 1. A final section will 
conclude with areas for possible further research that the approach and findings of this 
dissertation can stimulate. It will be shown how the theoretical and conceptual framework of 
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this dissertation provides much potential for useful policy analyses beyond the focus on Iran 
diplomacy of this research project. 
2. Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies towards the Iranian 
nuclear programme 
 
$JDLQVW WKHEDFNJURXQG RI5XVVLD¶VQXFOHDU WHFKQRORJ\FRRSeration with Iran in the 
1990s following the break-up of the Soviet Union, Moscow made a distinction between what 
it regarded as legitimate nuclear cooperation and an alarmist securitisDWLRQRI ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDU
programme. From the beginning of the nuclear stand-off in 2002, the Putin administration 
therefore emphasised the Iranian right to nuclear power, and the absence of conclusive 
HYLGHQFH RI D µSRVVLEOH PLOLWDU\ GLPHQVLRQ¶ RI WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU SURJUDPPH 3XWLQ 
Mousavian 2012: 163). When the nuclear file was then referred to the UNSC as a result of 
failed diplomatic attempts to solve the crisis, Russia worked, together with China, towards 
slowing down the pressure on Iran and watering down drafts of sanctions resolutions 
(Patrikarakos 2012: 224). This behavior, together with Russian public posturing, testified to 
the Russian principled skepticism regarding the use of sanctions as political instruments. The 
eventual adoption of sanctions resolutions bore witness to an increasing realisation in 
Moscow and Beijing of Iranian delaying techniques and also to a level of receptiveness to 
U.S. pressure. It also indicated that neither the Russian nor the Chinese government wanted to 
see the exclusive nuclear club to be enlarged by an additional nuclear Iran. In addition, 
Russian proposals to bring about political solutions OLNH WKH ³5XVVLDQ SODQ´ RI  DQG
6HUJH\/DYURY¶VVWHS-by-VWHSSODQDUH LOOXVWUDWLYHRI0RVFRZ¶VZLOOLQJQHVV WRFRQWULEXWH WR
the diplomatic track and disperse tensions and war speculation (ElBaradei 2012: 137).374 And 
DUJXDEO\,UDQ¶VGHFLVLRQWRWXUQWKH5XVVLDQSODQGRZQZDVRQHRIWKHIDFWRUVFRQWULEXWLQJWR
5XVVLD¶VJURZLQJLPSDWLHQFHZLWK,UDQLDQWDFWLFVDQGto disperse the impression that Moscow 
served as a diplomatic shield for Tehran in the UNSC (Mousavian 2012: 256-257). Critics of 
5XVVLD¶V³JRRGIDLWK´GLSORPDF\LQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUGRVVLHUKRZHYHUKDYHSRLQWHGRXWWKDWWKH
importance of energy politics for Russia and its interests in Caspian Sea politics account for a 
lack of genuine Russian interest in a long-term normalisation of relations between Iran and 
the West.375 This has occasionally nurtured the impression that Russia was flirting with the 
idea of using the Iran nuclear talks as a vehicle for obstructionism in order to get concessions 
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Walter Posch, SWP, Berlin, 25 June 2013. 
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in other domains. Such an impression of the Iran nuclear talks as a bargaining chip was 
DOOXGHG WR LQ 'HSXW\ )RUHLJQ 0LQLVWHU 6HUJHL 5\DENRY¶V UHPDUNV RQ  0DUFK 2014 on 
5XVVLD¶V SRWHQWLDO UHFRQVLGHUDWLRQ RI LWV SRVLWLRQ RQ WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU GRVVLHU LQ OLJKW RI
WesteUQSUHVVXUHRYHU0RVFRZ¶V8NUDLQHSROLFLHV$VKDVEHHQVKRZQKRZHYHUDQXPEHURI
security, regional and economic reasons explain the Russian constructive cooperation on the 
Iranian nuclear file beyond public threat gestures.       
 As a comprehensive Joint Plan of Action will replace the interim Geneva agreement of 
November 2013 on the basis of the political framework agreement, Russia might have to 
adapt to a partial rapprochement between Iran and the West in general, and between Iran and 
the US in particular. Economic prospects that the lifting of sanctions can entail as well as the 
important role Russia will play in the implementation of any final agreement with Iran 
conveys the significance of Russia as an actor in the Iranian nuclear file, and helps explain its 
surprisingly constructive collaboration.        
 Similar to Russia, China was skeptical of U.S. rhetoric that began to securitise the 
Iranian nuclear file. China underlined the Iranian obligation to prove the exclusively peaceful 
character of its nuclear program, but refrained from departing from pre-conceived 
assumptions over Iranian intentions. In its official diplomacy, China repeatedly emphasised 
,UDQ¶V OHJLWLPDWH ULJKW WR SHDFHIXO QXFOHDU HQHUJ\ XQGHU Article IV of the NPT, criticised 
Western pressure on Tehran, and reiterated the importance of political dialogue (Dorraj and 
Currier 2008; Garver 2011: 81-84; Mazza 2011; Nourafchan 2010: 39; Swaine 2010: 6-8; 
Yuan 2006). China was also critical of what it perceived as double standards in nuclear 
diplomacy, with Iran being harshly criticised for its lack of transparency while the West 
remained silent on the nuclear activities of non-NPT members such as Israel, Pakistan and 
India, amounting to what China criticisHGDV³QXFOHDUIDYRULWLVP´,QWHUnational Crisis Group 
2010: 4). Against the backdrop of the controversial Iranian nuclear file, it was especially the 
Chinese supply to Iran of sensitive nuclear technology in the 1980s and 1990s that was 
viewed with concern by Western governments (ElBaradei 2012: 117). When the Iranian 
nuclear file reached the UNSC in 2006, China prevented quick condemnation of Iran and 
braked efforts to impose sanctions in what has been characterisHGDVD³GHOD\-and-ZHDNHQ´
strategy (International Crisis Group 2010: 12). Like Russia, however, it eventually approved 
of resolutions that imposed a UN-backed sanctions regime on Tehran because of its continued 
lack of cooperation. And like Russia, the Chinese government does not accept additional 
unilateral sanctions imposed by the EU and the United States as legitimate measures to deal 
ZLWK WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU FKDOOHQJH ,Q DQDO\VHV RI &KLQD¶V ,UDQ Solicies, the importance of 
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Chinese-Iranian oil trade, and commercial Chinese investments in Iran are often emphasised 
(Burnam 2009; Chen 2010; Dorraj and Currier 2008; Djallil 2011; Garver 2011; International 
Crisis Group 2008; 2010: 5- =KL\XH  $IWHU 6DXGL $UDELD ,UDQ LV &KLQD¶V VHFRQG
largest oil supplier. China also benefits from Western sanctions imposed on Iran, since 
Chinese companies are happy to step in and fill the void in the Iranian market. Here, Beijing 
is seen as walking a tightrope between pursuing its commercial interests in Iran and showing 
receptiveness to international and Western security concerns. China is careful not to spoil its 
relations with the United States or to provoke perceptions that run counter to the official 
&KLQHVH LPDJH RI ³SHDFHIXO GHYHORSPHQW´ E\ RSHQO\ FRQWUDYHQLQJ H[LVWLQJ VDQFWLRQV OLVWV
Also, like Russia, China did not hinder UNSC sanctions resolutions, trying to balance a 
pragmatic commercial approach to business in Iran with mollifying Western security concerns 
related to the Iranian nuclear programme. Ignoring the latter would convey a disregard for 
Western perceptions not only of Iranian intentions, but also of Chinese foreign policy towards 
,UDQDQG IO\ LQ WKH IDFHRI&KLQD¶VSXEOLFGLSORPDF\SXUVXLQJDQ LQFUHDVLQJO\ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
SURILOH WKDW UHIOHFWV WKH FRXQWU\¶V JURZLQJ LPSRUWDQFH RQ WKH ZRUOG VFHQH 7KLV LV DOVR
evidenced by ChLQD¶V UHGXFWLRQRI ,UDQLDQRLO LPSRUWV LQRUGHU WRTXDOLI\IRU86VDQFWLRQV
waivers (Lohmann 2013: 4). Experts and officials interviewed for this research project have 
shared the impression that Chinese foreign policy in the Iranian nuclear file is far less 
µDFWLYLVW¶ WKDQ 5XVVLD¶V %HWZHHQ WKH WZR µQRQ-:HVWHUQ¶ PHPEHUV RI WKH 3 QHJRWLDWLRQ
IRUPDW &KLQD LV WKH RQH WKDW H[KLELWV WKH PRVW µVWUDWHJLF SDWLHQFH¶ DQG LV VHHQ DV µKLGLQJ¶
behind a more assertive Russia.   
Unlike Russia and China, Turkey did not have the diplomatic leverage surrounding 
,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHWKDWDSHUPDQHQWVHDWLQWKH816&DWWULEXWHV1HYHUWKHOHVVZKLOH
the government in Ankara could not prevent or approve the imposition of international 
sanctions on Iran, its rhetoric resHPEOHG WKH FDXWLRXV SRVLWLRQV RI &KLQD DQG 5XVVLD ³2XU
SRVLWLRQ LV FORVHU WR WKH 5XVVLDQ GLVFRXUVH WKDQ WR WKH :HVWHUQ RQH´ D 7XUNLVK IRUHLJQ
ministry official tellingly remarked in an interview.376 Turkey criticised the use of sanctions 
as political tools in international relations, warned of unhelpful pressure on Iran, and 
emphasised that only political dialogue would achieve a long-term solution to the diplomatic 
crisis emerging over the nuclear programme of neighboring Iran.377 7XUNH\¶V,UDQSROLF\KDV
often been a balancing act between the need to uphold good-neighborly relations in line with 
7XUNH\¶V³]HURSUREOHPVZLWKQHLJKERUV´DQG³6WUDWHJLF'HSWK´GRFWULQHVDVIRUPXODWHGE\
                                                          
376
 AƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁ ?ŶŬĂƌĂ ? ? ?ƵŐƵƐƚ ? ? ? ? ? 
377
 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚŚŝŐŚ-ranking Turkish diplomat, Ankara, 17 June 2013. Cf. also Udum 2012: 103-106.; 
Mercan 2009: 18- ? ? ?<ŝďĂƌŽŒůƵ ? ? ? ? P ?-6; Üstün 2010:  20; Larrabee and Nader 2013: 27.  
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IRUPHUIRUHLJQPLQLVWHUQRZSULPHPLQLVWHU$KPHG'DYXWR÷OXDQGDFHUWDLQ sensibility for 
:HVWHUQVHFXULW\SROLWLFDOFRQFHSWVWKDWDOOLDQFHVWUXFWXUHVOLNH7XUNH\¶V1$72PHPEHUVKLS
LQGLUHFWO\LPSO\3LHSHUD,QDQDWWHPSWWRQHJRWLDWHDSROLWLFDOVROXWLRQWR,UDQ¶VQXFOHDU
crisis, Turkey engaged in a process of proactive diplomacy and managed to secure the first 
Iranian agreement to a proposed fuel-swap deal in May 2010 (Parsi 2012: 172-.LEDUR÷OX
2010: 4-6). The Turkish shuttle diplomacy with Tehran in 2009-2010 was an illustration of a 
remarkable foreign policy activism that served at least two purposes strategically. While 
DVVXULQJWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV WKDW7XUNH\¶VFRPPLWPHQWWR LQWHUQDWLRQDOGLSORPDF\ZDVLQ OLQH
with Western security and non-proliferation priorities,378 7XUNH\¶VPHGiation also conveyed a 
prioritisation of political dialogue. At the same time, it underlined the rejection of sanctions as 
a counterproductive means of pressuring the Iranians. The unexpected rejection of the May 
2010 deal by the United States, and the subsequent imposition of UNSC sanctions resolution 
1929 just one month later, frustrated Ankara and abruptly ended the short-lived episode of 
Turkish mediation in the Iran dossier.379  
7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGV,UDQLVIROORZHGZLWKDZDWFKIXOH\HLQ:DVKLQJWRQ
7KH³JROG-for-JDV´GHDOEHWZHen Iran and Turkey, for example, was seen as a Turkish attempt 
to circumvent the U.S. unilateral sanctions regime on Iran (Kandemir 2013). As much as 
Ankara shows receptiveness to Western security perspectives as a NATO member and to the 
LPSRUWDQFHRIµWUDQVDWODQWLFVROLGDULW\¶WKHLPSHUDWLYHVRIJHRJUDSK\,UDQDVDQHLJKERUDQG
RIHFRQRPLFSUDJPDWLVPWKHQHHGIRURLODQGJDVGHOLYHULHVLPSRVHFRQVWUDLQWVRQ7XUNH\¶V
regional and general foreign policy. These constraints occasionally create a level of friction 
between the United States and Turkey over their respective approaches to Iran, even though 
Turkey hurries to emphasise the importance of solidarity with its U.S. ally.380   
3. Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies and Resistance to 
Hegemony 
 
It has been argued in this dissertation that the coexistence between dominant powers and 
powers that favour revisions to international security governance is characterised by the 
interacting forces of contestation and accommodation. Rather than constituting a bloc 
FKDOOHQJHWR$PHULFDQGRPLQDQFHLQµWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDOV\VWHP¶LWKDVEHHQVKRZQKRZ&KLQD
                                                          
378
 Turkey could base its diplomacy on the consent of the Obama administration, as evidenced by a letter 
written by U.S. President Obama to Brazilian President Lula in April 2010 in which he explicitly welcomed 
Turkish-Brazilian diplomatic initiatives (Mousavian 2012: 383; Parsi 2012: 187).  
379
 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚdƵƌŬŝƐŚŚŝŐŚ-ranking diplomat, Brussels, 29 May 2013.  
380
 ƵƚŚŽƌ ?ƐŝŶƚĞƌǀŝĞǁǁŝƚŚdƵƌŬŝƐŚĨŽƌĞŝŐŶŵŝŶŝƐƚƌǇŽĨĨŝĐŝĂů ?tĂƐŚŝŶŐƚŽŶ ? ? ?&ĞďƌƵĂƌǇ 2014. 
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Russia and Turkey display norm contestation and different conceptions of desirable security 
cultures, but propose an equitable adherence to common rules internationally. Here, a fruitful 
combination of neo-Gramscian with social constructivist scholarship has constituted an angle 
to illustrate resistance to hegemony in an understudied dimension. Situating this research 
finding in the wider literature on international norm dynamics, a distinction has been made 
EHWZHHQ µQRUPV¶DQGµUXOHV¶DQGKRZWKLVDSSOLHV WR µFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWKKHJHPRQLFSROLFLHV
7KHFDVHVWXGLHVH[DPLQHG LQ WKLVGLVVHUWDWLRQKDYHVKRZQKRZµFRPSOLDQFH¶RQ WKHSDUWRI
China, Russia and Turkey with approaches to the Iranian nuclear conflict has been selective, 
and how US policy preferences in the Iran dossier have been resisted on other occasions. 
Chinese, Russian, and Turkish reluctance to use sanctions as tools in international diplomacy 
did not prevent the eventual adoption of international sanctions against Iran. While 
PXOWLODWHUDO,UDQVDQFWLRQVDUHVHHQDVFRPSO\LQJZLWKWKHµUXOHV¶RIWKH81V\VWHPDGGLWLRQDO
unilateral sanctions are perceived as illegitimate and as an extraterritorialisation of domestic 
legislation. Besides an ideational resistance to unilateral sanctions, the economic impact of 
WKHVHµVHFRQGDU\VDQFWLRQV¶RQWKLUGFRXQWU\HQWLWLHVFRQVWLWXWHVDQDGGLWLRQDOPDWHULDODVSHFW
of Chinese, Russian, and Turkish criticism. Unlike EU sanctions, US unilateral sanctions have 
µH[WUDWHUULWRULDO¶DSSOLFDELOLW\&KLQHVH5XVVLDQDQG7XUNLVKHYHQWXDOFRPSOLDQFHZLWKVXFK
sanctions lists, then, indicates a level of receptiveness to the economic leverage of US-
dominated international financial mechanisms in instances where the respective governments 
have leeway over commercial decisions. While the precise balance between public and private 
sector deliberations is not always transparentLQWHUYLHZHHVFRQILUPHGWKDWµFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWK
sanctions that partially go beyond UN-mandated sanctions can be state-enforced and is often 
state-induced. Big energy companies in the countries examined here are state-owned, and 
decisions to reduce oil imports in response to energy sanctions are often political ones. But 
also private companies recoil from business in Iran with financial sanctions dangling over 
their heads like a Damocles sword. Compliance with Iran sanctions regimes on the part of 
private companies here forcefully underscores the structural dimension of hegemony whose 
reach extends beyond state control. 7KHSRZHURIODEHOVDQGRIµUHSXWDWLRQDOFRVWV¶ZRUNVLQ
subtle ways, and often slips the control of central governments.     
In this context, the Iran nuclear case serves as an illustration to show the 
contemporaneous interaction of the forces of consent and coercion in international politics. 
This is an observation that nuances the oftentimes too schematic scholarly terms of debate 




time, they presuppose an acceptance by a sufficiently large number of other actors. To the 
extent that other states act upon, sustain and reinforce U.S. dominant structures in the social, 
economic and political sphere, U.S. hegemony post-FRPHVFORVHVWWRDµKLVWRULFEORF¶LQ
a Gramscian understanding. This consensual order is complemented by US financial 
instruments (secondary sanctions, threats to exclude trading partners from US financial 
institutions) that serve to coerce other actors into acceptance of hegemonic policies. 
 At this point, this dissertation has offered a two-level model of foreign policy to 
understand Chinese, Russian and Turkish Iran policies: Norm advocacy on a discursive level 
need not be coherently translated into actual policies on a behavioural level. While Chinese, 
Russian and Turkish officials publicly advocate for an adherence to a security culture that 
emphasiseVFRPSOLDQFHZLWKWKHQRUPVRIµVRYHUHLJQW\¶DQGµnon-interference¶ and thus norm 
divergence from hegemony, their level of perceived material and political dependence on the 
United States prompts them to follow foreign policies that still comply with parts of U.S. 
hegemonic structures. Rule convergence was found on a behavioural level. The U.S. 
unilateral sanctions regime and compliance with an extraterritorialised U.S. legislation is the 
most prominent case in point.        
 On a discursive level, Chinese, Russian and Turkish foreign policies toward the 
Iranian nuclear programme arguably breathe the ambLWLRQWRSDUWLDOO\µGH-WesternisH¶ security 
cultures and discourses toward Iran. 3XEOLFDGYRFDF\IRUµGHPRFUDWLF¶LQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQV
was shown to follow the same logic of eroding the monopoly of hegemonic normative 
frameworks for the workings of international governance. Chinese, Russian, and Turkish 
foreign policies display a normative divergence with a U.S.-inspired security culture towards 
Iran, and their distinction between legitimate sanctions (those that follow UN rules) and 
illegitimate ones (those that are adopted unilaterally and thus violate the principle of 
Sovereign Equality) was a clear indication therefor. Eventual µFRPSOLDQFH¶ ZLWK 8S policy 
preferences on Iran on a behavioral level has been situational, selective, and motivated by 
differing ideational, institutional and material stakes at hand. Most notably, the predominance 
of the US in global trade and finance forces material constraints onto other actors that are not 
HDV\ WR GLVFDUG 86 ILQDQFLDO VDQFWLRQV H[HUW D SRZHUIXO KROG RYHU RWKHU JRYHUQPHQWV¶
decisions to curtail trade with Iran because their companies would otherwise risk losing 
access to US financial markets. This essentially amounts to material blackmail and exercises a 
VWUXFWXUDOSRZHUWKDWRIWHQWLPHVOHGWRµFRPSOLDQFH¶ZLWKSROLFLHVRQDEHKDYLRXUDOOHYHOWKDW
were otherwise criticised on normative grounds on a discursive level.   
 The coexistence of established and emerging powers will inevitably determine the 
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design of the future world order. The working relationship between former hegemons and 
µULVLQJSRZHUV¶ as potential challengers is constantly being re-balanced and re-negotiated. In 
this regard, with different prioritisations and perceptions of legitimacy on the part of the 
different actors involved, the Iranian nuclear crisis arguably is not only a battlefield for the 
survival of the NPT regime, but is a debate about differing conceptions of world order and 
security governance for decades to come. This research thus provides a timely and critical 
contribution to key questions of international politics in the 21st century.  
4. Areas for further Research 
 
2EVHUYHGGLVFUHSDQFLHVEHWZHHQDVWDWH¶VRIILFLDOUKHWRULFDQGits foreign policy behavior are 
not limited to the Iranian nuclear case. The previous chapter has pointed to the ambivalence 
EHWZHHQ &KLQHVH DQG 5XVVLDQ SXEOLF SOHGJHV WR WKH SULQFLSOHV RI µVRYHUHLJQW\¶ DQG µQRQ-
LQWHUIHUHQFH¶ZKLOHWKHLULQWHUIHUHQFHLQRther states may breach the very principles they hold 
dear in international politics. This ambivalence is neither limited to China, Russia or Turkey, 
nor to the principles presented in the preceding chapters. The distinction between discourse 
and behavior in a two-level model to analyse foreign policy merits further research and can 
serve as a model to be applied to other issue areas beyond the Iranian nuclear case. It allows 
the analytical synthesis between norm dynamics and rule applications in international 
relations and thus makes a conceptual contribution to the theoretical minefield of the 
international norm literature. The analytical as well as policy challenge is to craft models to 
acknowledge the inherently contested nature of norms while still allowing for a rules-based 
international order conducive to the furtherance of international peace and security. Research 
into policies and international politics is never neutral, as is no social science research. By 
necessity, the analysis in this dissertation has been one way of telling the story, and it is a 
conscious research decision to choose the conceptual, theoretical and methodological angle 
that has guided the investigation. However, it has been shown how the combination of 
constructivist scholarship with neo-Gramscian conceptual frameworks can offer theoretically 
novel interpretations of key questions about norm dynamics, World Order, security policies 
DQG WKH FRH[LVWHQFH EHWZHHQ µQRUP-VKDSHUV¶ DQG µQRUP-WDNHUV¶ ,W KDV EHHQ VXJJHVWHG KRZ
power shifts in international relations take place gradually. Further research is needed to 
examine these beyond a too static and schematic conception of power transitions that largely 
VWHP IURP UDWLRQDOLVW WKHRUHWLFDO VWUDLJKWMDFNHWV 7KH µSRZHU WUDQVLWLRQ SDUDGLJP¶ largely 
remains a neo-realist hobby horse. The contribution of other theoretical and conceptual 
angles, however, can add much-needed depth to the scholarship.     
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 ,QDVLPLODU IDVKLRQ LWKDVEHHQVKRZQWKDW µOHJDOLW\¶DQGµLOOHJDOLW\¶ LQ LQWHUQDWLRQDO
relations are relational notions by design. As the analysis of the Iranian nuclear case has 
demonstrated, the legal contestation over nuclear rights and obligations under the nuclear non-
proliferation treaty gave way to a much deeper-seated malaise in international power 
constellations. Working with these concepts as worked out in this dissertation will continue to 
enrich our understanding of fault lines between superpowers (US) and self-proclaimed 
revolutionary actors (Iran), between the modernising and the modernised world, and between 
those actors that substantially shaped world governance in the last century, and those that will 
OLNHO\EHµEULFV¶RIQHZRUPRGLILHGWHUPVRIWKHJDPH     
 Likewise, a better understanding of the conceptual implications thereof also directly 
translates into policy formulation: Government positions are informed by mutual perceptions, 
even if these do not correspond to reality. The assumption of Iranian victimisation as an 
inherent part of Shia political culture is an example of such preconceptions that have 
influenced how other delegations to the nuclear talks have formulated their bargaining 
positions in negotiations. This nexus between concepts and policies calls for continued 
accurate analyses that help realistically anticipate policy formulation on the part of other 
actors.  
Against these areas for further conceptual research, this dissertation has equally 
touched upon a number of subjects and geographical areas that merit further empirical 
research. First, a political framework agreement has been reached between the P5+1 with Iran 
on 2 April 2015. Yet, even after the conclusion of a comprehensive nuclear agreement, the 
Iranian nuclear conflict is far from over. Dividing lines are starting to emerge at the time of 
writing as to the scope, duration, and procedures of such a final agreement. The 
implementation of this agreement will take years, and the political nature of the Iranian 
nuclear conflict will be sure to spark further research on policy coordination between those 
actors bearing responsibility for a successful closure thereof. The eventual closure of the Iran 
dossier in a UN Security Council resolution as well as the closure of the case by the IAEA 
pursuant to its documentation of the exclusively peaceful nature of IrDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH
will need to be closely monitored by researchers and Iran watchers. The same holds true for 
the process of the lifting of both multilateral and unilateral Iran sanctions. The latter prospect 
has the potential to usher in a new phase of relations between Iran and the West that will 
undoubtedly inspire numerous research projects on the impact on global and regional politics.  
Second, relations between Russia and the West at the time of writing continue to 
bedevil international politics, and continue to be a topical subject in need of critical and 
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timely research. As this dissertation has shown, there is no easy answer to the question about 
5XVVLDQ µQDWLRQDO LQWHUHVWV¶ DQG WKH FDVH RI WKH ,UDQLDQ QXFOHDU WDONV KDV LOOXVWUDWHG a 
surprisinJO\ µFRPSDUWPHQWDOLVHG¶ IRUHLJQSROLF\ ZKHUH IURVW\ UHODWLRQV LQPRVW LVVXHV DUHDV
do not prevent constructive policy coordination on the Iranian nuclear file. The various 
foreign policy motivations presented in this dissertation can contribute to a better 
understanding of the complexity of Russian foreign policy, and the conceptual tools used in 
this endeavor can be applied to analyse relations between the West and Russia in other issue 
areas not studied in depth in this dissertation. The need for Area Studies expertise on Russia 
and the post-Soviet region more broadly could not be higher as relations between the West 
and Russia experience their most fundamental crisis since the end of the Cold War.  
Third, the analysis of Turkish foreign policy has provided a substantive discussion of 
the foreign policy of a country that will most likely continue to spark scholarly debates and 
discussLRQV7XUNH\¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\KDVEHHQVKRZQWREHDWDFURVVURDGVEHWZHHQSDUWLDOO\
competing regional security conceptions. This is to no small degree attributed to strategic 
shifts of the Turkish government. Many different variables enter into Turkish foreign policy 
decision-PDNLQJ DQG 7XUNH\ ZDWFKHUV ZLOO FRQWLQXH WR PDNH VHQVH RI 7XUNH\¶V VHHPLQJO\
derailed EU integration project, increasingly domestic authoritarian tendencies, Turkish-
Kurdish relations, the uneasy Turkish-American relationship, and TXUNH\¶VDPELJXRXVVWDQFH
on the advance of transnational Islamist fundamentalism. The empirical evidence presented in 
this dissertation can be a useful stepping stone for research delving into one or several of 
these aspects. The discussion of Turkish Iran SROLFLHVKDVXQGHUOLQHGKRZ7XUNH\¶VSRVLWLRQ
WRZDUGV,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHLVLQVHSDUDEOHIURPWKHZLGHUFRQWH[WRI7XUNLVKUHJLRQDO
policies and their implications for global security governance.   
Fourth, the case study on Turkish Iran policies has shown how an actor that is not 
formally part of the UN-mandated negotiation format can have an impact on the direction of 
diplomacy. The Turkish mediation in the Iranian nuclear conflict in 2009-2010 was a 
remarkable period of activist foreign policy whose purpose, scope, and repercussions have 
been analysed in this project. Similar cases of diplomatic mediation as well as the potential 
for it, can be studied in a comparable framework. Such research projects could build on the 
analysis provided here on Turkish mediation and expand the existing scholarly literature on 
mediation and negotiation. Cases need not be limited to Iran diplomacy. Insights into the 
mechanisms, preconditions and perceptions of third country mediators can shed light onto the 
structural dimensions of international diplomacy.  
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Fifth, the analysis of Chinese foreign policy towards Iran has touched upon myriad 
IRUHLJQ SROLF\ PRWLYDWLRQV RI &KLQD LQ JHQHUDO DQG HPEHGGHG WKH GLVFXVVLRQ RI &KLQD¶V
position towards the Iranian nuclear programme into the wider historical, regional, and global 
FRQWH[WRI&KLQHVHGLSORPDF\$V&KLQD¶VSROLWLFDOZHLJKWLVJURZLQJFRPPHQVXUDWHZLWKLWV
HFRQRPLF LQIOXHQFH LQ LPSRUWDQWZRUOG UHJLRQV&KLQD¶V OHDGHUVKLS LVJUDGXDOO\DGRSWLQJ LWV
foreign policy planning. Scholarly research is needed to accompany and study this 
development.  The evidence and conclusions presented here can contribute to the vast body of 
scholarly literature on Chinese foreign policy and provide nuance to the sometimes 
overheated discussion oQ µ&KLQD¶V ULVH¶ $V WKLV GLVVHUWDWLRQ KDV DUJXHG WKURXJKRXW SRZHU
shifts take place gradually, and the focus on structural forces of World Order can help zoom 
out from a too narrow actor-centric angle that characterises many studies of contemporary 
China.    
Sixth, further areas of research relate to those foreign policies that have served as 
points of reference throughout this dissertation, namely European and American policies 
towards the Middle East in general and Iran in particular. At a time where negotiations on a 
comprehensive nuclear agreement between the P5+1 and Iran are under way, it becomes a 
WLPHO\HQGHDYRUWRUHIOHFWRQVKLIWVLQSROLFLHVDQGSRVLWLRQVERWKRIWKHµ(¶DQGRIWKH86
This is especially the case as any implementation of a nuclear agreement will involve new 
policy planning by design: The process of the lifting of not only multilateral (UN-adopted), 
but also Western unilateral sanctions will require the crafting of new Iran policies in Western 
capitals, and a partial re-thinking RIUHODWLRQVEHWZHHQµWKH:HVW¶DQG,UDQRQWKHRQHKDQG
and between European and US Iran policies after the dissolution of the P5+1 format on the 
other. With the prospect of Iran sanctions lifted, European and US administrations are 
indicating diverging views on relations with Iran after the nuclear conflict will be solved, 
particularly regarding future trade and security policy towards Iran. Against the background 
of its significance for the regional and inter-regional security architecture, trade relations, and 
SROLWLFDODOOLDQFHVWKHµ,UDQDIWHUVDQFWLRQV¶VFHQDULRZLOOKDYHUHSHUFXVVLRQVRQWKHIXWXUHRI
WKH µWUDQVDWODQWLF GLDORJXH¶ RQ WKH 0LGGOH (DVW 5HVHDUFK LQ WKLV FRQWH[W FDQ PDNH
contributions to the debate on European Union Foreign Policy, the (8¶V,UDQDQG0LGGOH(DVW
SROLFLHVDQGWRWKHEXUJHRQLQJOLWHUDWXUHRQµWKH(8DVDQLQWHUQDWLRQDODFWRU¶ 
Seventh WKH UHODWLRQVKLS EHWZHHQ µHVWDEOLVKHG SRZHUV¶ DQG µHPHUJLQJ SRZHUV¶ ZLOO
continue to both inspire research projects and obfuscate policy debates at the same time. 
/DEHOV EHFRPH µVWLFN\¶ GHYHORS D G\QDPLF RI WKHLU RZQ WKDW JXLGH RXU DVVXPSWLRQV DERXW
polLWLFVDQGSROLFLHVEHFRPHµSDWKGHSHQGHQW¶7KH µ%5,&6¶ ODEHO LV DSULPHH[DPSOHRID
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classification of a group of rather diverse countries into one conceptual unit that has become a 
political unit in its own right despite fuzziness over status, scope and policy implications. The 
LQFOXVLRQ HVSHFLDOO\ RI 5XVVLD LQWR D JURXS RI HFRQRPLFDOO\ µULVLQJ SRZHUV¶ KDV EHHQ PRUH
WKDQ TXHVWLRQDEOH 7KLV UHVHDUFK SURMHFW KDV VKRZQ KRZ µUHVLVWDQFH¶ WR HVWDEOLVKHG SRZHU
VWUXFWXUHVRQ WKHSDUWRI µHPHUJLQJSRZHUV¶ LV PXOWifaceted. Pronounced economic interests 
need not automatically lead to a stronger articulation of political divergences. Analytical 
projections impact on self-perceptions, and more scholarly research is needed to accurately 
reflect on the nexus between macroeconomics and political clout in international relations at 
the interstice of the disciplines of economics, IR, and Area Studies.  
Finally, the previous chapter has referred to changes in US norm discourses that 
embedded US Iran policy in a more multilateral approach, and indicated how international 
norm dynamics have the potential to change policy preferences. More research is needed to 
investigate the effect that dissenting voices can have on US positions, and the extent to which 
µUHVLVWDQFH WR KHJHPRQ\¶ FDQ JHQHUDWH µIHHGEDFN HIIHFWV¶ RQ KHJHPRQLF VWUXctures. Rather 
than conceptualising a one-ZD\µVRFLDOLVDWLRQ¶RIµHPHUJLQJSRZHUV¶LQWRH[LVWLQJJRYHUQDQFH
VWUXFWXUHV WKH FDVH RI ,UDQ¶V QXFOHDU ILOH FDQ VHUYH DV D EDVLV IRU QHZ UHVHDUFK SURMHFWV WR
investigate the effects oI SURFHVVHV RI µWZR-way socialisDWLRQV¶ ZKHUHE\ UHVLVWDQFH WR
dominant power structures can eventually usher in a shift in these structures themselves. Such 
research would also have to shed light on the nexus between foreign policy learning, internal 
determinants of foreign policy, and domestic audience costs. The unprecedented partisan 
power struggle between (Republican-dominated) Congress and the US administration over 
US Iran policy at the time of writing is a forceful reminder for the validity and empirical 
necessity of such a research focus.  
The Iranian nuclear crisis is a proxy for numerous fundamental debates about 
international relations. The list of possible further research areas presented here is therefore 
not exhaustive, and should be thought of rather as a sketch board from which to venture out. 
This study project has hopefully managed to demonstrate how the Iran question is indeed a 










Attar, Sheikh. 2011. Ambassador of Iran to Germany. Iranian Nuclear Policy. Conference 
notes from the 59th Pugwash Conference on Science & World Affairs. European 
Contributions to Nuclear Disarmament & Conflict Resolution. Federal Foreign 
Office. Berlin, Germany. 1-4 July 2011.  
Bush, George W. 2002. State of the Union Address, 29 January 2002. Available at [last 
accessed 17 March 2011]: 
http://www.johnstonsarchive.net/policy/bushstun2002.html. 
Chinese foreign ministry. 2014. China's Five Principles for a Comprehensive Solution of the 
Iranian Nuclear Issue. 19 February 2014. Available at [last accessed 1 May 2014]: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjb_663304/zzjg_663340/jks_665232/jkxw_665
234/t1129941.shtml. 
Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization. 2013. Status of Signature and 
Ratification. Available at [last accessed 20 January 2013]: http://www.ctbto.org/the-
treaty/status-of-signature-and-ratification/. 
EU Council Conclusions. 2012. Iran: EU strengthens sanctions over lack of progress in 




EU Council Conclusions. 2013. Iran: EU strengthens sanctions over lack of progress in 




Eurostat. 2012. EU Oil Imports, by country of origin. Statistics Explained, 19 July 2012. 
Available at [last accessed 16 October 2013]: 
http://epp.eurostat.ec.europa.eu/statistics_explained/index.php?title=File:EU_Oil_im
ports,_by_country_of_origin_(in_%25).png&filetimestamp=20120719133014. 
European Commission. 2015. Energy Union Package. Communication from the European 
Commission to the European Parliament, the Council, the European Economic and 
Social Committee, the Committee of the Regions and the European Investment 
Bank: A Framework Strategy for a Resilient Energy Union with a Forward-Looking 
Climate Change Policy. European Commission Communication COM(2015) 80, 25 
February 2015. Available at [last accessed 13 April 2015]: 
http://ec.europa.eu/priorities/energy-union/docs/energyunion_en.pdf. 
European External Action Service. 2015. Joint Statement by EU High Representative 
Federica Mogherini and Iranian Foreign Minister Javad Zarif Switzerland. 2 April 
2015. Available at [last accessed 22 June 2015]: http://eeas.europa.eu/statements-
eeas/2015/150402_03_en.htm. 
Goldman Sachs. 2001. Building Better Global Economic BRICs. Global Economics Paper 





Hu, Jintao. 2007. Documents of the 17th National Congress of the Communist Party of China. 
Beijing: Foreign Languages Press.  
Hua, Chunying. 2014a. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press 
Conference on February 21, 2014. 0)$6SRNHVSHUVRQ¶V5HPDUNV. Available at [last 
accessed 23 April 2014]: http://www.chinamission.be/eng/fyrth/t1131024.htm. 
 . 2014b. Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Hua Chunying's Regular Press Conference 




IAEA. 2003. Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. IAEA Board report. Available at [last accessed 20 December 2012]: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2003/gov2003-40.pdf. 
 . 2006. Implementation of the NPT safeguards agreement in the Islamic Republic of 
Iran. IAEA Board report. Available at [last accessed 20 December 2012]: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2006/gov2006-53.pdf. 
 . 2011. Implementation of the NPT Safeguards Agreement and relevant provisions of 
Security Council resolutions in the Islamic Republic of Iran. IAEA board report, 24 
May 2011. Available at [last accessed 24 February 2014]: 
http://www.iaea.org/Publications/Documents/Board/2011/gov2011-29.pdf.  
InWHUQDWLRQDO(QHUJ\$JHQF\D3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLFRI&KLQD2LODQG*DV6HFXULW\
Emergency Responses of IEA Countries. Available at [last accessed 12 February 
2013]: http://www.iea.org/publications/freepublications/publication/China_2012.pdf. 
International Energy Agency. 2012b. World Oil Choke Points. Analysis Briefs. Available at 
[last accessed 19 February 2013]: http://www.eia.gov/countries/regions-
topics.cfm?fips=wotc&trk=p3. 
Katzman, Kenneth. 2006. The Iran-Libya Sanctions Act (ILSA). CRS Report for Congress, 26 
April 2006. Available at [last accessed 27 September 2014]: 
http://fpc.state.gov/documents/organization/66441.pdf. 
Miller, Steven E. 2011. Iranian Nuclear Policy. Conference notes from the 59th Pugwash 
Conference on Science & World Affairs. European Contributions to Nuclear 
Disarmament & Conflict Resolution. Federal Foreign Office. Berlin, Germany. 1-4 
July 2011.  
Putin, Vladimir. 2003. Interv¶Lu Prezidenta Rossii V.V. Putina Amerikanskim telekanalam. 
Novo-Ogoreva. September 20, 2003 Soobshschenie Press Sluzhby Prezidenta 
Rossijskoj Federatsii. MID RF DIP, Informatsionnij Biulleten¶ (Interview of 
American TV channels with Russian president V. Putin). Bulletin of the Press 
Service of the Russian Federation, 24 September 2003. 
 . 2014. Speech at the Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club. Kremlin 
Transcript. Available at [last accessed 26 January 2015]: 
http://eng.kremlin.ru/news/23137. 
Russian foreign ministry. 2011. Kommentarii Departamenta Informatsii i Pechati MID Rossii 
otnosLWHO¶QRGRNODGD0$*$7( po iranskoj iadernoj programme (Statement by the 
Russian foreign ministry press department regarding the IAEA report on the Iranian 
nuclear programme). Press statement, 8 November 2011. Available at [last accessed 




 . 2012a. Kommentarii Departamenta Informatsii i Pechati MID Rossii v sviazi s 
vvedeniem evropejskim soiuzom novykh sanktsij v otnoshenii Irana (Statement by 
the Russian foreign ministry press department regarding the new EU sanctions 
against Iran), Press statement, 23 November 2012. Available at [last accessed 2 
February 2014]: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
rasia.nsf/1083b7937ae580ae432569e7004199c2/c32577ca001745864425798e00532
3a7!OpenDocument, accessed 01 March 2012. 
 . 2012b. Kommentarii Departamenta Informatsii i Pechati MID Rossii na vopros 
DJHQVWYDµ,QWHUIDNV¶RWQRVLWHO¶QRYR]PR]KQRVWLSURYHGHQLDµ6KHVWHUNRM¶QRYRM
vstrechi s uchastiem Irana (Statement by the Russian foreign ministry press 
GHSDUWPHQWRQWKHTXHVWLRQRIµ,QWHUID[¶DJHQF\RQWKHSRVVLELOLW\RIWKHQHZ3




 . 2013a. Concept of the Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation. Available at [last 
accessed 15 January 2014]: http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/ns-
osndoc.nsf/1e5f0de28fe77fdcc32575d900298676/869c9d2b87ad8014c32575d9002b
1c38!OpenDocument.  
 . 2013b. Kommentarii Ministra inostrannykh del Rossii S.V.Lavrova dlia SMI po 
itogam uchastiia v peregovorakh po iranskoi iadernoi programme, Zheneva, 9 
noiabria 2013 goda (Statement by the Russian foreign minister S.V. Lavrov 
concerning the participation in talks on the Iranian nuclear programme, Geneva, 9 




 . 2014. Comment by Foreign Ministry Spokesman Alexander Lukashevich on the 
expansion of US sanctions against Russia. Press statement, 30 December 2014. 
Available at [last accessed 20 January 2015]: 
http://www.mid.ru/bdomp/brp_4.nsf/e78a48070f128a7b43256999005bcbb3/227e99e
07b4a2e79c3257dbe005c469b!OpenDocument. 
 . 2015. Zaiavlenie MID Rossii po itogam peregovorov v Lozanne ministrov 
inostrannykh del "Gruppy shesti' i Irana po voprosu ob uregulirovanii situatsii 
vokrug iranskoi iadernoi programmy (Foreign ministry statement on the foreign 
minister-level talks in Lausanne betwHHQWKH³*URXS RI6L[´DQG,UDQFRQFHUQLQJWKH
resolution of the situation surrounding the Iranian nuclear programme). Statement, 2 
April 2015. Available at [last accessed 4 May 2015]: 
http://mid.ru/brp_4.nsf/newsline/1172F6446B05FF5C43257E1B0068E88B. 
Ryabkov, Sergei. 2015. Interview with deputy foreign minister Sergei Ryabkov, Russia today, 
2 March 2015. Available at [last accessed 23 March 2015]: 
http://mid.ru/BDOMP/Brp_4.nsf/arh/7A81B5F85BAFCAEC43257DFC00537D23?
OpenDocument. 
Soltanieh, Ali Ashgar. 2011. Ambassador of Iran to the IAEA. Iranian Nuclear Policy. 
Conference notes from the 59th Pugwash Conference on Science & World Affairs. 
European Contributions to Nuclear Disarmament & Conflict Resolution. Federal 
Foreign Office. Berlin, Germany. 1-4 July 2011.  
228 
 
Tehran Metro. 2013. Iran seeks $2bn from China to complete Tehran metro. Available at 
[last accessed 20 February 2013]: http://tehran-metro.com/featured/iran-seeks-2bn-
from-china-to-complete-tehran-metro. 
Turkish foreign ministry. 2010. ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDP7KH7XUNLVK3HUVSHFWLYH-XQH
Powerpoint Briefing, Available at [last accessed 6 May 2015]: 
http://losangeles.cg.mfa.gov.tr/images/TemsilcilikOzel/b15prjzpaplfysi5nz31z4qmIr
ans%20Nuclear%20Program.pdf. 
 . 2015. No: 102, 3 April 2015, Press Release Regarding the Agreement on the Nuclear 
Program of Iran. Press Release. Available at [last accessed 6 May 2015]: 
http://www.mfa.gov.tr/no_-102_-3-april-2015_-press-release-regarding-the-
agreement-on-the-nuclear-program-of-iran.en.mfa. 
UN.  2006a. Security Council imposes sanctions on Iran for failure to halt Uranium 
enrichment, unanimously adopting Resolution 1737. Resolution 1737. Available at 
[last accessed 21 December 2012]: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs//2006/sc8928.doc.htm. 
 . 2006b. Provisional Summary, 5612th Security Council Meeting, S/PV.5612. 
Available at [last accessed 13 October 2014]: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.5612. 
 . 2007. Provisional Summary, 5647th Security Council Meeting. S/PV.5647. Available 
at [last accessed 13 October 2014]: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.5647. 
 . D6HFXULW\&RXQFLOWLJKWHQV5HVWULFWLRQRQ,UDQ¶VSUROLIHUDWLRQ-sensitive nuclear 
activities, increases vigilance over Iranian banks, has states inspect cargo. Security 
Council Resolution 1803. Available at [last accessed 21 December 2012]: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2008/sc9268.doc.htm. 
 . 2008b. Provisional Summary, 5848th Security Council Meeting. S/PV.5848. 
Available at [last accessed 13 October 2014]: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.5848. 
 . 2009. Provisional Summary, 6191st Security Council Meeting. S/PV.6191. Available 
at [last accessed 13 October 2014]: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6191. 
 . 2010a. Security Council imposes additional sanctions on Iran, voting 12 in favour to 
2 against, with 1 Abstention. Security Council Resolution 1929. Available at [last 
accessed 21 December 2012]: 
http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/2010/sc9948.doc.htm. 
 . 2010b. Provisional Summary, 6335th Security Council Meeting. S/PV. 6335. 
Available at [last accessed 13 October 2014]: 
http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/PV.6335. 
 . Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. Status of the Treaty. Available 
at [last accessed 20 January 2013]: http://disarmament.un.org/treaties/t/npt. 
U.S. Energy Information Administration. 2012. Natural Gas Exports from Iran. Independent 
Statistics & Analysis October 2012. Available at [last accessed 10 April 2013]: 
http://www.eia.gov/analysis/requests/ngexports_iran/pdf/full.pdf. 
 . 2013. Turkey. Analysis Briefs February 1. Available at [last accessed 10 April 2013]: 
http://www.eia.gov/countries/analysisbriefs/Turkey/turkey.pdf. 
U.S. Department of State. 2010. Background Briefing on Nuclear Nonproliferation Efforts 
with Regard to Iran and the Brazil/Turkey Agreement. Special Briefing, Senior 
229 
 
Administration Officials. Washington, May 28, 2010. Available at [last accessed 19 
April 2014]: http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2010/05/142375.htm. 
 . 2012. Three Companies Sanctioned Under the Amended Iran Sanctions Act. Media 
Note, 12 January 2012. Available at [last accessed 4 May 2014]: 
http://www.state.gov/r/pa/prs/ps/2012/01/180552.htm. 
 . 2013. Regarding Significant Reductions of Iranian Crude Oil Purchases. Remarks, 
29 November 2013. Available at [last accessed 17 May 2014]: 
http://www.state.gov/secretary/remarks/2013/11/218131.htm. 
US Treasury Department. 2011. Treasury Designates Ten Shipping Companies, Three 
,QGLYLGXDOV$IILOLDWHGZLWK,UDQ¶V1DWLRQDO6KLSSLQJ/LQH Press Release 20 June 
2011. Available at [last accessed 13 October 2014]: http://www.treasury.gov/press-
center/press-releases/Pages/tg1212.aspx. 
Wang, Yi. 2014. Wang Yi: The Agreement Between the P5+1 and Iran Should be Properly 
Implemented. Press cut-DQXDU\0LQLVWU\RI)RUHLJQ$IIDLUVRIWKH3HRSOH¶V
Republic of China. Available at [last accessed 23 April 2014]: 
http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/mfa_eng/wjdt_665385/zyjh_665391/t1116503.shtml. 
Wilson, Dominic and Purushothaman, Roopa. 2003. Dreaming with BRICS: the path to 
2050. Goldman Sachs Global Economic Paper No. 99. Available at [last accessed 
10 February 2013]: http://www.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/topics/brics/brics-
reports-pdfs/brics-dream.pdf 
Zarif, Mohamad Javad. 2006. Letter dated 31 July 2006 from the Permanent Representative 
of the Islamic Republic of Iran to the United Nations addressed to the President of 
the Security Council. United Nations Security Council, S/2006/603. Available at 
[last accessed 13 April 2015]: http://www.iranwatch.org/sites/default/files/unsc-
s2006603-irancomm-080206.pdf. 
Zoellick, Robert B. 2005. Wither China? From membership to responsibility? Remarks to 
National Committee on U.S.-China Relations. New York, 21 September 2005. 
Available at [last accessed 6 August 2014]: http://2001-
2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. 
 
Memoirs and Contemporary Works 
 
Chirac, Jacques. 2011. My Life in Politics. Transl. by Spencer, Catherine. New York: 
Palgrave Macmillan.  
Clinton, Hillary Rodham. 2014. Hard Choices. New York: Simon & Schuster. 
'DYXWR÷OX, Ahmet. 2001. 6WUDWHMLNGHULQOLN7UNL\H
QLQXOXVODUDUDVÕNRQXPX(Strategic 
Depth: Turkish Foreign Policy). ,VWDQEXO.UH<D\ÕQODUÕ 
ElBaradei, Mohamed. 2012. The Age of Deception. Nuclear Diplomacy in Treacherous 
Times. New York: Bloomsburg Publishing Plc.  
Fischer, Joschka. 2011. µ,DPQRWFRQYLQFHG¶Der Irak-Krieg und die rot-grünen Jahre. Köln: 
Kiepenhauer & Witsch.  
Mousavian, Seyed Hossein. 2012. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis. A Memoir. Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
  (with Shahir Shahidsaless). 2014. ,UDQDQGWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV$Q,QVLGHU¶V9LHZRQ
the Failed Past and the Road to Peace. New York, London: Bloomsbury.  
Primakov, Yevgeny. 2009. Russia and the Arabs. Behind the Scenes in the Middle East from 
the Cold War to the Present. Transl. by Gould, Paul. New York: Basic Books. 
230 
 
Rouhani, Hassan. 2011. Amniyat Melli va Diplomasi-ye Hastehi Iran (National Security and 
Nuclear Diplomacy).Tehran: Center for Strategic Research.  
 . 2013. Ruayt Tadabir va Omir (Narration of Foresight and Hope). Tehran: Center for 
Strategic Research.  
Rumsfeld, Donald. 2011. Known and Unknown. A Memoir. London: Sentinel.  




Abidi, Aqil Hyder Hasan. 1982. China, Iran and the Persian Gulf. New Delhi: Radiant 
Publishers.   
Adib-Moghaddam, Arshin. 2006. The International Politics of the Persian Gulf. A cultural 
Genealogy. New York: Routledge.  
 . 2010. Iran in World Politics. The Question of the Islamic Republic. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
 . 2011. A Metahistory of the Clash of Civilisations. Us and Them Beyond Orientalism. 
New York: Columbia University Press.  
 . 2014. On the Arab Revolts and the Iranian Revolution. Power and Resistance 
Today. London: Bloomsbury.  
Adler, Emanueal. 1997. Seizing the Middle Ground: Constructivism in World Politics, 
European Journal of International Relations vol. 3, no. 3: 319-63. 
Adler-Nissen, Rebecca. 2014. Stigma Management in International Relations: Transgressive 
Identities, Norms and Order in International Society. International Organisation vol. 
68, no. 1: 143-176. 
Adomeit, Hannes. 2007. Russlands Iran-Politik unter Putin. SWP study April 2007. Berlin: 
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik. German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs.  
. 2009. Russland und Iran. Welche Ziele und Interessen verfolgt Russland? Wie 
verlässlich ist Moskau, wenn es darum geht, Teherans Aufstieg zur Atommacht zu 
verhindern? Sozialwissenschaftliche Schriftenreihe, November 2009. Wien: 
Internationales Institut Liberale Politik. 
 . 2013. Fehler im Betriebssystem. Die russisch-amerikanischen Beziehungen. 
Osteuropa  vol. 63, no. 9: 57-78.  
Afrasiabi, Kaveh and Kibaro÷lu0XVWDID1HJRWLDWLQJ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3RSXOLVPBrown 
Journal of World Affairs vol. 12, no. 1: 1-17. 
Agamben, Giorgio. 2002. Homo sacer. Die Souveränität der Macht und das nackte Leben, 
Trans. Hubert Thüring. Frankfurt: Suhrkamp.  
$N\RO0XVWDID:K\GRHVQ¶W7XUNH\VSHDNXSRQ,UDQQXFOHDULVVXH"Turkey Pulse, Al 
monitor, 26 February 2015. Available at [last accessed 12 May 2015]: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/02/turkey-geneva-nuclear-iran-un.html#. 
Allison, Roy. 2013. Russia and Syria: explaining alignment with a regime in crisis. 
International Affairs vol. 89, no. 4: 795-823.  
Alterman, Jon B. and Garver, John. 2008. The Vital Triangle: China, the United States, and 
the Middle East. Washington, D.C.: CSIS Press. 
$OWXQÕúÕN0HOLKD%HQOL7KH3RVVLELOLWLHVDQG/LPLWVRI7XUNH\¶V6RIW3RZHULQWKH
Middle East. Insight Turkey vol. 10, no. 2: 41-54. 
231 
 
Andrianovna, Anna and Galouchko, Ksenia. 2015. S&3&XWV5XVVLD¶V5DWLQJWR-XQN
Sanctions and Oil Slump Hammer Ruble. Bloomberg News, 27 January 2015. 
Available at [last accessed 27 January 2015]: 
http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2015-01-26/russia-credit-rating-cut-to-junk-by-s-
p-for-first-time-in-decade.html. 
Ansari, Ali. 2006. Confronting Iran. The Failure of American Foreign Policy and the Next 
Great Conflict in the Middle East. New York: Basic Books.  
$QWRQHQNR2NVDQD5XVVLD¶V0LOLWDU\,QYROYHPHQWLQWKH0LGGOH(DVWMiddle East 
Review of International Affairs, vol. 5, no. 1: 1-14.  
Aras, Bülent. 2001. Turkish Foreign Policy towards Iran: Ideology and Foreign Policy in 
Flux. Journal of Third World Studies, vol. 18, no. 1: 105-124. 
Aras, Bülent & Ozbay, Fatih. 2006. Dances with Wolves: Russia, Iran and the Nuclear Issue. 
Middle East Policy, vol. 13, no. 4: 132-147. 
Arbatov, Alexei. 2007. Withdrawal from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. In: Arbatov, Alexei 
(ed.), At the Nuclear Threshold. The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, pp. 77-86.  
 . 2014. Iran, Russia, and the Ukrainian Crisis. The National Interest, 17 July 2014. 
Available at [last accessed 20 October 2014]: http://nationalinterest.org/blog/the-
buzz/iran-russia-the-ukrainian-crisis-10902?page=3. 
Armijo, Leslie Elliott. 2007. The BRIC Countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) as 
Analytical Category: Mirage or Insight? Asian Perspective vol. 31, no. 4: 7-42. 
Arrighi, G. 1993. The three hegemonies of historical capitalism. In: Gill, S. (ed), Gramsci, 
Historical Materialism and International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, pp. 148-85. 
Arslan, Deniz. 2015. Iran nuclear talks may pose opportunities and challenges for Turkey. 






Art, Robert J. 2008. The United States and the rise of China: Implications for the long haul. 
Political Science Quarterly vol. 125, no. 3: 359-391. 
Atkin, Muriel. 2011. Myths of Soviet-Iranian relations. In: Ansari, Ali (ed.), Politics of 
Modern Iran. Critical Issues in Modern Politics. Abingdon: Routledge.  
Atkinson, Paul and Coffey, Amanda. 2002. Revisiting the Relationship between Participant 
Observation and Interviewing. In: Gubrium, Jaber F. and Holstein, James A. (eds.), 
Handbook of Interview Research. Context & Method. Thousand Oaks, London, New 
Delhi: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 801-14. 
Aykan, Mahmut Bali. 1996. Turkish Perspectives on Turkish-US Relations Concerning 
Persian Gulf Security in the post-Cold War Era: 1989-1995. The Middle East Journal 
vol. 50, no. 3: 344-358.  
 . 2007. A Retrospective Analysis of Turkey-United States Relations in the Wake of 
the US War in Iraq in March 2003. In: Guney, Nursin Atesoglu (ed.), Contentious 




Baalbood, Abdulla and Edwards, Geoffrey. 2007. Reinforcing Ambivalence: The Interaction 
of Gulf States and the European Union. European Foreign Affairs Review vol. 12: 
537-554. 
Bacevich, Andrew J. 2002. American Empire. The Realities & Consequences of U.S. 
Diplomacy. Cambridge/London: Harvard University Press. 
Baczynska, Gabriela. 2015. Russia opens way to missile deliveries to Iran, starts oil-for-goods 
swap. Reuters, 13 April 2015 Available at [last accessed 13 May 2015]: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/13/us-iran-nuclear-russia-
idUSKBN0N40YX20150413. 
Balzacq, Thierry. 2010. Securitization Theory: How Security Problems Emerge and Dissolve. 
New York: Routledge.  
%DU¶HO=YL(UGRJDQLQ7HKUDQ7XUNH\ZDQWVWRGDQFHDWHYHU\0LGHDVWZHGGLQJ
Haaretz, 8 April 2015. Available at [last accessed 9 May 2015]: 
http://www.haaretz.com/news/middle-east/1.650923. 
%DUDQ=H\QRDQG/HVVHU,DQ27XUNH\¶V,GHQWLW\DQG6WUDWHJ\$*DPHRI7KUHH-
Dimensional Chess. In: Michael Schiffer and David Shorr (eds.), Powers and 
Principles. International Leadership in a Shrinking World. Plymouth: Lexington 
Books, pp. 197-224.  
Barkey, Henri J. 2013. Turkish-Iranian Competition after the Arab Spring. Survival vol. 54, 
no. 6: 139-162. 
%DU]HJDU.D\KDQ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDP,QIn: Kamrava, Mehran (ed.), The Nuclear 
Question in the Middle East. New York: Columbia University Press. 
%%&5XVVLD¶VFUHGLWUDWLQJGRZQJUDGHGE\6	3BBC Business News, 25 April 2014. 
Available at [last accessed 20 January 2015]: http://www.bbc.com/news/business-
27159423. 
 . 2015. Russia lifts ban on S-300 missile system delivery to Iran. BBC World News, 
13 April 2015. Available at [last accessed 22 April 2015]: 
http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-europe-32290335. 
Beach, Derek and Pedersen, Rasmus Brun. 2012. Process Tracing Methods. Ann Arbor: 
University of Michigan Press.  
Beeman, William. 2008. 7KH³*UHDW6DWDQ´YVWKH³0DG0XOODKV´+RZWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV
and Iran Demonize Each Other. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.  
Beeson, Mark. 2009. Hegemonic transition in East Asia? The dynamics of Chinese and 
American power. Review of International Studies vol. 35, no. 1: 95-112.  
Bellamy, Richard Paul. 1990. Gramsci, Croce and the Italian political tradition. History of 
Political Thought vol. 11, no. 2: 313-37.  
Belopolsky, Helen. 2009. Russia and the Challengers. Russian Alignment with China, Iran, 
and Iraq in the Unipolar Era. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Bercovitch, Jakob. 1992. Mediation in international relations: Multiple approaches to 
conflict management1HZ<RUN6W0DUWLQ¶V3UHVV,QF 
Bercovitch, Jacob and Schneider, Gerald. 2000. Who Mediates? The Political Economy of 
International Conflict Management. Journal of Peace Research vol. 37, no. 2: 145-
165. 
Berman, Ilan. 2006. Tackling the Moscow-Tehran Connection. The Journal of International 




Bernstein, Richard and Munro, Ross H. 1997. The Coming Conflict with America. Foreign 
Affairs vol. 76, no. 2: 18-32. 
Bertram, Christoph. 2009. Rethinking Iran. From Confrontation to Cooperation. Körber 
Policy Paper No. 6. Hamburg: Körber Foundation.  
%LOJLQ+DVUHW'LNLFL)RUHLJQ3ROLF\2ULHQWDWLRQRI7XUNH\¶V3UR-Islamist Parties: A 
Comparative Study of the AKP and Refah. Turkish Studies vol. 9, no. 3: 407-421.  
Bill, James A. 1988. The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of American-Iranian Relations. 
New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press. 
 . 1996. The Geometry of Instability in the Gulf: The Rectangle of Tension. In: al-
Suwaidi, Jamal S. (ed.), Iran and the Gulf: A Search for Stability. Abu Dhabi: The 
Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, pp. 99-117.  
%LVFRS6)RUDµPRUH DFWLYH¶(8LQWKH0LGGOH(DVW7UDQVDWODQWLF5HODWLRQVDQGWKH
6WUDWHJLF,PSOLFDWLRQVRI(XURSH¶V(QJDJHPHQWZLWK,UDQ/HEDQRQDQG,VUDHO-
Palestine. Egmont Paper 13: Royal Institute for International Relations. Brussels, 
March 2007. 
Blake, R.A. & Mouton, J.S. 1985. Solving Costly Organizational Conflicts. San Franciso: 
Josse-Bass. 
Bleek, Philipp C. and Stein, Aaron. 2012. Turkey and America Face Iran. Survival vol. 54, no. 
2: 27-38. 
Blumenthal, Dan. 2005. Providing Arms: China and the Middle East. Middle East Quarterly 
vol. 12: 11-19.  
%R=KL\XH&KLQD¶V0LGGOH(DVW3ROLF\6WUDWHJLF&RQFHUQVDQG(FRQRPLF,QWHUHVWV
Middle East Insight No. 61, 19 April 2011.  
Bob, Clifford. 2012. The Global Right Wing and the Clash of World Politics. Cambridge 
Studies in Contentious Politics. New York: Cambridge University Press.  
Borghard, Erica D. and Rapp-Hooper, Mira. 2013. Hizbullah and the Iranian Nuclear 
Programme. Survival vol. 55, no. 4: 85-106. 
Brady, Henry E. 2004. Data-Set Observations versus Causal-Process Observations: The 2000 
U.S. Presidential Election. In: Brady, Henry E. & Collier, David (eds.), Rethinking 
Social Inquiry: Doverse Tools, Shared Standards. Lanham, Md: Rowman & 
Littlefield, pp. 267-72. 
Braveboy-Wagner, Jaqueline Anne. 2009. Institutions of the Global South. New York: 
Routledge.  
Brawley, Mark R. 2007. Building Blocks or a Bric Wall? Fitting U.S. Foreign Policy to the 
shifting Distribution of Power. Asian Perspective vol. 31, no. 4: 151-175.  
Breslin, Shaun. 2009. UnderstandinJ&KLQD¶VUHJLRQDOULVHLQWHUSUHWDWLRQVLGHQWLWLHVDQG
implications. International Affairs, vol. 85, no. 4: 817-835. 
 . 2013. China and the global order: signaling threat or friendship? International 
Affairs vol. 3: 615-634. 
Bretherton, Charlotte and Vogler, John. 2006. The European Union as a Global Actor. 2nd 
edition. New York: Routledge.  
Broadhead, Ivan. 2011. Hong Kong Shipping Under Scrutiny for Iran Links. Voice of America 





Brookmore, David A. and Sistrink, Frank. 1980. The effects of perceived ability and 
impartiality of mediator and time pressure on negotiation. Journal of Conflict 
Resolution vol. 24, no. 2: 311- 27.  
Bromley, Simon. 2004. American power and the future of international order. In: A world of 
Whose Making? Ordering the International: History, Change and Transformation, 
eds. Brown, William, Bromley, Simon and Athreye, Suma. London: Pluto Press. 
Brown, Michael E.; Cote, Owen R.; Lynn-Jones, Sean M. and Miller, Steven E.  (eds.), 2000. 
The Rise of China. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press. 
Brütsch, Christian and Papa, Mihaela. 2013. Deconstructing the BRICS: Bargaining 
Coalition, Imagined Community, or Geopolitical Fad? The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics vol. 6: 299-327.  
Brzezinski, Zbigniew, et al. 2004. Iran: Time for a New Approach. New York: Council on 
Foreign Relations. 
Bulychev, Georgy and Vorontsov, Alexander. 2007. North Korea ± An Experiment in Nuclear 
Proliferation. In: Arbatov, Alexei (ed.), At the Nuclear Threshold. The Lessons of 
North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Moscow: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, pp. 13-29. 
Bull, Hedley. 1977. The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics. New York: 
Columbia University Press.  
 . 1995 [1966]. Society and Anarchy in International Relations. In: Der Derian (ed.), 
International Theory: Critical investigations, Basingstoke: Macmillan, pp. 75-93. 
Burman, Edward. 2009. China and Iran. Parallel History, Future Threat? Stroud: The 
History Press. 
Burnham, Peter. 1991. Neo-Gramscian Hegemony and International Order. Capital and Class 
vol. 45: 73-95.  
Burnham, Peter; Lutz, Karin Gilland; Grant, Wyan and Layton-Henry, Zig. 2008. Research 
Methods in Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. 
%XUQV:LOOLDP-DQG*ODVVHU6XVDQ%<RX&DQ¶W%RPE,W$ZD\,QWHUYLHZZLWK




Burton, J.W. 1969. Conflict and Communication: The Use of Controlled Communication in 
International Relations. New York: The Free Press.  
Buzan, Barry. 1983. People, States, and Fear: The National Security Problem in International 
Relations. London: Wheatsheaf Books. 
 &KLQDLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO6RFLHW\,Vµ3HDFHIXO5LVH¶3RVVLEOH"The Chinese 
Journal of International Politics vol. 3, no. 1: 5-36. 
Buzan, Barry and Diez, Thomas. 1999. The European Union and Turkey. Survival vol. 41, no. 
1: 41-57.   
Buzan, Barry and Segal, Gerald. 1998. A Western Theme. Prospect, February 1998: 18-23. 
Buzan, Barry; Waever, Ole and Wilde, Jaap de. 1998. Security. A New Framework for 
Analysis. Boulder, London: Lynne Rienner Publishers. 
Buzan, Barry & Waever, Ole. 2003. Regions and Powers. The Structure of International 
Society. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Cagaptay, Soner. 2004. Where Goes the US-Turkish Relationship? Middle East Quarterly 
vol. 11, no. 4: 1-10.  
235 
 
 . 2009. Is Turkey Leaving the West? Foreign Affairs. Snapshot, 26 October 2009. 
Available at [last accessed 9 May 2015]: 
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/turkey/2009-10-26/turkey-leaving-west. 
Calabrese, John. 1991. &KLQD¶V&KDQJLQJ5HODWLRQVZLWKWKH0LGGOH(DVW. London: Pinter 
Publishers.  
 . 2006. China and Iran: Mismatched Partners. Jamestown Occasional Papers. 
Available at [last accessed 10 February 2013]: 
http://www.jamestown.org/docs/Jamestown-ChinaIranMismatch.pdf. 
Campbell, David. 1993. Writing Security: United States Foreign Policy and the Politics of 
Identity. Manchester: Manchester University Press.  
Campbell, Donald T., and Fiske, Donald W. 1959. Convergent and discriminate validation by 
the multitrait-multimethod matrix. Psychological Bulletin, vol. 56, no.2: 81-105. 
&DVLHU7RP3XWLQ¶V3ROLF\7RZDUGVWKH:HVW5HIOHFWLRQVRQWKH1DWXUHRI5XVVLDQ
Foreign Policy. International Politics, vol. 43, no. 3: 384-401. 
Caverley, Jonathan D. 2007. United States Hegemony and the New Economics of Defense. 
Security Studies vol. 16, no. 4: 598-614.  
Cetinsaya, Gökhan. 1999. Rethinking Nationalism and Islam: Some Preliminary Notes on the 
5RRWVRI³7XUNLVK-,VODPLF6\QWKHVLV´LQ0RGHUQ7XUNLVK3ROLWLFDO7KRXJKWThe 
Muslim World vol. 89, no. 3-4: 350-76. 
 . 2003. Essential Friends and Natural Enemies: The Historic Roots of Turkish-Iranian 
Relations. Middle East Review of International Affairs vol. 7, no. 3: 116-32.  
Chan, Gerald. 1999. Chinese Perspectives on International Relations: A Framework for 
Analysis. London: MacMillan.  
 . 2006. &KLQD¶V&RPSOLDQFHLQ*OREDO$IIDLUV7UDGH$UPV&RQWURO(QYLURQPHQWDO
Protection, Human Rights. Singapore: World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd.  
&KDQ6WHYHD&DQ¶W*HW1R6DWLVIDFWLRQ"7KH5HFRJQLWLRQRI5HYLsionist States. 
International Relations of the Asia-Pacific vol. 4: 207±238. 
 . 2004b. Exploring Puzzles in Power-Transition Theory. Implications for Sino-
American Relations. Security Studies vol. 13, no. 3: 103-141.  
 . 2010. An Odd Thing Happened on the Way to Balancing: East Asian States' 
Reactions to China's Rise. International Studies Review vol. 12: 387-412. 
Charbonneau, Louis. 2011. Ahmadinejad wanted direct talks with U.S.: ElBaradei. Reuters, 




Meeting Summary, 7 March 2013. 
Chen, Dingding and Pu, Xiaoyu. 2014. Correspondence with Alastair Iain Johnston. Letter to 
the Editors. International Security vol. 38, no. 3: 176-183. 
Chen, Wen-6KHQJ&KLQD¶V2LO6WUDWHJ\µ*RLQJ2XW¶WR,UDQAsian Politics and Policy 
vol. 2: 39-54. 
Cheney, Dick. 2011. In: Cheney calls for air strike on Iran over captured drone. The Raw 





Chin, Gregory and Thakur, Ramesh. 2010. Will China Change the Rules of Global Order? 
The Washington Quarterly vol. 33: 119-138. 
Chomsky, Noam. 1992. A View from Below. In: The End of the Cold War. Its Meaning and 
Implications, ed. Hogan, Michael J. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 
137-150. 
 . 2003. +HJHPRQ\RU6XUYLYDO$PHULFD¶V4XHVWIRU*OREDO'RPLQDQFH. London: 
Penguin Books.  
 . 2013. Power Systems. Conversations on Global democratic uprisings and the New 
Challenges to U..S. Empire. Interviews with David Barsamian. New York: 
Metropolitan Books.  
&KULVWHQVHQ7KRPDV-3RVLQJ3UREOHPVZLWKRXW&DWFKLQJ8S&KLQD¶V5LVHDQG
Challenges for U.S. Security Policy. International Security vol. 25, no. 4: 5-40. 
 . 2011. The advantages of an assertive China: 5HVSRQGLQJWR%HLMLQJ¶VDEUDVLYH
diplomacy. Foreign Affairs vol. 90, no. 2: 54-67.  
Chubin, Shahram. 1993. The Soviets and the Gulf: Changing Priorities in the 1980s. In: 
Hollis, Rosemary (ed.), The Soviets, their Successors and the Middle East. 
Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp. 55-82.  
 . 2010. Iran and China: Political Partners or Strategic Allies? In: Kemp, Geoffrey and 
Sager, Abdulaziz (eds.), &KLQD¶V*URZLQJ5ROHLQWKH0LGGOH(DVW,PSOLFDWLRQVIRU
the Region and Beyond. Washington, DC: The Nixon Center, pp. 63-72.  
Clark, Ian. 2009a. Towards an English School theory of hegemony. European Journal of 
International Relations vol. 15, no. 2: 203-228.  
 . 2009b. Bringing hegemony back in. International Affairs vol. 85, no. 1: 23-26.  
 . 2011. China and the United States: a succession of hegemonies? International 
Affairs vol. 87, no. 1: 13-28. 
 . 2014. International Society and China: The Power of Norms and the Norms of 
Power. The Chinese Journal of International Politics vol. 7, no. 3: 315-340.  
Claude, Inis. 1966. Collective Legitimisation as a Political Function of the United Nations. 
International Organisation vol. 20, no. 3: 367-379. 
&ODZVRQ3DWULFNDQG(LVHQVWDGW0LFKDHO+DOWLQJ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDPPH7KH
Military Option. Survival vol. 50, no. 5: 13-19.  
Cohen, Warren I. 2010. $PHULFD¶V5HVSRQVHWR&KLQD$+LVWRU\RI6LQR-American Relations. 
New York: Colombia University Press.  
Collier, David. 1993. The Comparative Method. In: Finifter, A.W. (ed.), Political Science: 
The State of the Discipline II. Washington, D.C.: American Political Science 
Association, pp. 105-119. 
 . 2011. Understanding Process Tracing. Political Science & Politics vol. 44, no. 4: 
823-830. 
Collier, David and Mahoney, James. 1996. Insights and Pitfalls. Selection Bias in Qualitative 
Research. World Politics vol. 49, no. 1: 56-91.  
Collier, David; Brady, Henry E. and Seawright, Jason. 2004. Sources of Leverage in Causal 
Inference: Toward an Alternative View of Methodology. In: Brady, Henry E. and 
David Collier (eds.): Rethinking Social Inquiry. Diverse Tools, Shared Standards. 
Lanham, Md: Rowman & Littlefield,  pp. 229-266. 
237 
 
Conrad, Matthias. 2011. NATO-Russia Relations under Putin. Emergence and Decay of a 
Security Community? An Analysis of the Russian Discourse on NATO (2000-2008) 
Wien/Münster: LIT Verlag.  
Cook, Alethia H. and Roshandel, Jalil. 2009. The United States and Iran. Policy Challenges 
and Opportunities. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Cornell, Erik. 2001. Turkey in the 21st Century: Opportunities, Challenges, Threats. 
Richmond, Surrey: Curzon.  
Cortell, Andrew P. and Davis, James W. 2000. Understanding the Domestic Impact of 
International Norms: A Research Agena. International Studies Review vol. 2, no. 1: 
65-87. 
Cot, Jean-Pierre. 1972. International conciliation (R. Myers, Trans.). London: Europa.  
Cottam, Richard W. 1988. Iran and the United States: A Cold War Case Study. Pittsburgh: 
University of Pittsburgh Press.  
Cox, Robert W. 1981. Social Forces, States and World Orders: Beyond International 
Relations Theory. Millennium: Journal of International Studies vol. 10, no. 2: 126-
155. 
 . 1987. Production, Power and World Order: Social forces in the making of history. 
New York: Columbia University Press.  
 . 1993. Gramsci, hegemony and international relations: an essay in method. In: Gill, 
Stephen (ed.), Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 49-66. 
 . 1996. Approaches to World Order. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. 
'D:HL+DV&KLQDEHFRPHµWRXJK¶"China Security vol. 6, no. 3: 97-104.  
Dalby, Simon. 1992. Security, Modernity, Ecology: The Dilemmas of Post-Cold War Security 
Discourse. Alternatives vol. 17, no. 1: 95-134. 
Daly, John. 2013. How Far Will Turkey Go in Supporting Sanctions Against Iran? The 
Turkey Analyst vol. 6, no. 13. Available at [last accessed 8 March 2014]: 
http://www.turkeyanalyst.org/publications/turkey-analyst-articles/item/48-how-far-
will-turkey-go-in-supporting-sanctions-against-iran?.html. 
Dannreuther, Roland. 2004. Russia and the Middle East. In: Carter, Hannah and Ehteshami, 
Anoushiravan (eds.), 7KH0LGGOH(DVW¶V5HODWLRQVZLWK$VLDDQG5XVVLD. London and 
New York: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 22-41. 
 . 2012. Russia and the Middle East: A Cold War Paradigm? Europe-Asia Studies vol. 
64, no. 3: 543-560.  
Dareini, Ali Akbar. 2012. Iran, U.S. Talks Are Possible, Iran's Foreign Ministry Says. 
Huffington Post 3 December 2012. Available at [last accessed 12 January 2013]: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/12/03/iran-us-talks_n_2231526.html. 
'DYXWR÷OX$KPHW7XUNH\¶V0Hdiation: Critical Reflections from the field. Middle 
East Policy vol. 20, no. 1: 83-90.  
'DYXWR÷OX$KPHWDQG$PRULP&HVOR*LYLQJ'LSORPDF\D&KDQFHInternational 
Herald Tribune, 26 May 2010. Available at [last accessed 29 July 2014]: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/27/opinion/27iht-eddavutoglu.html?_r=0. 
Defense Industry Daily. 2006. US Ban on Russian Defense Firms Raises the Stakes. Defense 





Delpech, Therese. 2006. Iran and the Bomb. London: Hurst & Co.  
Deng, Yong. 2006. Reputation and the Security Dilemma: China Reacts to the China Threat 
Theory. In: Alastair Johnston and Robert Ross, eds., New Directions in the Study of 
&KLQD¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 186-214. 
'HQQ\5R\+HJHPRQRQWKHKRUL]RQ"&KLQD¶VWKUHDWWR(DVW$VLDQVHFXULW\
International Security vol. 19, no. 1: 149-168. 
Denzin, Norman K. 2009. The research act: a theoretical introduction to sociological 
methods. Chicago: Aldine. 
Derakhshi, Reza. 2009. Sinopec in $6.5 billion Iran refinery deal: Iranian media. Reuters, 25 
November 2009. Available at [last accessed 25 March 2015]: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2009/11/25/us-iran-china-refineries-
idUSTRE5AO20C20091125. 
Diakov, Anatoli. 2007. The Nuclear Fuel Cycle. In: Arbatov, Alexei (ed.), At the Nuclear 
Threshold. The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation 
Regime. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, pp. 127-141.  
 . 2009. Nuclear Fuel Cycle Security. In: Arbatov, Alexei & Dvorkin, Vladimir (eds.), 
Nuclear Proliferation: New Technologies, Weapons, Treaties. Moscow: Carnegie 
Endowment for International Peace, pp. 39-50.  
DiCicco, Jonathan M. and Levy, Jack S. 2003. The Power Transition Research Program: A 
Lakatosian Analysis. In: Elman, Colin and Elman, Miriam (eds.), Progress in 
International Relations Theory: Appraising the Field. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 
pp. 109-59. 
'LH]7KRPDV&RQVWUXFWLQJWKH6HOIDQG&KDQJLQJ2WKHUV5HFRQVLGHULQJµ1RUPDWLYH
3RZHU(XURSH¶Millennium vol. 33, no. 3: 613-636.  
Dillon, Dana R. 2007. The China Challenge. Standing Strong against the Military, Economic, 
and Political Threats That Imperil America. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield 
Publishers, Inc.  
Dillon, Michael. 2004. The Middle East and China. In: Carter, Hannah and Ehteshami, 
Anoushiravan (eds.), TKH0LGGOH(DVW¶V5HODWLRQVZLWK$VLDDQG5XVVLD. London and 
New York: RoutledgeCurzon, pp. 42-60.  
DiMaggio, Paul. 1997. Culture and Cognition. Annual Review of Sociology vol. 23: 263-87.  
Djallil, Lounnas. 2011. China and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis: Between Ambiguities and 
Interests. European Journal of East Asian Studies vol. 10: 227-253.  
Dobbins, James. 2012. War with China. Survival vol. 54, no. 4: 7-24.  
Dorraj, Manochehr and Currier, Carrie. 2008. Lubricated with Oil: Iran-China Relations in a 
Changing World. Middle East Policy, vol. 15, no. 2: 66-80. 
 . 2010. In Arms We Trust: Strategic and Economic Factors Motivating China-Iran 
Relations. The Chinese Journal of Political Science, vol. 15, no. 1: 49-69. 
'RUUDM0DQRFKHKU	(QWHVVDU1DGHU,UDQ¶V1RUWKHUQ([SRVXUH)RUHLJQ3ROLF\
Challenges in Eurasia. Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar, 
Center for International and Regional Studies, Occasional Paper No. 13.  
Downs, Erica S. 2004. The Chinese Energy Security Debate. The China Quarterly vol. 177: 
21-41. 
Dryburgh, Lynne. 2008. The EU as a Global Actor? EU Policy Towards Iran. European 
Security vol. 17, no. 2-3: 253-271. 
(FRQRP\(OL]DEHWK&7KHJDPHFKDQJHUFRSLQJZLWK&KLQD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\
revolution. Foreign Affairs vol. 89, no. 9: 142-152.  
239 
 
Eckstein, Harry. 1975. Case Study and Theory in Political Science. In: Greenstein, F.I. and 
Polsby, N.W. (eds.), Strategies of Inquiry. Handbook of Political Science, vol. 7. 
Reading: Addison-Wesley, pp. 92-123. 
Edelman, Eric S.; Krepinevich, Andrew F. and Montgomery, Evan Braden. 2011. The 
Dangers of a Nuclear Iran ± The Limits of Containment. Foreign Affairs vol. 90, no. 
1: 66-81.  
Ehrlich, Reese. 2007. The Iran Agenda: The Real Story of U.S. Policy and the Middle East 
Crisis. Sausalito, Calif.: PolitPointPress.  
Ekström, Mats. 2010. Causal Explanation of Social Action: The Contribution of Max Weber 
and of Critical Realism to a Generative View of Causal Explanation in Social 
Science. In: Olsen, Wendy (ed.), Realist Methodology. Volume I. Practical Realist 
Ontology. London: Sage Publications Ltd., pp. 79-100. 
Emadi, Hafizullah. 1997. &KLQD¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\Toward the Middle East. Karachi: Royal 
Book Company.  
Emery, Christian. 2013. US Foreign Policy and the Iranian Revolution. The Cold War 
Dynamics of Engagement and Strategic Alliance. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Entous, Adam and Parkinson, Joe. 2013. TuUNH\¶V6S\PDVWHU3ORWV2ZQ&RXUVHRQ6\ULDThe 
Wall Street Journal, 10 October 2013. Available at [last accessed 15 April 2015]: 
http://www.wsj.com/news/articles/SB10001424052702303643304579107373585228
330. 
Epstein, Charlotte. 2012a. Stop Telling Us How to Behave: Socialization or Infantilization? 
International Studies Perspectives vol. 13, no. 2: 135-45. 
 . 2012b. Symposium: Interrogating the Use of Norms in International Relations: An 
Introduction. International Studies Perspectives vol. 13, no. 2: 121-2.  
Esfandiary, Dina and Fitzpatrick, Mark. 2011. Sanctions on Iran: Defining and Enabling 
µ6XFFHVV¶Survival vol. 53, no. 5: 143-156.  
Etzioni, Amitai. 2011. Is China a responsible stakeholder? International Affairs vol. 87, no. 3: 
539-553. 
(XURSHDQ&RXQFLORQ)RUHLJQ5HODWLRQV(XURSH¶VDOWHUQDWLYHVWR5XVVLDQJDVArticle, 9 
April 2015. Available at [last accessed 13 April 2015]:  
http://www.ecfr.eu/article/commentary_europes_alternatives_to_russian_gas311666.  
Evera, Stephen Van. 1997. A Guide to Methods for Students of Political Science. Ithaca, NY: 
Cornell University Press.  
)DQ+RQJGD&KLQD¶V3ROLF\2SWLRQVWRZDUGV,UDQJournal of Middle Eastern and 
Islamic Studies (in Asia), vol. 5, no. 1: 45-60. 
Fars News Agency. 2014. Russian Diplomat: IAEA Report on Iran Should Result in 
Annulment of All Sanctions. Fars News Agency, 5 February 2014 [last accessed 22 
February 2014]: http://english.farsnews.com/newstext.aspx?nn=13921116001172. 
 . 2015. Iran, Russia Agree on Delivery of S300 Defense System. Fars News Agency, 




Fayazmanesh, Sasan. 2008. The United States and Iran: Sanctions, Wars and the Policy of 
Dual Containment. London: Routledge.  
Femia, Joseph. 2005. Gramsci, Machiavelli, and International Relations. Political Quarterly 
vol. 76, no. 3: 341-9.   
240 
 
Feng, Huiyun. 2009. Is China a Revisionist Power? The Chinese Journal of International 
Politics vol. 2: 313-334.  
Ferdinand, Peter. 2007. Russia and China: converging responses to globalization. 
International Affairs vol. 83, no. 4: 655-680. 
Fereday, Jennifer and Muir-Cochrane, Eimear. 2006. Demonstrating Rigor Using Thematic 
Analysis: A hybrid approach of inductive and deductive coding and theme 
development. International Journal of Qualitative Methods vol. 5, no. 1: 80-92.  
Ferguson, Neill. 2003. Hegemony or Empire? Foreign Affairs vol. 82, no. 5: 154-62.  
Fey, Marco; Hellmann, Andrea; Klinke, Friederike; Plümmer, Franziska; Rauch, Carsten. 
2013. Established and Rising Great Powers: The United States, Russia, China, and 
India. In: Müller, Harald and  Carmen. 2013. Theoretical Approaches in Norm 
Dynamics. In: Müller, Harald and Wunderlich, Carmen (eds.), Norm Dynamics in 
Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice. Athens: University of 
Georgia Press, pp. 163-206.  
Finnemore, Marta and Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political 
Change. International Organization, 52, no. 4: 887-917. 
Fiori, Giuseppe. 2013 (1979). Das Leben des Antonio Gramsci. Eine Biographie, transl. by 
Renate Heimbucher & Susanne Schoop. Berlin: Rotbuch.  
Fisher, R.J. 1972. Third Party Consultation: A Method for the Study and Resolution of 
Conflict. Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 16: 67-94.  
Fitzpatrick, Mark. 2006a. Iran and North Korea: The Proliferation Nexus. Survival vol. 48, 
no. 1: 61-80. 
 E$VVHVVLQJ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDPPHSurvival vol. 48, no. 3: 5-26.   
 . 2010. Iran: The Fragile Promises of the Fuel-Swap Plan. Survival vol. 52, no. 3: 67-
94. 
 . 2014. The Ukraine Crisis and Nuclear Order. Survival vol. 56, no. 4: 81-90.  
Fleetwood, Steve. 2010. Causal Laws, Functional Relations and Tendencies. In: Olsen, 
Wendy (ed.), Realist Methodology. Volume I. Practical Realist Ontology. London: 
Sage Publications Ltd., pp. 115-136. 
Flick, Uwe. 2004. Triangulation in qualitative research (B. Jenner, Trans.). In: Flick, Uwe; 
Kardorff, Ernst von and Steinke, Ines (eds.), A companion to qualitative research. 
Thousand Oaks: SAGE Publications, pp. 178-183. 
Florini, Ann. 1996. The Evolution of International Norms. International Studies Quarterly 
vol. 40, no. 3: 363-89. 
Foot, Rosemary. 2006. Chinese strategies in a US-hegemonic global order: accommodating 
and hedging. International Affairs vol. 82, no. 1: 77-94. 
 . 2009/10. China and the United States: Between Cold and Warm Peace. Survival vol. 
51, no. 6: 123-146.  
Foot, Rosemary and Walter, Andrew. 2011. China, the United States and global order. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Foucault, Michel. 1995 [1975]. Discipline and Punish. New York: Vintage Books Edition.  
Foyle, Douglas. 1997. Public Opinion and Foreign Policy: Elite Beliefs as a Mediating 
Variable. International Studies Quarterly vol. 41, no. 1: 141-69. 
)UDQFH0RVFRZUHEXIIV2EDPD¶VVHFUHW,UDQ-missile shield deal. France24, 4 March 2009 




Freedman, Robert O. 1991. Moscow and the Middle East. Soviet Policy since the invasion of 
Afghanistan. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 . 1997. Russia and Iran: A Tactical Alliance. SAIS Review vol. 17, no. 2: 93-109. 
 . 1998a. Russia and the Middle East: The Primakov Era. Middle East Review of 
International Affairs vol. 2, no. 2: 1-8. 
 . E5XVVLD¶V0LGGOH(DVW$PELWLRQVMiddle East Quarterly, September 1998: 
31-40. 
 . 2000. Russian-Iranian Relations in the 1990s. Middle East Review of International 
Affairs vol. 4, no. 2: 65-78. 
Friedberg, Aaron L. 2005. The Future of US.-China Relations: Is Conflict 
Inevitable? International Security vol. 30, no. 2: 7-45. 
 . 2011. A Contest for Supremacy: China, America, and the Struggle for Mastery in 
Asia. London and New York: W.W. Norton & Company.  
Fuller, Graham E. 2008. The New Turkish Republic: Turkey as a Pivotal State in the Muslim 
World. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace.  
Fuller, Graham E., et al. 1993. 7XUNH\¶V1HZ*HRSROLWLFV)URPWKH%DONDQVWR:HVWHUQ
China. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.  
Fürter, Henner. 2002. ,UDQ¶V5LYDOU\ZLWK6DXGL-Arabia between the Gulf Wars. Reading: 
Ithaca Press.  
Gaddis, John Lewis. 1997. We Now Know. Rethinking Cold War History. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
Ganji, Babak. 2012. Politics of Confrontation. The Foreign Policy of the USA and 
Revolutionary Iran. London: I.B. Tauris.  
Gargash, Anwar. 1996. Iran, the GCC States, and the UAE: Prospects and Challenges in the 
Coming Decade. In: al-Suwaidi, Jamal S. (ed.), Iran and the Gulf: A Search for 
Stability. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, pp. 
136-157.  
Garver, John. 2006a. China and Iran. Ancient Partners in a Post-imperial World. Seattle: 
University of Washington Press.  
 E'HYHORSPHQWRI&KLQD¶V2YHUODQG7UDQVSRUWDWLRQ/LQNVZLWK&HQWUDO6RXWK-
west and South Asia. The China Quarterly vol. 185:1-22. 
 . 2011. Is China Playing a Dual Game in Iran? The Washington Quarterly vol. 34, no. 
1: 75-88.  
*HHUDHUWV*XVWDDIDQG+ROVODJ-RQDWKDQ7KHµ3DQGUDJRQ¶&KLQD¶V'XDO'LSORPDWLF
Identity. BICCS Asia Papers vol. 2, no. 1: 1-15. 
Gehring, Thomas. 1994. Dynamics International Regimes: Institutions for International 
Environmental Governance. Frankfurt am Main: Lang.  
Gentry, Brandon. 2005. The Dragon and the Magi: Burgeoning Sino-Iranian Relations in the 
21st Century. The China and Eurasia Forum Quarterly, vol. 3: 111-25. 
George, Alexander and Bennett, Andrew. 2005. Case Studies and Theory Development in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge: MIT Press.  
Gergorin, Jean-Louis. 2009. Iran: Breaking the Deadlock. Survival vol. 51, no. 3: 19-25. 
Germain, Randall and Kenny, Michael. 1998. Engaging Gramsci: International Relations 
theory and the new Gramscians. Review of International Studies vol. 24, no. 1: 3-21.  
Gerring, John. 2007a. The Mechanismic Worldview: Thinking Inside the Box. British Journal 
of Political Science vol. 38, no. 1: 161-179.  
242 
 
Gertz, Bill. 2000. 7KH&KLQD7KUHDW+RZWKH3HRSOH¶V5HSXEOLF7DUJHWV$PHULFD. 
Washington: Regnery Publishing, Inc.  
Gill, Bates. 1998. Chinese Arms Exports to Iran. Middle East Review of International Affairs, 
vol. 2, no. 2: 55-70. 
 . 1999. Chinese Arms Exports to Iran. In: Kumaraswamy, P.R. (ed.), China and the 
Middle East. The Quest for Influence. New Delhi: Sage Publications, pp. 117-141.  
 . 2007. Rising Star: &KLQD¶VNew Security Diplomacy. Washington, DC: Brookings 
Institution Press.  
Gill, Stephen (ed.) 1993. Gramsci, Historical Materialism and International Relations. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 . 2003, 2008. Power and Resistance in the New World Order. Basingstoke: Palgrave.  
Gilpin, Robert. 1981. War and change in world politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
 . 1987. The Political Economy of International Relations. Princeton, NJ: Princeton 
University Press.  
*LUDJRVLDQ5LFKDUG5HGHILQLQJ7XUNH\¶V6WUDWHJLF2ULHQWDWLRQTurkish Policy 
Quarterly vol. 6, no. 4: 33-40. 
Giumelli, Francesco and Ivan, Paul. 2013. The effectiveness of EU sanctions. An analysis of 
Iran, Belarus, Syria and Myanmar (Burma). EPC Issue Paper No. 76.  
Gladstone, Rick. 2014. U.S. issues penalties tied to Iran sanctions. International New York 
Times, 8-9 February 2014.  
Glaser, Bonnie S. and Medeiros, Evan S. 2007. The changing ecology of foreign 
policymaking in China: the ascension anGGHPLVHRIWKHWKHRU\RIµSHDFHIXOULVH¶
China Quarterly vol. 190: 291-310. 
Glaser, Bonnie S. and Saunders, Philip C. 2002. Chinese civilian foreign policy research 
institutes: evolving roles and increasing influence. The China Quarterly vol. 171: 
597-616. 
*RGHKDUGW1DGLQH&KLQD¶V³QHXH´6HLGHQVWUDVVHQLQLWLDWLYHSWP-Studie, June 2014. 
Available at [last accessed 24 March 2015]: http://www.swp-
berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/products/studien/2014_S09_gdh.pdf. 
Goertz, Gary. 2006. 6RFLDO6FLHQFH&RQFHSWV$8VHU¶V*XLGH. Princeton: Princeton 
University Press.  
Goh, Evelyn. 2007/08. Great Powers and Hierarchical Order in Southeast Asia: Analyzing 
Regional Security Strategies. International Security vol. 32: 113±157. 
Golan, Galia. 1990. Soviet Policies in the Middle East. From World War II to Gorbachev. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 . 1998. Russia and Iran. A Strategic Partnership? London: Royal Institute of 
International Affairs.  
Gold, Dore. 2009. The Rise of Nuclear Iran. How Tehran defies the West. Washington: 
Regnery Publishing Inc.  
*ROGVWHLQ$YHU\*UHDW([SHFWDWLRQV,QWHUSUHWLQJ&KLQD¶V$UULYDOInternational 
Security vol. 22, no. 3: 36-73. 
Goldstein, Lyle J. 2011. Resetting the US-China Security Relationship. Survival vol. 53, no. 
2: 89-116. 
Gordon, Michael R. and Sanger, David. 2015. Iran Agrees to Detailed Nuclear Outline, First 
Step Toward a Wider Deal. The New York Times, 2 April 2015. Available at [last 
243 
 
accessed 3 April 2015]: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/04/03/world/middleeast/iran-
nuclear-talks.html?hp&action=click&pgtype=Homepage&module=first-column-
region&region=top-news&WT.nav=top-news&_r=1. 
Gramsci, Antonio. 1971. Selections from the Prison Notebooks, ed. and trans. Hoare, Q. 
London: Lawrence & Wishart.  
Guest, G., Namey, E. E., & Mitchell, M. L. 2012. Collecting qualitative data: a field manual 
for applied research. New York: SAGE Publications. 
 . 2007b. Case Study Research: Principles and Practices. Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press. 
Gul, Abdullah. 2011. In: Israel a burden on its allies, Turkish president Gül says. 7RGD\¶V
Zaman November 23. Available at [last accessed April 29, 2013]: 
http://www.todayszaman.com/news-263676-israel-a-burden-on-its-allies-turkish-
president-gul-says.html. 
Guldimann, Tim. 2007. The Iranian Nuclear Impasse. Survival, vol. 49, no. 3: 169-178. 
Gunter, Michael M. 2005. The US-Turkish Alliance in Disarray. World Affairs vol. 167, no. 
3: 113-123. 
Gusher, Anatoli. 1997. On Russian-Iranian Relations. International Affairs vol. 43, no. 2: 38-
44. 
*X]DQVN\<RHODQG<DGOLQ$PRV7KH$UDE:RUOG¶V5HVSRQVHWRDQ,VUDHOL$WWDFNRQ
Iran. Survival vol. 55, no. 4: 107-120. 
*U]HO$\OLQ7XUNH\¶V5ROHLQ'HIXVLQJWKH,UDQLDQ1XFOHDU,VVXHThe Washington 
Quarterly vol. 35: 141-152.  
Gürzel, A\OLQ	(UVR\(\S7XUNH\DQG,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDPMiddle East Policy, 
vol. 19, no. 1: 37-50. 
Habermas, Jürgen. 1981. Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns (Bd. 1: 
Handlungsrationalität und gesellschaftliche Rationalisierung; Bd. 2: Zur Kritik der 
funktionalistischen Vernunft). Frankfurt am Main: Suhrkamp.  




Reuters, 29 January 2014. Available at [last accessed 7 August 2014]: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/29/us-iran-turkey-erdogan-
idUSBREA0S11T20140129. 
Hakan, Altinay, ed. 2009. Reflections of EU-Turkey Relations in the Muslim World. Istanbul: 
Open Society Foundation.  
Hale, William. 2013. Turkish Foreign Policy since 1774. 3rd edition. London and New York: 
Routledge.  
Hall, Peter A. 2003. Aligning Ontology and Methodology in Comparative Politics. In: 
Mahoney, James and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich (eds.), Comparative Historical 
Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 373-
404. 
 . 2006. Systematic process analysis: when and how to use it. European Management 
Review vol. 3: 24-31. 
Hall, John A. 1993. Ideas and the Social Sciences. In: Goldstein, Judith and Keohane, Robert 
O. (eds.), Ideas and Foreign Policy. Beliefs, Institutions, and Political Change. 
Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, pp. 31-54.  
244 
 
Halliday, Fred. 2005. The Middle East in International Relations. Power, Politics and 
Ideology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Halper, Stefan. 2010. The Beijing Consensus: +RZ&KLQD¶V$XWKRULWDULDQ0RGHOZLOO
Dominate the Twenty-First Century. New York: Basic Books.  
Hancock, Kathleen J. 2007. Russia: Great Power Image Versus Economic Reality. Asian 
Perspective vol. 31, no. 4: 71-98.  
He, Hai and Feng, Huiyun. 2012. Debating &KLQD¶VDVVHUWLYHQHVV7DNLQJ&KLQD¶VSRZHUDQG
interests seriously. International Politics vol. 49, no. 5: 633-644. 
Heller, Mark A. 1992. The Dynamics of Soviet Policy in the Middle East. Between Old 
Thinking and New. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.  
Herrberg, A. 2008. Perceptions of International Peace Mediation in the EU: A Needs 
Analysis. Mediation Cluster, Initiative for Peacekeeping.  
Herman, Margaret G. 2008. Content Analysis. In: Klotz, Audie and Prakash, Deepa (eds.), 
Qualitative Methods in International Relations. A Pluralist Guide. London: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Hibbs, Mark. 2013. An Iran Deal-In Buy for Russia? Carnegie Article, 3 January 2013, 
available at: http://carnegieeurope.eu/2013/01/03/iran-deal-buy-in-for-russia/ez4g. 
 7XUNH\¶V,QWHUHVWVDQG7DQLGHKArms Control Wonk, 23 February 2015. 





&KLQD¶V0LOLWDU\7LHVZLWK,UDQAsian Affairs: An American Review, vol. 17, no. 4: 
15-29. 
Hinnebusch, Raymond. 2003. The international politics of the Middle East. Manchester and 
New York: Manchester University Press.  
Hinnebusch, Raymond and Ehteshami, Anoushiravan, (eds.), 2002. The Foreign Policies of 
Middle East States. Boulder, Colorado: Lynne Rienner Publishers, Inc.   
Hiro, Dilip. 2009. Inside Central Asia. A political and cultural history of Uzbekistan, 
Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkey, and Iran. New York: 
Overlook Duckworth.  
Holslag, Jonathan. 2011. 7UDSSHG*LDQWV&KLQD¶V7URXEOHG0LOLWDU\5LVH. Abingdon: 
Routledge, Adelphi Books.  
Homolar, Alexandra. 2011. Rebels without a Conscience: The Evolution of the Rogue States 
Narrative in US Security Policy. European Journal of International Relations vol. 
17, no. 4: 705-27.  
Howard, Roger. 2004. Iran in Crisis? Nuclear Ambitions and the American Response. 
London: Zed Books Ltd.  
+R\W3DXO'7KHµ5RJXH6WDWH¶,PDJHLQ$PHULFDQ)RUHLJQ3ROLF\Global Society 
vol. 14, no. 2: 297-310.  
Hughes, Christopher. 2005. Nationalism and multilateralism in Chinese foreign policy: 
implications for Southeast Asia. The Pacific review vol. 18, no. 1: 119-135. 
Hunter, Robert E. 2010. Rethinking Iran. Survival vol. 52, no. 5: 135-156.  
Huntington, Samuel. 1993. The Clash of Civilizations? Foreign Affairs vol. 72, no. 3: 22-49. 
245 
 
 . 1996. The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order. New York: 
Touchstone.  
Hurrell, Andrew. 2006. Hegemony, liberalism and global order: what space for would-be 
great powers? International Affairs vol.  82,  no. 1: 1-19.  
Ignatius, David. 2006. Talk Boldly with Iran. The Washington Post, 23 June 2006. Available 
at [last accessed 15 March 2015]: http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/content/article/2006/06/22/AR2006062201469.html. 
Ikenberry, John G. 2004. Liberalism and Empire: Logics of Order in the American Unipolar 
Age. Review of International Studies vol. 30: 609-30. 
 . 2008. The Rise of China and the Future of the West. Can the Liberal System 
Survive? Foreign Affairs vol. 87. No. 1: 23-37. 
,QWHUQDWLRQDO&ULVLV*URXS'HDOLQJZLWK,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDPCrisis Group Middle 
East Report Nr. 18, 27 October 2003. 
 . 2004. Iran: Where Next on the Nuclear Standoff? Crisis Group Middle East Report 
Nr. 15, 24 November 2004.  
 . 2006. Iran: Is There a Way Out of the Nuclear Impasse? Crisis Group Middle East 
Report Nr. 51, 23 February 2006.  
 . &KLQD¶V7KLUVWIRU2LOCrisis Group Asia Report Nr. 153, 9 June 2008.  
 . 2010. The Iran Nuclear Issue: The View from Beijing. Asia Briefing Nr. 100, 17 
February 2010.  
 . D,Q+HDY\:DWHUV,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDPWKH5LVNRI:DUDQG/HVVRQVIURP
Turkey. Middle East and Europe Report Nr. 116, 23 February 2012. 
 . 2012b. The P5+1, Iran and the Perils of Nuclear Brinkmanship. Middle East Briefing 
Nr. 34, 15 June 2012.  
 .  2013a. Spider Web: The Making and Unmaking of Iran Sanctions. Middle East 
Report Nr. 138, February 2013.  
 . E*UHDW([SHFWDWLRQV,UDQ¶V1HZ3UHVLGHQWDQGWKH1XFOHDU7DONVMiddle East 
Briefing Nr. 36, 13 August 2013.  
 . D,UDQDQGWKH36ROYLQJWKH1XFOHDU5XELN¶V&XEHMiddle East Report 
Nr. 152, 9 May 2014.  
 . E,UDQDQGWKH3*HWWLQJWR³<HV´Middle East Briefing Nr. 40, 27 August 
2014.  
 . 2014c. Iran Nuclear Talks: The Fog Recedes. Middle East Briefing Nr. 43, 10 
December 2014.  
Jackson, Richard L. 1983. The Non-Aligned, the UN, and the Superpowers. New York: 
Praeger Publishers.  
Jacques, Martin. 2012. When China Rules the World. 2nd edition. London: Penguin Books. 
Jafari, Peyman. 2009. Der andere Iran. Geschichte und Kultur von 1900 bis zur Gegenwart. 
Transl. by Hüsmert, Waltraut. Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung.  
Jafarzadeh, Alireza. 2007. The Iran Threat. President Ahmadinejad and the coming nuclear 
crisis. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Jaipal, Rikhi. 1987. Non-alignment. Origins, Growth and Potential for World Peace. New 
Delhi: Allied Publishers Private Limited.  




Jenkins, Gareth. 2012. 2FFDVLRQDO$OOLHV(QGXULQJ5LYDOV7XUNH\¶V5HODWLRQV:LWK,UDQ. 
Washington D.C.: Central Asia-Caucasus Institute and Silk Road Studies Program.   
Jin, Jiangxiang. 2005. Energy First: China and the Middle East. Middle East Quarterly, vol. 
12, no 2: 3-10.  
Johnson, Jeffrey C. and Weller, Susan C. 2002. Elicitation Techniques for Interviewing. In: 
Gubrium, Jaber F. and Holstein, James A. (eds.), Handbook of Interview Research. 
Context & Method. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications Ltd, 
pp. 491-514. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain, and Ross, Robert (eds.) 1999. Engaging China: The Management of 
an Emerging Power. London: Routledge. 
Johnston, Alastair Iain. 2003. Is China a Status Quo Power? International Security vol. 27: 5±
56. 
 . %HLMLQJ¶V6HFXULW\%HKDYLRULQWKH$VLD-Pacific: Is China a Dissatisfied 
Power? In:  Suh, J.J.; Katzenstein, Peter J. and Carlson, Allen (eds.), Rethinking 
Security in East Asia: Identity, Power, and Efficiency. Stanford, CA: Stanford 
University Press, pp. 34-96. 
 +RZ1HZDQG$VVHUWLYH,V&KLQD¶V1HZ$VVHUWLYHQHVV"International Security 
vol. 37, no. 4: 7-48.  
Johnson, John M. 2002. In-Depth Interviewing. In: Gubrium, Jaber F. and Holstein, James A. 
(eds.), Handbook of Interview Research. Context & Method. Thousand Oaks, 
London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 121-40.  
Johnstone, Ian. 2007. The Secretary-General as Norm Entrepreneur: In: Chesterman, Simon 
(ed.), Secretary or General? The UN Secretary-General in World Politics. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 123-38.  
Jones, Bruce. 2011. Beyond Blocs: The West, Rising Powers and Interest-Based International 
Cooperation. Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation.   
Jones, Jason. 2011. The American Rhetorical Construction of the Iranian Nuclear Threat. 
London, New York: Continuum.  
Jones, Steve. 2006. Antonio Gramsci. Abingdon: Routledge.  
Jorgensen, Knud Erik. 2001. Continental IR Theory: The Best Kept Secret. European Journal 
of International Relations vol. 6: 9-42. 
-RVKL6KDVKDQN7KHSHUPDQHQWFULVLV,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU7UDMHFWRU\Whitehall Paper 79. 
Royal United Services Institute for Defence and Security Studies (RUSI).  
Kagan, Robert. 2002. Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order. 
London: Atlantic.  
 . $PELWLRQDQGDQ[LHW\$PHULFD¶VFRPSHWLWLRQZLWK&KLQD,Q6FKPLWW*DU\-
(ed.), The rise of China: essays on the future competition. New York: Encounter 
Books, pp. 1-23.  
 . 2012. The World America Made. New York: Knopf.  
Kandemir, Asli. 2013. Exclusive: Turkey to Iran gold trade wiped out by new U.S. sanction. 
Reuters, 15 February 2013. Accessed June 10, 2013. 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2013/02/15/us-iran-turkey-sanctions-
idUSBRE91E0IN20130215. 
Kang, David C. 2003. Getting Asia Wrong: the need for new analytical frameworks. 
International Security vol. 27, no. 4: 57-85.  
247 
 
 . 2007. China Rising: Peace, Power, and Order in East Asia. New York: Colombia 
University Press.  
Kang, Jungmin (ed.) 2013. Assessment of the Nuclear Programs of Iran and North Korea. 
Heidelberg, New York, London: Springer.  
Kardas, Saban. 2010. Turkish-Iranian Energy Cooperation in the Shadow of U.S. Sanctions 




Kastner, Scott L. and Saunders, Phillip C. 2012. Is China a Status Quo or Revisionist State? 
Leadership Travel as an Empirical Indicator of Foreign Policy Priorities. 
International Studies Quarterly vol. 56, no. 1: 163-77. 
Katouzian, Homa. 2009. The Persians. Ancient, Medieval and Modern Iran. New Haven and 
London: Yale University Press.  
Katz, Mark. 2002. Russian-Iranian Relations in the Putin Era. Demokratizatsiya Winter 2002. 
 . 2006. Putin, Ahmadinejad and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis. Middle East Policy vol. 
13, no. 4: 125-131. 
  . 2008. Russian-Iranian Relations in the Ahmadinejad Era. Middle East Journal vol. 
62, no. 2: 202-216. 
 . 2010. Russia-Iranian Relations in the Obama Era. Middle East Policy vol. 17, no. 2: 
62-69. 
 . 2012. Russia and Iran. Middle East Policy vol. 19, no. 3: 54-64. 
Katzenstein, Peter. J. (ed.). 1996. The Culture of National Security. Norms and Identity in 
World Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.  
Katzenstein, Peter. J. and Okawara, Nobuo. 2001/02. Japan, Asian-Pacific Security, and the 
Case for Analytical Eclecticism. International Security vol. 26, no. 3: 153-85.  
Katzeinstein, Peter J. and Sil, Rudra. 2004. Rethinking Asian Security: A Case for Analytical 
Eclecticism. In: Rethinking Security in Asia, eds. Suh, J.J., Katzeinstein, Peter J. and 
Carlson, A. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, pp. 1-33.  
Kawulich, Barbara B. 2005. Participant observation as a data collection method. Forum: 
Qualitative Social Research. Accessed 29 July 2012 from http://www.qualitative-
research.net/index.php/fqs/article/view/466/996 
Kaye, Dalia Dassa and Wehrey, Frederic M. 2007. A Nuclear Iran: The Reactions of 
Neighbours. Survival vol. 49, no. 2: 111-128. 
Kazan, Isil. 2005. Turkey: Where Geopolitics still matters. Contemporary Security Policy vol. 
26, no. 3: 588-604.  
Keck, Margaret E. and Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy 
Networks in International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
.HPHQDGH:LOOHPYDQ,UDQ¶V5HODWLRQVZLWK&KLQDDQGWKH:HVW&RRSHUDWLRQDQG
Confrontation in Asia. Clingendael Diplomacy Paper 24. Available at [last accessed 
11 February 2013]: 
http://www.clingendael.nl/publications/2009/20091100_cdsp_paper_kemenade_iran.
pdf. 
 . 2010. China vs. the Western Campaign for Iran Sanctions. The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 33, no. 3: 99-114. 
248 
 
Kent, Ann. 2007. Beyond Compliance: China, international organizations, and global 
security. Stanford: Stanford University Press.  
Keohane, Robert O. 1984. After Hegemony: Cooperation and Discord in the World Political 
Economy. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
.HUU'DYLG7KHQHZ(XUDVLDQLVP7KHULVHRIJHRSROLWLFVLQ5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\
Europe-Asia Studies vol. 47, no. 6: 977-988. 
Keukeleire, Stephan and MacNaughtan, Jennifer. 2008. The Foreign Policy of the European 
Union. Basingstoke: Palgrave MacMillan.  
.KDMHSRXU%LMDQ'HFRGLQJ,UDQ¶VµUHVLVWDQFHHFRQRP\¶Iran Pulse, Al monitor, 24 
February 2014. Available at [last accessed 20 January 2015]: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/02/decoding-resistance-economy-iran.html#. 
Khalaji, Mehdi. 2008. Apocalyptic Politics. On the Rationality of Iranian Policy. Policy Focus 
No. 79. Washington: The Washington Institute for Near East Policy.  
Khan, Saira. 2002. Nuclear Proliferation Dynamics in Protracted Conflict Regions. A 
Comparative Study of South Asia and the Middle East. Aldershot: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited. 
Khanna, Parag. 2008. The Second World: How Emerging Powers Are Redefining Global 
Competition in the Twentieh-century. London: Penguin Books.  
 . 2014. Iran nuclear sanctions: Why the world still does business with Tehran. CNN, 
10 June 2014. Available at [last accessed 4 October 2014]: 
http://edition.cnn.com/2014/06/10/opinion/iran-nuclear-sanctions-parag-khanna/. 
KhlRSNRY$QWRQ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDP- An Unfinished Story. In: Arbatov, Alexei 
(ed.), At the Nuclear Threshold. The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, pp. 30-54.  
Khlopkov, Anton and Lutkova, Anna. 2010. The Bushehr NPP: Why did it take so long? 
Moscow: Center for Energy and Security Studies. Available at [last accessed 12 May 
2015]: http://a-pln.org/sites/default/files/apln-analysis-docs/TheBushehrNPP-
WhyDidItTakeSoLong.pdf. 
Khoo, Nicholas; Smith, Michael L.R. and Shambaugh, David. 2005. Correspondence: China 
Engages Asia? Caveat Lector. International Security, vol. 30: 196±213. 
Kibaro÷lu, Mustafa. 2006. Good for the Shah, Banned for the Mullahs: The West and Iran's 
Quest for Nuclear Power. The Middle East Journal, vol. 60, no. 2: 207-232. 
 ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU$PELWLRQVIURPD+LVWRULFDO3HUVSHFWLYHDQGWKH$WWLWXGHRIWKH
West. Middle Eastern Studies vol. 43, no. 2: 223-245. 
 . 7XUNLVK3HUVSHFWLYHVRQ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDUL]DWLRQEurasiaCritic April 2009: 48-
54.  
 . 2010. The Iranian quagmire: How to move forward. Position: Resuscitate the 
nuclear swap deal. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists: 1-7. 
 . :KDWZHQWZURQJZLWKWKH³=HUR3UREOHPVZLWK1HLJKERUV´'RFWULQH"
Turkish Policy Quarterly vol. 11, no. 3: 85-93. 
 7XUNH\¶V3ODFHLQWKHµ0LVVLOH6KLHOG¶Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern 
Studies vol. 15, no. 2: 223-236. 
Kibaro÷lu, Mustafa & Caglar, Boris. 2008. Implications of a Nuclear Iran for Turkey. Middle 
East Policy vol. 15: 59-80. 
249 
 
Kile, Shannon N. 2005. Europe and Iran: Perspectives on Non-Proliferation. Oxford: Oxford 
University Press.  
King, Gary; Keohane, Robert O. and Verba, Sidney. 1994. Designing Social Inquiry: 
Scientific Inference in Qualitative Research. Princeton: Princeton University Press.  
Kinzer, Stephen. 2008. $OOWKH6KDK¶V0HQ$Q$PHULFDQ&RXSDQGWKH5RRWVRI0LGGOH(DVW
Terror. Hoboken, New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc.  
  . 2010. Reset Middle East. Old Friends and New Alliances: Saudi Arabia, Israel, 
Turkey, Iran. London, New York: I.B.Tauris & Co Ltd. 
Kirichenko, Elina. 2007. The Effectiveness of Nuclear Export Controls. In: Arbatov, Alexei 
(ed.), At the Nuclear Threshold. The Lessons of North Korea and Iran for the 
Nuclear Non-Proliferation Regime. Moscow: Carnegie Endowment for International 
Peace, pp. 68-76.  
Kissinger, Henry A. 2011. On China. New York: The Penguin Press.  
 . 2012. The Future of U.S.-Chinese Relations. Foreign Affairs, vol. 91, no. 2: 44-55. 
Klare, Michael T. and Thomas, Daniel C. (eds.) 1994. World Security: Challenges for a New 
Century. New York: St. Martin's. 
Kleiboer, Marieke. 1996. Understanding Success and Failure of International Mediation. The 
Journal of Conflict Resolution vol. 40, no. 2: 360-389.   
 . 1998. The Multiple Realities of International Mediation. Boulder: Lynne Rienner.  
Klein, Bradley. 1994. Strategic Studies and World Order: The Global Politics of Deterrence. 
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Kolodziej, Edward A. 1992. Renaissance in Security Studies? Caveat Lector! International 
Studies Quarterly vol. 36, no. 4: 421-38. 
Kommersant. 2013. Rossiya i Iran nashli orushie sblishayushego deijstvia (Russia and Iran 
found the weapon that brings them closer together). 11 September 2013. Available at 
[last accessed 17 October 2013]: http://www.kommersant.ru/doc/2276010. 
Kowert, Paul. 1998. Agent versus Structure in the Construction of National Identity. In: 
Kubálková, Vendulka; Onuf, Nicholas and Kowert, Paul (eds.), International 
Relations In A Constructed World. New York & London: M.E. Sharpe. pp. 101-122. 
Kowert, Paul and Legro, Jeffrey. 1996. Norms, Identity and Their Limits: A Theoretical 
Reprise. In: Katzeinstein, Peter J. (ed.), The Culture of National Security. New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 451-97.  
Kozhanov, Nikolai. 2015a. Tshem obernetsya reshenie 5RVVLLQRVWDYO\DWµ,UDQX6-300 
5XVVLD¶V6-300 Sale to Iran: An Expected Surprise). Carnegie Commentary, 15 
April 2015. Available at [last accessed 22 April 2015]: 
http://carnegie.ru/2015/04/15/ru-59780/i73t 
. 2015b. Understanding the Revitalization of Russian-Iranian Relations. Carnegie 




Krahmann, Elke. 2005. American Hegemony or Global Governance? Competing Visions of 
International Security. International Studies Review vol. 7: 531-545. 
Kratochwil, Friedrich. 2001. Constructivism as an Approach to Interdisciplinary Study. In: 
Fierke, Karin M. and Jorgensen, Knud Erik (eds.), Constructing International 
Relations. The next Generation. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, pp. 13-35. 
250 
 
.UDXWKDPPHU&KDUOHVD7KHµGHWHUUHQFHZRUNV¶IDQWDV\Washington Post, 30 August 
2012. Available at [last accessed 31 January 2013]: 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-08-30/opinions/35491847_1_deterrence-
iran-soviet-union. 
 . 2012b. The abandonment. Washington Post, 13 September 2012. Available at [last 
accessed 31 January 2013]: http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2012-09-
13/opinions/35496021_1_nuclear-program-fordow-parchin. 
Krook, Mona Lena and True, Jacqui. 2012. Rethinking the Life Cycles of International 
Norms: The United Nations and the Global Promotion of Gender Equality. European 
Journal of International Relations vol. 18, no. 1: 103-27.  
Kubálková, Vendulka; Onuf, Nicholas and Kowert, Paul. 1998. Constructing Constructivism. 
In: Kubálková, Vendulka; Onuf, Nicholas and Kowert, Paul (eds.), International 
Relations In A Constructed World. New York & London: M.E. Sharpe. pp. 3-24. 
.XFKLQV$QGUHZ	:HLW]5LFKDUG5XVVLD¶V3ODFHLQDQ8QVHWWOHG2UGHU&DOFXODWLRQV
in the Kremlin. In: Schiffer, Michael & Shorr, David (eds.), Powers and Principles. 
International Leadership in a Shrinking World. Plymouth: Lexington Books, pp. 
165-196. 
Kugler, Jacek and Lemke, Douglas. 1996. Parity and War: Evaluations and Extensions of the 
War Ledger. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press.  
Kumaraswamy, P.R. (ed.), 1999. China and the Middle East. The Quest for Influence. New 
Delhi: Sage Publications.  
Kupchan, Charles. 2012. 1R2QH¶V:RUOG7KH:HVWWKH5LVLQJ5HVWDQGWKH&RPLQJ*OREDO
Turn. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
. 2014. The Normative Foundations of Hegemony and The Coming Challenge to Pax 
Americana. Security Studies vol. 23: 219-257.  
Kurki, Milja and Smith, Steve. 2010. International Relations and Social Science. In: Dunne, 
Tim; Kurki, Milja; Smith, Steve (eds.), International Relations Theories. Discipline 
and Diversity. 2nd edition. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 14-35.  
Kuzmicheva, L. 2009. EU Foreign Policies in the Middle East- Iran, Iraq, Syria, Israeli-
Palestinian Peace Process. Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars.  
Kvale, Steinar and Brinkmann, Svend. 2009. Interviews. Learning the Craft of Qualitative 
Research Interviewing. London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: SAGE Publications 
Ltd.  
Laclau, Ernesto. 1988. Metaphor and Social Antagonisms. In: Nelson, Cary and Grossberg, 
Lawrence (eds.), Marxism and the Interpretation of Culture. Basingstoke: Macmillan 
Education, pp. 249-257.   
Laclau, Ernesto and Mouffe, Chantal. 1985. Hegemony and socialist strategy: towards a 
radical democratic politics. London: Verso.  
Laidi, Zaki. 2012. BRICS: Sovereignty power and weakness. International Politics vol. 49: 
614-632.  
. 2014. Towards a post-hegemonic world: The multipolar threat to the multilateral 
order. International Politics vol. 51: 350-365.  
Lampton, David M. 2014. Following the Leader. Ruling China, From Deng Xiaoping to Xi 
Jinping. Berkely: University of California Press.  
Lanteigne, Marc. 2009. Chinese Foreign Policy. An introduction. New York: Routledge.  
Lapid, Yosef. 1989. The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-
Positivist Era. International Studies Quarterly vol. 33, no. 3: 235-254. 
251 
 
Lapid, Yosef and Kratochwil, Friedrich. (eds.). 1996. The Return of Culture and Identity in IR 
Theory. Boulder and London: Lynne Rieder. 
Larrabee, Stephen F. and Lesser, Ian O. 2003. Turkish Foreign Policy in an Age of 
Uncertainty. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation.  
Larrabee, Stephen F. and Nader, Alireza. 2013. Turkish-Iranian Relations in a Changing 
Middle East. Santa Monica: RAND Corporation. 
Lata, Vasily and .KORSNRY$QWRQ,UDQ¶V0LVVLOHDQG1XFOHDU&KDOOHQJH$
Conundrum for Russia. PIR Center report. Available at [last accessed 28 January 
2013]: http://www.pircenter.org/report/lata_05-08-2003.pdf. 
Lavrov, Sergei. 2013. Differences Over Venue Delay Iran Plus Six Meeting ± Lavrov. In: RIA 
Novosti 28 January 2013. Available at [last accessed 30 February 2013]: 
http://en.rian.ru/world/20130128/179085284.html. 
Layne, Christopher. 2006. The Peace of Illusions. American Grand Strategy from 1940 to the 
Present. New York: Cornell University Press. 
Lebow, Richard Ned and Valentino, Benjamin. 2009. Lost in transition: a critical analysis of 
power transition theory. International Relations vol. 23, no. 3: 389-410. 
Lee, Lavina. 2010. US Hegemony and International Legitimacy: Norms, Power and 
Followership in the Wars in Iraq. London: Routledge.  
Ledeen, Michael A. 2007. 7KH,UDQLDQ7LPH%RPE7KH0XOODK=HDORW¶V4XHVWIRU
Destruction1HZ<RUN6W0DUWLQ¶V3UHVV 
Lemke, Douglas. 1997. The continuation of history: power transition theory and the end of the 
cold war. Journal of Peace Research vol. 34, no. 1: 23-26.  
/HSLQJZHOO-RKQ:57KH5XVVLDQPLOLWDU\DQGVHFXULW\SROLF\LQWKHµQHDUDEURDG¶
Survival vol. 36, no. 3: 70-92. 
Lesser, Ian O. 1992. Bridge or Barrier? Turkey and the West After the Cold War. Santa 
Monica: RAND Corporation.  
 . 2005. Turkey, Iran, and Nuclear Risks. In: Henry Sokolski & Patrick Clawson (eds.), 
Getting Ready for a Nuclear-Ready Iran. Carlisle: Strategic Studies Institute of the 
US Army War College (SSI), pp. 89-112. 
Leverett, Flynt. 2013. The Iranian Nuclear Issue, The End of the American Century, and the 
Future of International Order. Penn State Journal of Law & International Affairs vol. 
2, no. 2: 240-271. 
Leverett, Flynt and Leverett, Hillary Mann. 2013. Going to Tehran. Why the United States 
Must Come to Terms with the Islamic Republic of Iran. New York: Metropolitan 
Books. 
Levy, Jack S. 2008. Power transition theory and the rise of China. In: Ross, Robert S. and 
Feng, Zhu (eds.), &KLQD¶VDVFHQWSRZHUVHFXULW\DQGWKHIXWXUHRILQWHUQDWLRQDO
politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, pp. 11-33.  
Lewis, Jonathan Eric. 2006. Replace Turkey as a Strategic Partner? The Middle East 
Quarterly vol. 13, no. 2: 45-52. 
Li, Xiaojun. 2010. Social Rewards and Socialization Effects: An Alternative Explanation for 
WKH0RWLYDWLRQ%HKLQG&KLQD¶V3DUWLFLSDWLRQLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO,QVWLWXWLRQVThe 
Chinese Journal of International Politics vol. 3: 347-377.   
Liang, Wei. 2007. China: Globalization and the Emergence of a New Status Quo Power? 
Asian Perspective vol. 31, no. 4: 125-149.  
Libman, Alexander. 2014. Aussenwirtschaftlicher Protektionismus in Russland. SWP-Aktuell 
69, November.  
252 
 
Lieber, Robert J. 2014. The Rise of the BRICS and American primacy. International Politics 
vol. 51: 137-154. 
/LHEHUVRQ6WDQOH\6PDOO1¶VDQG%LJ&RQFOXVLRQV$Q([DPLQDWLRQRIWKH5HDVRQLQJ
in Comparative Studies Based on a Smal Number of Cases. Social Forces vol. 70, 
no. 2: 307-320. 
 . 1994. More on the Uneasy Case for Using Mill-Type Methods in Small-N 
Comparative Studies. Social Forces vol. 72, no. 4: 1225-1237.   
Lijphart, Arend. 1971. Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method. American Political 
Science Review vol. 65, no. 3: 682-693. 
/LQ&KULVWLQD&KLQD¶V3HUVLDQ*XOI6WUDWHJ\,VUDHODQGD1XFOHDUL]LQJ,UDQ
Jamestown China Brief, vol. 9, no. 21: 5-8. 
Linklater, Andrew. 2008. The Achievements of Critical Theory. In: Smith, Steve; Booth, Ken 
and Zalewski, Marysia (eds.), International theory: positivism & beyond. Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, pp. 279-298. 
/LSSPDQ7KRPDV:6DXGL$UDELD¶V1XFOHDU)XWXUH,Q.DPUDYD0HKUDQHGThe 
Nuclear Question in the Middle East. New York: Columbia University Press, pp. 
105-124.  
/LTXQ=KX&KLQD¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\'HEDWHVChaillot Papers, September 2010. Paris: 
European Union Institute for Security Studies.  
Litwak, Robert. 2008. Living with Ambiguity: Nuclear Deals with Iran and North Korea. 
Survival vol. 50, no. 1: 91-118. 
 . 2012. Outlier States. American Strategies to Change, Contain, or Engage Regimes. 
Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson Center Press.  
 . 2014. ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU&KHVV&DOFXODWLQJ$PHULFDµV0RYHV. Washington, D.C.: 
Woodrow Wilson Center Press.  
Lohmann, Sascha. 2013. Unilaterale US-Sanktionen gegen Iran. SWP-Aktuell vol. 63: 1-8. 
 . 2014. Minenfelder der US-Außenwirtschaftspolitik. Unilaterale Finanzsanktionen im 
Dienst nationaler Sicherheit. SWP-Aktuell vol. 71: 1-8.  
 . 2015. Zwang zur Zusammenarbeit. SWP-Aktuell vol. 54: 1-8. 
Lowe, Robert & Spencer, Claire. (eds.) 2006. Iran, its neighbours, and the regional crises. A 
Middle East Programme Report. The Royal Institute of International Affairs.  
Lucas, Edward. 2008. The New Cold War. How the Kremlin Menaces both Russia and the 
West. London: Bloomsburg Publishing Inc.  
Lukyanov, Fyodor. 2014. Russia plays the Iran card. Al-monitor, 17 January 2014 [last 




Lutz, Meris. 2010. Turkey: Ankara adds Israel to list of strategic security threats. Free 
Republic November 1. Accessed 20 April 2013. 
http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/2619192/posts. 
Lynch, Daniel. 2009. Chinese Thinking on the Future of International Relations: Realism as 
the Ti, Rationalism as the Yong? The China Quarterly vol. 197: 87-107.  
0DF)DUODQH61HLO7KHµ5¶LQ%5,&VLV5XVVLDDQHPHUJLQJSRZHU"International 
Affairs vol. 82, no. 1: 41-57.  
253 
 
Mahbubani, Kishore. 2013. The Great Convergence. Asia, the West, and the Logic of One 
World. New York: Public Affairs.  
Mahoney, James. 2000. Strategies of Causal Inference in Small-N Analysis. Sociological 
Methods & Research vol. 28, no. 4: 387-424.  
Mahoney, James and Goertz, Gary. 2006. A Tale of Two Cultures: Contrasting Quantitative 
and Qualitative Research. Political Analysis vol. 14, no. 3: 227-249.  
Mahoney, James and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich. 2003. Comparative Historical Analysis in the 
Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Maloney, Suzanne. 2010. Sanctioning Iran: If Only It Were So Simple. The Washington 
Quarterly vol. 33, no. 1: 131-147. 
Mango, Andrew. 1994. Turkey: The Challenge of a New Role. New York: Praeger.  
Mankoff, Jeffrey. 2009. Russian Foreign Policy. The Return of Great Power Politics. 
Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Inc..  
March, James G. & Olsen, Johan P. 1984. The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors 
in Politics Life. American Political Science Review vol. 78: 734-49.  
 . 1989. Rediscovering Institutions: The Organizational Basis of Politics. New York: 
Free Press.  
 . 1995. Democratic Governance. New York: Free Press.  
 . 1998. The Institutional Dynamics of International Political Orders. International 
Organization vol. 52, no. 4: 943-969. 
Markey, Daniel S. 2014. Reorienting U.S. Pakistan Strategy. From Af-Pak to Asia. Council 
Special Report No. 28, January 2014. New York: Council on Foreign Relations.  
Mastney, Vojtech and Nation, Craig R. 1996. Turkey Between East and West. New 
Challenges for a Rising Regional Power. Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press.  
Mazza, Michael. 2011. China-Iran Ties: Assessment and Implications for U.S. Policy. AEI 
Iran Tracker, 21 April 2011. Available at [last accessed 11 February 2013]: 
http://www.irantracker.org/analysis/michael-mazza-china-iran-ties-assessment-and-
implications-us-policy-april-21-2011. 
McCain, John. 2012. In: John McCain On Iran Situation: A 'Train Wreck' . The Huffington 
Post 9 August 2012. Available at [last accessed 11 January 2013]: 
http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2012/09/08/john-mccain-on-iran-
situa_n_1867422.html. 
McCain, Morris. 1987. Thinking South: Soviet Strategic Interests in Iran, Afghanistan and 
Pakistan. In: Malik, Hafeez (ed.), Soviet-American Relations with Pakistan, Iran and 
Afghanistan. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp. 39-53.  
Mearsheimer, John J. and Walt, Stephen M. 2007. The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy. 
London: Penguin Books Ltd.   
0HGHLURV(YDQ6DQG)UDYHO7D\ORU0&KLQD¶VQHZGLSORPDF\Foreign Affairs vol. 
82, no. 6: 22-35.  
Medvedev, Dmitry. ,Q5XVVLD¶V0HGYHGHYFULWLFL]HV,UDQVDQFWLRQVUHSRUWReuters, 17 




Meier, Oliver. 2014. In der Krise liegt die Chance. Der Atomkonflikt mit Iran und seine 
Auswirkungen auf das nukleare Nicht-verbreitungsregime. SWP research paper, 
October 2014. Berlin: SWP.  
254 
 
Meier, Oliver and Pieper, Moritz. 2015. Russland und der Atomkonflikt mit Iran. 
Kontinuitäten und Brüchen bei den russischen Interessen im Zeichen der 
Ukrainekrise. SWP-Aktuell 38, April 2015: 1-4.  
Melman, Yossi and Jafandar, Meir. 2007. The Nuclear Sphinx of Tehran: Mahmoud 
Admadinejad and the State of Iran. New York: Carroll & Graf.  
Mendras, Marie. 2012. Russian Politics: The Paradox of a Weak State. London: C. Hurst & 
Co.  
Mercan, Murat. 2009. Turkish Foreign Policy and Iran. Turkish Policy Quarterly vol. 8: 13-
19. 
0LODQL0RKVHQ,UDQ¶V*XOI3ROLF\)URP,GHDOLVPDQG&RQIURQWDWLRQWR3UDJPDWLVP
and Moderation. In: al-Suwaidi, Jamal S. (ed.), Iran and the Gulf: A Search for 
Stability. Abu Dhabi: The Emirates Center for Strategic Studies and Research, pp. 
83-98.  
 . :K\7HKUDQ:RQ¶W$EDQGRQ$VVDGLVPThe Washington Quarterly vol. 36, 
no. 4: 79-93.  
Mironova, Irina. 2015. Rossia i Iran na mirovykh gasovykh rynkakh: budushaya konkurentsia 
neisbeshna? (Russia and Iran on the global gas market: is future competition 
inevitable?) PIR Center Analysis. Index Besopasnosti Nr. 112 (Security Index), 
available at [last accessed 28 May 2015]: 
http://pircenter.org/media/content/files/13/14301343850.pdf. 
Mizin, Victor. 2004. The Russia-Iran Nuclear Connection and U.S. Policy Options. Middle 
East Review of International Affairs vol. 8, no. 1:  71-85.  
Moore, C.W. 2003. The Mediation process. San Franciso: Josse-Bass.  
Morton, Adam David. 2007. Unraveling Gramsci. Hegemony and passive revolution in the 
global economy. London: Pluto Press.  
Mowle, Thomas S. 2007. Transatlantic Relations and Turkey. In: Guney, Nursin Atesoglu 
(ed.), Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey. Hampshire: Ashgate 
Publishing Limited, pp. 19-32. 
Morris, Ian. 2011. Why The West Rules ± For Now. The patterns of history and what they 
reveal about the future. London: Profile Books.  
0RVKLU]DGHK+RPHLUD'LVFXUVLYH)RXQGDWLRQVRI,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3ROLF\Security 
Dialogue vol. 38, no. 4: 521-543.  
Muravchik, Joshua. 2006. Bomb Iran. Los Angeles Times, 19 November 2006. Available at 
[last accessed 11 January 2013]: http://www.latimes.com/news/la-op-
muravchik19nov19,0,4699035.story.  
Murray, Donette. 2010. US Foreign Policy and Iran. American-Iranian relations since the 
Islamic revolution. Abingdon: Routledge.  
Müller, Harald. 2001. International Relations as Communicative Action. In: Fierke, Karin M. 
and Jorgensen, Knud Erik (eds.), Constructing International Relations. The next 
Generation. New York: M.E. Sharpe, Inc, pp. 160-178. 
 . 2013. Introduction. Where It All Began. In: Müller, Harald and  Carmen. 2013. 
Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics. In: Müller, Harald and Wunderlich, 
Carmen (eds.), Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, 
and Justice. Athens: University of Georgia Press, pp. 1-19. 
Nadelmann, Ethan A. 1990. Global Prohibition Regimes: The Evolution of Norms in 
International Society. International Organization vol. 44, no. 4: 479-526. 
255 
 
Nadkarni, Vidya. 2013. Introduction. In: Nadkarni, Vidya and Noonan, Norma (eds.), 
Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective. The Political and Economic Rise 
of the BRIC Countries. London: Bloomsbury Academic, pp.1-21.  
1DVU9DOLDQG7DNH\K5D\7KH&RVWVRI&RQWDLQLQJ,UDQ:DVKLQJWRQ¶V0LVJXLGHG
New Middle East Policy. Foreign Affairs vol. 87, no. 1: 85-94. 
Nau, Henry R. 2002. At Home Abroad: Identity and Power in American Foreign Policy. 
Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.  
 . 2012. Introduction: Domestic Voices of Aspiring Powers. In: Nau, Henry R. and 
Ollapally, Deepa M. (eds.), Worldviews of Aspiring Powers. Domestic Foreign 
Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 3-35.  
Naumkin, Vitaly. 1998. The Russian-Iranian Relations: Present status and prospects for the 
future. Journal of International Affairs, vol. 3, no. 1. 
Neal, Andrew W. 2013. Empiricism without positivism. King Lear and critical security 
studies. In: Salter, Mark B. and Mutlu, Can E. (eds.), Research Methods in Critical 
Security Studies. New York: Routledge, pp. 42-45.  
Nel, Philip. 2010. Redistribution and recognition: what emerging regional powers want. 
Review of International Studies vol. 36: 951-974.  
Neuman, L. W. 2006. Social research methods: Qualitative and quantitative approaches 
(Sixth ed.). Boston: Pearson Education Inc. 
Nincic, Miroslav. 2005. Renegade Regimes: Confronting Deviant Behavior in World Politics. 
New York: Columbia University Press.  
Nizameddin, Talal. 2013. 3XWLQ¶V1HZ2UGHULQWKH0LGGOH(DVW. London: Hurst.  
Nourafchan, Nicolo. 2010. Constructive Partner or Menacing Threat? AnalyziQJ&KLQD¶V5ROH
in the Iranian Nuclear Program. Asian Security vol. 6, no. 1: 28-50. 
Oborne, Peter and Morrison, David. 2013. A dangerous delusion. Why the West is wrong 
about nuclear Iran. London: Elliot and Thompson Limited.  
Odendahl, Teresa and Shaw, Aileen M. 2002. Interviewing Elites. In: Gubrium, Jaber F. and 
Holstein, James A. (eds.), Handbook of Interview Research. Context & Method. 
Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 299-316. 
2÷X]OX7DULN. 0LGGOH(DVWHUQL]DWLRQRI7XUNH\¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\'RHV7XUNH\
Dissociate from the West? Turkish Studies vol. 9, no. 1: 3-20.  
Oktav, Ozden Zeynep. 2007. The Limits of Change: Turkey, Iran, Syria. In: Guney, Nursin 
Atesoglu (ed.), Contentious Issues of Security and the Future of Turkey. Hampshire: 
Ashgate Publishing Limited, pp. 85-98.  
Olson, Robert W. 2001. 7XUNH\¶V5HODWLRQVZLWK,UDQ6\ULDDQG5XVVLD-2000. The 
Kurdish and Islamist Questions. Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers.  
 . 2004. Turkey-Iran Relations 1979-2004: Revolution, Ideology, War, Coups, and 
Geopolitics. Costa Mesa: Mazda Publishers.  
Onuf, Nicholas G. 1989. World of Our Making: Rules and Rule in Social Theory and 
International Relations. Columbia: University of South Carolina Press 
 . &RQVWUXFWLYLVP$8VHU¶V0DQXDO,Q.XEiONRYi9HQGXOND2QXI1LFKRODV
and Kowert, Paul (eds.), International Relations In A Constructed World. New York 
& London: M.E. Sharpe. pp. 58-78. 
Organski, A.F.K. 1968. World politics. New York: Knopf. 
256 
 
Organski, A.F.K. and Kugler, Jacek. 1980. The War Ledger. Chicago: University of Chicago 
Press. 
Orlov, Vladimir. 2010. Iranskiy Faktor v Opredelenii Vneshnepoliticheskikh Prioritetov 
Rossii (7KH,UDQLDQ)DFWRULQ'HWHUPLQLQJ5XVVLD¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\Priorities). 
Moscow: PIR-Center. 
Orlov, Vladimir A. and Vinnikov, Alexander. 2005. The Great Guessing Game: Russia and 
the Iranian Nuclear Issue. The Washington Quarterly vol. 28, no. 2: 49-66. 
Ozkan, Mehmet. 2010. Turkey-Brazil involvement in Iranian Nuclear Issue: What is the Big 
Deal? Strategic Analysis vol. 35, no. 1: 26-30. 
Önis, Ziya. 2009. Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign Policy Activism in 
Turkey During the AKP Era. Turkish Studies vol. 10, no. 1: 7-24. 
 . 0XOWLSOH)DFHVRIWKH³1HZ´7XUNLVK)RUHLJQ3ROLF\8QGHUO\LQJ'\QDPLFV
and a Critique. Insight Turkey vol. 13, no. 1: 47-65.  
Önis, Ziya and <ÕOPD]ùXKQD]. 2009. Between Europeanization and Euro-Asianism: Foreign 
Policy Activism in Turkey during the AKP Era. Turkish Studies vol. 10: 7-24.  
Özcan, Nihat Ali and Özdamar, Özgür. 2010. Uneasy Neighbors: Turkish-Iranian Relations 
since the 1979 Islamic Revolution. Middle East Policy vol. 17, no. 3: 101-117.  
Pamuk, Humeyra. 2014. Turkey's president approves law tightening grip on judiciary. 
Reuters, 26 February 2014. Available at [last accessed 15 April 2015]: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/02/26/uk-turkey-judiciary-
idUKBREA1P1MF20140226. 
Parasiliti, Andrew. 2009. Iran: Diplomacy and Deterrence. Survival vol. 51, no. 5: 5-13.  
 . 2012. Closing the Deal with Iran. Survival vol. 54, no. 4: 33-42. 
Parker, John W. 2009. Persian Dreams. Moscow and Tehran Since the Fall of the Shah. 
Washington, D.C.: Potomac Books, Inc.  
Parsi, Trita. 2007. Treacherous Alliance. The Secret Dealings of Israel, Iran, and the U.S. 
New Haven and London: Yale University Press.  
 . 2012. $6LQJOH5ROORIWKH'LFH2EDPD¶V'LSORPDF\ZLWK,UDQ. Yale: Yale 
University Press. 
Patrick, Stewart. 2010. Irresponsible stakeholders: the difficulty of integrating rising powers. 
Foreign Affairs vol. 89, no 6: 44-53. 
Patrikarakos, David. 2012. Nuclear Iran. The Birth of an Atomic State. London, New York: 
I.B. Tauris. 
Pedatzur, R. 2007. The Iranian Nuclear Threat and the Israeli Options. Contemporary Security 
Policy vol. 28, no. 3: 513-541. 
Peimani, Hooman. 2006. The EU and US Policies towards Iran: Common Objectives and 
Different Approaches, in: Bono, Giovanna (ed.), The Impact of 9/11 on European 
Foreign and Security Policy. Brussels: VUB Press, chap. 10.  
Peräkylä, Anssi. 2004. Conversation Analysis. In: Seale, Clive; Gobo, Giampietro; Gubrium, 
Faber F. and Silverman, David (eds)., Qualitative Research Practice. London: SAGE 
Publications Ltd, pp. 165-79.   
Perkovich, George and Ülgen, Sinan (eds). 2015a. 7XUNH\¶V1XFOHDU)XWXUH. Washington: 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
 . E:K\7XUNH\:RQ¶W*R1XFOHDUProject Syndicate, 10 April 2015. Available 







Perthes, Volker. 2008. Iran ± Eine politische Herausforderung. Frankfurt am Main: 
Suhrkamp.  
 . 2009. Iran als außenpolitischer Akteur. In: Aus Politik und Zeitgeschichte 49/2009. 
Bonn: Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung. 
 . $PELWLRQDQG)HDU,UDQ¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\DQG1XFOHDU3URJUDPPHSurvival 
vol. 52, no. 3: 95-114. 
Phillips, Lauren M. 2008. International Relations in 2030: The Transformative Power of 
Large Developing Countries. Discussion Paper 3/2008. Bonn: Deutsches Institut für 
Entwicklungspolitik. 
Pieper, Moritz. 2013a. Turkish Foreign Policy toward the Iranian Nuclear Programme: In 
Search of a New Middle East Order after the Arab Spring and the Syrian Civil War. 
Alternatives- Turkish Journal of International Relations vol. 11, no. 3: 81-92. 
 . E'UDJRQ'DQFHRU3DQGD7URW"&KLQD¶V3RVLWLRQWRZDUGVWKH,UDQLDQ1XFOHDU
Programme and Its Perception of EU Unilateral Iran Sanctions. European Journal of 
East Asian Studies vol. 12: 295-316. 
 . 2014a. The Syrian Civil War: Regional Ramifications, Global Disharmony and 
Hegemonic Decline. Singapore Middle East Papers, 6 May 2014, vol. 6, no 1: 1-14.  
 . 2014b. Chinese, Russian, and Turkish Policies in the Iranian Nuclear Dossier: 
Between Resistance to Hegemony and Hegemonic Accommodation. Asian Journal 
of Peacebuilding vol. 2, no. 1: 17-36.  
 . 2015a. Turkey's Iran Policy: A Case of Dual Strategic Hedging. In: Kanat, Kilic 
Bugra; Tekelioglu, Ahmet Selim and Ustun, Kadir (eds.), Politics and Foreign 
Policy in Turkey. Historical and Contemporary Perspectives. Ankara: SETA 
Publications, pp. 107-130. 
 . 2015b. Between the democratisation of international relations and status quo 
SROLWLFV5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\WRZDUGVWKH,UDQLDQQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH
International Politics (forthcoming).  
Pijl, Kees van der. 1984. The making of an Atlantic Ruling Class. London: Verso.  
Pilat, Joseph F. 2007. The end of the NPT regime? International Affairs vol. 83, no. 3: 469-
482. 
Pirseyedi, Bobi. 2013. Arms Control and Iranian Foreign Policy. Diplomacy of discontent. 
Abingdon: Routledge.  
Platt, Jennifer. 2002. The History of the Interview. In: Gubrium, Jaber F. and Holstein, James 
A. (eds.), Handbook of Interview Research. Context & Method. Thousand Oaks, 
London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 33-53.  
Pollack, Kenneth M. 2004. The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America. New 
York: Random House.  
Portela, Clara. 2010. European Union Sanctions and Foreign Policy: When and Why Do They 
Work? London: Routledge.  
Posch, Walter. 2013. The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism. The Making of Iranian 




Potter, William C. and Mukhatzhanova, Gaukhar. 2012. Nuclear Politics and the Non-aligned 
Movement: Principles vs. Pragmatism. Abingdon, New York: 2012.  
Raas, Whitney and Long, Austin. 2007. Osirak Redux? Assessing Israeli Capabilities to 
Destroy Iranian Nuclear Facilities. International Security vol. 31, no. 4: 7-33. 
Ragin, Charles C. 1987. The Comparative Method: Moving Beyond Qualitative and 
Quantitative Strategies. Berkey and Los Angeles: University of California Press.  
Ram, Haggai. 2009. Iranophobia. The Logic of an Israeli Obsession. Stanford: Stanford 
University Press. 
Ramazani, Rouhollah K. 1990. Soviet Foreign Policy and Revolutionary Iran: Continuity and 
Change. In: Malik, Hafeez (ed.), Domestic Determinants of Soviet Foreign Policy 
towards South Asia and the Middle East. Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp. 225-
241.  
Ramo, Joshua Cooper. 2010. How To Think About China. Times, 19 April 2010.  
Raphaeli, Nimrod. 2010. Turkey Throws Iran a Safety Net. Inquiry & Analysis Series Report 
No. 629, 3 August 2010: Middle East Media Research Institute. 
Rapkin, David P. and Braaten, Dan. 2009. Conceptualising hegemonic legitimacy. Review of 
International Studies vol. 35: 113-149.  
Rapley, Tim. 2004. Interviews. In: Seale, Clive; Gobo, Giampietro; Gubrium, Faber F. and 
Silverman, David (eds.), Qualitative Research Practice. London: SAGE Publications 
Ltd, pp. 15-33.   
5D]DQL(KVDQDQG,GULV1RU$]L]DQ,UDQ¶V&KLQD3ROLF\$1HJOHFWHG7KHPHLQWKH
Field of Iranian Foreign Policy Studies. 16 May 2012, Institute for Middle East 
Strategic Studies (in Tehran). Available at [last accessed 11 February 2013]: 
http://en.merc.ir/default.aspx?tabid=98&ArticleId=429. 
Reus-6PLW&KULVWLDQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQV,UUHOHYDQW"'RQ¶W%ODPH7KHRU\
Millenium vol. 40, no. 3: 525-540. 
 . 2014. Power, Legitimacy, and Order. The Chinese Journal of International Politics 
vol. 7, no. 3: 341-359.  
Reuters. 2010. Russia warns U.S. against unilateral Iran sanctions. Reuters, 13 May 2010 [last 
accessed 19 October 2013]: http://www.reuters.com/article/2010/05/13/us-russia-
iran-us-idUSTRE64C1SU20100513. 
 . 2013. China criticizes new EU sanctions on Iran, calls for talks. Reuters. Available 
at [last accessed 14 February 2013]: http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/10/16/us-
iran-nuclear-eu-china-idUSBRE89F0BF20121016. 
 . 2015a. China warns over Iran talks failure, urges compromise. Reuters, 1 April 
2015. Available at [last accessed 3 April 2015]: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2015/04/01/us-iran-nuclear-china-
idUSKBN0MS3FC20150401. 
 . 2015b. USA für Sanktionsautomatismus in Atomabkommen mit Iran. Reuters 
Germany, 6 May 2015. Available at [last accessed 22 June 2015]: 
http://de.reuters.com/article/worldNews/idDEKBN0NR0AW20150506. 
 . 2015c. Iran's Rouhani vows to back Syria 'until the end of the road'. Reuters, 2 June 





Ria Novosti. 2007. Moscow to press U.S. for sanction cancellation ± FM Lavrov. Ria Novosti 
3 February 2007. Available at [last accessed 17 October 2013]:  
http://en.ria.ru/world/20070203/60158997.html. 
Richter, Paul and Mostaghim, Ramin. 2015. Iran shifts on key issue in nuclear talks as 




Organization 54, vol. 1: 1-39. 
Robins, Philip. 1991. Turkey and the Middle East. The Royal Institute of International 
Affairs, London: Pinter Publishers.  
 . 7XUNH\¶VµGRXEOHJUDYLW\¶SUHGLFDPHQWWKHIRUHLJQSROLF\RIDQHZO\DFWLYLVW
power. International Affairs vol. 89, no. 2: 381-397.  
Rohlfing, Ingo. 2012. Case Studies and Causal Inference: An Integrative Framework. 
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Ross, Robert S. 1997. Beijing as a Conservative Power. Foreign Affairs vol. 76, no. 2: 33-44.  
 . 2006. Balance of Power Politics and the Rise of China: Accommodation and 
Balancing in East Asia. Security Studies vol. 15: 355±395. 
Ross, Robert S. and Zhu, Feng (eds.) 2008. &KLQD¶V$VFHQW3RZHU6HFXULW\DQGWKH)XWXUH
of International Politics. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press. 
Ruggie, John Gerard. 1998. What Makes the World Hang Together? Neo-utilitarianism and 
the Social Constructivist Challenge. International Organization vol. 52, no. 4: 855-
885. 
Rubenfeld, Samuel. 2011. US Threatens Sanctions On Chinese Banks Over Iran. The Wall 
Street Journal, 28 September 2011. Available at [last accessed 13 October 2014]: 
http://blogs.wsj.com/corruption-currents/2011/09/28/us-threatens-sanctions-on-
chinese-banks-over-iran/. 
Rubinstein, Alvin Z. 1982. Soviet Policy toward Turkey, Iran, and Afghanistan. New York: 
Praeger Publishers.  
Rupert, Mark. 1995. Producing Hegemony: The politics of mass production and American 
global power. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
 . 2000. Ideologies of Globalization. London: Routledge.  
Ruzzene, Attilia. 2012. Drawing Lessons from Case Studies by Enhancing Comparability. 
Philosophy of the Social Sciences vol. 42, no. 1: 99-120. 
Rynning, Sten and Ringsmore, Jens. 2008. Why Are Revisionist States Revisionist? Reviving 
Classical Realism as an Approach to Understanding International Change. 
International Politics vol. 45, no. 1: 19-39.  
Sandholtz, Wayne. 2007. Prohibiting Plunder: How Norms Change. New York: Oxford 
University Press.  
 . 2009. Explaining International Norm Change. In: Sandholtz, Wayne and Stiles, 
Kendall (eds.), International Norms and Cycles of Change. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 1-26.  
Sanger, David E.; Glanz, James and Becker, Jo. 2010. Around the World, Distress over Iran. 





Sanger, David. 2014. Role for Russia Gives Iran Talks a Possible Boost. International New 
York Times, 3 November 2014. Available at [last accessed 17 November 2014]: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/04/world/middleeast/role-for-russia-gives-iran-
nuclear-talks-a-possible-boost.html?_r=0. 
Santos Vieria de Jesus, Diego. 2011. Building Trust and Flexibility: A Brazilian View of the 
Fuel Swap with Iran. The Washington Quarterly vol. 34: 61-75. 
Sakwa, Richard. 2002. Russian Politics and Society. 3th edition. London and New York: 
Routledge. 
 . 2011. Russia and Europe: Whose Society? Journal of European Integration vol. 33, 
no. 2: 197-214. 
 . 7KHSUREOHPRIµWKHLQWHUQDWLRQDO¶LQ5XVVLDQLGHQWLW\IRUPDWLRQInternational 
Politics vol. 49, no. 4: 449-465. 
 . 2015. Frontline Ukraine. Crisis in the Borderlands. London: I.B. Tauris.  
Sanaei, Mehdi. 2013. Iran-Russia: Maintaining bilateral relations. Valdai Club, 15 April 2013. 
Available at [last accessed 16 October 2013]: http://valdaiclub.com/asia/57440.html. 
Sarukhanyan, Sevak. 2006. Rossia i Iran. 10 let yaderonovo cotrudnitshestva (Noravank. 
Russia and Iran. 10 years of nuclear cooperation). Yerevan: Nautshno-obrasovatelnij 
fond.   
Sasnal, Patrycja and Secrieru, Stanislav. 2015. Out of the Comfort Zone: Russia and the 
Nuclear Deal with Iran. Strategic File, No. 11 (74), June 2015. Warsaw: The Polish 
Institute of International Affairs.  
Sauer, Tom. 2007. Coercive Diplomacy by the EU: The Iranian Nuclear Weapons Crisis. 
Third World Quarterly vol. 28, no. 3: 613-633.  
 . 2015. The EU as a Coercive Diplomatic Actor? The EU-3 Initiative towards Iran. In: 
Koops, Joachim A. and Macaj, Gjovalin (eds.), The European Union as a Diplomatic 
Actor. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.  
Saul, Jonathan and Hafezi, Parisa. 2014. Exclusive: Iran, Russia negotiating big oil-for-goods 
deal. Reuters, 10 January 2014. Available at [last accessed 20 October 2014]: 
http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/01/10/us-iran-russia-oil-
idUSBREA090DK20140110. 
Saunders, Paul J. 2015. Russia eyes Iranian arms deal after Lausanne. Al-monitor, 6 April 
2015. Available at [last accessed 18 April 2015]: http://www.al-
monitor.com/pulse/originals/2015/04/iran-s300-sale.html. 
Savin-Baden, Maggi and Major, Claire Howell. 2013. Qualitative Research. The essential 
guide to theory and practice. London and New York: Routledge.  
Savolainen, Jukka. 1994. The Rationality of Drawing Big Conclusions Based on Small 
6DPSOHV,Q'HIHQVHRI0LOO¶V0HWKRGVSocial Forces vol. 72, no. 4: 1217-1224.  
Savyon, Ayelet. 2010. The Iran-Turkey-Brazil Nuclear Agreement: In the Iranian Perception, 
a New World Order Led By Iran. Middle East Media Research Institute: Inquiry & 
Analysis Series Report No.610, May 17, 2010. 
Sazhin, Vladimir. 2010. What kind of Iran is advantageous to Russia? Vremya Novostey 5 
March 2010. 
Schiffer, Michael and Shorr, David. 2009. Powers and Principles. International Leadership 
in a Shrinking World. Plymouth: Lexington Books.  
Schmitt, Carl. 1993. Politische Theologie: Vier Kapitel zur Lehre der Souveränität. Berlin: 
Duncker & Humblot.  
261 
 
Scholl-Latour, Peter. 2001. Allahs Schatten über Atatürk. Die Türkei in der Zerreißprobe. 
München: Goldmann.   
Schwarzmantel, John. 2009. Introduction. Gramsci in his time and in ours. In: McNally, 
Mark and Schwarzmantel, John (eds), Gramsci and global politics: hegemony and 
resistance. London and New York: Routledge, pp. 1-16. 
Schweller, Randall L. 1999. Managing the Rise of Great Powers: History and Theory. In: 
Johnston, Alastair Ian and Ross, Robert S. (eds), Engaging China. New York: 
Routledge, pp. 1-31.  
Scott, J. 1990. Domination and the Art of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts. New Haven: Yale 
University Press.  
Seawright, Jason and Gerring, John. 2008. Case Selection Techniques in Case Study 
Research. A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options. Political Research 
Quarterly vol. 61, no. 2: 294-308.  
Senn, Martin. 2009. Wolves in the Woods. The Rogue State Concept from a Constructivist 
Perspective. Baden-Baden: Nomos.  
Serfaty, Simon. 2011. Moving into a Post-Western World. The Washington Quarterly vol. 
34, no. 2: 7-23. 
 . 2012/13. The West in a World Recast. Survival vol. 54, no. 6: 29-40. 
Service, Robert. 2000. Lenin. A Biography. London: Pan Books.  
 . 2007. Comrades. Communism: A World History. London: Pan Books.  
Seufert, Günter. 2012. Foreign Policy and Self-Image. The Societal Basis of Strategy Shifts in 
Turkey. SWP Research Paper. September 2012. Berlin: Stiftung Wissenschaft und 
Politik. German Institute for International and Security Affairs. 
 . 2014. Türkei. In: Mächte und Milizen. Wer sind die wichtigsten Akteure des Nahen 
Ostens? Und was wollen sie? Internationale Politik Nr. 5, September/Oktober 2014, 
pp. 32-34. 
Shakleina, Tatiana. 2013. Russia in the New Distribution of Power. In: Nadkarni, Vidya and 
Noonan, Norma (eds.), Emerging Powers in a Comparative Perspective. The 
Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries. London: Bloomsbury 
Academic, pp. 163-187. 
Shambaugh, David. 2000. Sino-American Strategic Relations: From Partners to Competition. 
Survival vol. 42, no. 1: 97-115.  
 . 2002&KLQD¶VLQWHUQDWLRQDOUHODWLRQVWKLQN-tanks: evolving structure and process. 
The China Quarterly vol. 171: 575-596. 
 . 2004/05. China Engages Asia: Reshaping the Regional Order. International 
Security vol. 29: 64±99. 
 . ,QWURGXFWLRQ7KH5LVHRI&KLQDDQG$VLD¶V1HZ'\QDPLFV,Q6KDPEDXJK
David (ed.), Power Shift: China and $VLD¶V1HZ'\QDPLFV. Berkeley, CA: 
University of California Press, pp. 1-22. 
Shambaugh, David and Xiao, Ren. 2012. China: The Conflicted Rising Power. In: Nau, Henry 
R. and Ollapally, Deepa M. (eds.), Worldviews of Aspiring Powers. Domestic 
Foreign Policy Debates in China, India, Iran, Japan, and Russia. New York: Oxford 
University Press, pp. 36-72.  
Shanghai Institute of International Studies. 2013. Shanghai Institutes for International Studies. 
Annual Report.  
262 
 
Shaw, Martin. 1993. There Is No Such Thing as Society: Beyond Individualism and Statism 
in International Security Studies. Review of International Studies vol. 19: 159-75. 
6KHQ'LQJOL,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU$PELWLRQV7HVW&KLQD¶V:LVGRPWashington Quarterly 
vol. 29, No. 2: 56±57. 
6KHQQD-RKQ&7KH&DVH$JDLQVWWKH&DVH$JDLQVW,UDQ5HJLRQDOLVPDVWKH:HVW¶V
Last Frontier. The Middle East Journal vol. 64, no. 3: 341-363. 
Sheridan, Mary Beth. 2009. Russia Not Budging on Iran Sanctions. The Washington Post, 14 
October 2009. Available at [last accessed 19 October 2013]: 
http://articles.washingtonpost.com/2009-10-14/world/36795978_1_sanctions-and-
threats-secret-nuclear-facility-iranian-nuclear-program. 
Shirk, Susan L. 2007. &KLQD)UDJLOH6XSHUSRZHU+RZ&KLQD¶V,QWHUQDO3ROLWLFV&RXOG
Derail Its Peaceful Rise. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
Shuy, Roger W. 2002. In-Person versus Telephone Interviewing. In: Gubrium, Jaber F. and 
Holstein, James A. (eds.), Handbook of Interview Research. Context & Method. 
Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 537-55. 
Sick, Gary. 1985. All )DOO'RZQ$PHULFD¶V)DWHIXO(QFRXQWHUZLWK,UDQ. London: I.B. 
Tauris.  
Sicker, Martin. 1988. The Bear and the Lion. Soviet Imperialism and Iran. New York: 
Praeger Publishers.  
Sinha, Radha. 2003. Sino-American Relations. Mutual Paranoia. Basingstoke: Palgrave 
Macmillan.  
Slavin, Barbara. 2011. Iran Turns to China, Barter to Survive Sanctions. Atlantic Council: 
Iran Task Force. Available at [last accessed 11 February 2013]: 
http://www.acus.org/files/publication_pdfs/403/111011_ACUS_IranChina.PDF 
Sohn, Lous B.; Juras, Kristen Gustafson; Noyes, John E. and Franckx, Erik. 2010. Law of the 
Sea in a nutshell. 2nd edition. St. Paul: West Nutshell Series.  
Solingen, Etel. 2012a. Domestic Sources of Nuclear Behavior in the Middle East. In: 
Kamrava, Mehran (ed.), The Nuclear Question in the Middle East. New York: 
Columbia University Press, pp. 21-48.  
 . 2012b. Ten dilemmas in nonproliferation statecraft. In: Etel Solingen (ed.), 
Sanctions, Statecraft, and Nuclear Proliferation. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Sotero, Paulo and Armijo, Leslie Elliott. 2007. Brazil: To Be Or Not To Be a Bric? Asian 
Perspective vol. 31, no. 4: 43-70.  
Sørensen, Georg. 2008. The Case for Combining Material Forces and Ideas in the Study of 
IR. European Journal of International Relations vol. 14, no. 5: 5-32. 
Sperling, James and Kirchner, Emil. 1995. Introduction: The Changing Definition of 
Security. In: Kirchner, Emil; Bluth, Christoph and Sperling, James (eds.), The 
Future of European Security. Brookfield, Vt.: Dartmouth Pub, pp. 1-22. 
6WHLQ$DURQ8QGHUVWDQGLQJ7XUNH\¶V3RVLWLRQRQWKH,UDQLDQ1XFOHDU3URJUDPWMD 
Junction, 12 January 2012. Available at [last accessed 23 January 2013]: 
http://wmdjunction.com/120112_turkey_iran_nuclear.htm. 
Stokes, Doug. 2005. $PHULFD¶V2WKHU:DU7HUURUL]LQJ&RORPELD. London/ New York: Zed 
Books.  
Stiles, Kendall and Sandholtz, Wayne. 2009. Cycles of International Norm Change. In: 
Sandholtz, Wayne and Stiles, Kendall (eds.), International Norms and Cycles of 
Change. New York: Oxford University Press.  
263 
 
Stürmer, Michael. 2008. Putin and the Rise of Russia. London: Orion Books Ltd.  
Subacchi, Paola. 2008. New power centres and new power brokers: are they shaping a new 
economic order? International Affairs vol. 84, no. 3: 485-498.  
Sullivan, Peter. 2014. Kerry: Congress doesn't need initial vote on Iran. The Hill, 22 October 




6ZDLQH0LFKDHO'%HLMLQJ¶V7LJKWURSH:DONRQ,UDQChina Leadership Monitor nr. 
33, 28 June 2010. Available at [last accessed 11 February 2013]: 
http://www.hoover.org/publications/china-leadership-monitor/article/35436. 
 . 2011. $PHULFD¶V&KDOOHQJH : Engaging a Rising China in the Twenty-First Century. 
Washington, DC : Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
Takeyh, Ray and Maloney, Suzanne. 2011. The self-limiting success of Iran sanctions. 
International Affairs vol. 87, no. 6: 1287-1312. 
Talmadge, Caitlin. 2008. Closing Time. Assessing the Iranian Threat to the Strait of Hormuz. 
International Security vol. 33, no. 1: 82-117.  
Tansey, Oisin. 2007. Process tracing and elite interviewing: a case for non-probability 
sampling. Political Science and Politics vol. 40, no. 4: 765-772. 
Tarock, Adam. 2006. ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPHDQGWKH:HVWThird World Quarterly vol. 
27, no. 4: 645-664. 
Tertrais, Bruno. 2006. The Iranian Nuclear Crisis. In: Daalder, I., Gnesotto, N. & Gordon, P. 
(eds.), Crescent of Crisis. US-European Security for the Greater Middle East. 
Washington: Brookings Institution, pp. 25-40.  
 . 2010/11. A Nuclear Iran and NATO. Survival vol. 52, no. 6 : 45-62.  
7DúSÕQDUgPHU7XUNH\¶V6WUDWHJLF9LVLRQDQG6\ULDThe Washington Quarterly vol. 
35: 127-140.  
7DúSÕQDUgPHU0DOOH\5REHUWDQG6DGMDGSRXU.DULP6\PSRVLXP,VUDHO7XUNH\
and Iran in the Changing Arab World. Middle East Policy, vol. 19, no. 1: 1-24. 
Tessman, Brock and Wolfe, Wojtek. 2011. Great Powers and Strategic Hedging: The Case of 
Chinese Energy Security Strategy. International Studies Review vol. 13: 214-240. 
Therme, Clément. 2012a. Iran and Israel: From Aggressive Rhetoric to Military 
Confrontation? $FWXHOOHVGHO¶,IUL, 13 October 2012. Available at [last accessed 23 
January 2013]: http://www.ifri.org/?page=contribution-detail&id=7350. 
 . 2012b. Les Relations entre Téhéran et Moscou depuis 1979. Paris: Les Presses 
Universitaires de France.  
 . 2013. Iran and Russia: A Tactical Entente. In: Cronin, Stephanie (ed.), Iranian-
Russian Encounters. Empires and Revolutions since 1800. New York: Routledge, 
pp. 377-400.  
Therme, Clément and Khazaneh, Reza. 2012. Le développement du programme nucléaire 
iranien: entre aspects techniques et questions politiques. Maghreb-Machrek nr. 212: 
103-118. 
Thies, Cameron G. 2002. A Pragmatic Guide to Qualitative Historical Analysis in the Study 
of International Relations. International Studies Perspectives vol. 3: 351-372. 
Timmermann, Kenneth R. 2006. Countdown to Crisis: The Coming Nuclear Showdown with 
Iran. New York: Three Rivers.  
264 
 
7RGD\¶V=DPDQProsecutor illegally sought opinion of government on evidence in 
Iran-backed terror probe. Article, 10 February 2015. Available at [last accessed 15 
April 2015]: http://mobile.todayszaman.com/national_prosecutor-illegally-sought-
opinion-of-government-on-evidence-in-iran-backed-terror-probe_372288.html. 
Toukan, Abdullah and Cordesman, Anthony H. 2010. 2SWLRQVLQ'HDOLQJZLWK,UDQ¶V
Nuclear Program. Washington: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 
March 2010. 
Towns, Ann E. 2012. Norms and Social Hierarchies: Understanding International Policy 
DiIIXVLRQµIURP%HORZ¶International Organization vol. 66, no. 2: 179-209. 
Trenin, Dmitri. 2001. The End of Eurasia. Russia on the Border Between Geopolitics and 
Globalization. Washington, D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
 . 2006. Russia Leaves the West. Foreign Affairs vol. 85, no. 4: 87-96. 
 . 2009. Reaction to: .XFKLQV$QGUHZ	:HLW]5LFKDUG5XVVLD¶V3ODFHLQDQ
Unsettled Order: Calculations in the Kremlin. In: Schiffer, Michael & Shorr, David 
(eds.), Powers and Principles. International Leadership in a Shrinking World. 
Plymouth: Lexington Books, pp. 188-192. 
 . 2012. Russia and the West need to rediscover each other in 2013. Carnegie article, 
24 December 2012. Available at [last accessed 21 January 2014]: 
http://carnegieeurope.eu/publications/?fa=50468. 
 . 3XWLQ¶V6\ULDQ*DPH3ODQWorld Today vol. 69, no. 8/9, 7 October 2013. 
Available at [last accessed 18 October 2013]: 
http://www.chathamhouse.org/publications/twt/archive/view/194529. 
 . 2014. Russia: Sealing the New Quality of Its Foreign Policy. Eurasia Outlook, 20 
January 2014. Available at [last accessed 22 February 2014]: 
http://carnegie.ru/eurasiaoutlook/?fa=54244 
Trenin, Dmitri and Malashenko, Alexey. 2010. Iran. A View From Moscow. Washington, 
D.C.: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
Tsukimori, Osamu and Goswami, Manash. 2013. Exclusive: Iran oil exports to plunge, no 




LQ5XVVLD¶VIRUHLJQSROLF\Geopolitics vol. 12, no. 3: 375-399. 
Udum, ùHEQHP7XUNH\¶VQRQ-nuclear weapons status. A theoretical assessment. 
Journal on Science and World Affairs, vol. 3, no. 2: 51-59.  
 7UNL\H¶QLQøUDQ Nükleer Meselesindeki Siyaseti (Turkish Policy on the 
Iranian Nuclear Issue). Ortado÷uz Analiz vol. 43, no. 4: 98-107. 
Ülgen, Sinan. 7KH6HFXULW\'LPHQVLRQRI7XUNH\¶V1XFOHDU3URJUDP1XFOHDU
Diplomacy and Non-Proliferation Policies. Center for Economic and Foreign Policy 
Studies (EDAM), 9 December 2011. Available at [last accessed 23 January 2013]: 
http://www.edam.org.tr/EDAMNukleer/section5.pdf 
 . 2012. Turkey and the Bomb. February 2012. Washington: Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace.   
hVWQ.DGLU7XUNH\¶V,UDQ3ROLF\%HWZHHQ'LSORPDF\DQG6DQFWLRQVInsight Turkey 
vol. 12, no. 3: 19-26. 
9DKHGL(OLDV7XUNH\5HPRYHV,UDQIURP³5HG%RRN´7KUHDW/LVWIran Review, 5 





Van Kersbergen, Kees and Verbeek, Bertjan. 2007. The Politics of International Norms. 
European Journal of International Relations vol. 13, no. 2: 217-38. 
Varasteh, Manshour. 1991. The Soviet Union and Iran, 1979-89. In: Ehteshami, Anoushira 
and Varasteh, Manshour (eds.), Iran and the International Community. London: 
Routledge, pp. 46-59.  
Vassiliev, Alexei. 1993. Rossia na blishnem i srednem vostoke: Ot messianstva k 
pragmatismu (Russia in the Near and Middle East: From Messianism to 
Pragmatism). Moscow: Russian Academy of Sciences.   
Venter, Al J. 2005. ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU2SWLRQ7HKUDQ¶V4XHVWIRUWKH$WRP%RPE. Havertown, 
PA: Casemate.  
Vezirgiannidou, Sevasti-Eleni. 2013. The United States and rising powers in a post-
hegemonic global order. International Affairs vol. 89, no. 3: 635-651. 
Waever, Ole; Buzan, Barry; Kelstrup, Morten and Lemaitre, Pierre. 1993. Identity, 
Migration, and the New Security Agenda in Europe. New York: St. Martin's. 
Walker, Henry A. and Cohen, Bernard P. 1985. Scope Statements ± Imperatives for 
Evaluating Theory. American Sociological Review vol. 50, no. 3: 288-301.   
Walt, Stephen M. 1991. The Renaissance of Security Studies. International Studies Quarterly 
vol. 35, no. 2: 211-39. 
Wang, Jisi. 2005. Searching for Stability With America. Foreign Affairs vol. 84, no. 5: 39-
48. 
 . &KLQD¶VVHDUFKIRUDJUDQGVWUDWHJ\DULVLQJJUHDWSRZHUILQGVLWVZD\
Foreign Affairs vol. 90, no. 3: 68-79.  
Warren, Carol A. B. 2002. In: Gubrium, Jaber F. and Holstein, James A. (eds.), Handbook of 
Interview Research. Context & Method. Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi: SAGE 
Publications Ltd. 
Warrick, Joby. 2013. Iran opens nuclear talks ZLWKSURSRVDOVWRHQGµXQQHFHVVDU\FULVLV¶RYHU
its atomic program. The Washington Post, 15 October 2013. Available at [last 
accessed 7 December 2014]: http://www.washingtonpost.com/world/national-
security/iran-opens-nuclear-talks-with-proposals-to-end-unnecessary-crisis-over-its-
atomic-program/2013/10/15/7c937e38-3597-11e3-be86-6aeaa439845b_story.html. 
Weiss, Robert S. 1994. Learning from Strangers. The Art and Method of Qualitative 
Interview Studies. New York: Free Press. 
Welch, David E. 1992. The Organizational Process and Bureaucratic Politics Paradigms: 
Retrospect and Prospect. International Security vol. 17, no. 2: 112-146. 
 . 1993. Justice and the Genesis of War. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.  
Wendt, Alexander. 1987. The Agent-Structure Problem in International Relations Theory.  
International Organization vol. 41, no. 3: 335-70. 
 . 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press.  
Westphal, Kirsten. 2014. Russland und Europas Energiemix. Krim-Krise: Abhängigkeiten 
und Strategien. Energlobe, 20 March 2014. Available at [last accessed 13 April 
2015]: http://energlobe.de/politik/krim-krise-abhaengigkeiten-und-strategien-
russland-und-europas-energiemix.  




Widmaier, Wesley W. and Park, Susan. 2012. Differences beyond Theory: Structural, 
Strategic and Sentimental Approaches to Normative Change. International Studies 
Perspective vol. 13, no. 2: 123-34. 
Wiener, Antje. 2008. The Invisible Constitution of Politics: Contested Norms and 
International Encounters. Cambridge, New York: Cambridge University Press.  
. 2009. Enacting meaning-in-use: qualitative research on norms and international 
relations. Review of International Studies vol. 35: 175-193.  
Wilkinson, David. 1999. Unipolarity without Hegemony. International Studies Review vol. 1, 
no. 2: 141-172. 
Williams, Michael C. 2003. Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and International 
Politics. International Studies Quarterly vol. 47: 511-531. 
Williams, Paul D. (ed.) 2008. Security Studies. An introduction. New York: Routledge.  
Wilson, Andrew. 2014. Ukraine Crisis. What it means for the West. New Haven and London: 
Yale University Press.  
Winrow, Gareth M. 2003. Pivotal State or Energy Supplicant? Domestic Structure, External 
Actors, and Turkish Policy in the Caucasus. Middle East Journal vol. 57, no. 1: 76-
92. 
Wodak, Ruth. 2004. Critical Discourse Analysis. In: Seale, Clive; Gobo, Giampietro; 
Gubrium, Faber F. and Silverman, David (eds.), Qualitative Research Practice. 
London: SAGE Publications Ltd, pp. 197-213.   
Worth, Owen. 2009. Beyond world order and transnational classes. The (re)application of 
Gramsci in global politics. In: McNally, Mark and Schwarzmantel, John (eds), 
Gramsci and global politics: hegemony and resistance. London and New York: 
Routledge, pp. 19-31.  
. 2011. Recasting Gramsci in international politics. Review of International Studies 
vol. 37: 373-392.  
:X;LQER)RXU&RQWUDGLFWLRQV&RQVWUDLQLQJ&KLQD¶V)RUHLJQ3ROLF\%HKDYLRU
Journal of Contemporary China vol. 10, no. 27: 293-301. 
Wunderlich, Carmen. 2013. Theoretical Approaches in Norm Dynamics. In: Müller, Harald 
and Wunderlich, Carmen (eds.), Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: 
Interests, Conflicts, and Justice. Athens: University of Georgia Press, pp. 20-47.  
$µ5RJXH¶*RQH1RUP(QWUHSUHQHXULDO",UDQZLWKLQWKH1XFOHDU
Nonproliferation Regime. In: Wagner, Wolfgang; Werner, Wouter and Onderco, 
Michal (eds)., 'HYLDQFHLQ,QWHUQDWLRQDO5HODWLRQVµ5RJXH6WDWHV¶DQG,QWHUQDWLRQDO
Security. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, pp. 83-104.  
Wunderlich, Carmen; Hellmann, Andrea; Müller, Daniel; Reuter, Judith; and Schmidt, Hans-
Joachim. 2013. Non-Aligned Reformers and Revolutionaries: Egypt, South Africa, 
Iran and North Korea. In: Müller, Harald and  Carmen. 2013. Theoretical 
Approaches in Norm Dynamics. In: Müller, Harald and Wunderlich, Carmen (eds.), 
Norm Dynamics in Multilateral Arms Control: Interests, Conflicts, and Justice. 
Athens: University of Georgia Press, pp. 246-95. 
Wuthnow, Joel. 2010. China and Cooperation in UN Security Council Deliberations. The 
Chinese Journal of International Politics vol. 3: 55-77. 
Yan, Xuetong. 2006. The Rise of China and its Power Status. The Chinese Journal of 
International Politics vol. 1: 5-33. 
267 
 
Yapp, Malcolm E. 1982. Soviet Relations with the Countries of the Northern Tier. In: 
Dawisha, Adeed and Dawisha, Karen (eds.), The Soviet Union in the Middle East. 
Policies and Perspectives. London: Heinemann Educational Books Ltd., pp. 24-44.  
. 1983. The Soviet Union and Iran since 1978. In: Kauppi, Mark V. and Nation, Craig 
R. (eds.), The Soviet Union and the Middle East in the 1980s. Opportunities, 
Constraints, and Dilemmas. Lexington, Massachusetts: Heath and Company, pp. 
227-246.  
Yew, Yvonne. 2011. Diplomacy and Nuclear Non-Proliferation: Navigating the Non-Aligned 
Movement. Discussion Paper 7, 2011. Cambridge, MA: Belfer Center for Science 
and International Affairs.  
Yodfat, Aryeh Y. 1984. The Soviet Union and Revolutionary Iran. Beckenham: Croom Helm.  
Young, Michael D. and Schafer, Mark. 1998. Is There Method in Our Madness? Ways of 
Assessing Cognition in International Relations. Mershon International Studies 
Review vol. 42: 63-96.  
Yuan, Jing-Dong. 2006. China and the Iranian Nuclear Crisis. Jamestown Foundation: China 
Brief, 1 February 2006. Available at [last accessed 24 January 2013]: 
http://www.jamestown.org/programs/chinabrief/single/?tx_ttnews%5Btt_news%5D
=3926&tx_ttnews%5BbackPid%5D=196&no_cache=1. 
YurWDHY9ODGLPLU%XVKHKU5XVVLDDQG,UDQ¶V0HHWLQJSRLQWRussian Analytica vol. 4, 
April 2005: 99-114.  
Zak, Chen. 2002. ,UDQ¶V1XFOHDU3ROLF\DQGWKH,$($$Q(YDOXDWLRQRI3URJUDP. 
Washington: Carnegie Endowment for International Peace.  
Zakaria, Fareed. 2011. The Post-American World. And the Rise of the Rest. London: Penguin 
Books.  
Zaum, Dominik. 2007. The Sovereignty Paradox. The Norms and Politics of International 
Statebuilding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.  
=KDQJ-LDQ7KHGRPHVWLFVRXUFHVRI&KLQD¶VPRUHDVVHUWLYHIRUHLJQSROLF\
International Politics vol. 51, no. 3: 390-397.  
Zhang, Yonjing. 1998. China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond. 
1HZ<RUN6W0DUWLQ¶V3UHVV 
=KDR6XLVKHQJ&KLQD¶V3UDJPDWLF1DWLRQDOLVP,V,W0DQDJHDEOH"The Washington 
Quarterly, vol. 29, no. 1: 131-144. 
. 2008. China-U.S. Relations Transformed. Perspectives and strategic interactions. 
New York: Routledge.  
. 2013. China: A Reluctant Global Power in the Search for its Rightful Place. In: 
Nadkarni, Vidya and Noonan, Norma (eds.), Emerging Powers in a Comparative 
Perspective. The Political and Economic Rise of the BRIC Countries. London: 
Bloomsbury Academic, pp.101-130.  
Zhao, Tong. 2015. China and the Iranian Nuclear Negotiations. Carnegie Article, 2 February 
2015. Available at [last accessed 24 March 2015]: 
http://carnegietsinghua.org/2015/02/02/china-and-iranian-nuclear-negotiations 
Ziegler, Charles E. 2012. Conceptualizing sovereignty in Russian foreign policy: Realist and 






Annex I Ȃ List of interviews Conducted 
 
Interview # Date & location Description of the interviewee 
1 Brussels, 13 March 2013 
 
EEAS official, nuclear 
negotiation team 
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EEAS official, nuclear 
negotiation team 
8 Ankara, 14 June 2013 Prof. Dr. Meliha ůƚƵŶŦƔŦŬ, 
Department of International 
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deputy directorate general for 
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department of International 
Relations, Hacettepe University 
11 Ankara, 18 June 2013 Prof. Dr. Hüseyin ĂŒĐŦ, expert 
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of department for International 
Relations, Middle East 
Technical University 
 
12 Berlin, 25 June 2013 Dr. Walter Posch, senior Iran 
analyst, Stiftung Wissenschaft 
und Politik (German Institute 
for International and Security 
Affairs) 
 
13 Brussels, 23 July 2013 Dr. Ian Lesser, Executive 
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14 via Skype, 25 July 2013 Dr. Ali Vaez, senior Iran analyst, 
International Crisis Group 
 
15 Vienna, 13 August 2013 high-ranking German diplomat 
to the IAEA 
16 over phone, 23 August 2013 high-ranking Turkish diplomat 
to the IAEA 
 
17 Istanbul, 7 September 2013 Soli Özel, foreign news editor at 
Habertürk and lecturer at Kadir 
Has University 
 
18 Ankara, 9 September 2013 ƌ ?bĞďŶĞŵhĚƵŵ ?ĞǆƉĞƌƚŝŶ
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Turkish foreign policy, 
department of International 
Relations, Hacettepe University 
19 Ankara, 9 September 2013 Gökhan Bacik, Dean of the 
faculty of administration, IPEK 
University 
 
20 Moscow, 12 November 2013 Russian foreign ministry official, 




21 Moscow, 13 November 2013 Dr. Alexei Arbatov, head of the 
Center for International 
Security at IMEMO 
 
22 Moscow, 15 November 2013 Dr. Andrey Baklitsky, PIR 
ĞŶƚĞƌ ?Ɛ “ZƵƐƐŝĂĂŶĚEƵĐůĞĂƌ
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Coordinator, PIR Center 
23 Washington, 10 February 2014 Dr. Trita Parsi, president of the 
National Iranian American 
Council 
 
24 Washington, 14 February 2014 Turkish diplomat to the US  
 
25 email correspondence, 13 
March 2014 
Russian diplomat, permanent 
mission of the Russian 
federation to the EU 
26 Brussels, 18 March 2014 Belgian foreign ministry official  
 
27 Brussels, 20 March 2014 Russian diplomat, permanent 
mission of the Russian 
federation to the EU  
28 Brussels, 20 March 2014 EEAS official, nuclear 
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29 Shanghai, 16 April 2014 Dr. Jin Liangxian, senior 
research fellow, Shanghai 
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Institute for International 
Studies (SIIS) 
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31 Beijing, 22 April 2014 former Chinese diplomat at the 
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Institute for International 
Studies (CIIS) 
32 Beijing, 22 April 2014 Dr. Wu Riqiang, associate 
professor, Renmin University 
 
33 Beijing, 24 April 2014 Dr. Li Xin, associate professor, 
China Institutes of 
contemporary international 
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34 Beijing, 24 April 2014 Dr. Liao Baizhi, Deputy director 
Institute of Middle East Studies, 




35 Beijing, 25 April 2014 Dr. Zhang Lihua, resident 
scholar at Carnegie Beijing and 
director of the China-EU 
relations research center, 
Tsinghua University 
36 Beijing, 6 May 2014 Dr. Su Hao, China Foreign 
Affairs University 
37 London, 11 July 2014 Dr. Mark Fitzpatrick, 
International Institute for 
Strategic Studies (IISS) 
 
38 London, 11 July 2014 Dr. Dina Esfandiary, 
International Institute for 
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44 Washington, 30 October 2014 US State Department official 
45 Washington, 31 October 2014 Chinese diplomat to the US 
46 Washington, 31 October 2014 Dr. Robert Litwak, Vice 
President for Scholars and 
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Academic Relations and 
Director, International Security 
Studies, Woodrow Wilson 
Center 
47 Washington, 31 October 2014 Russian diplomat to the US 
48 Berlin, 14 November 2014 Dr. Oliver Meier, Stiftung 
Wissenschaft und Politik 
(German Institute for 
International and Security 
Affairs),  
49 Berlin, 14 November 2014 German foreign ministry 
official, Iran desk 
50 Brussels, 29 January 2015 NATO official, WMD Non-
Proliferation Centre, Emerging 
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51 Brussels, 6 February 2015 Belgian foreign ministry official, 
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52 Brussels, 24 February 2015 EEAS official, Security Policy 
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nuclear negotiation team 
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53 email correspondence, 12 
March 2015 
Russian diplomat, permanent 
mission of the Russian 
federation to the EU 
54 Berlin, 18 March 2015 Dr. Mark Hibbs, senior 
associate, Carnegie Endowment 
for International Peace, Nuclear 
Policy Program 
55 Brussels, 19 March 2015 Russian diplomat, permanent 
mission of the Russian 













Annex IIȂ List of attended conferences and events 
  
# Date Event title and organisers 
 
1 25 September 
2012, Brussels 
After Osama: Pakistan, Afghanistan and the Future of Regional 
Stability  
 
Guest lecture by Imtiaz Gul, Executive Director, Centre for Research and 
Security Studies (CRSS), Islamabad, organised by the European Peace and 
Security Studies Programme (EPSS) 




Panel discussion with Rosemary Foot, Oxford University, and Xie Tao, 
professor at the Beijing Foreign Studies University, organised by the 
Brussels Institute for Contemporary China Studies (BICCS) in cooperation 
with the Flanders-China Chamber of Commerce (FCCC) and the EU-Asia 
Centre 




Panel discussion with Prof. Dr. Michael Pettis, Tsinghua University, 
Steven Vanackere, Belgian Vice Premier and Minister of Finance, Marc 
van Sande, Vice President Umicore and Chinese Ambassador Liao 
Liqiang, organised by the Brussels Institute for Contemporary China 
Studies (BICCS) in cooperation with the Flanders-China Chamber of 
Commerce (FCCC) and the EU-Asia Centre 
4 16 October 
2012, Brussels 
Syria: The price of the Russian-Chinese veto: Is the West hiding 
behind the red curtain? 
 
Discussion with Ekaterina Chirkova, Policy advisor at the South Asia 
Democratic Forum, organised by the EuroArab Forum 
5 12 November 
2012, Brussels 
Reshaping Economic Security in Southwest Asia and the Middle East 
 
9th Annual Worldwide Security Conference organised by the EastWest 
Institute 




Lecture by Ambassador Zhong Jianhua, Chinese Special Envoy to Africa, 






Dimensions beyond the ENP 
 
International Conference organised by the College of Europe 
8 27 November 
2012, Brussels 
State-building, failing states, and the engines of change in the Middle 
East 
 
Guest lecture at BSIS by Dr. Rolf Schwarz, Political Officer in the Middle 
East and North Africa Section of the Political Affairs and Security Policy 
Division of NATO Headquarters 
9 28 November 
2012, Brussels 
7DFNOLQJ&KLQD¶VHFRQRPLFDQGVRFLDOFKDllenges: A Role for Europe? 
 
European Policy summit organised by the Friends of Europe, featuring, i.a. 
Zhang Lirong, Chargé d'Affaires at the Mission of the People's Republic of 
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China to the EU 
10 10 December 
2012, Brussels 
The World in 2020 ± Can NATO Protect us? The Challenges to 
Critical Infrastructure 
 
Conference organised by NATO and the Carnegie Endowment for 
International Peace 
11 12 December 
2012, Brussels 
Breaking the Turkey-EU Stalemate 
 
Panel discussion with Marc Pierini, former EU ambassador to Turkey and 
visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe, Sinan Ülgen, Turkish foreign policy 
analyst and visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe and Selim Yenel, 
Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Turkey to the EU, organised by 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 




Lecture by Selim Yenel, Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Turkey 
to the European Union, organised by The Centre for EU Studies, the Ghent 
Institute for International Studies and the Centre for Turkish Studies at 
Ghent University 
 
13 23 January 
2013, Brussels 
Poor Record, Positive Solutions: Advancing Press Freedom in Turkey 
 
Panel discussion with Ahmet Insel, managing editor and columnist; Marc 
Pierini, visiting scholar at Carnegie Europe; and Marietje Schaake, MEP, 
organised by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 




A Proposal for the Resolution of the Iranian Nuclear Standoff 
 
Panel discussion with Fatemeh Haghighatjoo, Seyed Aliakbar Mousavi, 
both former Iranian parliamentarians; George Perkovich, Vice President 
for Studies and Director of the Nuclear Policy Program at the Carnegie 
Endowment; Jim Walsh, International Security expert and Research 
Associate at MIT; and Robert Litwak, Vice President for Scholars and 
Academic Relations and Director, International Security Studies, organised 
by the Woodrow Wilson Center 
 
15 31 January 
2013, Brussels 
$VLD¶V)XWXUH± Challenges and Opportunities 
 
Keynote Speech by Rajat M. Nag, Managing Director of the Asian 
Development Bank (ADB), organised by the European Institute for Asian 
Studies  
16 4 February 
2013, Berlin 
,UDQ¶V5ROHLQ Regional Peace and Balance of Power  
 
Speech by and Discussion with Dr. Ali Akbar Salehi, Foreign Minister of 
Iran; organised by the German Council on Foreign Relations 
17 14 February 
2013, Brussels 
China and Globalization  
 
Panel discussion with Wang Haifeng, expert at the Institute of Foreign 
Economics of the NDRC; and Gustaaf Geeraerts, director of BICCS, 
organised by the Brussels Institute for Contemporary China Studies 
(BICCS) 
18 21 February 
2013, Brussels 
Emerging Global Security Threats & Future Challenges ± The NATO 
Perspective 
 
Talk by Dr. Jamie Shea, NATO Deputy Assistant Secretary General for 
Emerging Security Challenges, organised by Vesalius College in 
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association with the Institute for European Studies  
19 26 February 
2013, Brussels 
Russia and the European Union: Difficult Partners- Chances for a 
New Start 
 
International high-level Conference under Chatham House Rules organised 
by the Friedrich-Ebert Foundation  
20 27 February 
2013, Brussels 
$QHZHUDLQ7XUNH\¶VGHPRFUDF\- Settling the Kurdish issue?  
 
3DQHOGLVFXVVLRQµ7XUNLVK,QVLJKWV3ROLF\'LDORJXH¶ZLWK.HPDO%XUND\
president of the Rights and Freedoms Party (HAK-PAR), Mehmet Özcan, 
president of the Ankara Strategy Institute and Taylan Cicek, vice president 
RI<NVHNRYD,QGXVWULDOLVWV¶DQG%XVLQHVVPHQ¶V$VVRFLDWLRQ<h6,$'
organised by the European Policy Centre 
21 5 March 2013, 
Brussels 
Consolidating the Revolutions in North Africa ± Rethinking Policies 
towards the Region 
 
Experts roundtable under Chatham House Rules with, i.a., Helga Schmid, 
EEAS Deputy Secretary General, organised by the Friedrich-Ebert 
Foundation  
22 7 March 2013, 
Brussels 
3rd NATO-Asia Security Dialogue 
 
International conference under Chatham House Rules organised by the 
Konrad-Adenauer Foundation and NATO Public Diplomacy Division 
23 8 April 2013, 
Brussels 
Turkey and the New Regional Balance in the Middle East 
 
Expert roundtable with Rouzbeh Parsi, research fellow at the EU Institute 
IRU6HFXULW\6WXGLHV6DYDú*HQoSURIHVVRUDW)DWLK8QLYHUVLW\,VWDQEXO
Reza Marashi, research director at the National Iranian-American Council, 
and Marc Otte, Belgian foreign ministry official, organised by the 
European Policy Center 
24 8 April 2013, 
Brussels 
,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUVWDQG-off and its regional role 
 
Panel discussion with Trita Parsi, president of the National Iranian 
American Council; Walter Posch, senior associate at the German Institute 
for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Thierry Coville, researcher at 
WKH,QVWLWXWGH5HODWLRQV,QWHUQDWLRQDOHVHW6WUDWpJLTXHV,5,66DYDú*HQo
professor at Fatih University Istanbul; and Mohammad Ali Shabani, 
doctoral researcher at SOAS; organised by the European Policy Center. 
25 15-16 April 
2013, Moscow 
Russia and the EU: The Future of Europe and Eurasia  
 
International academic conference organised by the University of 
Birmingham and the Institute for Europe at the Russian Academy of 
Sciences 






Middle East Technical University, Ankara; organised by the Centre for 
Turkish Studies, Ghent University and the Yunus Emre Turkish Cultural 
Centre Brussels 




Speech by Selim Yenel, Ambassador and Permanent Delegate of Turkey to 
the European Union; organised by the Royal Higher Institute for Defence 





Panel discussion with MEP Alexander Graf Lambsdorff, ALDE rapporteur 
for accession negotiations with Turkey; and Gökce Percinoglu, Project 
Coordinator Foreign Policy Programme TESEV; organised by the 
Friedrich-Nauman Foundation 
29 03 June 2013, 
Brussels 
The Third World, Global Islam and Pragmatism: The Making of 
Iranian Foreign Policy 
 
([SHUW([FKDQJHZLWK-RKQ2¶5RXUNH(($6KHDGRIGHSDUWPHQWIRUWKH
Arabic peninsula, Iran and Iraq; Dr. Walter Posch, senior associate at the 
German Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP); Daniel 
Keohane, FRIDE Director of strategic relations; organised by the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs 
30 5-8 June 2013, 
Tartu 
1st European Workshop in International Studies  
 
International academic conference organised by the University of Tartu 
and the Estonian Foreign Policy Institute 
31 12-14 June 
2013, Ankara 
Turkey in the World 
 
12th International academic conference on International Relations 
organised by the Middle East Technical University (METU) Ankara 
32 9 July 2013, 
Brussels 
A U.S. Perspective on the Middle East 
 
Panel discussion with Ian Lesser, Executive Director of the Brussels office 
of the German Marshall Fund of the United States, and Robert Wexler, 
president of the S. Daniel Abraham Center for Middle East Peace, 
organised by the German Marshall Fund of the United States 
33 11 July 2013, 
Brussels 
EXACT conference: Europe in the World 
 
.H\QRWHVSHHFKE\'DYLG2¶6XOOLYDQ(($6&KLHI2SHUDWLQJOfficer 
34 2-4 September 
2013, Leeds 
Exchanging ideas on Europe 
 
43rd Annual Conference organised by the University Association for 
Contemporary European Studies (UACES) 
35 19 September 
2013, Brussels 
The Future of NATO 
 
Keynote speech by Anders Fogh Rasmussen, NATO Secretary General 
36 9-12 October 
2013, New 
Orleans 
2013 Annual Meeting 
 
47th International Conference of the Middle East Studies Association  
37 26 November 
2013, Brussels 
EU-China Relations: The Next Ten Years 
 
Europe-China Forum, organised by the Friends of Europe  
38 14 January 
2014, Brussels 
+pJpPRQLHHW/HDGHUVKLS3RXUTXRLO¶2FFLGHQWGRPLQH-t-il le monde ? 
 
Panel discussion with Nicolas Pascual de la Parte, Ambassador, Spanish 
permanent representation to the EU, Marquis Olivier de Trazegnies, 
historian, and José Ignacio Benavides, former Spanish ambassador , 
organised by the institute européen des relations internationales 
 
39 3 February 
2014, Brussels 
Atoms for Peace in the 21st century 
 
Keynote speech by Yukiya Amano, Secretary General of the International 
Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), organised by the Egmont Institute 
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Young Scholars on Turkey 
4th academic conference, organised by the SETA Foundation 
 
41 10 March 2014, 
Brussels 
Tehran Calling: A New Direction for Iran?  
 
Debate with Cornelius Adebahr and Dr. Rouzbeh Parsi, organised by the 
Carnegie Endowment for International Peace 
42 26-29 March 
2014, Toronto 
Spaces and Places. Geopolitics in an Era of Globalization 
 
InternatioQDO6WXGLHV$VVRFLDWLRQ¶V,6$th Annual Convention 
43 18-22 August 
2014, Ankara 
Fourth World Congress for Middle Eastern Studies (WOCMES) 
 
International academic conference organised by the Middle East Technical 
University (METU) 





Seventh Annual ASMEA Conference. Searching for Balance in the 
Middle East and Africa 
 
International academic conference organised by the Association for the 
Study of the Middle East and Africa 
45 15 January 
2015, Brussels 
Policy Spotlight debate with Turkish prime minister Ahmet Davutoglu 
 
3ROLF\6SRWOLJKWRQ³7XUNH\(8DQGDFKDQJLQJZRUOGPHHWLQJ
FKDOOHQJHVWRJHWKHU´organised by Friends of Europe 
46 2-3 February 
2015,  
Brussels 
EU-Russia relations: Which way forward?  
 
Jean Monnet conference organised by the University of Kent, in the 
framework of a Jean Monnet Multilateral Research Group between the 
University of Kent, Carleton University, Canada, St. Petersburg State 
University, and Johannes Gutenberg University Mainz.  
47 27 February 
2015, Brussels  
After Minsk 2: What options for European policies towards Russia?  
 
Expert roundtable with Prof. Markus Kaim, SWP, and Vincent Degert, 
EEAS, organised by the German Institute for International and Security 
Affairs (SWP) 
48 17 March 2015, 
Berlin 
7KHWDONVRQ,UDQ¶VQXFOHDUSURJUDPPH,PSOLFDWLRQVIRUUHJLRQDO
security and non-proliferation 
 
Expert roundtable under Chatham House rules, organised by the German 
Institute for International and Security Affairs (SWP) and the Heinrich-
Böll Foundation 
49 16-17 April 
2015, Plsen 
Russia: Identities and Foreign Policies 
 
International academic Conference at the University of West Bohemia, 
Plsen, Czech Republic  
50 21 April 2015, 
Brussels  
NATO and Missile Defence: Where next?  
 
Expert seminar under Chatham House rules, jointly organised by the 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation, the German Institute for International and 
Security Affairs (SWP), and the Center for International and Security 
Studies at the University of Maryland (CISSM)  
51 14 May 2015, 
London 
Are European Union Sanctions Effective?  
 
Workshop under Chatham House rules, organised by the Department of 
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International Relations of the London School of Economics 
 
 
